Iran-E3 Nuclear Talks, Diverging Views on Israel Within Iran’s Leadership, Tehran’s Water Crisis, and More

Week of July 21, 2025 | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council

Iranian President Submits Emergency Bill to Criminalize “False News Content” Online Amid Growing Backlash

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has submitted a double-urgency bill to parliament titled the “Bill for Countering the Publication of False News Content in Cyberspace.” The draft legislation, which contains 22 articles, was approved in a cabinet session on June 28 and formally submitted to the Islamic Consultative Assembly on July 20, bearing the signatures of both President Pezeshkian and Justice Minister Amin Hossein Rahimi.

According to the bill’s introduction, the legislation aims to respond to the expansion of modern digital communication tools and the growing role of citizens in producing and sharing online content. It claims that the spread of distorted or fabricated news content has serious consequences, such as harming reputations, damaging public mental security, deceiving audiences, discrediting official institutions, and undermining national cohesion. The legal justification cites a 2021 Supreme Council of Cyberspace resolution and Clause 2 of Article 158 of the Iranian Constitution.

The bill was originally drafted by the Judiciary in October 2023 and submitted to the government as a judicial proposal. The cabinet began reviewing it in December 2024. Following the bill’s public release, the Legal Department of the Presidential Office issued a clarification denying that the proposal was a reaction to recent wartime tensions or emotionally driven legislation.

The original version of the bill contained 90 articles, which were drastically reduced after internal government review. During this process, the bill’s length was cut to around 20 articles, and key elements were revised. The initial model of licensing online platforms was replaced with a registration-based approach. Mandatory fact-checking by users and platforms before publication was removed. The proposed state-run verification system was also deleted, shifting oversight from pre-publication to post-publication. Many originally proposed criminal offenses were eliminated and replaced with civil liability. The most severe penalties were reduced, and only large-scale platforms—defined as those with more than 0.1% of the national population as users—would be subject to the law’s enforcement.

Despite these revisions, the bill has triggered a wave of criticism from legal experts, journalists, political activists, and even supporters of the Pezeshkian administration. Critics argue that the bill undermines freedom of expression and contradicts campaign promises to open access to digital space and protect civil liberties. The bill defines “false content” as material that “has no basis in reality, is a distorted version of reality, or reflects it incompletely—such as through the deliberate omission of key parts—so as to mislead or confuse the public or damage reputations.”

Azar Mansouri, Secretary-General of the reformist Ettehad-e Mellat party, stated on the social platform X that the bill violates the Iranian Constitution’s provisions on access to information and civil rights. She urged President Pezeshkian to withdraw the bill. Legal expert Kambiz Norouzi called it “the Protection Plan in disguise”, referencing the previously rejected Tarh-e Sianat, a 2021 proposal aimed at controlling online services and limiting access to global platforms such as Instagram and WhatsApp. According to Norouzi, the current bill pursues similar objectives but is more dangerous due to its simplicity and easier enforcement. He also accused the government of concealing the bill until its submission, stating that “no one knew this bill was under discussion until the day it was submitted,” and warned that had it been made public earlier, “it would have triggered widespread backlash.”

Concerns have also been raised about the harsh criminal penalties proposed in the bill. Journalist Milad Alavi noted that under Articles 13 to 15, if a public figure posts a misleading tweet during wartime or a national crisis, they could face 10 to 15 years in prison—a punishment exceeding that for armed robbery, which under Article 652 of the Penal Code carries a maximum of 10 years. Article 14 states that in times of crisis, emergency, or war, publication of false news—even if not considered “corruption on Earth”—can result in one level higher sentencing, bringing it close to the most severe penalties allowed by law.

Law professor Mohsen Borhani described the bill as “the final nail in the coffin of free speech in Iran.” He wrote that “if the bill is not withdrawn and passed into law, everyone will be forced into silence or punished.”

The controversy has revived memories of the failed Protection Plan, formally known as the “Regulatory System for Cyberspace Services”, which was approved by a parliamentary committee in March 2022 but cancelled the next day due to procedural issues. That proposal sparked massive backlash, including over one million signatures on a public petition, with critics warning that it would severely restrict internet access and social media usage.

Public opposition to that plan extended beyond reformists and civil society activists. Even some hardline figures and pro-establishment conservatives spoke out against it. The previous plan proposed an elaborate regulatory structure and institutional controls, while critics argue the new bill accomplishes similar goals under a simpler and more discreet framework. Kambiz Norouzi warned that both proposals aim to criminalize criticism of government incompetence, corruption, and abuse of power, with the current bill doing so without the administrative complexity of its predecessor.

Iran–E3 Nuclear Talks End Without Breakthrough as Snapback Threat Looms

High-level nuclear negotiations between Iran and the three European powers—Britain, France, and Germany (E3)—concluded in Istanbul on Friday, July 25, without reaching a new agreement. However, both sides agreed to continue the dialogue, leaving the door open for further talks. The meeting, held at the Iranian consulate in Istanbul, was the first formal diplomatic exchange since the 12-day conflict between Iran and Israel, and occurred as the E3 pressed for a renewed nuclear accord under a tight deadline.

Kazem Gharibabadi and Majid Takht-Ravanchi represented Iran at the deputy foreign minister level. Gharibabadi described the discussions as “serious, candid, and comprehensive” and noted that Iran strongly criticized the European position on the recent military escalation. He also reaffirmed Iran’s opposition to the “snapback” mechanism, which would restore previously lifted UN sanctions.

The E3 has given Iran until the end of August to agree to a new nuclear deal or face the reactivation of the snapback mechanism under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This mechanism allows for the reimposition of UN sanctions that had been waived in 2015. Before the meeting, European diplomats warned Tehran that Europe “will not remain passive”, while Iranian officials signaled a firm and assertive approach to the negotiations.

Iranian media reported that the snapback issue was the main focus of the Istanbul talks. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei urged Europe to use this opportunity to correct its previous “unconstructive” policies, which Tehran believes weakened Europe’s credibility as a negotiator. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reiterated Iran’s unwavering commitment to uranium enrichment, regardless of any potential agreement.

Gharibabadi warned that activation of the snapback mechanism would be met with a “negative response” and noted that withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains a possibility. He also stated that Iran will not resume direct talks with the United States unless three conditions are met:

  1. The U.S. must rebuild trust with Tehran.
  2. Washington must abandon hidden military agendas.
  3. The U.S. must formally recognize Iran’s right to peaceful uranium enrichment under the NPT.

Although Iranian officials have expressed openness to a deal similar to the JCPOA, they emphasized that direct negotiations with the U.S. are currently not feasible. Nevertheless, Iran is willing to offer guarantees on the peaceful nature of its nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of Western sanctions.

While in New York, Gharibabadi also met with the ambassadors of Russia, China, and ten non-permanent members of the UN Security Council as part of Tehran’s strategy to maintain diplomatic support and counterbalance Western pressure.

Meanwhile, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, speaking from Singapore, called on Iran to demonstrate greater transparency and resume cooperation with international inspectors. He expressed hope that IAEA monitoring activities could resume by the end of the year, particularly in light of the recent U.S. airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in Isfahan, Natanz, and Fordow.

Iran agreed to a technical visit by an IAEA team within the next two to three weeks, though no inspections will be conducted during this trip. The delegation, led by Grossi’s deputy, is expected to arrive before the September meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, where Grossi will present his first report since Israel’s attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities.

In the aftermath of the war, Iran’s parliament passed emergency legislation mandating a reduction in cooperation with the IAEA. The law requires that all IAEA access requests be approved by the Supreme National Security Council. Nevertheless, Araghchi confirmed that Iran will continue cooperating with the agency within the bounds of this new framework and emphasized the need to ensure the safety of inspectors visiting damaged nuclear sites.

As the August deadline approaches, Iran has reiterated its intent to continue uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes, with or without a deal. Gharibabadi again warned that efforts to restore previous UN Security Council resolutions via the snapback mechanism would trigger a strong Iranian response, and exiting the NPT remains an option. Iranian media quoted him as saying that this course had been proposed by the previous administration and is still “on the table.”

Following the conclusion of the Istanbul meeting, Gharibabadi stressed that while Iran remains open to dialogue with Europe, the E3 must adopt an independent stance and not coordinate their position with Washington. He underscored that Iran’s nuclear rights—particularly its right to uranium enrichment—must be fully recognized under international law.

Araghchi reaffirmed that Iran would not abandon its uranium enrichment or missile development programs, emphasizing that Tehran’s core strategic positions remain unchanged, especially in light of recent military threats.

Although Iran has left the door open to future diplomacy with the United States, officials insist that the current environment is not conducive to direct talks. Still, Tehran remains prepared to offer assurances of the peaceful intent behind its nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief. Whether these diplomatic efforts can bear fruit—or whether the region edges closer to renewed confrontation—remains to be seen in the coming weeks.

Diverging Views on Israel Within Iran’s Leadership: Between Diplomatic Signals and Revolutionary Rhetoric

Published July 24, 2025

Recent remarks by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi elicited attention from U.S. President Donald Trump and backlash from hardline voices inside Iran. In a high-profile interview with Fox News anchor Bret Baier, Araghchi stated that the recent U.S. military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities proved that “there is no military solution” to the nuclear issue. He emphasized that diplomatic engagement remains the only viable path forward, reaffirming that Tehran is willing to negotiate.

Responding to questions on Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Araghchi firmly declared that Iran will not abandon its uranium enrichment program, calling it “a source of national pride and a key scientific achievement.” He acknowledged that the facilities had suffered “serious damage” and that uranium enrichment had been temporarily halted. Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization is reportedly assessing the damage and intends to share its findings with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Araghchi expressed conditional openness to reviving a nuclear agreement similar to the JCPOA, though he noted that “direct talks” with the U.S. are currently not feasible. However, he added that Iran is ready to provide assurances that its nuclear program will remain peaceful, in exchange for the lifting of Western sanctions. The Fox News interview prompted an immediate reaction from U.S. President Donald Trump, who referenced Araghchi’s admission of nuclear site damage on Truth Social, stating: “As I said, we’ll do it again if needed.”

In the same interview, Araghchi dismissed claims of any Iranian plans to assassinate Donald Trump or U.S. officials, stating that Iran has never had such a policy. He also reaffirmed Iran’s commitment to its missile program, describing it as “the country’s most reliable defensive capability.” Araghchi stated that Iran would never mount nuclear warheads on its missiles and defended support for regional allies like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, calling them “freedom fighters”. He added that “they fight for a legitimate cause” and compared Iran’s support to U.S. and Israeli military aid, particularly in conflicts involving Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen.

When asked about calls to wipe Israel off the map, Araghchi distanced Iran from such rhetoric, saying: “That has never been Iran’s policy.” However, he warned that “Israel’s crimes against Palestinians may make its survival in the region unsustainable.”

These nuanced remarks triggered a harsh response from hardliners within Iran. Hossein Shariatmadari, editor-in-chief of Kayhan newspaper and a close associate of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, strongly criticized Araghchi, writing: “We hope his comments are soon corrected.” He argued that Iran should reaffirm Ayatollah Khomeini’s statement that “Israel must be erased from the face of the earth.”

Shariatmadari described Israel as a “fake regime” and a “cancerous tumor,” echoing revolutionary rhetoric. He also criticized Araghchi’s call for a new nuclear agreement, questioning: “What benefit did the JCPOA ever bring to Iran?” According to him, the Rouhani administration spent the country’s full diplomatic capacity, yet sanctions were not lifted and in fact doubled.

These contrasting statements reflect a significant internal divide within the Iranian leadership. While the Foreign Ministry promotes engagement and de-escalation, at times fashioning its messaging for a conservative American audience, the hardline establishment remains rooted in anti-Israel ideology. Although Iran officially severed recognition of Israel after the 1979 Revolution, the language and tone used by officials today suggest that any attempt to soften the Iranian position toward Israel in the wake of the war could encounter stiff resistance.

Iran’s Post-War Political Climate: Calls for Dialogue and Deep Structural Reform Amid Crisis

Published July 24, 2025

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s recent remarks on the government’s readiness to engage in dialogue with the opposition have sparked widespread reactions across political circles and social media. In a meeting with reformist politicians, Pezeshkian stated, “We are even ready to hold fair and just dialogue with the opposition, because resolving the country’s problems requires dialogue, not confrontation.”

This statement has drawn both praise and skepticism. The reformist-affiliated Ham-Mihan newspaper—owned by former Tehran mayor Gholamhossein Karbaschi—welcomed the remarks, noting it is rare to hear the term “opposition” used by Iranian officials. In contrast, Javan newspaper, which is close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), headlined its coverage with a warning: “President to Reformists: Do Not Sow Division.”

Most reactions have unfolded on social media, where many users highlighted that a large portion of Iran’s opposition is currently imprisoned within the country, not abroad. Political reformist activist Saeed Shariati wrote: “The president’s words show confidence. But don’t go far. The most noble, popular, and closest opposition figure—Mir-Hossein Mousavi—is just one alley away. Visit him.”

Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a prominent critic of the Islamic Republic, has been under house arrest with his wife Zahra Rahnavard since February 2011. He has repeatedly called for a national referendum to change the constitution and form a constituent assembly, proposing a peaceful transition away from the current system.

Numerous political and economic experts have issued open letters since the Iran-Israel ceasefire, urging sweeping changes to Iran’s governance model to address the country’s worsening crises. The latest came from jailed political activist Mostafa Tajzadeh, who in a letter to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called for fundamental reforms aligned with the national will.

Tajzadeh warned that “the chance of achieving mutual concessions in negotiations with the U.S. has dwindled,” adding that “the lifting of sanctions is now nearly impossible.” He blamed “the Supreme Leader’s strategic miscalculations” for placing the Islamic Republic in its “weakest and most fragile state.”

In his letter, Tajzadeh stressed that the accumulation of crises and declining political legitimacy have emboldened Israel to contemplate “chaos, civil war, and redrawing the Middle East map.” He argued that only through meaningful reforms—such as establishing a constituent assembly via free and fair elections and amending the constitution—can Iran avoid deeper national peril.

Alternatively, he suggested that Khamenei could step down to allow sweeping, people-driven changes. At the same time, Tajzadeh cautioned that avoiding negotiations would give Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and U.S. President Trump a pretext for future military aggression.

Tajzadeh, a former Deputy Interior Minister under President Khatami and a leading reformist, has been imprisoned multiple times since the 2009 protests. He is currently serving a sentence that began in July 2022. In the letter, he condemned Israel’s military attack on Iran while affirming the right to resistance—but also criticized the regime’s strategy for making Iran more vulnerable to international hostility.

He called for structural reforms, asserting: “Only by bringing the people onto the stage can we shift the imbalance of power, make sanction relief achievable, and prevent war.” He also reiterated the demand for a referendum, saying: “Iran’s salvation requires a change in the political playing field. A referendum or a constituent assembly can do that without threatening national security.”

Tajzadeh was previously imprisoned for seven years after the 2009 protests and was re-arrested in July 2022. He now faces a five-year sentence on charges of “collusion against national security” and “spreading falsehoods.” His lawyer, Houshang Pourbabai, recently stated that, given two years remaining from his earlier sentence, Tajzadeh could remain in prison until the year 2032.

Tehran’s Water Crisis: A Nation on the Brink

Published July 24, 2025

Tehran is facing a worsening water crisis, with the capital’s major reservoirs at historic lows. The Amir Kabir Dam is currently at only 38% capacity, marking a 58% decrease compared to the same period last year. The situation is even more dire at Lar Dam, which has dropped to just 7% of its capacity, reflecting a 34% year-over-year decline. Other major dams such as Latian and Mamloo are also in critical condition, both operating at 20% capacity and showing a 47% reduction in stored water. While the Taleghan Dam remains in relatively better shape with 53% capacity, it too has seen a 32% decline from last year.

According to the Tehran Water and Wastewater Company, five consecutive years of drought and a dramatic reduction in rainfall—reportedly the worst in 60 years—have severely affected Tehran’s water reserves. Projections suggest that the Mamloo Dam may go offline by September 2025, with Lar, Latian, and Amir Kabir following soon after. Tehran’s water storage levels have now dropped to their lowest point in more than a century. This crisis has been driven by a combination of excessive water extraction, prolonged drought, and severe climate change.

Residents are already feeling the impact. Frequent and widespread water outages are occurring across many districts of Tehran due to falling water pressure and supply shortages. Iran’s energy minister has acknowledged that the government has no alternative but to ask citizens to endure the current conditions.

The roots of the crisis lie in three interrelated causes. First, poor water management has led to unregulated and illegal groundwater extraction, severely depleting underground aquifers and damaging the region’s water table. Second, climate change has caused declining precipitation and rising temperatures, placing even greater stress on already strained water supplies. Third, uncontrolled population growth and unregulated water consumption in residential, industrial, and agricultural sectors have placed unsustainable pressure on available resources.

The situation has escalated to the point that experts now warn of the risk of the ecological crisis triggering a broader cascade of failures. As vital life-sustaining resources such as water become unstable, national cohesion and security are increasingly threatened. While environmental degradation may not directly lead to state failure, it can accelerate it—especially when combined with poor governance, rising inequality, and economic crises. When large populations are forced to compete over limited water, land, and agricultural resources, the likelihood of conflict, migration, and unrest grows. The Iranian government has so far failed to respond adequately to past warning signs, such as the 2022 water crisis in Hamedan, which was effectively ignored and repressed despite its severity.

During that crisis, in August 2022, the city of Hamedan experienced a major water crisis. For over 30 to 40 hours, many residents had no access to running water, and the situation peaked on August 19 when the Ekbatan Dam ran dry and the city’s main water supply was completely shut off. Dr. Banafsheh Zahraei, a water resources expert and former secretary of the National Task Force on Water Adaptation, noted that residents were subjected to intense hardship. Emergency responses included water tanker distribution, bottled water handouts, and the import of water from neighboring provinces. Yet the deeper crisis extended beyond logistical challenges. Vulnerable populations such as the elderly, children, and the sick suffered greatly, and the event left a deep scar on the collective memory of the city. This scenario now serves as a stark warning to Tehran, which risks facing a similar humanitarian breakdown if immediate and decisive measures are not taken.

In response to the growing crisis, the government is fast-tracking the Taleghan Water Transfer Project. Taleghan Dam, located 65 kilometers from Tehran, remains a key water source for the capital. It currently holds over 200 million cubic meters of water. Ehsan Estahmami, engineering director of the second Taleghan pipeline, emphasized in a recent interview that Tehran is facing one of its most serious water challenges in decades. He warned that the city is likely to endure two to three extremely difficult weeks as summer water consumption rises. The first pipeline, operational since 2001, delivers 2.5 cubic meters per second of water to both Tehran and Karaj. The second pipeline, which is 80% complete, will double the total capacity to 5 cubic meters per second, again divided equally between the two cities.

The project has encountered numerous obstacles, ranging from military zones and industrial areas to private land and protected territories near Karaj, Kordan, and Koohsar. Still, 52 kilometers of the 62-kilometer pipeline have been completed. The first phase is expected to be operational by late August, increasing Tehran’s daily water supply by an additional 216,000 cubic meters. However, while this infrastructure project offers short-term relief, it cannot resolve the deeper structural issues that led to the crisis.

Experts argue that Tehran still has options, but time is running out. Immediate actions include tapping aquifers near treatment plants and deploying compact portable purification units to temporarily reinforce the water grid. Mid-term strategies focus on implementing advanced wastewater recycling systems using technologies such as ultrafiltration (UF), advanced oxidation (AOP), and reverse osmosis (RO). Although these systems require significant investment—estimated at $500 million—and two years to deploy at full scale, initial pilot phases could begin within three months in the most critical districts.

Deeper institutional reform is also necessary. Water governance in Iran is currently fragmented and inefficient. Experts have called for the creation of a centralized Ministry of Water and Environment to streamline decision-making and coordinate national policy. Pricing reforms are equally urgent. While household water should remain affordable as a public good, industrial and agricultural consumption must be restructured around economic value and efficiency to curb waste and eliminate unproductive sectors.

Finally, Iran must figure out a way to open its doors to foreign investment and advanced technologies. Without political and economic stability, and without global partnerships, no technical solution—no matter how innovative—will be sufficient. The Tehran water crisis is not merely a local emergency. It is a national warning. If ignored, it may set off a chain reaction of environmental, social, and political consequences with irreversible damage. The time to act is now.