Recent comments made by Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei, the head of Iran’s Judiciary, suggesting the number of political prisoners is limited to five people or less, along with remarks from reformist-aligned figures, have sparked a wave of media and political reactions. Analysts have once again pointed out that the root of this ambiguity lies in the narrow and vague definition of “political crime” in the 2016 law—a law that was eventually passed after 37 years of delays but remains limited and ineffective, without any reforms to date.
Mohseni-Ejei stated that “a few days after the end of the recent imposed war, several political and media groups informed me through various channels that, in order to strengthen social unity and cohesion, they requested the release of those referred to as political prisoners. I did not ignore their request or respond negatively, but instead I asked them to provide a list of these prisoners so we could examine and scrutinize them. The noteworthy point is that until now, none of those requesting groups have provided me with a list, and when faced with my demand, some of them said they had reservations about submitting a list of political prisoners.”
He also acknowledged the disagreement over labeling prisoners as political or security-related, stating, “We have a difference of opinion regarding the definition of a political prisoner. Sometimes all security prisoners are called political prisoners, and other times, it is the opposite. There is all this noise and commotion about how many political prisoners we have; well, you can announce that after your own examination, the number of our political prisoners does not even reach five, so that the misleading propaganda of our adversaries can be neutralized and lose its effect.”
Meanwhile, Elyas Hazrati, head of the Government’s Information Council and publisher of Etemad newspaper, in a meeting with media representatives and the head of the Judiciary, said, “I asked many journalists and intellectuals to provide me with the names of political prisoners, but only three were introduced to me. Eventually, by adding two more, I presented a list of five to the head of the Judiciary.” In fact, Hazrati, who is both head of the Government’s Information Council and the editor-in-chief of one of the few remaining reformist newspapers, has effectively presented a narrative aligned with the judicial system, more so than representing a position as a journalist or political activist.
Article 168 of the Iranian Constitution, established in 1979, stipulates that trials for “political and press crimes” must be public and include a jury. However, the absence of a law defining “political crime” rendered this article effectively useless for decades.
Efforts to draft a law on political crime began in the mid-1980s, but due to the security atmosphere following the war, differences between branches of government, and fears of opening up political criticism, this process was repeatedly halted. Even in the 2000s, when drafts were proposed in Parliament, the Guardian Council or the government of the time suspended them. Finally, on May 10, 2016, the 9th Parliament passed a five-article “Political Crime Law”, which was approved by the Guardian Council in June of the same year.
After two years of review in Parliament, the Political Crime Law was passed in 2015 in the final days of the 9th Parliament and was ratified by President Hassan Rouhani in 2016. The Judiciary implemented the law in 2020.
According to Article 1 of the law, “crimes committed with the intention of reforming the country against the political management and institutions or domestic or foreign policies of the country,” without intending to harm the government, are considered political crimes. In Article 2, the law lists the types of political crimes, including the spread of false information, insults, and defamation against the heads of the three branches of government, the Head of the Expediency Council, Vice Presidents, Ministers, Members of Parliament, Members of the Assembly of Experts, and members of the Guardian Council, as well as foreign political representatives in Iran.
Article 5 mentions that the determination of whether an accusation is political lies with the prosecution or the court in which the case is being tried. Article 6 of the law provides benefits such as a ban on solitary confinement for more than 15 days, regular family visits, and access to books, publications, radio, and television for political prisoners. Furthermore, if these individuals commit another political crime, they are not subject to the law of increased punishment for repeat offenders. However, in reality, many of these benefits are practically not implemented due to the label of “security” associated with such individuals.
From the very beginning, the content of the law and its implementation raised challenges for political activists and lawyers. One of the most complicated issues regarding the definition of political crime is that, in the first stage, if the prosecutor believes that the defendant’s intent was not to reform the country but to harm the Islamic Republic, the case is excluded from the scope of this law.
Since the law’s implementation, the distinction between political and security crimes has been a critical issue in the treatment of prisoners. For instance, political criminals are allowed to avoid wearing prison uniforms, have family visits, and access educational materials. However, the real challenge lies in the interpretation by authorities—whether the crime is seen as political or security-related. This has led to a situation where many individuals who commit crimes falling under the political crime category are not categorized as political prisoners but rather as security prisoners.
Lawyers have emphasized that this law is incomplete and does not provide a clear definition of what constitutes a political crime. Even the spokesperson for the Judiciary at the time acknowledged the ambiguity in the differentiation between political and security crimes. It now seems that, after a long period, this issue has once again come to the forefront of news, with the debate continuing over the proper categorization of political prisoners.
Figures such as Mostafa Tajzadeh, who is imprisoned for peaceful political activities, illustrate this problem. By international standards, he and hundreds of others should be classified as political prisoners, yet the judiciary continues to label them as security offenders, stripping them of the protections outlined in the Political Crime Law. Political dissent is often reframed as a threat to national security to justify harsh sentences.
In this context, human rights advocates such as Emadeddin Baghi have noted that if the judiciary truly wanted a complete and accurate list of prisoners, it would not need to request one from others. Baghi recalls that if independent civil institutions like the “Association for the Defense of Prisoners’ Rights” were not facing restrictions, they could maintain and share accurate, up-to-date information with the judiciary, media, and the public. He also noted that during Ebrahim Raisi’s tenure as judiciary chief, a similar list was provided, leading to pardons and releases. More recently, Baghi was contacted by Ezzatollah Zarghami, who had met with Ejei about prisoners and asked him to prepare a list. Baghi said he compiled only a list of 70 male and female prisoners, aiming to choose names that would face fewer political and security obstacles — while still expressing his hope that all prisoners might one day be freed.
Similarly, Azar Mansouri, head of the “Reform Front,” has argued in a letter to the judiciary that her organization can only provide criteria for identifying political prisoners, not participate in the “list-making game,” which she says legitimizes the regime’s narrow definition of political prisoners and excludes many innocent detainees. Mansouri emphasized that, under Iran’s constitution, no one should be imprisoned for peaceful political or civil activity or expression of beliefs — yet the authorities label political prisoners as “security” cases. She insists that anyone jailed for peaceful political engagement or expression of opinion should be recognized as a political or conscientious prisoner and freed immediately.
Political analyst Ahmad Zeidabadi has identified three reasons why political groups in Iran avoid producing such lists: (1) they often lack detailed knowledge of each prisoner’s charges and activities; (2) they suffer from conceptual confusion over the legal distinction between political and security offenses; and (3) they fear defending the rights of prisoners whose rhetoric against senior officials has been especially harsh. Zeidabadi considers the “Association for the Defense of Prisoners’ Rights” a credible body for distinguishing political from non-political prisoners and believes it could provide the judiciary with a comprehensive, reliable list.