Iran’s Nuclear Program was Significantly Damaged But Not “Obliterated”
Much of the public debate in the United States over the June 2025 military attack on Iran has focused on whether the Iranian nuclear program was “obliterated.” While this question risks obscuring broader strategic evaluations of the merits of the strike, the preponderance of evidence suggests the nuclear program was significantly damaged, but far from completely destroyed.
This is not a surprise: there has never been a military solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, short of a massive military intervention involving a coerced regime change and long-term occupation that leaders from both political parties say they want to avoid.
Three Iranian nuclear sites at Fordow, Isfahan and Natanz were hit hard, particularly by U.S. B-2 stealth bombers and submarine-launched cruise missiles targeting the Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22, 2025. Iran’s active enrichment at Natanz and Fordow, which had been under IAEA monitoring, has been halted and it is likely that all of the centrifuges installed at those facilities have been destroyed or rendered inoperable for the foreseeable future. Likewise, capabilities at Isfahan, including a facility capable of converting uranium gas to metal, were destroyed.
However, key elements of Iran’s program remain intact, including Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to near weapons grade. U.S. and Israeli officials suggest this stockpile is still buried and inaccessible. However, Iran had indicated that it may have moved this stockpile prior to strikes. Even if it did not, it is also plausible that Iran would be able to clear out rubble and access stockpiles that may have been buried in the strikes.
This stockpile could be enough for ten nuclear warheads if enriched further to weapons grade. Moreover, Iran retains centrifuge parts and machines that were positioned outside of the main declared nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow. Along with this core infrastructure, Iran maintained other nuclear-related facilities that were not struck in the June 22 attack, and it is highly possible if not likely that Iran built other deeply-buried facilities prior to the June war.
While the strikes represent a major setback to Iran’s declared facilities, if Iran were to ever decide to weaponize its nuclear program, most nonproliferation experts believe it would break out covertly at an undeclared site. Here, there still appears to be a lane for Iran to pursue weaponization covertly if it chose to do so, and it is not clear if or when the U.S., Israel or others would be able to detect a covert pursuit of weaponization. Iran is a large country, and it is quite possible that its leadership already prepared another deeply-buried facility for a breakout in the wake of an attack. Jeffrey Lewis, a professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, estimates that Iran using “what survived” in the strike could potentially produce a nuclear weapon in “less than a year.” This largely matches an initial Defense Intelligence Agency assessment that suggested the strikes set back Iran’s program by months. As James Acton of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace summarized in Foreign Policy, “the United States needs to grapple with the reality that its military operation increased Iran’s incentives to build the bomb while only marginally and temporarily setting back its capabilities to do so.”
International Inspectors Have Lost Oversight over Iran’s Nuclear Program
In the wake of the Israeli and U.S. attacks, Iran’s parliament acted to reduce cooperation with the IAEA, mandating that future IAEA access requests must be approved by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. The IAEA, which was forced to halt its inspection efforts amid the war, has not been able to resume inspection of Iran’s nuclear program and is sending a technical team to Iran in the near future to seek to negotiate some level of restored access.
The IAEA plays a vital role in global nonproliferation efforts, and has a sterling record as a monitor. No nation under active IAEA inspection has secured nuclear weapons. Those nations that have secured nuclear weapons either secured them before the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, never signed it or – in the case of North Korea – kicked out inspectors and withdrew from the NPT in 2003 before testing its first nuclear weapon in 2006.
Prior to the war, all of Iran’s active enrichment facilities were under regular inspection, and the IAEA issued regular reports documenting at the granular level all of Iran’s moves on its nuclear program. This key insight has been lost, which represents a major blow to ensuring that Iran does not weaponize and that the global debate on Iran’s nuclear program is grounded in fact rather than fantasy. Whether recent Iran-IAEA engagement can restore some degree of monitoring over Iran’s nuclear program remains uncertain.
The Civilian Toll of the War was Steep
More than half of the 1,000 Iranians killed in the 12 days of war were civilians. Among those individuals whose identities could be confirmed by the human rights organization HRANA, at least 140 were women and children. Israel attacked several sites that housed many civilians in one of the most populous cities in the world, including bombardments of apartment complexes and Evin prison.
The dead include:
- Nasim Tabatabaei, 58, a retired teacher and poet, was killed along with her husband Ahmad, and their 9-year-old grandson Rayan, in an Israeli airstrike on the Milad Residential Complex in Rey.
- Saman Ghaderi, 27, a night courier in Tehran.
- Leila Shabani, 43, a night-shift nurse in Modarres Hospital.
- Amir Asadi and Maryam Ghanbari, newlyweds from Qazvin, who had been married for just three months.
- Ali Asghar Pazouki, a 69 year-old father, who was killed while on an errand.
Many in Iran were also displaced during the war, as there was an exodus from heavily bombarded cities like Tehran to less densely-populated areas. This flight was stressful both for those impacted and those in the diaspora hoping their loved ones could get to safety amid congested roads and fuel shortages. Many elderly and infirm Iranians were forced to stay put, despite evacuation orders put out by Israel, as their loved ones hoped and prayed for their safety amid reports of death and destruction.
Iranian Missiles Depleted Israel and U.S. Missile Interceptors, and Inflicted Damage Inside Israel
Israel did more damage inside Iran than Iran was able to inflict in turn, but serious damage was inflicted inside Israel. Despite Israeli military censorship, video of Iran’s retaliatory strikes shows heavy damage to locations in Israel, including Tel Aviv and Haifa. Israelis were regularly forced to shelter in bunkers throughout the volleys, with 28 killed and thousands more injured.
Many of Iran’s retaliatory strikes reflect a tit-for-tat nature. As Sina Toossi of the Center for International Policy wrote: “Following an Israeli drone strike targeting an Iranian oil refinery in the South Pars gas field, Iran responded by targeting a refinery in Haifa. After Israeli airstrikes targeted Iranian research centers suspected of involvement in nuclear activities, Iran retaliated by striking the Weizmann Institute of Science near Tel Aviv—a facility long suspected of playing a role in Israel’s own nuclear research. Through these reciprocal attacks, Iran aimed to signal its capacity for measured retaliation and to reinforce its deterrence posture. Notably, both sides refrained from targeting energy infrastructure after the initial exchange.”
Despite heavy targeting of Iranian missile launchers during the war, the Wall Street Journal reported that ”Iran pierced Israel’s defenses with increasing success” over the course of the 12 days of war. Likewise, the repeated Iranian missile barrages caused the U.S. to expend roughly a quarter of its THAAD missile interceptor stockpile in defense of Israel. The use of as many as 150 THAAD missiles far outpaces America’s ability to replace them, as the U.S. is expected to produce 12 over the course of this fiscal year.
The War May Soon Reignite
While a ceasefire between Israel and Iran is holding for now, it appears to be a particularly brittle one. Absent Trump’s forceful call on Israel to stand down from further bombings in Iran, it may not have even taken effect in the first place.
President Trump, in apparent response to an interview with Iranian Foreign Abbas Araghchi in which he maintained Iran’s right to uranium enrichment, threatened to attack Iran again. He asserted that if Iran restarts its nuclear program, “we’ll wipe it out faster than you can wave your finger at it. We will do that gladly, openly and gladly.” Araghchi responded in a post on X, stating “If aggression is repeated, we will not hesitate to react in a more decisive manner and in a way that will be IMPOSSIBLE to cover up.” Likewise, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz threatened further attacks in Iran in response to any threats, warning that Israel could target Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
While heated rhetoric may or may not lead to renewed hostilities, there is little evidence that a comprehensive diplomatic approach is underway that could prevent a renewal of the war. Moreover, the so-called E3 – the United Kingdom, France and Germany – have moved to trigger “snapback” of six previously-waived UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran, which is set to be implemented if no diplomatic breakthrough is reached by the end of the 30-day window by September 27, 2025. Some recent progress between the IAEA and Iran shows promise, but the E3 seems set to trigger snapback, raising the prospect of Iranian retaliation and more tit-for-tat escalation.
The June War Benefitted the Islamic Republic’s “Resistance” Narrative
The Islamic Republic, following years of failing to deliver for its citizens on basic needs and through brutal crackdowns on popular protests, had been suffering through a major legitimacy crisis. Many Iranians strongly objected to the policies of their own government, and increasingly questioned its choices including its hostility toward the United States and Israel. While this crisis of legitimacy persists in the wake of the war, Israel’s attacks appear to have given renewed life to a nationalistic narrative urging “resistance” against American hegemony in the Middle East – particularly for generations that did not live through the brutal Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s and had increasingly questioned the Iranian government’s priorities and spending in its near abroad.
“I used to be one of those who would chant during protests to not send Iranian money to Lebanon or Palestine. But now I understand that the bombs we all face are one and if we don’t have strong defenses across the region, the war comes to us,” an artist in Tehran told Dr. Narges Bajoghli of Johns Hopkins University. In the wake of the attack, the Iranian government has sought to capitalize on this resurgent nationalism by subtly incorporating more prominent nationalistic themes into government activities and messaging.
While some speculated that Israel was intent on conducting a “regime change” war via stand-off strikes taking out Iranian leaders, there is little evidence that it made any serious headway to threaten the stability of the Iranian government. Both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the exiled former crown prince of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, exhorted Iranians to rise up amid the war and overthrow their government. Yet, Iranians did not do so, likely out of a mix of anger and opposition to the war, fear of bombardment and prioritization of survival. Rather than spark popular protests against the government, some chose to turn out for rallies against the attacks both during and after the war.
Many critics of the Iranian government have spoken out harshly against the Israeli war, including many who have served lengthy prison sentences for their advocacy for democracy and human rights. Many human rights defenders have long warned that sanctions and the threat of war make their cause much more difficult by contributing to securitization of domestic criticism. Unfortunately, there is a trend of Iran’s government increasing executions after the war amid deep concerns regarding lack of due process and transparency. Iran’s government has also increased the penalties for cooperation with foreign powers and considered measures to further restrict online activities, leading to concerns of a more restrictive security environment inside Iran.
Conclusion
The June war may have made Iranian proliferation more – not less – likely by providing Iran with an incentive to dispense with its prior caution on its nuclear program and by cratering belief in Iran that negotiations can put the country in a more secure position. These facts are not reflected in the statements of President Trump, who has asserted that the June strikes represented a decisive blow and expressed bafflement at Iran’s position against surrendering uranium enrichment in the future. As it stands, many in Iran now believe that the nuclear negotiations that the Trump administration initiated in the lead-up to Israel’s attack was all a ruse designed to lull Iran into a false sense of security.
What was true before the war is still true today: military strikes cannot resolve security issues between the U.S. and Iran, including on the nuclear issue. For that, sincere and effective diplomacy is needed – yet, it is equally hard to see the path forward in the wake of the strikes.