Week of March 9, 2026 | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council

• War Resilience, Qods Day Mobilization, and Strategic Vulnerabilities in the Iran–U.S. Conflict
• Mojtaba Khamenei’s First Letter Signals Escalation and a Wartime Doctrine for Iran
• Uncertainty Surrounds Iran’s Participation in the 2026 FIFA World Cup Amid Escalating War and Political Tensions
• Escalating War, Leadership Uncertainty, and Regional Spillover
• Economic Pressure on Iranian Society Amid the Expanding War
• Iranian Women’s National Football Team Players Granted Asylum in Australia Amid War-Time Tensions
• The Iran War and the Risk of an Existential Shi’a Mobilization Across the Middle East
• Mojtaba Khamenei Named as Iran’s New Supreme Leader
• The Human Cost of the Expanding Iran War

War Resilience, Qods Day Mobilization, and Strategic Vulnerabilities in the Iran–U.S. Conflict

As the war between Iran, the United States, and Israel enters its fourteenth day, each party is clashing militarily and projecting competing narratives about endurance and collapse. Recent developments – including the Qods Day rallies in Iran today, the crash of a U.S. aerial refueling tanker in Iraq, continued missile exchanges, and rising regional anxiety in Gulf Cooperation Council countries – illustrate that the war remains far more complex than a straightforward story of overwhelming military dominance by any side.

One of the most visible political messages came during the Qods Day rallies held across Iran, particularly in Tehran. Iranian state media broadcast images showing large crowds and the participation of senior government officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani, Judiciary Chief Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, prominent cleric Ahmad Arafi, members of the Guardian Council, and other senior officials. Coming amid ongoing strikes and in the wake of executed and threatened assassinations of senior officials, the appearances projected resolution and defiance. 

By attending the rally in person, Iranian officials sought to convey that they were not paralyzed by security concerns and were willing to appear publicly alongside ordinary supporters despite the risks of attack. At several moments during the demonstrations, explosions were reported in central Tehran near the rally route, including near areas surrounding Revolution Street and other central districts. In some cases the blasts occurred not far from where senior officials were present, reinforcing the impression that the leadership deliberately chose to remain visible in public rather than retreat entirely into protected facilities.

The rally therefore served as a deliberate wartime signal. Iranian authorities wanted to demonstrate that the government remains present, that the streets remain under its control, and that it continues to possess organized supporters capable of mobilizing publicly even during wartime. While this does not indicate universal public support for the government, it does show that the Islamic Republic still retains a committed base willing to mobilize in the political space despite airstrikes and security risks. 

In recent days, Israel has also shifted part of its targeting strategy toward Iran’s internal security apparatus inside Tehran. After Basij forces reportedly established new checkpoints across various parts of the capital, the Israeli Air Force – guided by Israeli military intelligence – conducted coordinated strikes against these checkpoints and the forces stationed at them. Data compiled by the U.S.-based Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded at least 18 Israeli strikes on Basij checkpoints on Wednesday alone, most of them inside Tehran. According to the same dataset, approximately 30 percent of Israel’s recorded strikes in recent days have allegedly targeted Iranian internal security and repression institutions rather than conventional military assets. Analysts suggest that these operations may be designed not only to degrade the regime’s coercive capabilities but also to encourage domestic unrest by weakening the government’s ability to control protests and internal dissent, effectively opening a potential internal front within Iran. However, the Qods Day turnout suggests that these efforts have not yet weakened who is in control of the streets.

This matters because an apparent assumption in U.S., Israel and among some anti-government Iranians early in the war was that the killing of Iran’s former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on the first day of the conflict might quickly destabilize the Iranian political system. Some observers believed that removing the central figure of the Islamic Republic would trigger rapid fragmentation at the top of the state. So far, however, there is no clear evidence that the Iranian government is collapsing.

If such expectations existed in Washington, they likely reflected a misunderstanding of how the Iranian political system operates. The Islamic Republic is not structured around a single individual alone but around a layered network of institutions, including the Revolutionary Guards, Basij mobilization structures, clerical institutions, security organizations, and an extensive bureaucratic apparatus. The death of a supreme leader is undeniably a major shock, but it does not automatically dismantle the broader institutional framework that sustains the system.

The ambiguity surrounding Mojtaba Khamenei, who was appointed as the new Supreme Leader following his father’s death, has also contributed to the political narrative of the war. Reports from Iranian political figures indicate that he survived at least two assassination attempts during attacks on leadership facilities, including a strike that reportedly killed members of his family. Yet no public video or audio appearance from him has been released since his appointment, which has fueled speculation about his physical condition. While he may have been wounded, there is no independently confirmed evidence establishing the extent of his injuries. U.S. officials, including President Donald Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, have suggested that Mojtaba Khamenei may have been wounded during the initial attacks, while some Iranian officials insist he remains in control and directing the country’s response. 

At the military level, the United States maintains that it has inflicted extensive damage on Iranian military capabilities. According to U.S. Central Command, more than 6,000 targets inside Iran have been struck, including radar systems, command centers, missile production sites, weapons factories, and elements of Iran’s naval infrastructure. American officials claim that the campaign has severely degraded Iran’s conventional capabilities, stating that a large portion of Iran’s missile launchers, air defense systems, and naval assets have been destroyed or damaged, and that the United States continues to prioritize strikes against potential Iranian minelaying operations in the Strait of Hormuz.

However, the operational picture appears more complex than those claims alone might suggest. Iran’s military strategy has long relied heavily on missiles, drones, and dispersed launch systems rather than traditional air power or large conventional formations. Despite the scale of U.S. strikes, Iran continues to launch missiles toward Israeli territory – increasingly in tandem with Hezbollah – and to deploy drones across the region, indicating that these capabilities have not been neutralized. While American officials argue that Iranian missile and drone capacities have been significantly reduced, ongoing launches suggest that Iran retains enough surviving systems to continue retaliatory operations.

The United States lost six servicemembers amid the crash of a U.S. KC-135 Stratotanker aerial refueling aircraft in western Iraq. The U.S. Central Command stated “The circumstances of the incident are under investigation. However, the loss of the aircraft was not due to hostile fire or friendly fire. The identities of the service members are being withheld until 24 hours after next of kin have been notified.” Reports also indicated a second U.S. KC-135 was damaged and made an emergency landing in Israel. At least 13 U.S. servicemembers have been killed in 14 days of the war, with at least 140 injuries.

Shortly after the crash, however, the group known as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq – an umbrella network of Iran-aligned militias – claimed responsibility for attacking the tanker aircraft. Whether or not that claim is accurate, the incident highlights the strategic importance of tanker aircraft in modern air warfare.

Aerial refueling aircraft such as the KC-135 are essential to sustaining long-range air operations. They have allowed Israeli and U.S. fighter jets and bombers to remain airborne longer, extend their operational reach, and maintain a high tempo of strikes over distant targets. If Iran-aligned groups in Iraq or elsewhere were able to consistently disrupt tanker operations or threaten the airspace and bases supporting them, it could have significant consequences for the U.S. air campaign. Even limited interference with refueling operations could reduce sortie duration, complicate flight planning, and increase the logistical burden of maintaining sustained air pressure on Iran.

Beyond the battlefield, the conflict is increasingly affecting regional stability and global economic conditions. Oil prices have climbed toward roughly $100 per barrel, driven by fears of prolonged disruption in the Persian Gulf and uncertainty surrounding maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most critical energy corridors in the world. Iranian authorities have indicated that they now exercise tight control over maritime passage in the strait, warning that vessels must obtain authorization before crossing the strategic waterway.

Reports indicate that at least thirteen commercial vessels have been attacked in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman. Several of these incidents involved ships struck by projectiles or explosive-laden remote vessels, leading to fires, casualties among crews, and the suspension of some regional oil exports. In one recent incident, two oil tankers were struck near Iraqi waters close to the port of Umm Qasr, causing fires on both vessels and resulting in at least one reported fatality. Maritime rescue teams were forced to evacuate dozens of crew members as regional shipping companies began reconsidering whether to risk passage through the strait.

Some regional governments have already begun adjusting to the situation. Turkey confirmed that one of its ships was allowed to pass through the Strait of Hormuz only after receiving permission from Tehran, while several additional vessels remain waiting for clearance. At the same time, France and Italy have reportedly begun diplomatic discussions with Iran aimed at securing safe maritime passage, reflecting growing concern among European states about the potential disruption of global shipping.

The broader geopolitical implications of the conflict are also becoming increasingly visible. Russia welcomed the United States’ temporary easing of sanctions on Russian oil purchases, viewing the move as an attempt to stabilize energy markets amid the war. Analysts estimate that the surge in oil prices during the first week of the conflict alone generated billions of dollars in additional revenue for Moscow, which is in the midst of a long war of attrition following its invasion of Ukraine.

Regional security tensions are also expanding geographically. NATO air defenses reportedly intercepted an Iranian ballistic missile that entered Turkish airspace, while Saudi Arabia announced that its air defense systems had shot down more than twenty drones approaching its territory. In Iraq’s Kurdish region near Erbil, a French soldier was killed and several others wounded in a drone attack, highlighting the growing risk to international forces operating in the wider theater of the war.

Inside Iran, the humanitarian consequences of the conflict continue to grow. According to figures released by the Iranian Ministry of Health, the war has resulted in thousands of civilian casualties, including 2,729 injured women and 223 women killed, as well as 1,190 injured minors and at least 202 children under the age of eighteen killed. More than 150 health centers have reportedly been damaged, several hospitals have been evacuated, and dozens of ambulances have been destroyed during the strikes.

At the same time, international political pressure is growing over the bombing of the girls’ school in Minab, which Iranian authorities say killed 175 civilians, including around 110 children, during the early stages of the war. 46 U.S. senators and 121 Representatives have demanded a formal answer from the Pentagon regarding whether American forces were responsible for the strike and whether outdated targeting data may have contributed to the tragedy, along with additional details on steps the Department of War is taking to minimize civilian harm and comply with the laws of war. Reporting has indicated that officials conducting an internal investigation believe the U.S. is at fault, which would make the incident one of the deadliest civilian casualty events associated with U.S. military operations in the Middle East in recent decades.

Taken together, these developments suggest that the war has entered a stage characterized by mutual endurance rather than rapid collapse. The United States and Israel have clearly inflicted significant military damage on Iran’s conventional infrastructure, yet Iran continues to maintain retaliatory missile and drone operations, retain organized political control at home, and exert influence through regional networks.

The Qods Day rallies therefore represented more than a symbolic event. They were intended as a wartime demonstration that the Iranian government remains operational, continues to mobilize loyal supporters, and is not retreating from public political life despite ongoing military pressure. At the same time, the crash of the U.S. tanker aircraft in Iraq – combined with the continued activity of regional militias – serves as a reminder that the logistical backbone of the U.S. military campaign remains exposed to asymmetric disruption. In short, the conflict is increasingly revealing itself as a prolonged regional struggle shaped by military pressure, political resilience, and asymmetric counter-strategies, rather than a rapid campaign leading to the immediate collapse of one side.

Mojtaba Khamenei’s First Letter Signals Escalation and a Wartime Doctrine for Iran

Mojtaba Khamenei’s first message as Iran’s new supreme leader marks a significant moment in the evolving U.S.-Israel-Iran war. Rather than presenting a conciliatory tone or a transition toward diplomacy, the letter outlines a doctrine of continued resistance, escalation, and national mobilization. Delivered through Iranian state television rather than through a public appearance, the statement comes amid ongoing speculation about Mojtaba Khamenei’s health and physical condition following the attacks that killed his father, Ali Khamenei, and several members of his family. The decision to deliver the message in written form, read by a television presenter, underscores both the sensitivity of the moment and the leadership’s effort to assert authority during a period of intense military pressure.

In his message, Mojtaba Khamenei framed the current conflict as an existential confrontation imposed on Iran by the United States and Israel. He emphasized that national unity, public participation, and social resilience are central to Iran’s ability to withstand the war. Addressing the Iranian public directly, he praised the population’s behavior during the days when the country was temporarily without a supreme leader, describing the people’s “insight, courage, and presence” as the factor that preserved national stability. The letter repeatedly stresses the importance of maintaining effective public presence in political, social, cultural, and even security arenas, portraying the population itself as a key pillar of Iran’s wartime defense.

However, the most consequential sections of the message focus on Iran’s military strategy moving forward. Mojtaba Khamenei explicitly calls for the continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz, describing it as a critical tool for inflicting pressure on Iran’s adversaries. The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil and gas supplies normally pass. By endorsing the ongoing closure of the strait, the new leader signals that maritime disruption and pressure on global energy markets will remain central to Iran’s war strategy.

The letter also confirms that attacks on American military bases in neighboring countries will continue, although Mojtaba Khamenei emphasized that these operations are intended to target foreign military installations rather than the host countries themselves. According to the statement, Iranian forces have already struck several such bases and will continue doing so as long as the war persists. At the same time, he revealed that Iran has studied the possibility of opening additional military fronts in areas where its adversaries have limited experience and significant vulnerabilities, suggesting that the geographical scope of the conflict could expand.

Another key aspect of the message is its explicit endorsement of Iran’s regional allies. Mojtaba Khamenei thanked members of what Tehran calls the “Axis of Resistance,” including forces in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and armed groups in Iraq, describing them as loyal partners standing alongside Iran during the conflict. This acknowledgment signals that the Iranian leadership continues to view these networks as an integral part of its broader military and strategic architecture, capable of extending pressure across multiple fronts in the Middle East.

Alongside these strategic messages, the letter places strong emphasis on revenge for those killed during the war, particularly civilians and children. Mojtaba Khamenei stated that Iran would not abandon what he described as the “file of revenge” for victims of the conflict, including those killed in the bombing of the girls’ school in Minab, an attack that caused the deaths of more than one hundred children. He declared that every Iranian killed by enemy attacks constitutes a separate case demanding retaliation, and that Iran will continue pursuing revenge until what he considers full justice is achieved.

At the same time, the message attempts to address the humanitarian consequences of the war. Mojtaba Khamenei expressed sympathy with families who lost loved ones, with those injured in the attacks, and with people whose homes or businesses were destroyed. He also called on government institutions to provide free medical treatment for the wounded and to establish mechanisms to compensate citizens for financial losses caused by the war, presenting these commitments as obligations that Iranian officials must implement and report back to the leadership.

The letter was issued while the end of the war is not in sight. Israel has launched repeated waves of airstrikes targeting infrastructure across Tehran and other major Iranian cities, including energy facilities, military installations, and sites alleged to be connected to Iran’s nuclear development program. Iranian authorities have simultaneously reported new waves of missile and drone attacks against Israeli territory and against U.S. military facilities across the Middle East, reflecting the increasingly regional character of the war.

Despite the scale of the military campaign against Iran, intelligence assessments circulating among Western officials indicate that the Iranian political system has not collapsed and continues to maintain internal control, even after the death of Ali Khamenei and the transition of leadership to Mojtaba. The first message from the new leader therefore serves not only as a wartime directive but also as a declaration of political continuity and regime consolidation under wartime conditions, regardless of the health of Mojtaba Khamenei.

Taken together, Mojtaba Khamenei’s first letter presents a clear strategic signal. It affirms that Iran intends to continue the war through regional pressure, maritime disruption, proxy coordination, and retaliatory strikes, while simultaneously attempting to mobilize the Iranian public around a narrative of national resistance, sacrifice, and revenge. Rather than signaling a pause or a search for compromise, the message suggests that the new leadership is preparing the country for a prolonged conflict in which Iran seeks to offset its conventional military disadvantages through asymmetric tactics, regional escalation, and strategic disruption far beyond its borders.

Uncertainty Surrounds Iran’s Participation in the 2026 FIFA World Cup Amid Escalating War and Political Tensions

Published March 12, 2026

Iran’s participation in the 2026 FIFA World Cup, scheduled to take place from June 11 to July 19, 2026, in the United States, Canada, and Mexico, has become increasingly uncertain amid the ongoing war involving Iran, the United States, and Israel. What began as a major international sporting event has gradually become entangled with geopolitical tensions, security concerns, and domestic political considerations in both Tehran and Washington.

Iran has already qualified for the tournament and is scheduled to play three group-stage matches in the United States. According to the current schedule, Iran is set to face New Zealand on June 15 and Belgium on June 21 in Los Angeles, followed by a match against Egypt on June 26 in Seattle. However, the continuation of military confrontation between Iran and the United States, combined with heightened regional tensions, has cast serious doubt on whether the Iranian national team will ultimately participate in the tournament.

The issue first gained international attention after FIFA President Gianni Infantino revealed that he had discussed Iran’s participation with U.S. President Donald Trump during a meeting about preparations for the upcoming tournament. Infantino later stated publicly that Trump had welcomed Iran’s national team to compete in the United States, emphasizing that global sporting events such as the World Cup can bring people together even during periods of political tension.

However, the political messaging from Washington soon became more ambiguous, and even ominous. Donald Trump later stated that although Iran’s team would technically be welcome to participate, he did not believe that attending the tournament would be appropriate “for their own life and safety.” This statement introduced a new layer of uncertainty, suggesting that while there is no formal prohibition on Iran’s participation, the U.S. administration has expressed clear concerns about the security implications of hosting the Iranian team during, or potentially shortly after, the ongoing war.

At the same time, officials in Tehran have also expressed skepticism about participation under the current circumstances. Mehdi Taj, President of the Iranian Football Federation, acknowledged that following recent military attacks it is difficult to view the World Cup with optimism, particularly because several of Iran’s matches are scheduled to take place in the United States. Iranian officials have also referenced the recent controversy involving Iran’s women’s national football team in Australia, where several players reportedly sought humanitarian protection after facing political pressure during the AFC Women’s Asian Cup.

In addition to political concerns, Iranian government officials have also raised direct security considerations regarding the men’s national team traveling to the United States while the two countries remain in an active military confrontation. Iran’s Minister of Sports recently suggested that participation in the World Cup may not be possible under current conditions, particularly after the United States and Israeli war against Iran.

Despite these statements, Iran has not formally withdrawn from the tournament, and under FIFA regulations any withdrawal would require official notification to the organization. The FIFA World Cup regulations require qualified teams to participate unless extraordinary circumstances arise, and any withdrawal could lead to disciplinary measures, financial penalties, and the possible replacement of the team. FIFA retains broad authority to determine how such a situation would be handled if a qualified team withdraws or becomes unable to compete.

For now, FIFA appears to be adopting a wait-and-see approach, as the situation remains fluid and politically sensitive. A formal Iranian withdrawal could force FIFA to select a replacement team, potentially from the Asian Football Confederation, although the regulations allow the organization considerable discretion in determining the appropriate response.

At the same time, the uncertainty surrounding Iran’s participation reflects a broader reality: the 2026 World Cup is unfolding against the backdrop of one of the most serious geopolitical crises in the Middle East in recent years. With Iran responding to attacks through missile and drone strikes targeting Israel and regional locations hosting U.S. military forces, the conflict has created a security environment that inevitably affects international events involving Iranian nationals.

As a result, Iran’s presence at the tournament now depends not only on sporting considerations but also on diplomatic developments, security assessments, and the evolving trajectory of the conflict itself. Until a formal decision is made by either Tehran or FIFA, Iran remains officially qualified for the 2026 World Cup—but the possibility of withdrawal has become a realistic scenario amid the continuing war and rising political tensions.

Escalating War, Leadership Uncertainty, and Regional Spillover

Published March 11, 2026

The war between Iran, the United States, and Israel continues to expand across the Middle East, with new developments highlighting intensifying regional military activity, mounting civilian damage inside Iran, growing threats to international shipping in the Persian Gulf, and emerging political tensions surrounding Iran’s leadership following the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Growing concerns have emerged regarding both the health condition and the legitimacy of Mojtaba Khamenei’s selection as Iran’s new Supreme Leader. According to Alireza Salarian, Iran’s ambassador to Cyprus, Mojtaba Khamenei sustained injuries during the same attack that killed his father and several members of the family. In an interview with The Guardian conducted at the Iranian embassy in Nicosia, Salarian stated that he had heard “his legs and arms were injured” and that Mojtaba Khamenei was likely currently hospitalized.

Iranian state television previously acknowledged that Mojtaba Khamenei had been wounded during the attack but did not provide further details. Since the announcement of his appointment, no public message, speech, or appearance has been released, fueling speculation about his condition and ability to govern. These concerns were further amplified when Mojtaba Khamenei did not appear at the public funeral ceremony for senior Iranian military commanders killed during the first days of the war. The absence of the newly appointed leader from such a symbolic event has raised additional questions among observers and political figures inside and outside Iran.

The manner of Mojtaba Khamenei’s appointment has also generated debate within Iran’s political sphere. Many Iranian political figures publicly congratulated him after the announcement of his leadership, framing the transition as necessary for stability during wartime. However, former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami notably refrained from congratulating Mojtaba Khamenei directly. In his public statement, Khatami acknowledged the selection of the “third leader of the Islamic Republic” and wished success to the new leadership but avoided any explicit congratulatory message addressed personally to Mojtaba Khamenei, a silence that many observers interpret as a subtle political signal.

More explicit criticism came from Abolfazl Ghadiani, a prominent dissident political activist currently imprisoned in Evin Prison, who strongly condemned the process. Ghadiani described the appointment as “a disgraceful puppet show designed to turn the Islamic Republic into a hereditary monarchy.” He argued that transferring leadership from father to son represents an attempt to institutionalize dynastic rule within the Islamic Republic and reflects a deeper political illegitimacy within the governing system.

Meanwhile, reports from southern Iran indicate that a major hospital in Bushehr has been severely damaged following nearby explosions linked to ongoing military strikes. Local officials reported that the Persian Gulf Martyrs Hospital, a facility with approximately 280 beds, sustained extensive structural and equipment damage and has been temporarily removed from service. Iranian officials state that at least nine hospitals across the country have been damaged since the start of the conflict, raising growing humanitarian concerns regarding access to medical care during the war. Additional reports from Tehran indicate that a branch of Bank Sepah was struck during an overnight air attack, killing several bank employees who were reportedly working late to prepare end-of-month salary payments. Iranian authorities described the strike as an attack on civilian economic infrastructure.

Military tensions have also escalated around the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime chokepoints. Iran’s central military command headquarters, Khatam al-Anbia, declared that Iran will not allow “even one liter of oil benefiting the United States and its allies” to pass through the Strait of Hormuz.

Western intelligence sources believe Iran may be preparing to deploy naval mines in the area using small vessels capable of carrying multiple sea mines. The United States has warned Iran against such actions and reports that American forces have already targeted and destroyed 16 Iranian minelaying boats near the strait. At the same time, Iran has denied that it intends to mine the Strait of Hormuz, arguing that such a step is unnecessary because it already possesses effective operational control over the waterway. Iranian officials say their geographic position and naval presence allow them to influence maritime traffic without physically blocking the strait. 

According to statements attributed to Iranian authorities, Tehran has indicated that commercial vessels from certain countries may be allowed to pass through the strait if their governments take political steps such as closing U.S. or Israeli embassies or reducing cooperation with them. Some reports also suggest that Chinese vessels have continued to transit the Strait of Hormuz with Iran’s approval, indicating that Tehran may be attempting to regulate shipping selectively rather than impose a full blockade. Analysts note that deploying naval mines could undermine this selective control mechanism, since mining the strait could disrupt traffic for all vessels, including those from countries Iran may wish to allow through.

Despite these statements, the situation in the waters around the Strait of Hormuz has become increasingly dangerous. Several commercial vessels have recently come under attack. The United Kingdom’s maritime monitoring agency reported multiple incidents involving projectiles striking commercial vessels near the Strait of Hormuz, including container ships and cargo vessels. In one incident, a cargo ship caught fire after being hit and had to be evacuated. A Thai-flagged cargo vessel was also attacked while passing through the strait. According to Thai naval authorities, 23 Thai crew members were onboard, with 20 rescued by the Omani navy while rescue operations continued for three others.

The conflict is increasingly spilling beyond Iran’s borders. Iranian forces and allied militias have reportedly launched missile and drone attacks against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait, as well as other targets across the Gulf region. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced the start of the 38th wave of its ongoing military campaign, stating that operations would continue until what it described as the “complete surrender of the enemy.”

Gulf states have reported intercepting several projectiles. Saudi Arabia announced it had intercepted six ballistic missiles aimed at Prince Sultan Air Base, while also downing multiple drones targeting oil facilities. In Iraq, a drone struck a major U.S. diplomatic support facility near Baghdad International Airport, causing structural damage but no reported casualties. U.S. officials believe the attack was likely carried out by Iranian-aligned militias operating under the umbrella of the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq.” In the United Arab Emirates, authorities in Dubai reported that two drones crashed near Dubai International Airport, injuring three people, although air traffic later returned to normal.

The intensifying conflict has also triggered growing concern among global energy markets and major industrial economies. Energy ministers from the Group of Seven (G7) announced that they are prepared to coordinate with the International Energy Agency to take “all necessary measures” to address rising oil prices, including the possible use of strategic reserves. Reports indicate that the 32 members states of the International Energy Agency are considering one of the largest coordinated releases of emergency oil reserves in history if disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz worsen.

At the diplomatic level, the United Nations Security Council voted on the first resolution addressing the war, adopting a resolution condemning Iranian attacks on Gulf Cooperation Council countries and threats to international shipping. Russia and China abstained. Russia has proposed a separate resolution calling for a ceasefire and condemning attacks on civilians without directly assigning blame to Iran, Israel, or the United States.

At the same time, the war is exposing growing uncertainty about its strategic direction. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has warned that the United States and Israel appear to have “no joint plan for a quick and convincing end” to the conflict. Despite earlier rhetoric supporting the war and the goal of toppling the Islamic Republic, Merz emphasized that Europe has no interest in an endless war and warned against outcomes resembling Libya or Iraq, stressing that the world still needs a stable Iran capable of remaining part of a regional peace and security framework.

Taken together, the combination of leadership uncertainty in Tehran, criticism of Mojtaba Khamenei’s succession, expanding regional attacks, threats to global energy routes, and mounting civilian infrastructure damage suggests that the conflict is entering a more dangerous and unpredictable phase. With no clear diplomatic pathway emerging and military operations continuing across multiple fronts, the war increasingly appears to be evolving from a direct confrontation into a broader regional crisis with profound humanitarian, political, and economic consequences.

Economic Pressure on Iranian Society Amid the Expanding War

Published March 11, 2026

The ongoing war that began on February 28, 2026 (9 Esfand 1404) with U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on political, military, and nuclear targets across Iran has rapidly extended beyond military confrontation, placing severe pressure on Iran’s already fragile economy and the daily lives of millions of civilians. Even before the conflict began, Iran’s economy was struggling with chronic stagflation, high unemployment, and extreme inflation in food and consumer goods, with some basic items already experiencing price increases of over 90 percent. The escalation of military operations, combined with infrastructure damage, internet shutdowns, and declining economic activity has significantly intensified these pressures.

In Tehran, field reports describe a city undergoing a dramatic transformation. According to a report published by the Coordination Council of Iranian Teachers’ Trade Associations, ten days after the start of the war the capital has fallen into what observers describe as an unsettling silence. Streets that once remained busy late into the night are now largely empty, many shops are closed, and economic activity has slowed dramatically. Residents describe an atmosphere increasingly dominated by military checkpoints, armed patrols, and a heavy security presence, creating what many perceive as a city operating under a wartime security environment. The report portrays citizens caught between the fear of aerial attacks and the psychological strain of heightened security measures, while daily economic life has slowed to a crawl.

One of the most immediate consequences of the conflict has been the rapid rise in the price of essential food items. Field reports indicate that prices of basic staples such as eggs and potatoes have doubled or even tripled within the first ten days of the war. Even moderate increases in staple food prices have compounded the hardship of households already struggling with inflation. For instance, the price of a tray of eggs increased from approximately 280,000 toman to around 340,000 toman, while chicken leg prices rose from about 195,000 toman per kilogram to roughly 230,000 toman. Vegetables such as tomatoes and cucumbers have also become noticeably more expensive. These increases come on top of already severe inflation, making it increasingly difficult for many families to afford even the most basic meals. Observers describe the emotional strain experienced by parents who must navigate the anxiety of war while struggling to provide food for their families.

The conflict has also sharply disrupted commercial activity across the country. Tehran’s Grand Bazaar—historically the economic heart of the capital—has been partially closed, with some sections completely shut down. Many shop owners report suspending operations due to fear of further military strikes, declining demand, supply disruptions, and uncertainty about future conditions. As a result, daily sales in parts of the bazaar have reportedly fallen by between 50 and 70 percent, reflecting a significant contraction in economic activity. Across urban areas, consumer demand has dropped sharply, as many households now focus exclusively on purchasing essential goods while postponing all other spending due to uncertainty about income and the future.

Energy infrastructure has also come under pressure. On March 6 (16 Esfand), several fuel storage facilities near Tehran were struck during military operations, including oil depots in the Kouhak and Shahran districts and a storage facility in Karaj. Explosions were also reported near the Shahr-e Rey refinery complex. These incidents triggered widespread concerns about fuel shortages. Long lines formed at gas stations across the capital within hours of the reports, as residents rushed to secure fuel. Some citizens reported the emergence of a temporary black market for gasoline, where fuel was sold in containers for up to three times the official price. While authorities later stated that fuel distribution remained stable, the attacks reduced regional storage capacity and placed additional pressure on an already strained distribution network. In Tehran and the neighboring Alborz province alone, daily consumption reaches approximately 22 million liters of gasoline and 12 to 18 million liters of diesel, meaning that the fuel distribution system must transport between 34 and 40 million liters of petroleum products every day to maintain supply.

Another major shock to the economy has come from one of the longest internet disruptions in Iran in recent years. Monitoring organizations report that nationwide restrictions have lasted for more than a week, severely limiting access to international internet services. These disruptions have had a profound impact on Iran’s digital economy. Many online businesses, startups, freelancers, and service providers rely heavily on stable internet access to operate. Previous internet shutdowns earlier in 2025 had already caused major economic losses. During a roughly twenty-day disruption earlier in the year, nearly 80 percent of ATMs temporarily stopped functioning and thousands of online jobs were effectively halted. The current shutdown is once again undermining digital commerce, payment systems, and online services.

The disruption has also affected transportation services. Iran’s major ride-hailing platforms rely on GPS and mapping systems to function. With internet services disrupted, drivers and passengers report that these services operate only partially, reducing income for hundreds of thousands of drivers. Reports indicate that demand for workers in small companies has fallen by as much as 74 percent in recent weeks, reflecting the broader slowdown across many sectors of the economy.

Although major cities still report relatively stable access to protein products such as meat, poultry, and dairy, producers warn that the agricultural sector may soon face growing difficulties. Farmers and poultry producers report concerns about shortages of livestock feed, declining demand, and logistical disruptions. Some producers warn that if the war continues for an extended period, domestic meat and poultry production could face significant challenges, potentially leading to shortages and further price increases.

Conditions also vary significantly across different regions of the country. While Tehran and other large cities still maintain relatively stable supplies of essential goods, residents in some smaller provinces report more difficult conditions. In Bushehr and Hormozgan provinces, for example, residents describe longer lines at bakeries and greater difficulty obtaining some essential items. In response, the government has reportedly introduced temporary purchasing limits in some supermarkets, restricting the quantity of items such as bottled water, cooking oil, canned food, and other essential goods that consumers can buy.

The war has also increased pressure on the healthcare sector and on the psychological well-being of the population. Residents report that prices for supplements, sedatives, and psychiatric medications have increased by more than 30 percent, driven by rising demand as anxiety and sleep disorders spread among the population. Children are reportedly among those most psychologically affected, with many experiencing fear and distress during nighttime airstrikes.

Humanitarian organizations warn that the situation could worsen if the war continues. The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies has reported that humanitarian needs inside Iran are increasing rapidly and has requested more than $50 million in emergency funding to support relief operations over the next sixteen months. The organization estimates that approximately five million people may require assistance, including healthcare, shelter, water and sanitation and psychological support. Across the country, more than 2,100 emergency response teams and over 6,500 Red Crescent staff and volunteers are currently engaged in search-and-rescue operations and humanitarian support.

Despite the many pressures, some markets appear relatively stable for the moment. However, economists caution that this stability largely reflects a sharp drop in consumer demand rather than genuine economic resilience. Many households are delaying purchases and conserving resources while waiting to see how the conflict evolves. Experts warn that the most severe economic consequences may emerge after the conflict ends. If consumer demand suddenly returns while production and supply chains remain weakened, the country could face another wave of inflation, shortages, and economic instability.

In this environment, the war has transformed Iran’s existing economic crisis into a broader humanitarian challenge. Rising food prices, damaged infrastructure, disrupted fuel distribution, prolonged internet shutdowns, declining employment opportunities, and growing psychological stress are collectively placing immense pressure on ordinary citizens. As the conflict continues, the economic and social costs of the war are increasingly being borne not by military actors, but by millions of civilians struggling to maintain daily life under conditions of uncertainty and hardship.

Iranian Women’s National Football Team Players Granted Asylum in Australia Amid War-Time Tensions

Published March 12, 2026

The situation surrounding Iran’s women’s national football team has become an international political and humanitarian issue after several players reportedly sought asylum in Australia during the AFC Women’s Asian Cup. The developments have drawn attention from governments, international organizations, and supporters, reflecting the broader political climate surrounding Iran amid ongoing regional tensions.

According to Australian officials, several members of the Iranian women’s national football team have received humanitarian visas and are now permitted to remain in Australia. The players were identified by Australian authorities as Atefeh Ramazani-Zadeh, Zahra Sarbali, Mona Hamoudi, Fatemeh Pasandideh, and Zahra Ghanbari. Australian Home Affairs Minister Tony Burke confirmed that he personally met the athletes and signed their humanitarian visa applications after they indicated that they wished to stay in Australia for safety reasons.

Australian authorities stated that the players left their team hotel and were transferred by police to a secure location, where discussions regarding their immigration status continued for several days. According to Burke, the players emphasized that they are not political activists but athletes seeking personal safety. He also noted that the Australian government would offer the same opportunity to other members of the team if they choose to remain in the country.

According to a report by Tasnim News Agency, Mohaddeseh Zolfi, a member of Iran’s women’s national football team, withdrew her request for asylum in Australia and announced her intention to return to Iran. Iranian state-affiliated media claimed that her earlier asylum request had been made under significant pressure from the Australian government and what they described as hostile media outlets.

The controversy began during Iran’s participation in the Women’s Asian Cup in Australia. In the team’s first match, several Iranian players refused to sing the Iranian national anthem, an act that drew significant attention and reportedly led to threats from hardline supporters of the Iranian government. In subsequent matches, however, the players sang the anthem and performed a military-style salute during its broadcast, a gesture that raised concerns among observers that the athletes may have been under pressure from Iranian authorities or worried about the safety of their families.

Following Iran’s elimination from the tournament after a 2–0 defeat to the Philippines, hundreds of Iranian supporters gathered outside the stadium in Gold Coast, chanting slogans such as “Save our girls.” Some supporters attempted to block the team bus, urging the players to remain in Australia rather than return to Iran.

The case has also attracted political attention in the United States. Former U.S. President Donald Trump publicly urged Australia to grant asylum to the players, warning that forcing them to return to Iran could put their lives at risk. In a social media post, Trump stated that if Australia refused to provide protection, the United States would be willing to accept them. The statement is notable given that the Trump administration has recently deported some Iranian refugees back to their country after denying them asylum, even during periods of intensified repression against protesters in Iran, highlighting a striking contrast in policy rhetoric. Iranians generally remain barred from securing visas, asylum or refugee status in the United States.

Iranian authorities have responded by urging the team to return home. In a statement, Iran’s Prosecutor General’s Office said the players could return to Iran “with calm and reassurance.” The statement claimed that some players had been influenced by emotional reactions and what it described as “enemy provocations,” referring to what Iranian officials called the “American-Zionist war.” Authorities suggested that the actions of certain players had been politically exploited by Iran’s adversaries.

Meanwhile, Iran’s Football Federation criticized Trump’s comments as “direct political interference” in football affairs, calling on FIFA to prevent political tensions from affecting international football competitions. Separate reporting this week indicated that the men’s soccer team, Team Melli, will not participate in the 2026 World Cup in the United States given the ongoing war and American involvement in killing Iran’s Supreme Leader.

Reports from journalists in Australia indicate that the remaining members of the Iranian team face difficult decisions. Some players are reportedly considering returning to Iran due to fears that their families could face pressure or retaliation if they remain abroad. Others are believed to be exploring options for staying in Australia or traveling to third countries.

The case highlights the intersection of sports, politics, and human rights during a period of heightened regional conflict. For the athletes involved, the decision whether to remain abroad or return home carries profound personal consequences, as it could affect not only their own futures but also the safety and well-being of their families in Iran.

The Iran War and the Risk of an Existential Shi’a Mobilization Across the Middle East

Published March 10, 2026

The ongoing war between Iran and the United States and Israel is increasingly evolving beyond a conventional military confrontation into what many actors across the region perceive as an existential struggle for Shi’a communities in the Middle East. A combination of military escalation, the symbolic killing of key leadership figures, religious mobilization by senior clerics, and deep historical memory of sectarian violence has transformed the conflict into something far more dangerous than a traditional geopolitical dispute.

At the center of this transformation is the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during the opening phase of the war, an event that has had profound political, religious, and psychological consequences across Shi’a networks in the region. Ayatollah Khamenei was not only the political leader of Iran, but also a marja (source of emulation) for many Shi’a Muslims, meaning that millions of believers across the Middle East and beyond followed his religious guidance. In Shi’a Islam, senior clerics known as maraji’ hold extraordinary authority over their followers in matters of law, faith, and political conduct. Because of this unique position, Khamenei’s death was perceived not merely as the elimination of a state leader but as the killing of a major Shi’a religious authority during a foreign military campaign.

For many Shi’a communities, this event reinforced the belief that the war is not simply about Iran’s nuclear program or regional influence but about the future security and political survival of Shi’a power in the Middle East. Following Khamenei’s death, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani of Iraq has become the single most influential Shi’a religious authority in the world. Sistani has long been one of the most respected and widely followed maraji’ among Shi’a Muslims, particularly in Iraq and across many Shi’a communities in the Middle East and the global diaspora.

For decades, Sistani and Khamenei together represented two of the most important religious authorities in the Shi’a world, each exercising influence through different religious and political networks. However, after the killing of Khamenei, Sistani’s position has become even more central, effectively leaving him as the most authoritative marja for millions of Shi’a believers at a critical moment in the region. Because of this role, Sistani’s statements and potential religious rulings now carry even greater weight than before, and any call from him regarding the defense of Shi’a communities or Iran could have major political and military consequences across the Middle East.

In response to the war, Sistani issued a strong condemnation of the attacks on Iran and called on Muslims and the international community to oppose the war and show solidarity with the Iranian people. Within Shi’a religious and political networks, discussions have also emerged about the possibility of religious mobilization to defend Iran, including references to the concept of communal jihad in defense of the Islamic community.

The significance of such a religious ruling is demonstrated by history. In 2014, when ISIS captured the Iraqi city of Mosul and threatened Baghdad, Sistani issued a historic fatwa calling for defensive jihad. That ruling mobilized tens of thousands of volunteers and led to the creation of the Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi), which became a central force in defeating ISIS. This precedent illustrates the extraordinary capacity of a single fatwa from a senior Shi’a cleric to mobilize large numbers of fighters across national borders.

Another crucial factor shaping the perception of the war is the role Iran plays in the broader Shi’a political landscape. For decades, Iran has functioned as the strategic backbone of Shi’a movements across the Middle East, providing political, financial, and military support to several key actors. These include Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shi’a militias in Iraq, and the Houthi movement in Yemen. Together, these actors form what is often described as a transnational Shi’a alliance, sometimes referred to as the “axis of resistance.”

For many of these movements, the survival of Iran’s political system is directly connected to their own security and influence. If Iran were weakened or replaced by a government hostile to Shi’a movements, many groups believe they would become highly vulnerable to regional rivals and extremist organizations. This perception contributes to the growing view that defending Iran is essential for protecting Shi’a communities across the region.

The interpretation of the current conflict is also deeply shaped by recent historical trauma, particularly the atrocities committed by ISIS against Shi’a communities in Iraq. One of the most defining events occurred in June 2014 with the massacre at Camp Speicher near the Iraqi city of Tikrit. During this attack, ISIS militants captured thousands of unarmed Iraqi military cadets, most of whom were Shi’a. Between 1,100 and 1,700 young cadets were systematically executed, with their bodies thrown into the Tigris River or buried in mass graves. Many of the victims were barely twenty years old. ISIS deliberately filmed the executions and circulated the videos to terrorize Shi’a communities. The massacre became one of the largest terrorist killings of the modern era and left a profound psychological scar across the Shi’a world.

The trauma of Speicher was one of the primary factors behind the mass mobilization that followed Sistani’s 2014 fatwa, ultimately contributing to the defeat of ISIS. Because of this history, many Shi’a communities interpret the current war through the lens of collective survival and the need to prevent another wave of sectarian violence.

At the same time, the conflict is escalating militarily inside Iran itself. Iranian authorities announced that funeral ceremonies for several senior military commanders killed in the war will take place in Tehran, reflecting significant leadership losses. Among those reported killed are Abdolrahim Mousavi (Chief of Staff of Iran’s Armed Forces), Mohammad Pakpour (Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), Ali Shamkhani (Secretary of the Defense Council), Aziz Nasirzadeh (Minister of Defense), and Mohammad Shirazi (Head of the Office of the Supreme Leader).

Missile strikes have also affected civilian areas. Iranian media reported that a missile struck Bagheri Highway in Tehran, killing civilians and burning multiple vehicles. Another strike reportedly targeted a traffic police building in eastern Tehran, causing additional fatalities. In the city of Khomein, authorities reported damage to at least 265 civilian buildings, including homes and commercial units. Israel has also stated that it targeted an underground ballistic missile development complex at Imam Hussein University in Tehran, which Israeli officials described as a facility involved in missile research and development.

Meanwhile, Iranian officials have made clear that Tehran is not seeking a ceasefire under current conditions. Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated that Iran must continue fighting until the aggressor is punished so that such attacks are never repeated. Similarly, Iran’s central military command declared that the war will not end unless the United States and Israel express regret for their actions, emphasizing retaliation for the killing of Iran’s leadership. Iranian officials have also warned that continued attacks could lead to disruptions in oil exports from the region, potentially affecting global energy markets further.

Beyond Iran itself, the conflict risks drawing in multiple Shi’a armed movements across the region. Hezbollah in Lebanon, for example, already views its confrontation with Israel as an existential struggle. Despite ceasefire arrangements in recent years, Israel has continued targeted strikes against individuals suspected of Hezbollah membership, reinforcing the organization’s belief that the conflict with Israel remains ongoing. Hezbollah has also struck back amid the Iran war, landing blows in Israeli territory and adding to the difficulty of Israel’s defense against Iranian retaliation.

Similarly, Iraqi Shi’a militias and the Houthi movement in Yemen maintain strong ideological and military ties with Iran. If Iran were perceived to face an existential threat, these groups could feel compelled to enter the conflict more directly, expanding the battlefield from the Persian Gulf to the eastern Mediterranean.

Taken together, these developments suggest that the war is gradually shifting from a conventional interstate conflict into a confrontation shaped by religious authority, sectarian identity, and historical trauma. Three dynamics are particularly significant: the killing of Ali Khamenei, a figure who held both political leadership and religious authority; the potentially decisive role of Grand Ayatollah Sistani, whose religious rulings have previously triggered mass mobilization; and the widespread perception that Iran represents the backbone of Shi’a political security in the Middle East.

When conflicts become framed as struggles for communal survival rather than strategic disputes, they become far more difficult to contain or resolve. For this reason, the current war risks evolving into a much wider regional confrontation involving Iran, Israel, the United States, and multiple Shi’a armed movements across the Middle East. If this transformation continues, the conflict could become one of the most destabilizing sectarian crises in the region since the rise of ISIS, with consequences extending far beyond Iran itself.

Mojtaba Khamenei Named as Iran’s New Supreme Leader

Published March 8, 2026

Iranian state media have announced that Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, has been selected as the new Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, marking a historic and controversial transition of power during an ongoing war. The announcement was formally made today, March 8, following days of speculation after Ali Khamenei was killed in strikes on the Iranian leadership compound during the first day of the U.S.-Israel war on Iran on February 28. Those strikes also killed Zahra Haddad-Adel, the wife of Mojtaba Khamenei and daughter of former Iranian parliament speaker Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, as well as Mansoureh Khojasteh-Bagherzadeh, the wife of Ali Khamenei, Mesbah Bagheri-Kani, the husband of Hoda Khamenei, and Zahra Mohammadi Golpayegani, the 14-month-old granddaughter of Ali Khamenei. According to Iran’s state television news channel, Mojtaba Khamenei has been wounded in the current war and reportedly been left permanently disabled, though additional details are not yet available on the extent of his injuries.

Mojtaba Khamenei becomes the third Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic and the first leader in the country’s post-revolutionary history whose leadership effectively follows his father, raising debate about the unprecedented nature of the succession. According to official Iranian news agencies, the Assembly of Experts voted decisively to appoint Mojtaba Khamenei as the new leader. However, the exact procedure of the vote remains unclear. During the week following Ali Khamenei’s death, no public in-person meeting of the Assembly of Experts was reported, with Iranian officials citing wartime security conditions as the reason. Reports also emerged that the secretariat of the Assembly of Experts in the city of Qom had been struck by U.S. and Israeli missiles, although no confirmed casualty figures were released. Reports suggest that consultations may have taken place remotely or through representatives, though no official details about the voting mechanism have been released.

The leadership transition comes amid the ongoing war between Iran and the United States and Israel, which began with strikes on Iranian leadership facilities on February 28. In the immediate aftermath of the attack that reportedly killed Ali Khamenei, speculation emerged about whether Mojtaba Khamenei had also been killed in the strike. After four days of silence, Iranian media reported that Mojtaba Khamenei was alive and actively involved in advising on key national decisions, fueling speculation that preparations were underway for selecting a new leader. 

According to Iran’s constitution, until a new Supreme Leader is formally chosen, the country is governed by a temporary leadership council composed of the president, the head of the judiciary, and a clerical member of the Guardian Council. With the announcement of Mojtaba Khamenei’s appointment, that transitional arrangement appears to have ended.

The decision has generated mixed reactions inside Iran’s political circles. Some conservative figures quickly expressed support. Hardline parliamentarian Hamid Rasaei indirectly welcomed the development, referring to Mojtaba Khamenei as an “Ayatollah” and suggesting that “Khamenei has become young again,” implying continuity with the policies of the late leader.

Others criticized the timing and process of the decision. Conservative journalist Mohammad Mohajeri described the rushed selection of a leader during wartime as “suspicious and illogical.” Former minister Abbas Akhoundi warned that choosing a successor in the middle of war could be “a dangerous deviation and a deadly poison for Iran during wartime.” Iranians who welcomed the killing of Khamenei now face the elevation of his son who appears deeply linked to the legacy of his father.

The succession also comes after years of speculation about Mojtaba Khamenei’s possible role as a future leader. Two years ago, Mahmoud Mohammadi-Araghi, a member of the Assembly of Experts, said in an interview with ILNA that Ali Khamenei had opposed considering his sons as candidates for succession. This statement remains one of the very few indirect indications attributed to the late leader regarding the issue of hereditary succession. Despite that earlier claim, Mojtaba Khamenei had long been considered one of the most likely candidates, largely due to his close connections with political, clerical, and security institutions within the Islamic Republic and his influential role in managing the office of the Supreme Leader.

Mojtaba Khamenei was born on September 8, 1969, in Mashhad, the second son among six children of Ali Khamenei. He attended the Alavi religious school and, according to Iranian media reports, participated as a teenager in several short deployments during the Iran–Iraq war. In 1999, at the age of 30, he moved to the religious city of Qom to pursue advanced clerical studies. Notably, he had not worn clerical robes until that time, an unusual path in Iran’s clerical hierarchy where religious training typically begins earlier.

He was married to the daughter of Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, a prominent conservative politician and former speaker of the Iranian parliament, until she was killed in the airstrike that killed his father. Although Mojtaba Khamenei has never officially held a government position, he is widely believed to have played an influential role within the power structure of the Islamic Republic, particularly through his involvement in the management of his father’s office and his relationships with security and political institutions.

The office of the Supreme Leader oversees a vast network of economic foundations and institutions sometimes described as an economic empire estimated to control assets worth as much as $95 billion. Because these organizations lack financial transparency and oversight, the exact role Mojtaba Khamenei may have played in their management cannot be independently verified.

Mojtaba Khamenei’s name first gained public prominence during the 2005 Iranian presidential election, when reformist candidate Mehdi Karroubi accused him of interfering in the election process in favor of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. His name resurfaced again during the controversial 2009 presidential election, when protests erupted across Iran. Demonstrators frequently chanted “Mojtaba, may you die before seeing the leadership,” accusing him of involvement in the suppression of protest movements and electoral interference. Former reformist official Mostafa Tajzadeh later described the 2009 election as an “electoral coup” and claimed that pressure against him and his family had been ordered directly by Mojtaba Khamenei, allegations that have remained politically contentious.

In recent years, some religious media and clerical figures have referred to Mojtaba Khamenei as “Ayatollah.” In 2022, a religious news agency in Qom reported that he had begun teaching advanced “dars-e kharej” courses in Islamic jurisprudence, the highest level of study in Shi’a seminaries, suggesting he had reached the scholarly level of ijtihad. However, very little is known about his personal political views, and no public interviews or detailed policy positions attributed directly to him have ever been published.

Among some political figures, Mojtaba Khamenei has also been described as a potential agent of generational change within the Islamic Republic. Fa’ezeh Hashemi Rafsanjani suggested that Mojtaba Khamenei could become a “Mohammed bin Salman-like figure” for Iran, possibly introducing certain reforms within the system. Other political figures, including Abbas Palizdar and Abdolreza Davari, have in recent years expressed support for the idea of Mojtaba Khamenei eventually becoming Supreme Leader.

Following the official announcement of his leadership, many officials and political figures within the Islamic Republic congratulated him, including Hassan Khomeini, one of the grandsons of first Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Iran’s security and military institutions also quickly declared loyalty to the new leader. In a statement, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) congratulated Mojtaba Khamenei’s appointment and pledged full obedience, describing him as a qualified jurist and a young thinker capable of guiding the Islamic Republic through difficult historical moments. The statement emphasized that the Islamic Republic would continue its path despite the loss of the previous leader, asserting that the system is not dependent on any single individual.

The Iranian national police command also issued a statement declaring full allegiance to the new Supreme Leader, promising loyalty “to the last breath.” Similarly, Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff and the Central Headquarters of Khatam-al-Anbiya declared that the armed forces would stand under the command of Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei and defend Iran’s security against foreign enemies “until the last drop of blood.”

The IRGC Intelligence Organization also published a statement on social media declaring loyalty to Mojtaba Khamenei, emphasizing that Iran’s armed forces would defend the country under his leadership against foreign conspiracies. Beyond Iran’s borders, regional allies also expressed support. Hezbollah in Lebanon issued a statement congratulating Mojtaba Khamenei on his selection as Iran’s Supreme Leader, while Yemen’s Ansarullah movement also welcomed the decision, describing it as a sign of unity and resilience within the Iranian political system.

Inside Iran, Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei described Mojtaba Khamenei’s appointment as “a source of hope and satisfaction for the Iranian nation,” emphasizing that Iran remains engaged in a struggle against what he described as hostile enemies during a critical moment in the country’s history.

At the same time, the leadership transition has unfolded against the backdrop of escalating tensions with the United States. U.S. President Donald Trump previously rejected the possibility of working with Mojtaba Khamenei, calling him “a lightweight” in comments to Axios and suggesting Trump himself would be involved in choosing Iran’s next leader. “Khamenei’s son is unacceptable to me. We want someone that will bring harmony and peace to Iran,” Trump stated in the interview. Trump also warned that any future leader of Iran would need U.S. approval, stating that “if he does not receive our approval, he will not last long.” In another remark, Trump suggested that whoever becomes Iran’s new leader could eventually face assassination.

For years, speculation about Mojtaba Khamenei’s succession circulated widely, particularly as Ali Khamenei’s age advanced and discussions about the future leadership of the Islamic Republic intensified among members of the Assembly of Experts. Several clerics had hinted that the identity of the next leader had already been determined but kept confidential due to security concerns. After months of public absence and limited visibility, Mojtaba Khamenei’s sudden emergence as the new Supreme Leader marks one of the most consequential leadership transitions in the history of the Islamic Republic, taking place during a period of war, internal uncertainty, and intense geopolitical pressure on Iran.

The Human Cost of the Expanding Iran War

Published March 8, 2026

As the war involving Iran, the United States, and Israel enters a more dangerous phase, its human consequences are becoming harder to ignore. The war is exacting deep civilian, humanitarian, environmental, and regional costs. The latest developments show not only an escalation in attacks and counterattacks, but also a widening pattern of damage to homes, schools, hospitals, fuel infrastructure, public services, and the daily lives of millions of people across Iran and the broader region.

The impact on civilians inside Iran is triggering deep concerns worldwide. Iranian authorities say that preliminary figures from the first week of the war show that among those killed were 198 women, 190 people under the age of 18, and 6 children under the age of 5. Officials said the youngest victim identified so far was an eight-month-old baby girl, while the oldest was an 88-year-old man. They added that around 30 percent of the dead are children. These numbers, if confirmed, underscore that the burden of the war is falling heavily on noncombatants, including some of the most vulnerable members of society.

The damage to civilian infrastructure inside Iran appears extensive. According to Iranian Red Crescent and other official accounts, thousands of non-military sites have been damaged, including residential units, commercial properties, schools, medical centers, and Red Crescent facilities. One of the latest assessments reported that 9,669 civilian units had been damaged, including 7,943 residential units and 1,617 commercial units. Authorities also said that 65 schools, 32 medical and pharmaceutical centers, and 13 Red Crescent facilities had been hit, while ambulances, rescue vehicles, and emergency personnel were also affected. Iranian officials further said that 11 medical workers have been killed and 33 injured, while the World Health Organization has reportedly confirmed 13 attacks on health facilities in Iran and one in Lebanon. Even if some figures remain difficult to independently verify in real time, the pattern is clear: civilian life-sustaining infrastructure is being heavily degraded.

Recent attacks on fuel depots and storage facilities in and around Tehran and Alborz province have added a new dimension to the humanitarian toll, lighting parts of the capital city on fire and spreading thick, caustic black smoke. Major fires have continued to burn long after the strikes. Iranian officials warned residents to avoid unnecessary movement, wear masks, and remain indoors where possible. The Red Crescent also warned of the possibility of toxic rainfall or acid rain, saying that the burning oil facilities could release large amounts of hydrocarbons and sulfur and nitrogen oxides into the atmosphere. Residents who managed to get online described a city filled with fear, darkened skies, and anxiety over breathing polluted air. Social media posts spoke of black powder settling with the rain, fears for people living near fuel depots, and a general sense that ordinary urban life had been replaced by emergency survival.

The attacks have also produced immediate economic and social disruptions for civilians. In Tehran, damage to the fuel distribution network led authorities to reduce personal fuel quotas and make the metro system free and available 24 hours a day in order to manage movement in the city. Residents were urged to avoid unnecessary travel and only go to fuel stations when absolutely necessary. Temporary housing measures for displaced families are reportedly underway in multiple provinces, while emergency shelter efforts have been concentrated in provinces such as Mazandaran, Gilan, Ardabil, and Golestan. Officials also say that islands such as Qeshm, Kish, Hormuz, and Hengam have largely been emptied of travelers, though local residents remain there.

The war’s toll has not been limited to Iran. As Iranian retaliatory strikes and drone operations have expanded, neighboring countries in the Gulf have also experienced direct consequences. Reports from Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq indicate that missiles, drones, or debris have struck and threatened airports, fuel depots, desalination facilities, government buildings, residential structures, and other civilian sites. Kuwait reported fires and damage linked to drone attacks, including damage to a government social security building and fuel storage linked to Kuwait International Airport. Bahrain said a desalination facility was damaged and that debris caused injuries and property damage, which appears to have been a direct retaliation to a U.S. strike – originating from Bahrain – that damaged a desalination plant on Qeshm island, knocking out water supply for 30 villages. The UAE reported casualties and injuries after interception operations and falling debris. There were also reports of strikes or attempted strikes near the U.S. embassy in Baghdad and damage to a UN-related building in Iraqi Kurdistan. These developments show how quickly the war is imposing civilian costs not only on Iranians and Israelis, but on populations across the wider region.

Inside Israel, the humanitarian impact is also mounting. Israeli health authorities said that since the beginning of the war, 1,929 people have been injured and taken to hospitals, with 122 still hospitalized and 9 reported in serious condition. Earlier emergency service reports said that 10 civilians had been killed, including 9 people in a missile strike on Beit Shemesh. These figures point to the continuing danger posed by Iranian missile fire. While Israel’s air defense systems remain active, it appears their capabilities have been significantly diminished by Iranian strikes on regional radar systems, which provide early warning to the Israeli population. While Israeli civilians are able to take cover in the country’s significant bomb shelter systems, civilians on all sides are increasingly living under missile warnings, emergency disruptions, and the constant threat of death or injury.

Another troubling feature of the current phase of the war is the increasing normalization of threats against political and civilian-adjacent institutions. Israel publicly warned that it would target members of Iran’s Assembly of Experts and any potential successor involved in choosing a new supreme leader. At the same time, senior Israeli figures such as Yair Lapid have called for destroying Iran’s oil fields in order to paralyze the country economically, while Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has openly framed the war as an effort to create conditions for regime change. President Donald Trump has likewise spoken publicly about wanting to choose who governs Iran, raising fears that the war is shifting from a military campaign into an openly coercive struggle over Iran’s political future. Such rhetoric increases the risk that the conflict will become even broader, more punitive, and more devastating for civilians.

The human cost is also being compounded by confusion, contradictory messaging, and political uncertainty inside Iran. President Masoud Pezeshkian apologized to neighboring countries for Iranian attacks and said further strikes would stop unless attacks on Iran originated from those countries. This was quickly seized upon by Trump, who claimed that the apology was the result of U.S. bombardment and that Iran was losing the war. According to Trita Parsi of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, Trump’s intervention may have blown up a regional mediation effort designed to deescalate aspects of the war, with Pezeshkian’s remarks the first step. Afterwards, other power centers, including the judiciary chief, military command, and hardline political figures, indicated that attacks on regional bases and interests linked to the United States and Israel could continue with full intensity. At the same time, members of the Assembly of Experts and other officials have suggested that a majority view has formed on Iran’s next leadership, while also acknowledging unresolved obstacles and the temporary rule of a leadership council. This political uncertainty adds another layer of instability at a moment when ordinary civilians are already living through bombardment, displacement, shortages, and fear.

There is also a wider humanitarian and environmental danger in the militarization of essential infrastructure. Competing accusations have emerged over attacks on water desalination facilities, especially in relation to Qeshm and Bahrain. Regardless of who is responsible in each case, the fact that water infrastructure is now part of the conflict shows how quickly the war is moving toward targets that sustain everyday life. Attacks on schools, fuel depots, hospitals, airports, and water systems do not simply damage buildings; they endanger public health, disrupt shelter and transportation, and deepen the vulnerability of entire populations.

At the military level, Iranian officials are presenting the conflict as one they can sustain for the long term. The IRGC has said it can continue a high-intensity war for at least six more months, and officials have threatened expanded missile and drone operations. At the same time, Iranian sources have emphasized that the country’s air defenses have performed better than they did during the June war, particularly in intercepting drones over Iranian territory. This is an important claim because, if accurate, it suggests a reduced ability for the United States and Israel to use drones or related aerial operations to find and strike mobile missile launchers and other time-sensitive targets inside Iran. Even so, whatever the tactical balance may be, the war’s strategic reality is unchanged: the longer it continues, the greater the pressure on civilians, infrastructure, and regional stability.

International reactions increasingly reflect concern over that widening human toll. China has called for an immediate ceasefire, warning that the war should never have started and that attempts to reshape regional political systems from outside are unacceptable. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has warned that the conflict could spiral beyond anyone’s control and has stressed that unlawful attacks are causing immense suffering to civilians and serious risks to the global economy, especially for the most vulnerable. Turkey has also warned against any scenario aimed at provoking civil war inside Iran, calling such a path a historic mistake.

Taken together, the latest developments suggest that this war is no longer defined only by military targets or strategic deterrence. It is increasingly a conflict of burned neighborhoods, damaged hospitals, injured medical workers, displaced families, frightened children, polluted skies, interrupted water and fuel systems, and civilians caught between rival narratives of escalation. The scale of human suffering already visible in Iran, Israel, and across the region should make clear that further expansion of the war will not produce security. It will produce more death, more displacement, more environmental damage, and deeper regional trauma.

The central story of this phase of the war is not only who is striking whom, or which side claims military advantage. It is that civilians are paying the price.