Iran and U.S. Consider Dialogue Amid Pressure, Discussion of Direct Trade
Recent developments suggest that both Iran and the United States have signaled an interest in some form of dialogue regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Amwaj Media, citing sources in Iran, suggests that Iran could soon make a decision on pursuing indirect “proximity talks” with the U.S., mediated by the United Arab Emirates, which had delivered President Trump’s letter to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei earlier this week.
On the Iranian side, the government’s official stance appears to favor indirect talks. Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s Foreign Minister in these reports, has stated that direct negotiations with the United States are not feasible at this time unless certain conditions change. However, there are other voices in Iran advocating more direct engagement. Abbas Abdi, a well-known political figure and journalist who supported Masoud Pezeshkian in the latest election, openly suggested that meeting with influential Americans could offer a chance to clarify each side’s intentions without formally committing to direct negotiations. Abdi has said:
“As far as I know, talking to influential Americans who do not hold official State Department positions in the U.S. government is not prohibited. Steve Witkoff may be Trump’s special representative in the region, but that does not necessarily constitute a conventional official post. His positions regarding Iran, as expressed in interviews with Tucker Carlson, are more reasonable than those of most others in the U.S. government, and he has sent clear messages about potential dialogue.”
In his recent Norooz speech, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei did not explicitly reiterate a ban on negotiations; rather, he warned the United States against threatening Iran, declaring that hostile actions would be met with a forceful response. He also stressed that regional resistance movements, such as those in Yemen, act on their own initiative and are not proxies of Iran, a misconception he believes exists among U.S. and certain European policymakers.
On the American side, there also appear to be conflicting perspectives and statements. Steve Witkoff, President Trump’s special representative for the Middle East, stated in an interview with journalist Tucker Carlson that the administration prefers to avoid war and is interested in pursuing a verifiable deal on Iran’s nuclear program. He has mentioned ongoing indirect talks with Iran through “hidden channels,” emphasizing the administration’s preference for diplomacy over military force. Witkoff also discussed the contents of Trump’s letter to Khamenei via an Emirati intermediary, describing it as intended to build trust, not threaten. By contrast, Michael Waltz, the White House national security advisor, struck a more hawkish tone when asked about Witkoff’s remarks, insisting that the Trump administration’s policy is “full dismantlement” of its nuclear program. Absent concrete directives from the President, each official appears to have offered their own interpretation of the policy, with Iran seemingly left to parse whose remarks best reflect the U.S. position.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi confirmed last week that Iran received Trump’s letter, characterizing it as both a threat and an opportunity, while noting that Iran’s rejection of direct negotiations is not due to stubbornness but rather historical experience. Iran’s circumspect approach to diplomacy stems not just from the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) during Donald Trump’s presidency, but also the subsequent tightening of sanctions that the U.S. has pursued in recent weeks. While Araghchi conceded that the JCPOA in its original form may no longer be fully viable—given Iran’s expanded nuclear activities and America’s extended sanctions—he believes its core “formula and logic” could still guide any future agreement, whereby sanctions relief would be exchanged for verifiable assurances of a peaceful nuclear program.
Araghchi also stated in this interview that there is no ban on Iran’s economic relations with the United States. Araghchi further stated: “One criticism of the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) is that it did not pave the way for American businesses to engage commercially with Iran. However, this limitation originated from the United States itself, as it only lifted secondary sanctions under the JCPOA while primary sanctions remained in place, effectively preventing American individuals from doing business with Iran.” He also added:
“Nevertheless, the U.S. did introduce some exceptions within its primary sanctions, including permissions for aircraft purchases and a few other limited activities. Immediately after the JCPOA, we began negotiations to purchase airplanes from Boeing in the U.S. and Airbus in Europe. Contracts were signed for approximately 80 aircraft, and had the JCPOA remained in effect, these deliveries would likely have started last year. Thus, we have no barriers on our side to trade with the United States; the restrictions exist only from the American side.”
The U.S. has engaged in a number of new sanctions designations of entities involved in Iran’s oil sector, following the President’s signature of a memorandum laying out “maximum pressure.” This includes the Trump administration’s sanctioning of a Chinese refinery that had reportedly purchased about 500 million dollars’ worth of Iranian oil, signaling that the activities of a major global power in China are not necessarily beyond the reach of America’s economic coercion. The announcement appeared to trigger further economic losses and depreciation of Iran’s currency.
Amid this tightening, Iraq’s Oil Minister, Hayan Abdel-Ghani, stated in an interview with Al-Iraqiya Network that some Iranian tankers have used falsified Iraqi paperwork to evade sanctions, and that Baghdad has reportedly informed Washington of these instances, prompting U.S. forces to intercept tankers carrying Iranian oil disguised as Iraqi shipments. However, Iran has denied the claims that new Iranian tankers have been seized by the United States.
Still, past reports suggest Iranian vessels have sometimes resorted to various methods to bypass sanctions, including disguising transponder information. In response, the United States has intensified its scrutiny of Iranian oil exports, especially large-capacity tankers (VLCCs) critical to Iran’s export capabilities. Iran, for its part, has reacted to past seizures of its oil by seizing certain foreign tankers in regional waters, further inflaming tensions.
Despite these friction points, both governments hint at a willingness to avoid a military confrontation. Abdi’s suggestion to invite Witkoff and journalist Tucker Carlson to Iran—ostensibly to hold informal discussions and convey Iran’s perspectives directly to Washington—reflects an openness in parts of Iran’s political sphere to shedding diplomatic restraints to pursue Iran’s interests. Even so, progress toward full-fledged talks remains uncertain, given the many actors determined to prevent an opening and the conflicting statements in both Washington and Tehran. Iran’s response to President Trump’s letter, which Araghchi suggests will come in due course, could prove a pivotal moment. For now, tensions persist, and the notion of formal negotiations remains just a possibility.