Week of February 23, 2026 | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council

• Iran’s Inflation Crisis Reaches Historic Levels Amid Deepening Economic Hardship
• Student Protests Persist Across Iranian Universities as Authorities Escalate Disciplinary and Judicial Measures
• U.S.–Iran Talks at a Critical Juncture as Diplomacy Proceeds Under the Shadow of Escalation
• 353 Iranian Public Figures Issue Statement: “No to War and Aggression Against Iran”
• National Unity, Minority Rights, and the Risks of Escalation: A Delicate Opposition Divide
• A Name-Based Reckoning: Documented Fatalities and State Responsibility in Iran’s 1404 Uprising
• In Memory of Dr. Abdolmajid Arfaee, Guardian of Iran’s Ancient Written Heritage
• Ali Babachahi, Influential Iranian Poet and Literary Critic, Dies at 83
• Renewed Student Protests Across Iranian Universities Reflect Political Fragmentation and Continued Grievances
• Student Protests Reignite Across Iranian Universities as Trials of January Detainees Begin

Iran’s Inflation Crisis Reaches Historic Levels Amid Deepening Economic Hardship

Two official Iranian institutions have released separate reports confirming that inflation in Iran has reached its highest level in years, and possibly decades. The Central Bank of Iran estimates that point-to-point inflation in Bahman stood at 62.2 percent, the highest level recorded since March 2023. Meanwhile, the Statistical Center of Iran reports an even higher figure, stating that point-to-point inflation reached 68.1 percent in Bahman 1404, marking the highest rate since the agency began publishing such data. Although the two figures differ due to methodology, both confirm an unprecedented acceleration in price growth.

Monthly inflation has also surged sharply. The Central Bank estimated monthly inflation in Bahman at 8.4 percent, while the Statistical Center placed it at 9.4 percent — both the highest monthly figures since May 2022, more than three and a half years ago. At that time, the removal of subsidized import currency for certain goods triggered a dramatic price shock. Monthly inflation measures the average increase in prices compared to the previous month, while point-to-point inflation reflects the average rise compared to the same month in the prior year.

According to official data, one of the primary drivers of the inflation spike is the sharp rise in food prices. Average food and beverage costs increased by 11 percent in Dey and 14.7 percent in Bahman alone. Over a twelve-month period, food prices rose by 99 percent, effectively doubling. The Statistical Center reports an even higher annual increase of 105 percent for food prices. Between Dey and Bahman, the price of meat and poultry rose by more than 24 percent, while the cost of edible oils and fats increased by over 50 percent in a single month. A key contributing factor to the recent surge was the decision to halt the allocation of the 28,500-toman subsidized dollar for imports of oilseeds and livestock feed. However, food prices have been rising faster than other goods for most of the past year.

Unlike the inflationary shock of Khordad 1401, which was largely concentrated in food and restaurant prices, the current wave of inflation has spread broadly across sectors. Transportation, communications, household appliances, and various consumer services are now experiencing rapid price increases. This broader pattern suggests that, beyond subsidy removal, sharp currency depreciation and continued liquidity growth are playing significant roles in fueling inflation.

While official inflation represents a national average, the actual inflation experienced by households varies based on income level, location, and consumption patterns. For many families — particularly those with limited incomes — the real cost of living increase may far exceed official figures. The surge in prices has coincided with continued economic stagnation. A multi-week internet shutdown that began in mid-Dey severely disrupted internet-dependent businesses and parts of the broader market. Even after internet services were restored, many businesses have not returned to normal conditions. One small business owner in Isfahan reported that her monthly sales dropped from around 30 million tomans before the shutdown to less than 3 million tomans, forcing her family to consider selling assets to cover rent and loan payments. She noted that for many households, basic food and housing costs have become the primary concern, pushing non-essential purchases out of reach.

With inflation accelerating and purchasing power collapsing, labor representatives are demanding that the minimum wage for next year be doubled. Worker representatives estimate that the monthly cost of living now ranges between 40 to 45 million tomans, arguing that the current minimum wage of approximately 15 million tomans should be increased to at least 30 million tomans per month. Employers, however, warn that such an increase could bankrupt small businesses already struggling under recessionary pressures.

In response to the inflation data, officials have stated that the monthly distribution of one million tomans in commodity vouchers per person has helped improve the purchasing power of the lowest three income deciles. At the same time, they acknowledge that economic pressure has intensified for the remaining seven deciles of society.

The combination of historic inflation levels, currency volatility, liquidity growth, business disruption, and stagnant wages has created one of the most challenging economic environments in recent memory. For millions of Iranians, the convergence of rising prices and declining real incomes has made basic livelihood increasingly difficult, deepening uncertainty about the country’s economic and political trajectory in the months ahead.

Student Protests Persist Across Iranian Universities as Authorities Escalate Disciplinary and Judicial Measures

Student protests have continued across multiple Iranian universities, deepening tensions between demonstrators and authorities and prompting a widening wave of disciplinary suspensions, virtual class transitions, and official threats of judicial intervention. The latest developments follow renewed campus mobilizations that began after universities reopened in the wake of the bloody January unrest. Since returning to in-person classes, students in Tehran and several provincial cities have organized daily gatherings, sit-ins, and strikes, while clashes between protesters and pro-government student groups have intensified in some campuses.

At the University of Tehran, three students were temporarily suspended for what officials described as “disrespect toward the national flag.” According to reports, the university president issued a temporary suspension order pending a disciplinary council session. The names of the students have not been publicly released. In recent demonstrations, some protesters reportedly tore and burned the flag of the Islamic Republic while raising the pre-revolutionary Lion and Sun flag, reflecting the sharp symbolic polarization visible on campuses.

Meanwhile, the scale of disciplinary measures appears to be expanding significantly. According to a report by the newspaper Shargh, at least 180 students at the University of Tehran have been barred from entering campus pending disciplinary review. These students reportedly received text messages stating that their participation in an “illegal gathering” violated educational and disciplinary regulations and that their access to university grounds was prohibited until further notice. In addition, more than 60 other students were allegedly banned through verbal notification by university security officials, without formal written communication.

The unrest has spread to numerous institutions, including Khajeh Nasir University, Shahid Beheshti University, Alzahra University, Soore University, the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Tehran, and Iran University of Science and Technology, where both protest gatherings and clashes have been reported. At some campuses, including Khajeh Nasir and Iran University of Science and Technology, confrontations between protesters and pro-government supporters reportedly turned violent. At Alzahra and Shahid Beheshti, students staged sit-ins, chanting slogans such as “Freedom, Freedom” and “We don’t want spectators, join us.” Images circulating online also show that at the University of Science and Technology, police forces were stationed outside the campus while university security reportedly documented the identities of students wearing black clothing, a symbol of mourning connected to those killed during the January crackdown. 

As protests have widened, several universities have shifted toward virtual instruction. Allameh Tabataba’i University announced that all classes across all degree levels will be held online until the end of Esfand (March). Earlier, Islamic Azad University declared that its theoretical classes would move online from 9 Esfand through the end of the academic year. According to the Telegram channel “United Students,” universities in Kurdistan, Zanjan, Elm-o-Farhang, and Kharazmi had already made similar announcements. Some conservative lawmakers have openly advocated for this approach. Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, a principlist member of parliament, described virtual classes as a “more prudent decision” given the current climate and warned against deepening polarization on campuses.

Senior judicial and political officials have simultaneously adopted a more confrontational tone. Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, head of the judiciary, publicly warned that students who committed “crimes” must be identified and referred to judicial authorities, stating that if the Ministry of Science does not introduce them, the judiciary would act independently—“at a higher cost.” He specifically condemned the burning of the national flag and the chanting of certain slogans as incompatible with university environments. The Prosecutor General, Mohammad Movahedi-Azad, similarly called for swift identification and “decisive legal action” against those allegedly connected to the unrest, asserting that such mobilizations often coincide with sensitive political moments and external pressures on the country.

The Minister of Science, Hossein Simayi-Sarraf, stated that he supports in-person classes “provided that universities are not arenas of violence, insult, and hatred.” He warned that if unrest continues, he may be compelled to transition institutions to virtual instruction. At the same time, government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani acknowledged that students have the “right to protest” and may carry emotional grievances following January’s events, but emphasized that religious sanctities and the national flag constitute “red lines.”

The Sharif University of Technology has also become a focal point of controversy. University President Masoud Tajrishi confirmed that the prosecutor’s office intends to intervene in campus developments. He stated that both protesting students and pro-government student groups had organized unauthorized gatherings and that members of both sides have been temporarily barred from campus access. He further warned that if the number of banned students grows, the university may shift entirely to online instruction.

In a separate incident, Sharif University’s website was reportedly subjected to cyberattacks. For a brief period, parts of the site displayed the university’s pre-revolutionary name, “Aryamehr University of Technology.” A statement attributed to a group of students claimed responsibility, describing the action as a symbolic reminder of a historical identity they believe cannot be erased. University officials later characterized the event as a cyberattack and temporarily took the site offline to protect data.

Taken together, the developments suggest an escalating cycle: expanding student mobilization, growing disciplinary sanctions, increasing judicial threats, and a broad shift toward virtual education as a mechanism of control. University campuses, long central to Iran’s political mobilization and discourse, once again stand at the intersection of generational dissent, institutional authority, and symbolic struggle.

U.S.–Iran Talks at a Critical Juncture as Diplomacy Proceeds Under the Shadow of Escalation

The latest round of indirect negotiations between the United States and Iran has unfolded at an exceptionally sensitive and consequential moment, with diplomacy advancing amid an unprecedented American military build-up. Following the third round of talks in Geneva on February 26, Iranian officials described the discussions as serious, dense, and constructive, pointing to what they called “good progress” on key elements of a potential agreement.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi characterized the negotiations as among the most substantive to date, stating that both sides had entered detailed discussions on the framework of a possible deal. He emphasized that Iran is prepared to address international concerns regarding its nuclear program and to work through technical questions in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but firmly rejected any demand for dismantling its nuclear infrastructure. Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi, serving as mediator, described the talks as achieving “significant progress” and announced that technical-level discussions are expected to resume in Vienna next week, potentially paving the way for a fourth political round.

Despite Tehran’s cautiously optimistic tone, Washington has remained more measured in its public messaging. While U.S. officials described the talks as “positive,” they have avoided endorsing claims of breakthrough. President Donald Trump, speaking during his annual State of the Union address to Congress on Tuesday, placed the negotiations within a broader narrative of deterrence and pressure. In his remarks, Trump reiterated that the United States will never allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon, warning that despite the damage inflicted by the U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear program, “they’re starting it all over.” He described the Iranians as “terrible people” and suggested that Iran could pursue intercontinental ballistic missile technology that would allow Iran to strike the United States.

However, little information in the public domain supports the President’s claims on the nuclear and missile programs. Iran is not presently enriching and analysts predict that Iran could be ten years or more away from fielding missiles that could strike the United States, if it made a decision to pursue the capability. While he ultimately signaled a preference for diplomacy, his tone reinforced a harsh posture toward Iran.

Meanwhile, senior U.S. officials have reinforced the narrative of Iran posing a threat. Vice President J.D. Vance has suggested that Iran has resumed efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon, also without evidence. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, meanwhile, has reiterated that diplomacy remains the preferred path but stressed that negotiations must address not only the nuclear file, but also Iran’s ballistic missile program and maritime capabilities in the Persian Gulf. Rubio described Iran’s missile arsenal as a serious threat to U.S. bases and regional partners, signaling that Washington seeks a broader security framework rather than a narrowly defined nuclear agreement. 

This represents a notable potential split in the administration. Vance, perceived as more open to a deal, seems focused on a threat the negotiations are designed to address. By contrast, Rubio – widely perceived as more hostile to a deal – has emphasized a threat outside the scope of negotiations. The varying degrees of openness to a deal may explain a considerable amount of the administration’s conflicting messages on Iran and the negotiations as a whole.

The diplomatic track is unfolding alongside visible military preparedness. The United States has carried out one of its largest regional force repositionings in recent years, including the deployment of strategic aerial refueling aircraft to Israel, assets typically associated with extended-range air operations. Reports indicate that U.S. Central Command has presented President Trump with a range of military options, from limited strikes targeting missile launchers or nuclear facilities to a broader sustained campaign that could involve coordination with Israel.

At the same time, the United States authorized the voluntary departure of non-essential government personnel and their families from Israel as a precautionary measure. China has also urged its citizens to leave Iran, citing security risks, while Jordan has publicly stated that it will not allow its airspace to be used in a potential regional conflict. These moves reflect the degree to which governments are hedging against the possibility that diplomacy could falter.

Sanctions pressure has intensified in parallel. In the days surrounding the Geneva talks, Washington imposed new sanctions on more than 30 individuals, entities, and vessels accused of facilitating Iranian oil exports and supporting ballistic missile and drone production. U.S. officials described the measures as part of a broader “maximum pressure” strategy designed to increase leverage at the negotiating table.

Tehran continues to assert that it does not seek nuclear weapons. President Masoud Pezeshkian has reiterated that Iran’s religious leadership prohibits the development of such arms, framing this stance as a principled and doctrinal position rather than a tactical one. At the same time, Iranian military officials have issued warnings that any U.S. strike would provoke a decisive response. Senior commanders have emphasized readiness across drone, missile and air defense capabilities, while Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Takht-Ravanchi described a potential U.S. attack as a “real gamble” that could destabilize the region.

The current moment reflects a stark paradox: negotiations are ongoing and have not collapsed, yet both sides are simultaneously reinforcing deterrence and preparing for escalation. Iran portrays the Geneva talks as evidence of forward movement toward sanctions relief and structured guarantees. The United States signals openness to diplomacy, but continues to stress that the military option remains credible and available.

As the process transitions to technical discussions in Vienna, the central question is whether this fragile diplomatic opening can translate into a concrete, verifiable framework—or whether political pressures, mistrust, and military signaling will erode the space for compromise. For now, Washington and Tehran remain in a narrow corridor – not at war, yet not at peace – with the coming weeks likely to determine whether diplomacy gains momentum or the region edges closer to confrontation despite active talks.

353 Iranian Public Figures Issue Statement: “No to War and Aggression Against Iran”

A group of 353 Iranian political figures, researchers, civil society activists, and public intellectuals from across a broad spectrum of political and ideological backgrounds have signed and published a statement titled “No to War and Aggression Against Iran.” The signatories have also invited citizens to join a public campaign under the same name through an online petition platform.

The list of signatories includes prominent political, academic, and civil society figures representing a wide range of perspectives. Among them are Eshaq Jahangiri, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Behzad Nabavi, Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi, Ali Rabiei, Ali Jannati, Hamidreza Jalaeipour, Ahmad Shirzad, Seyed Mostafa Mousavi Lari, Korosh Ahmadi, Reza Nasri, Fayyaz Zahed, Gholamreza Ghafari, and many others.

In their statement, the signatories describe war and violence as “the greatest evils in politics,” emphasizing that war kills, destroys infrastructure, deepens poverty, sacrifices innocent lives, fuels further violence, and undermines prospects for development, democracy, justice, and prosperity in Iran. The text argues that military escalation would exacerbate existing crises and diminish the country’s capacity to resolve its challenges. The statement explicitly criticizes what it describes as warmongering, sanctions, and threats by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and hawkish policymakers in Washington, asserting that such actions aim to destabilize and weaken Iran.

At the same time, the signatories stress that the painful loss of life in Dey 1404 (January 2026) or any other grievance cannot justify war or the destruction of the country. Emphasizing political diversity among themselves, the authors state that “without hesitation and without qualification” they oppose any form of aggression against Iran. They argue that solutions to Iran’s problems – however difficult – must emerge from constructive, development-oriented internal reforms rather than external military intervention. They further declare that in the event of aggression, they will stand in defense of the country. The signatories also call on fellow citizens, as well as individuals with influence and public standing, to raise their voices against war and foreign intervention.

The publication of the statement comes amid heightened regional tensions and growing concerns over potential military escalation involving Iran. By gathering support from individuals across political divides, the initiative reflects an attempt to articulate a broad-based civic position rejecting war while emphasizing national sovereignty and internally driven reform.

National Unity, Minority Rights, and the Risks of Escalation: A Delicate Opposition Divide

The recent formation of a coalition among five Kurdish political parties has added a new layer of complexity to Iran’s already fragmented opposition landscape. Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), Khabat Organization of Iranian Kurdistan, and Komala – Kurdistan Toilers Organization have now allied, presenting itself as an effort to coordinate political action at a moment of national crisis. However, it has also revived longstanding sensitivities surrounding armed factions, autonomy demands, and fears of territorial fragmentation.

Several of the member groups maintain military wings, a legacy of decades of conflict in border regions and resistance to central governance. Although many Kurdish political actors frame their demands in terms of federalism, decentralization, or minority rights within a democratic Iran, the presence of organized armed forces inevitably fuels suspicion among nationalist constituencies. In a country where territorial integrity is deeply embedded in political identity, particularly amid regional instability and external pressure, even symbolic references to transitional self-administration or force unification can be perceived as destabilizing. Movements seeking legitimacy within a broader Iranian public sphere must therefore navigate these sensitivities carefully and communicate their goals with clarity and restraint.

Notably, Abdullah Mohtadi, Secretary-General of Komala Kurdistan of Iran, did not join the coalition. While expressing openness to cooperation, he raised concerns about the absence of a clear operational roadmap and ambiguity regarding key structural issues. His cautious stance suggests that even within Kurdish political circles, questions remain about the alliance’s coherence and long-term sustainability.

The coalition’s announcement prompted a strong reaction from Reza Pahlavi, who labeled the groups “separatist” and reaffirmed that territorial integrity is a non-negotiable red line. His emphasis on national unity is reflected by many Iranians who are highly sensitive to the possibility of fragmentation. However, his broader political posture – including public support for intensified Western and Israeli pressure and military actions against the Islamic Republic – complicates the narrative. Calls for foreign military strikes on Iranian soil, even when directed at the ruling establishment, risk reinforcing nationalist defensiveness and may deepen internal polarization. Advocating external intervention while simultaneously positioning oneself as the guardian of territorial integrity can appear strategically inconsistent and politically risky.

At the same time, Kurdish armed-political actors face their own credibility challenge. In an environment shaped by war rhetoric and foreign involvement, movements that combine political demands with military structures may unintentionally strengthen hardline narratives that conflate minority rights with separatism. Even when their stated objective may be democratic restructuring rather than secession, the optics of armed organization can undermine cross-ethnic trust within any future national framework.

The unfolding exchange highlights a central dilemma within Iran’s opposition: how to reconcile legitimate minority rights and decentralization with broad-based national cohesion. Excessive securitization of ethnic demands can silence democratic dialogue, yet ambiguity about armed authority and territorial arrangements can alarm a public already wary of instability. Similarly, mobilizing nationalist sentiment may generate short-term political support, but reliance on foreign military leverage carries long-term reputational and ethical costs.

If a credible alternative political future is to emerge, opposition forces across ideological lines may need to adopt a language that lowers tensions rather than amplifies them – affirming both the indivisibility of the country and the equal dignity and rights of its diverse peoples. Without that balance, fragmentation within the opposition itself may become as significant an obstacle as the political order it seeks to replace.

A Name-Based Reckoning: Documented Fatalities and State Responsibility in Iran’s 1404 Uprising

In the aftermath of Iran’s nationwide uprising of Dey 1404, the question of how many lives were lost has emerged as one of the most contested and consequential dimensions of the crisis. In the weeks following the crackdown, sharply divergent figures circulated across political, media, and official channels. By early Bahman 1404, reported estimates ranged from approximately 3,400 fatalities to claims exceeding 33,000. These sweeping numbers, however, were largely presented as aggregate totals without publicly verifiable, name-based documentation, making independent assessment difficult and leaving the factual record deeply disputed.

Amid this landscape of competing narratives, the Iranian government announced that 3,117 individuals had been killed during the events of 18 and 19 Dey and subsequently published a list containing identifying details, including first name, last name, father’s name, and partial national identification numbers. Initially, 2,986 names were released, with the remaining cases listed as unspecified. In a subsequent update, the number of published names rose to 3,038. The government described this release as part of an effort to increase transparency and assume responsibility in accounting for the events, inviting citizens to report omitted names or procedural irregularities and pledging that a formal review mechanism would examine such submissions. The publication of a name-based official list marked a significant departure from previous protest cycles, in which comparable public disclosure had not occurred.

Within this environment, the Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) released its 1,350-page report, “Crimson Winter,” documenting the first fifty days of protests from 7 Dey to 26 Bahman 1404. While HRANA notes that its broader documentation framework records 7,007 fatalities during this period, the report’s most concrete and publicly verifiable contribution lies in the publication of 4,555 named individuals who were killed during the uprising.

These 4,555 names include children, protesters, non-protesting civilians, and members of government or security forces. The importance of this figure is not merely quantitative but evidentiary. Name-based documentation enables cross-referencing, independent scrutiny, and comparative analysis. Unlike abstract totals, identifiable records form a dataset that can be examined, reconciled, and methodologically evaluated.

The difference between HRANA’s 4,555 publicly released names and the government’s 3,117-name list amounts to 1,438 additional identified individuals. This discrepancy represents a substantive divergence between two name-based datasets. When the comparison involves named and identifiable individuals rather than broad numerical estimates, a discrepancy of this magnitude requires a clear explanation of the criteria, sources, and verification standards used in compiling each list, so that the differences can be understood through evidence rather than debate.

Beyond fatality counts, “Crimson Winter” documents the nationwide scope and structural dimensions of the unrest. According to HRANA’s findings, protests occurred in 682 locations, across 203 cities, spanning all 31 provinces of Iran, underscoring the nationwide character of both the demonstrations and the state response. The report further records 55 university protests across 36 campuses, highlighting the central role of students and academic institutions in the movement.

In addition to documented fatalities, HRANA reports 25,846 civilians were injured and 4,884 security personnel were injured. The report records 53,777 documented arrests, including 555 detained children and minors and 147 detained university students. It further documents 369 cases of forced confessions and 11,053 summons notices. These figures broaden the scope of analysis beyond deaths alone, illustrating the wider scale of coercive measures and the societal impact during the fifty-day period under review.

Yet beyond methodology and statistical comparison lies the human dimension. Each name among the 4,555 publicly-documented deaths represents a life ended – a child, a student, a worker, a parent. Each name reflects a family facing grief, uncertainty, and unresolved questions. The shift from abstract totals to identifiable individuals transforms the discussion from numerical scale to lived human loss.

The existence of two independently compiled name-based datasets differing by more than 1,400 individuals makes clarification necessary. At this juncture, the government can be pressed to explain how its list was compiled, what inclusion criteria were applied, and whether it needs to be expanded based upon new, publicly-available data. Clarification regarding definitions of protest-related deaths, temporal scope, geographic coverage, and evidentiary standards would help narrow the gap between records. Greater methodological transparency would contribute to a clearer and more reconciled understanding of the events.

The broader debate over casualty estimates may continue, and figures may evolve as further documentation emerges. At present, however, the most analytically-grounded comparison rests not in headline totals but in the names that have been made public. In contexts where information access remains constrained and narratives sharply diverge, name-based documentation offers a stable foundation for accountability, historical record, and acknowledgment of human loss.

Ultimately, the state bears responsibility for the deaths that it inflicted. Ensuring that all documented deaths are accounted for, clearly classified, and transparently reviewed is not merely a matter of statistical reconciliation. It is a matter of institutional responsibility, public trust, and respect for the dignity of those who lost their lives. A credible process of clarification and reconciliation would strengthen the integrity of the public record and help honor the memory of the victims of the 1404 uprising.

In Memory of Dr. Abdolmajid Arfaee, Guardian of Iran’s Ancient Written Heritage

Dr. Abdolmajid Arfaee, one of Iran’s most distinguished scholars of ancient languages and the first Iranian researcher to translate the Cyrus Cylinder directly from Neo-Babylonian into Persian, passed away on February 24, 2026 at the age of 86. His death marks a profound loss for the academic community and for all those committed to the preservation and rigorous study of Iran’s ancient cultural heritage. At a time when only a small number of specialists worldwide are capable of directly reading Elamite cuneiform texts, Arfaee was widely regarded as one of the last representatives of a generation of master epigraphists who dedicated their lives to recovering the voices of ancient civilizations through disciplined philological work.

Born on August 31, 1939 in Genu, Bandar Abbas, Arfaee developed an early interest in Iran’s pre-Islamic history and languages. After completing his education in Iran, he pursued advanced studies in the United States, spending more than eight years at the University of Chicago, where he specialized in Akkadian (Neo-Babylonian) and Elamite. This rigorous training placed him among the few Iranian scholars capable of directly reading and interpreting primary cuneiform sources. He returned to Iran in 1974, dedicating his knowledge to research, teaching, and the advancement of ancient Near Eastern studies.

Arfaee’s scholarship was defined by textual precision, historical context, and resistance to ideological interpretation. His translation of the Cyrus Cylinder distinguished itself by relying on a direct reading of the original Neo-Babylonian text and situating it within the historical framework of the time when it was created. Rather than endorsing politicized narratives, he emphasized linguistic accuracy and documentary evidence, offering a careful and academically-grounded interpretation.

The Cylinder, formed of ancient clay, included an inscribed declaration praising Achaemenid king Cyrus the Great following the Persian conquest of Babylon in 539 BCE. It was placed in the temple to the God Marduk, with the text claiming that Cyrus was chosen by Marduk to displace the impious Babylonian king and had acted to improve the lives of his new subjects. Its rediscovery in 1879 shed significant light on the Persian empire of Cyrus, Mesopotamia and the ancient world.

Beyond the Cyrus Cylinder, Arfaee played a major role in the study and translation of thousands of administrative clay tablets from the Achaemenid period, written largely in Elamite cuneiform, known as the Persepolis Fortification Tablets. These tablets provide critical insight into the economic organization, labor systems, and administrative structure of the Achaemenid Empire. Through decades of meticulous work, he helped clarify the internal governance mechanisms of the empire and reinforced the importance of Elamite as one of its official administrative languages. His three-volume publication on the Persepolis Fortification Tablets (2008) remains a landmark contribution to Iranian Elamite studies.

Arfaee was also actively engaged in efforts to facilitate the return of portions of the Persepolis tablets held abroad for decades, reflecting his deep commitment to the responsible stewardship of cultural heritage. Even in his final years, he continued to advocate for the documentation and repatriation of these materials.

In recognition of his lifetime of scholarship, Arfaee received the Iranian Cypress Award (2015) for his contributions to cultural heritage. In 2022, he was honored with the UNESCO Sun Medal, in collaboration with Iran’s National Museum and the National Committee of ICOM, acknowledging his role in safeguarding and interpreting Iran’s ancient written memory.

Fluent in the Larestani (Achomi) dialect, Arfaee viewed living local languages as part of a continuous historical thread connecting contemporary Iranian identity with its ancient textual past. His life’s work built a bridge between the silent clay tablets of antiquity and modern society, demonstrating that careful scholarship can illuminate complex historical realities. The National Iranian American Council (NIAC) extends its deepest condolences to the family of Dr. Abdolmajid Arfaee, his students and colleagues, and all those in Iran and across the diaspora who cherish Iran’s cultural heritage. His dedication to scholarly integrity, cultural preservation, and rigorous historical inquiry will remain an enduring example for future generations. May his memory live on in the texts he illuminated, the knowledge he preserved, and the many scholars he inspired.

Ali Babachahi, Influential Iranian Poet and Literary Critic, Dies at 83

Published February 25, 2026

Ali Babachahi, the prominent Iranian poet, literary critic, and researcher, has passed away at the age of 83 after a period of illness. He died in a hospital in Karaj, marking the end of a literary career that spanned more than five decades and left a lasting imprint on contemporary Persian poetry.

Born in 1942 (1321) in Bandar Kangan, Bushehr Province, Babachahi emerged as one of the distinctive voices in Iran’s modern poetic landscape. Over the course of his life, he published nearly 30 volumes of poetry, criticism, and research, reflecting both his creative range and intellectual depth.

Among his notable poetry collections are “Aghl Azabam Midahad” (Reason Torments Me), “Nam-Nam Baranam” (I Am a Gentle Rain), “Housh va Havas-e Gol-e Shabbo Baraye Man Kafi-st” (The Scent and Awareness of the Night-Blooming Flower Is Enough for Me), and “Bia Goosh-Mahi Jam Konim” (Let’s Collect Seashells). His work evolved significantly over time, moving from social romanticism and Nimaic poetry toward a more experimental post-Nimaic style, reflecting formal innovation and philosophical reflection.

In 1967 (1346), Babachahi founded the literary magazine Takapu in Bushehr. The publication was shut down shortly afterward under pressure from SAVAK, the intelligence and security organization of the Pahlavi era. That same year, he published his first poetry collection, “Dar Bi-Tekyeh-Gahi” (In a State of Groundlessness). Before the 1979 Revolution, he released three additional poetry collections and collaborated with leading literary and cultural journals of the time, including Khosheh, Roshanfekr, and Roudaki. Following the Revolution, Babachahi continued his literary engagement through editing books, researching classical Persian texts, collaborating with publishers and the University Publishing Center, and serving for many years as the poetry page editor of the influential literary magazine Adineh. His editorial and critical work played a vital role in shaping discussions around contemporary poetry in Iran.

Beyond poetry, Babachahi contributed significantly to literary scholarship. His research works include “Shorveh-Saraei dar Jonub-e Iran” (Shorveh Recitation in Southern Iran), as well as critical studies on contemporary poets such as Manouchehr Sheibani, Fereydoun Tavalloli, and Esmail Shahroudi. He also authored two children’s poetry books, demonstrating his versatility across genres.

Two documentary films were made about his life and work. In the summer of 2011 (1390), a documentary titled “In Ghiyafeh Mashkook” (This Suspicious Face), directed by Vahid Alizadeh Razzazi, explored Babachahi’s poetic world and featured reflections from prominent literary figures on his artistic vision and personality.

Babachahi was also among the intellectuals reportedly targeted in the 1996 “Armenia bus” incident, part of the broader chain murders of Iranian cultural figures carried out by agents of the Ministry of Intelligence. During the incident, a busdriver twice attempted to kill the intellectuals on board by jumping out of the bus, only for the passengers to take control and stop the bus. Along with the other passengers, he survived that episode, which later became emblematic of state-sponsored violence against writers and dissidents in the 1990s.

Ali Babachahi’s death marks the loss of a prolific and influential voice in Iranian literature—an author who continuously redefined his poetic language while remaining deeply engaged with both tradition and modernity. His legacy endures through his expansive body of work and his influence on generations of poets and readers. The National Iranian American Council extends its heartfelt condolences to Ali Babachahi’s family, friends, colleagues, and to the countless readers in Iran and across the diaspora who found meaning, beauty, and courage in his poetry. At a time when cultural voices have too often faced pressure and suppression, Babachahi’s lifelong commitment to literary expression stands as a testament to the enduring power of art and thought. NIAC mourns his passing alongside Iranians everywhere and honors the legacy he leaves behind for future generations.

Renewed Student Protests Across Iranian Universities Reflect Political Fragmentation and Continued Grievances

Published February 25, 2026

Universities across Iran have witnessed renewed student protests following the reopening of campuses after the deadly January (Dey month) demonstrations. Over the past three days, multiple institutions in Tehran and other major cities have experienced gatherings, memorials for those killed in the earlier unrest, and clashes between students and pro-government groups. The protests underscore two parallel dynamics: continued student mobilization despite prior repression and deep ideological fragmentation within the opposition landscape on campuses.

Since universities reopened, students have organized daily gatherings at Sharif University of Technology, University of Tehran, Amirkabir University, Shahid Beheshti University, Iran University of Science and Technology, Khaje Nasir University, Alzahra University, and Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, as well as at medical universities in Tehran and Mashhad. Many of the gatherings were framed as memorials marking the fortieth day since the January protest deaths, a significant milestone in Iranian mourning traditions. Protesters chanted slogans such as “Death to the dictator,” “By the blood of our comrades, we stand until the end,” and “We did not give blood to compromise,” reflecting continued anger over the state’s violent crackdown and unresolved political grievances.

Unlike previous waves of campus unrest that were more ideologically unified, the current protests reveal the presence of at least three identifiable political tendencies. Monarchist-leaning students at several universities referenced pre-1979 institutional names and chanted slogans including “Long live the Shah” and “Pahlavi is coming back.” In at least one instance, students raised the pre-revolutionary lion-and-sun flag, a symbol increasingly used by monarchist supporters advocating regime change.

At the same time, other demonstrators explicitly rejected both the Islamic Republic and a return to monarchy. Slogans such as “Death to the oppressor, whether Shah or Leader” and “Woman, Life, Freedom – Iranian Republic” signal a current within the student body that favors systemic transformation toward a republican model distinct from both clerical rule and dynastic restoration. These competing visions underscore the fragmented nature of the opposition space on campuses, where opposition to the current system does not translate into consensus about Iran’s political future.

Confrontations were reported between protesting students and members of the student Basij, a campus organization aligned with the authorities. In several cases, attempts by Basij members to block protest routes or organize parallel gatherings led to physical scuffles. University officials reportedly intervened to prevent escalation.

Sharif University’s administration confirmed that several students have been temporarily barred from campus pending disciplinary review, citing behavior “contrary to university norms,” including inappropriate language and physical altercations. Reports from multiple campuses indicate heightened security presence and the possibility of further disciplinary measures. Such actions raise concerns about renewed academic penalties, surveillance, and long-term repercussions for student activists.

At Alzahra University, footage showed protesters tearing and burning the flag of the Islamic Republic, a highly symbolic act that carries significant legal and political risk in Iran’s current environment. The reappearance of monarchist symbols alongside republican and “Woman, Life, Freedom” slogans reflects the ongoing evolution of protest discourse since 2022 and highlights the university as one of the few remaining arenas for open political expression.

The renewed campus protests suggest that the January crackdown did not eliminate student dissent. However, visible ideological divisions among protesters may complicate efforts to form a unified national student movement. At the same time, disciplinary actions and clashes with pro-government groups increase the risk of further escalation. Historically, universities have played a catalytic role in broader political mobilization in Iran. Whether current demonstrations remain confined to campuses or expand beyond them will depend on both state response and the ability of student factions to navigate their internal divisions while sustaining collective action.

Student Protests Reignite Across Iranian Universities as Trials of January Detainees Begin

Published February 21, 2026

Student protests have reemerged across several major Iranian universities as campuses marked the fortieth day after the January unrest, prompting renewed calls for accountability and the release of detained students. Gatherings were reported at Mashhad University of Medical Sciences, Sharif University of Technology, Amirkabir University of Technology, and Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran, reflecting continued unrest within Iran’s academic community.

According to the Telegram channel “United Students,” students at Mashhad University of Medical Sciences held a protest gathering on Saturday, February 21 inside the university campus, chanting slogans including “Freedom, Freedom” and “Student, raise your voice, shout your rights.” The demonstration was described as peaceful, but it unfolded within a broader climate of tension that has persisted since the January crackdown.

At the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences at Shahid Beheshti University, students organized a sit-in in remembrance of those killed during the January protests and in solidarity with detained classmates. Participants lit candles in memory of Hadi Forough, a graduate of the university who was killed in the protests, and sang patriotic songs including “Ey Iran.” Students also called on university officials to actively pursue the release of two students who reportedly remain in detention.

Tensions were more pronounced at Sharif University of Technology, where reports indicate that a student gathering escalated into physical confrontation. The student outlet Amirkabir Newsletter reported that a protest held at noon was disrupted by members of the Basij student organization, resulting in clashes between opposing groups. Earlier, the Basij had reportedly called for a ceremony marking the fortieth day since the deaths of security services and government-linked individuals. Protesters on campus chanted slogans including “Long Live the Shah,” “Death to the dictator,” and other anti-government messages, highlighting the sharp political polarization now visible within university spaces. Images and videos circulating online appear to show confrontations, though independent verification remains limited.

At Amirkabir University of Technology, students gathered on the first day of in-person reopening, reportedly wearing black clothing as a sign of mourning. According to student reports, the demonstration commemorated individuals killed during the January unrest, which took place on January 8–9.

These renewed campus protests coincide with the beginning of judicial proceedings against January detainees. Iran’s judiciary announced that the first court session for three protesters – identified as Ashkan Maleki, Mehrdad Mohammadinia, and Arman Marefati – was held at the Tehran Revolutionary Court. According to the judiciary-affiliated outlet Mizan, the defendants are accused of setting fire to Jafari Mosque and Imam Hadi Seminary in Tehran’s Kooy-e Nasr district, burning motorcycles, damaging public property, blocking streets, and acting “operationally” on behalf of hostile foreign actors. During the session, video footage from the night of January 8–9 was presented, and a member of the mosque’s board of trustees testified. Two of the defendants reportedly answered questions from the presiding judge.

Human rights organizations have repeatedly expressed concern about the handling of January protest cases, citing allegations of serious due process violations, coerced confessions, physical and psychological mistreatment, and restricted access to independently chosen legal counsel. These concerns echo broader patterns documented in previous protest cycles.

The convergence of renewed student activism and the opening of Revolutionary Court trials underscores the continued volatility in Iranian society following the January crackdown. University campuses – historically central to Iran’s reform and protest movements and political debates – once again appear to be focal points of dissent, remembrance, and political polarization. Whether these demonstrations remain symbolic acts of mourning and solidarity or evolve into a broader wave of mobilization may depend in part on how authorities respond in the coming days, particularly regarding detained students and ongoing prosecutions.