Iran-U.S. Talks Advance Toward a 60-Day Deal, Nabavian’s Hardline Resistance, Khamenei’s Distant Approval, and More

Iran Unfiltered

June 22, 2026

Week of June 15, 2026 | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council

The Nabavian Affair: Hardline Resistance to the Iran–U.S. Deal Moves Into the Open
A Historic Opening: Iran–U.S. Talks Advance Toward a 60-Day Deal Despite Trump’s Threats and Lebanon Tensions
Khamenei Approved the Deal, But Distanced Himself From It
Iranian Reactions to the U.S.–Iran Agreement Reveal Broad Support for Diplomacy, but Significant Hardline Resistance Remains
Iran-U.S. MOU Generates Hope for Peace but Faces Opposition from Israel, U.S. Hawks, and Iranian Hardliners
Deal to End the War is Finalized, but Spoilers Remain

The Nabavian Affair: Hardline Resistance to the Iran–U.S. Deal Moves Into the Open

The controversy surrounding remarks by Iranian parliamentarian Mahmoud Nabavian on state television has become one of the clearest signs yet of the growing resistance to the Iran–U.S. memorandum of understanding from hardline factions within the Islamic Republic. Nabavian, the deputy chairman of Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee and a leading figure in the Paydari Front, appeared on a live broadcast on state television and read portions of what he claimed were confidential communications from Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei regarding negotiations with the United States. According to Nabavian, Khamenei had repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the direction of the talks and had imposed multiple conditions on negotiators, including preserving Iran’s enrichment rights, obtaining compensation from the United States, lifting sanctions, securing access to frozen Iranian assets, and maintaining full sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.

Nabavian further claimed that Khamenei had opposed negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program unless Iran’s enrichment rights were explicitly recognized and had warned that the negotiations taking place in Pakistan had deviated significantly from the conditions that originally justified them. He argued that the memorandum ultimately differed from what the leadership had envisioned and suggested that Khamenei had serious reservations about both the process and the outcome.

The reaction was immediate and extraordinary. State television abruptly cut the live broadcast before Nabavian finished his remarks. Hours later, IRIB issued a statement describing his comments as an improper disclosure of classified materials and warned that the matter could be subject to legal prosecution. The broadcaster subsequently accepted the resignation of a senior network manager and announced disciplinary measures against those responsible for the program.

The severity of the response was striking. Iranian state television has often served as a platform for critics of negotiations with the United States, including many figures associated with the Paydari Front. Nabavian himself had repeatedly appeared on television in recent months criticizing the negotiations and portraying the memorandum as a step toward turning Iran into an American “colony.” The decision to interrupt the program and publicly threaten legal action suggests that authorities viewed his comments as crossing a political red line.

The backlash extended well beyond state television. Saeed Ajorlou, a member of the negotiating team’s media apparatus and a close ally of Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, accused Nabavian of deliberately distorting confidential texts. Other political figures criticized him for selectively presenting excerpts from a much larger body of correspondence. Journalist Sadegh Hosseini called for greater accountability over repeated leaks of sensitive information, while former presidential adviser Hesameddin Ashena argued that if the documents were genuinely classified at the highest level, the law clearly defined the consequences of unauthorized disclosure. Even some conservative figures criticized Nabavian, arguing that his partial disclosures undermined institutional order and were designed to defend previous claims that the agreement amounted to Iranian surrender.

Yet the significance of the episode extends beyond questions of classified information. At its core, the controversy reflects an emerging struggle over how the public should understand the Iran–U.S. agreement and the role of the country’s leadership in approving it.

In a written statement attributed to Mojtaba Khamenei following the announcement of the memorandum, the Supreme Leader stated that he had “another opinion” regarding the agreement but ultimately permitted it to move forward after President Masoud Pezeshkian accepted responsibility for implementing it. Many observers interpreted the statement as an effort to create some political distance between the leadership and the agreement while preserving institutional unity and allowing diplomacy to proceed.

Nabavian’s intervention appeared designed to push that interpretation much further. By selectively quoting what he described as confidential communications, he sought to portray Khamenei not merely as cautious about the agreement but as fundamentally dissatisfied with many of its core elements. In effect, Nabavian attempted to strengthen the narrative advanced by hardline opponents that the memorandum represented a deviation from the leadership’s preferred strategy and was being pursued despite significant reservations at the highest levels.

By contrast, President Masoud Pezeshkian has offered a very different account of how the agreement was reached. Speaking at a national governance conference following the announcement of the memorandum, Pezeshkian described the agreement as the product of months of negotiations, consultations, and institutional review. He argued that if fully implemented, the memorandum could become a historic achievement for Iran, help resolve many of the country’s challenges, and create a new political and economic reality for both Iran and the broader Middle East.

Most significantly, Pezeshkian disclosed that more than 90 percent of participants in the Supreme National Security Council supported the agreement. According to the president, after extensive discussions, all members ultimately voted in favor of moving forward, although some limited disagreements remained. While he did not identify dissenting figures, his remarks offered one of the clearest indications yet that the agreement enjoys overwhelming support among Iran’s senior national security leadership.

Pezeshkian also emphasized the roles played by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, the negotiating team, and the Supreme National Security Council. He praised the cooperation among the executive, legislative, judicial, and military institutions and argued that this unity had strengthened Iran’s position. Perhaps most importantly, Pezeshkian explicitly credited Mojtaba Khamenei for making the agreement possible. He stated that negotiators would not retreat from the framework established by the Supreme Leader and argued that the authorities and guidance provided by him were indispensable to achieving the breakthrough. According to Pezeshkian, without the Supreme Leader’s support and guidance, the agreement would not have been possible.

These remarks stand in sharp contrast to the narrative advanced by Nabavian and other hardline opponents of the memorandum. Whereas Nabavian sought to portray the leadership as deeply dissatisfied with the negotiations, Pezeshkian presented the process as one that received overwhelming support from the country’s most important decision-making institutions and ultimately from the Supreme Leader himself.

The broader political context is equally important. Since the announcement of the memorandum, figures associated with the Paydari Front and other ideological factions have mounted a sustained campaign against the agreement. Nabavian has been among the most vocal critics, describing the memorandum as a path toward Iranian dependence on the United States and warning that it compromises national sovereignty. His opposition is consistent with a long record of resistance to engagement with Washington, opposition to Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-recommended reforms, and support for confrontational regional policies.

The controversy also highlights the increasingly isolated position of the agreement’s most vocal opponents. Despite significant criticism from hardline networks, the political system moved swiftly against Nabavian following his televised remarks. State television interrupted the broadcast, accepted a senior resignation, threatened legal action, and publicly distanced itself from his claims. Such a coordinated response suggests that key institutions are seeking to protect the agreement from internal sabotage and prevent disputes over the leadership’s position from undermining its implementation.

Viewed in this broader context, the Nabavian affair reveals that the primary political struggle is no longer over whether the Iran–U.S. memorandum should exist. The agreement has already secured support from President Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Araghchi, Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf, the Supreme National Security Council, and ultimately the Supreme Leader. Instead, the emerging battle is over how the agreement will be interpreted, who will claim ownership of it, and who will bear responsibility if it succeeds or fails.

The episode therefore represents one of the clearest indications yet that a relatively small but highly organized hardline faction continues to resist the agreement and is attempting to frame it as a departure from the leadership’s preferred course. At the same time, the reaction from state institutions suggests that the Iranian establishment has largely coalesced around the memorandum and is determined to prevent opponents from using the authority of the Supreme Leader to undermine a diplomatic initiative that now appears central to the state’s post-war strategy.

A Historic Opening: Iran–U.S. Talks Advance Toward a 60-Day Deal Despite Trump’s Threats and Lebanon Tensions

The first round of high-level Iran–U.S. negotiations in Switzerland produced diplomatic progress, even as President Donald Trump’s threatening social media post over Lebanon briefly disrupted the atmosphere and underscored the fragility of the process. The talks were held at the Bürgenstock resort overlooking Lake Lucerne, a venue owned by Katara Hospitality, part of Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund, a notable detail given Doha’s central role as one of the mediators. The negotiations entailed an intensive, reportedly 12-hour marathon round of discussions involving Iranian, American, Qatari, and Pakistani officials.

At the opening of the talks, Vice President JD Vance described the meeting as “historic”, saying its purpose was to “turn a new page” and begin “a new chapter” in relations with the Iranian people. Vance said Washington was seeking a broader transformation in the region based on stability and peace, and framed the negotiations as an opportunity to move beyond decades of confrontation.

Vance was joined by Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, underscoring the degree to which the talks were being handled by figures close to Trump’s inner circle rather than treated as a routine diplomatic engagement. Their presence suggested that the administration viewed the Switzerland track as a high-priority initiative with potentially transformative implications.

However, moments after Vance’s remarks, Trump posted on Truth Social that Iran must immediately stop its allied forces in Lebanon from “causing trouble,” warning that if it did not, the United States would strike again “even harder.” The post created immediate tension. Iranian media reported that Tehran’s delegation formally complained to the American side and paused the talks for internal consultations.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who led the Iranian delegation, responded sharply, saying Iran did not take American threats seriously and warning that Iran’s armed forces were prepared to respond if necessary. Iranian officials also avoided appearing in a joint photo or handshake ceremony with the American delegation, reflecting sensitivity to domestic political pressures in Tehran.

Despite the disruption, the negotiations continued and produced several concrete outcomes. Qatar and Pakistan issued a joint statement describing the first day of talks as “positive and constructive” and announcing that the parties had made “encouraging progress.” The agreements outlined include:

A roadmap to reach a final agreement within 60 days;
The immediate continuation of technical negotiations;
The creation of a High-Level Committee to oversee implementation and political coordination;
The establishment of a direct communication channel between Iran and the United States; and
The creation of a conflict-control mechanism focused on Lebanon.

The newly established High-Level Committee will supervise working groups on nuclear issues, sanctions relief, implementation, monitoring, and dispute resolution, providing a structured framework for advancing the memorandum of understanding. The establishment of a direct communication channel is intended to prevent incidents and misunderstandings in the Strait of Hormuz and ensure the safe passage of commercial shipping. This issue had become increasingly urgent following Iranian threats to close the waterway amid disputes over Lebanon.

Lebanon Emerges as the Central Challenge

As could be predicted following President Trump’s remarks, Lebanon appears to remain the most difficult issue in the negotiations. Under the memorandum of understanding, Iran, the United States, and their respective allies are expected to support an immediate and permanent end to military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon. However, Israel has insisted that its forces will remain in a security buffer zone in southern Lebanon, while Iran and Hezbollah have rejected any continued Israeli presence.

To address this challenge, the parties agreed to establish a Lebanon Conflict-Control Mechanism, facilitated by Qatar and Pakistan, to monitor compliance with the ceasefire and reduce the risk of renewed escalation. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei described the mechanism as a way to ensure that the memorandum is actually implemented rather than merely signed. He emphasized the principle of “commitment for commitment” and said Iran would monitor compliance continuously.

At the same time, unconfirmed reports suggest that Egypt and Saudi Arabia may be promoting a framework under which Israel would withdraw from southern Lebanon while Hezbollah would retain its weapons but commit not to use them. Such a formula would effectively postpone the contentious issue of Hezbollah’s disarmament while prioritizing a sustainable ceasefire. However, these reports remain unverified and should be treated cautiously.

Progress on Sanctions and Frozen Assets

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi described the negotiations as having produced “significant progress.”

According to Araghchi:

Restrictions on Iran’s oil and petrochemical exports have been suspended;
The naval blockade has been lifted;
Some frozen Iranian assets have been released;
A reconstruction and economic development initiative for Iran has begun; and
Significant progress has been made toward ending the conflict in Lebanon.

Iranian economic officials also announced that $12 billion in frozen Iranian assets could be released in two phases, with $6 billion released initially and another $6 billion later. Meanwhile, Hamid Bord, head of the National Iranian Oil Company and a member of Iran’s negotiating team, said discussions on lifting oil sanctions were pursued aggressively. He reported that Iranian vessels had already begun using previously restricted routes and that a substantial volume of oil exports had resumed.

Regional Support for the Negotiations

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif described the negotiations as “successful,” citing the 60-day roadmap, technical talks, and the creation of implementation mechanisms as evidence of meaningful progress. The diplomatic process also received regional backing. On June 21, the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey met in Cairo to discuss regional developments and efforts to reduce tensions, including the U.S.–Iran memorandum of understanding.

Participants included:

Faisal bin Farhan (Saudi Arabia)
Mohammad Ishaq Dar (Pakistan)
Badr Abdelatty (Egypt)
Hakan Fidan (Turkey)

According to official statements, the ministers discussed Pakistan’s mediation efforts, developments in Lebanon, regional stability, and the need to preserve the diplomatic track. They emphasized continued coordination to reduce tensions and restore security throughout the region. The significance of these consultations is that the Switzerland process has evolved beyond a purely bilateral U.S.–Iran negotiation. It now encompasses Lebanon, sanctions relief, Gulf security, oil exports, maritime navigation, and broader regional stability.

Israeli Opposition and Continuing Risks

The talks continue to face substantial resistance from Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated that Israel would remain in its security buffer zone in southern Lebanon “as long as necessary.” He also declared that no political development would alter his commitment to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz similarly stated that Israeli forces would remain in southern Lebanon and retain full freedom of action against perceived threats. On the other side, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem rejected any Israeli military presence inside Lebanon, while IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Qaani warned that Israel would face additional losses if it refused to withdraw.

These competing positions illustrate why Lebanon has become the first major test of the Switzerland framework. Success in reducing tensions there could reinforce the broader diplomatic process, while failure could empower opponents of diplomacy across the region.

A Fragile but Significant Breakthrough

The negotiations did not produce a final agreement, and substantial obstacles remain. Nuclear restrictions, sanctions relief, implementation mechanisms, Lebanon, regional security issues, and domestic political opposition in both countries all remain unresolved.

Nevertheless, the talks produced a framework that did not exist before:

A 60-day roadmap toward a final agreement;
A High-Level Committee overseeing implementation;
Technical working groups;
A direct Hormuz communication channel;
A Lebanon conflict-control mechanism;
Movement on sanctions relief; and
Progress on frozen assets.

Most importantly, the talks demonstrated that both sides remain committed to pursuing diplomacy despite significant political pressure and recurring crises. For that reason, Vance’s description of the meeting as “historic” may ultimately prove accurate. The Switzerland negotiations represent the most serious attempt in years to move the United States and Iran from military confrontation toward a structured diplomatic process. The breakthrough remains fragile, but it has established a framework that could, if sustained, reshape regional dynamics and potentially open a new chapter in U.S.–Iran relations.

Khamenei Approved the Deal, But Distanced Himself From It

Published June 19, 2026

The statement issued by Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, regarding the U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding may be one of the most consequential political messages of his leadership so far. While he explicitly authorized the agreement and did not oppose it, the language of the statement suggests a deliberate effort to create political distance between himself and the deal. The key passage is his assertion that:

“As a matter of principle, I held a different view. However, based on the commitment made by the President, in his capacity as head of the Supreme National Security Council, on behalf of himself and the other members, and his explicit acceptance of responsibility for the matter, I authorized it.”

This formulation is significant for several reasons. First, Khamenei makes a point of stating that he personally preferred a different course of action. Rather than presenting the agreement as his own strategic choice, he emphasizes that he approved it despite his reservations. This allows him to maintain distance from the policy while still permitting it to move forward. Most importantly, he publicly stated that he had “a different view” and only approved the deal after receiving assurances from President Pezeshkian and the Supreme National Security Council.

Second, he explicitly places responsibility on President Masoud Pezeshkian and the Supreme National Security Council. The statement highlights that Pezeshkian “accepted responsibility” for the agreement before receiving authorization.

By emphasizing that Pezeshkian “accepted responsibility,” Khamenei appears to be assigning political ownership of the agreement to the government rather than to himself. This approach appears intended to address two distinct audiences. The first audience consists of hardline supporters, conservative activists, and segments of the political base that rallied behind the leadership during more than one hundred days of war. Many within these circles remain deeply skeptical of negotiations with the United States. By stressing that he initially opposed the agreement, Khamenei reassures hardline supporters that he has not abandoned the ideological principles of resistance and that the deal should not be interpreted as a personal endorsement of rapprochement with Washington.

The second audience is the broader political establishment. If the memorandum ultimately fails, if negotiations collapse, or if Washington is perceived to violate its commitments, the political responsibility will fall primarily on the government and President Pezeshkian rather than on the Supreme Leader himself. In effect, Khamenei has approved the process while insulating his own political capital from its outcome. The reactions that followed the statement suggest that many officials recognized the potential for this interpretation and sought to counter it.

President Pezeshkian’s response focused heavily on the Supreme Leader’s support for diplomacy. He described the statement as a “roadmap” for protecting Iran’s national interests and emphasized that the government and the Supreme National Security Council remain committed to implementing the Leader’s guidance. Pezeshkian’s response sought to frame the negotiations as a system-wide decision endorsed by the Supreme Leader rather than a personal initiative of his administration.

The President’s communications office reinforced this message, arguing that the Leader’s authorization for negotiations constituted a valuable asset for the negotiating team and rejecting suggestions of disagreement among the leadership.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf adopted a notably different tone. Rather than emphasizing diplomacy, he framed the agreement through an ideological and confrontational lens. His response was filled with references to “the front of monotheism,” “the front of falsehood,” “resistance,” “struggle,” and keeping “our hands on the trigger.” He argued that diplomacy itself should be viewed as another battlefield in the broader struggle against adversaries.

The contrast between Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf is revealing. Pezeshkian emphasized governance, diplomacy, and national interests. Ghalibaf emphasized resistance, confrontation, and ideological struggle. While both support the agreement, they appear to be speaking to different audiences.

Pezeshkian is focused on reassuring the broader public and demonstrating that diplomacy can deliver results. Ghalibaf is focused on reassuring hardline constituencies that the agreement does not represent an ideological retreat. Statements from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Supreme National Security Council Secretariat, and conservative cleric Ahmad Alamolhoda followed a similar pattern.

All publicly endorsed the negotiations while simultaneously stressing distrust of the United States, preserving the achievements of the war, and maintaining readiness for military retaliation if the agreement is violated. This messaging appears designed to preserve unity within the political system while preventing backlash from hardline factions.

Taken together, Khamenei’s message can best be understood as a form of conditional and cautious support. He did not block the agreement. He authorized it. But he also made clear that it was not his preferred course of action. This distinction is politically important. By endorsing the negotiations while distancing himself from ownership of them, Khamenei preserves support among hardline constituencies while shifting responsibility for the agreement’s success or failure toward the government.

At the same time, the statement elevated Pezeshkian’s political standing. In recent weeks, the growing visibility of figures such as Ali Larijani and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in the negotiation process had led some observers to conclude that the president had been sidelined. Instead, Khamenei repeatedly emphasized Pezeshkian’s role as both President and Chairman of the Supreme National Security Council, effectively placing him at the center of the process.

The most important political message of the statement, therefore, may not have been directed at Washington at all. It was directed at Iran’s domestic political landscape. The negotiations will proceed. The Supreme Leader has authorized them. But the political ownership – and potentially the political liability – belongs primarily to President Pezeshkian and his government.

Iranian Reactions to the U.S.–Iran Agreement Reveal Broad Support for Diplomacy, but Significant Hardline Resistance Remains

Published June 18, 2026

The announcement of a preliminary agreement between Iran and the United States to end more than one hundred days of war has triggered a broad debate across Iran’s political spectrum. While disagreements remain over the details of the agreement and the prospects for a final settlement, the most striking feature of the reaction has been the breadth of support for diplomacy, including from figures and institutions not traditionally associated with the reformist camp.

Unlike the debates surrounding the 2015 nuclear deal, the emerging divide is no longer simply between reformists who support engagement and conservatives who oppose it. Instead, many influential conservative figures, state-affiliated media outlets, establishment insiders, academics, journalists, and civil society voices have endorsed the agreement as a means of consolidating Iran’s wartime gains and avoiding further destruction. At the same time, a smaller but vocal hardline faction continues to warn against trusting the United States and making concessions at the negotiating table.

The Iranian press offers perhaps the clearest illustration of this shift. Reformist newspaper Shargh ran the headline “The War Is Over”, framing the agreement as an opportunity to transition from military confrontation to diplomacy. In an editorial titled “The Difficult Road Ahead,” the paper argued that the agreement is intended primarily to create space for the next phase of negotiations rather than resolve all outstanding disputes. Shargh emphasized that issues such as Iran’s missile program and regional allies are not included in the current framework and that the agreement is focused on ending hostilities, lifting economic pressure, and creating a pathway toward a comprehensive settlement.

Etemad similarly welcomed the agreement under the headline “The First Day of Understanding”, publishing the full text of the memorandum and describing it as the beginning of a new phase rather than the end of the process. The newspaper highlighted provisions calling for a permanent end to military operations across all fronts, including Lebanon, mutual respect for sovereignty, and a commitment to negotiate a final agreement within sixty days.

Sazandegi offered one of the strongest endorsements, featuring the headline “A Major Step Forward” and presenting the agreement as an opportunity for economic recovery, reconstruction, and Iran’s reintegration into international diplomacy. Ettelaat likewise embraced the diplomatic opening, warning that “those who benefit from war want war to continue.” The paper argued that sanctions profiteers, political opportunists, and those invested in perpetual confrontation should not be allowed to derail a chance for peace.

Perhaps the most noteworthy position came from Javan, a newspaper closely associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Rather than criticizing negotiations, Javan argued that diplomacy should be viewed as a continuation of the battlefield. The paper wrote that “negotiation can be like war and a continuation of it,” criticizing those who reject all forms of diplomacy and arguing that governments can fight and negotiate simultaneously. Javan insisted that diplomacy should not automatically be equated with surrender and warned against portraying every agreement either as a complete victory or a betrayal.

By contrast, Kayhan has remained deeply skeptical. Its headline — “The Enemy Was Defeated on the Battlefield; Beware the Loopholes of the Agreement” — encapsulates its position. Editor Hossein Shariatmadari argues that the conflict between Iran and the United States is fundamentally ideological and existential. While not rejecting the end of the war itself, he insists that Iran must not surrender the achievements secured through military resistance. Shariatmadari warned that Washington’s long-term objective remains weakening the Islamic Republic and argued that Iran’s armed forces must remain fully prepared even if a final agreement is reached.

What is particularly notable is that support for the agreement extends beyond political elites and into civil society, academia, and the broader intellectual sphere. Emad Baghi, one of Iran’s most prominent human rights advocates, described the agreement as a “win-win negotiation.” While arguing that the war itself could and should have been avoided, Baghi maintained that Iran’s ability to withstand pressure from major world powers and emerge with an agreement represented a source of national pride. More importantly, he suggested that the agreement offers a lesson for domestic politics: if Iran and the United States can move beyond decades of hostility and negotiate, then political actors within Iran should likewise embrace dialogue rather than exclusion. He argued that differing viewpoints should be heard rather than criminalized and called for a less polarized political environment.

Reformist sociologist and political commentator Mohammadreza Jalaipour linked the agreement to a broader process of political moderation and consensus-building inside the Iranian system. He argued that the agreement would not have been possible without the election of President Masoud Pezeshkian, the more pragmatic leadership of Parliament under Ghalibaf, years of reformist efforts to build consensus, and what he described as the successful synergy between the battlefield, diplomacy, public mobilization, and state institutions. In Jalaipour’s view, the agreement represents the culmination of a political strategy that rejected both radical confrontation and political despair.

Notably, support for the agreement has also emerged from long-time critics of the Islamic Republic. Ali Afshari, a prominent democracy advocate and former student activist, described the understanding as “a victory for Iran as a country and an ancient nation.” While emphasizing that the struggle for democracy remains unresolved, Afshari argued that ending the war was an essential first step and urged Iranians to focus on social cohesion, economic recovery, and realistic political reform rather than either triumphalism or cynicism.

Legal scholar and attorney Bahmani Ghajar used the agreement to call for national reconciliation. Describing the agreement as a major military, political, and diplomatic achievement, he urged authorities to accompany it with a general amnesty for political prisoners and detainees. Ghajar argued that rebuilding the country after the war requires the participation of all Iranians and that national unity should be strengthened through forgiveness and inclusion.

Retired university professor Yadollah Karimpour offered one of the most detailed public defenses of the agreement. He argued that the central question facing critics is whether they genuinely preferred the continuation of war and destruction to a diplomatic opening. Karimpour contended that even an imperfect agreement shifts both countries from a military phase to a diplomatic phase, making a return to war significantly more costly. He further argued that the agreement creates breathing room for society and the economy, weakens the influence of those who profit from perpetual crisis, and provides a framework for distinguishing genuine supporters of peace from advocates of continued confrontation. Summarizing his position, Karimpour wrote that “even the worst peace agreements are usually more effective than the best and most justifiable wars.”

Outside formal political institutions, several prominent journalists and analysts have also publicly welcomed the agreement. Ahmad Zeidabadi wrote that “the darkness of war has passed and a new tomorrow has arrived,” calling for reconciliation, forgiveness, and national healing after months of conflict. Conservative commentator Mohammad Mohajeri argued that if diplomacy succeeds in ending the war, “the business of sanctions profiteers and war profiteers will come to an end,” reflecting broader frustration with ideological opposition to negotiations.

Several notable former officials from varied political backgrounds have also expressed support for the agreement. Former President Hassan Rouhani described the agreement as a major national achievement and urged Iranians to protect it from sabotage. He warned that Israel would likely attempt to undermine the diplomatic opening, just as it sought to destroy previous agreements, and stressed that the coming sixty days would be critical for securing a lasting settlement. Rouhani wrote that “the achievement of the preliminary understanding must be protected” and emphasized that national unity would be essential for reaching a final agreement.

Former President Mohammad Khatami similarly endorsed the agreement w hile emphasizing caution. In a widely circulated statement, he argued that “this is not the end of the crisis, but the beginning of a difficult and lengthy road toward overcoming it and opening a horizon of life free from war.” Khatami praised the military, the negotiating team, and national institutions while stressing that the ultimate objective should be lasting peace and regional stability.

Former First Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri described the agreement as “a major achievement in ending a costly war” and called on all political and civil currents to support it. He argued that the agreement could open a new chapter for addressing Iran’s economic and social challenges and provide an opportunity for reconstruction and development.

Notable pragmatic centrists also supported the agreement. Mohsen Hashemi, chairman of the central council of the Executives of Construction Party, argued that if the agreement is accompanied by realism and national consensus, it could become “the beginning of a new era of stability, development, and reconstruction of Iran’s national power.” He also called for a reassessment of Iran’s economic relationships with China and Russia and argued that Tehran should use any diplomatic opening to pursue more balanced international partnerships. Hossein Marashi, secretary-general of the Executives of Construction Party, declared that “the time has come for all political currents, including critics of the negotiations, to join the nation and welcome the agreement.” Marashi urged political factions to focus on reconstruction, economic growth, and improving living conditions rather than prolonging political disputes.

One of the most politically significant endorsements came from Seyyed Hassan Khomeini, grandson of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and a figure often viewed as a bridge between establishment and reformist currents. In a speech defending both the agreement and the role of Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Khomeini argued that “the collective wisdom of the Islamic Republic has concluded that action must be taken today.” He urged Iranians to trust the decisions of senior officials and warned that “we may not succeed through consensus, but we will certainly fail through division.”

Khomeini explicitly defended Ghalibaf, describing him as “a war commander, the brother of a martyr, and one of the Islamic Republic’s first-rate managers.” He stressed that Ghalibaf was serving in a key decision-making and negotiating role and argued that “attacking and undermining senior decision-makers serves no purpose.” Significantly, Khomeini emphasized that major decisions regarding negotiations and diplomacy are being taken under the supervision and approval of the country’s highest leadership, directly challenging hardline efforts to portray negotiators as acting independently or irresponsibly.

Support for the agreement has also emerged from within Parliament and the broader conservative establishment. Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, a member of Parliament’s National Security Committee, stated plainly that “we must move toward peace with the United States.” He criticized hardline opponents of diplomacy and argued that if they stop creating obstacles, Iran can successfully reach a durable agreement.

Alaeddin Boroujerdi, another member of the National Security Committee, described the fourteen-point memorandum as an agreement that “serves Iran’s interests to a significant degree.” He argued that the United States had been forced into negotiations by military and economic pressure and pointed to the easing of restrictions on Iranian shipping as an early sign that the agreement was already producing tangible benefits.

Mahmoud Vaezi, former chief of staff to President Rouhani, defended the agreement as one negotiated “from a position of strength” and approved by all major institutions of the state. Former MP Jalal Rashidi Koochi directly challenged hardline criticisms after the agreement became public, asking: “Which part of this agreement turns Iran into an American colony?” He criticized accusations that negotiators had betrayed national interests and argued that many of the attacks were politically motivated rather than substantive.

Meanwhile, Saeed Ajorlou, a member of the negotiating team’s media operation, described the agreement as a “step-by-step” framework that preserves Iran’s leverage and includes mechanisms for reversibility. He argued that the United States had accepted obligations exceeding those undertaken by Iran and characterized the current moment as “the season for securing national interests.”

Despite the breadth of support, opposition has not disappeared. The strongest criticism continues to come from figures associated with the Paydari Front and hardline media outlets. Mahmoud Nabavian, Amirhossein Sabeti, Hamid Rasai, and Qasem Ravanbakhsh have all warned that Iran risks squandering military gains through diplomacy. Ravanbakhsh summarized this view by declaring: “Victory in diplomacy is a gift; just do not turn the victories of resistance into defeat.” Hardline critics generally argue that Iran’s achievements on the battlefield – including preventing regime change, preserving territorial integrity, and demonstrating military deterrence – should not be traded away in negotiations whose final outcomes remain uncertain.

Yet even among critics, an important distinction has emerged. Most opponents are not openly advocating a return to war. Rather, they argue that diplomacy must proceed only under conditions that preserve what they view as Iran’s strategic gains. This marks a notable departure from previous periods when opposition to negotiations was often more categorical.

Overall, the debate surrounding the U.S.–Iran agreement reveals a political landscape far more complex than the one that existed during the nuclear negotiations a decade ago. Support for diplomacy now extends beyond reformists and moderates to include influential conservative figures, establishment insiders, security officials, newspapers aligned with state institutions, academics, civil society leaders, and even some long-time critics of the Islamic Republic. The principal divide is no longer between reformists and conservatives, but between those who view diplomacy as the next chapter in the defense of the homeland and those who see negotiations as a potential threat to the gains achieved through resistance.

For now, supporters of the agreement appear to hold the upper hand. From Khatami and Rouhani to Seyyed Hassan Khomeini, from Shargh and Etemad to Javan and parts of the conservative establishment, from human rights advocates like Emad Baghi to democracy activists like Ali Afshari, a remarkably broad coalition has emerged around the idea that Iran should use the current opening to secure peace, reduce economic pressure, and begin rebuilding after war. Whether that coalition can hold together through the next sixty days of negotiations may determine not only the fate of the agreement itself, but also the future direction of Iranian politics.

Iran-U.S. MOU Generates Hope for Peace but Faces Opposition from Israel, U.S. Hawks, and Iranian Hardliners

Published June 17, 2026

The announced Iran-U.S. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) represents the most significant diplomatic breakthrough since the outbreak of the war. Yet despite growing momentum behind the agreement, its future remains uncertain. While senior officials in both Tehran and Washington are presenting the accord as a pathway to ending the conflict and opening a new phase of diplomacy, it faces determined opposition from Israel, hardliners in Washington, and a vocal faction of Iranian conservatives.

According to the published text, the 14-point MOU commits the United States, Iran, and their allies to an immediate and permanent end to military operations across all fronts, including Lebanon. The parties pledge not to initiate attacks against one another, refrain from threats or the use of force, and negotiate a final agreement within 60 days. The agreement also outlines the lifting of the U.S. naval blockade on Iran, the restoration of commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, the eventual return of U.S. military deployments to pre-war levels, a $300 billion reconstruction and development initiative for Iran, sanctions relief, and commitments regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including a pledge that Iran will never acquire nuclear weapons and cooperation on diluting enriched uranium under IAEA supervision.

The diplomatic significance of the agreement has been underscored by reports that President Donald Trump and President Masoud Pezeshkian may personally attend the signing ceremony in Switzerland. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei confirmed that such a meeting remains under consideration, while Trump has indicated that he may remain in Europe to participate in the ceremony. If realized, such a meeting would represent the highest-level direct contact between Iranian and American since the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

Iranian leaders have largely portrayed the agreement as a strategic success. President Masoud Pezeshkian described the MOU as an opportunity to address many of Iran’s economic and political challenges, arguing that its full implementation could “create a different world” for both Iran and the Middle East. He praised the negotiating team and credited months of diplomacy and coordination for making the breakthrough possible.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who has played a central role in the negotiations, has advanced an even broader defense of the agreement. According to Ghalibaf, military victories only acquire lasting value when they are translated into legally and politically binding achievements. He argued that battlefield successes achieved during the war would have limited historical or practical significance if they were not converted into formal agreements that secure tangible gains.

Ghalibaf has repeatedly rejected the argument that diplomacy represents a retreat from military resistance. Instead, he has portrayed the MOU as the direct result of Iran’s battlefield leverage. Referring to developments during the negotiations, he claimed that issues that had remained unresolved for weeks were settled within hours after military actions changed the negotiating environment. He specifically pointed to provisions concerning Lebanon and the lifting of the naval blockade as examples of outcomes that would have been difficult to achieve through military action alone. In his telling, diplomacy succeeded because it was backed by military strength.

At the same time, Ghalibaf emphasized Iran’s profound distrust of the United States, stating that Iranian negotiators entered the talks fully aware of Washington’s history toward Iran but sought to negotiate from a position of strength rather than weakness. He argued that the agreement demonstrates how military power and diplomacy can work together, with force creating leverage and negotiations converting that leverage into lasting political gains. In one of his most notable formulations, he argued that “victories on the battlefield have no lasting value unless they are recorded in a political and legal document.”

Senior Iranian officials have also increasingly highlighted the economic rationale for the agreement. Ghalibaf argued that Iran must now focus on reducing pressure on ordinary citizens, rebuilding the country after the war, and creating conditions for economic recovery and development. Supporters of the agreement have framed it as an effort to transform military resilience into sanctions relief, investment, reconstruction, and long-term stability.

This position has received substantial institutional support. Iran’s Supreme National Security Council confirmed that the MOU was finalized after months of difficult negotiations and described it as a major achievement. Meanwhile, 261 members of parliament issued a statement backing the negotiating team, warning against efforts to divide the public and undermine diplomacy through rumors and political agitation.

Support for the agreement has also come from outside the current administration. Former President Mohammad Khatami, the most prominent figure associated with Iran’s moderate and reformist political camp, welcomed the agreement and described it as a courageous step toward a durable settlement. Khatami called on both supporters and critics of the Islamic Republic to back the negotiating process, reflecting the broader view among moderates and reformists that diplomacy offers the best opportunity to reduce tensions, ease economic pressure, and reintegrate Iran into the international economy.

President Donald Trump has likewise projected confidence regarding the agreement. In recent remarks, Trump stated that the MOU achieves “everything we intended to achieve—and more.” He argued that continuing the war through additional bombing campaigns would not have produced better results and suggested that prolonged conflict would have risked severe economic consequences for both the region and global markets. Trump emphasized that without the agreement, the Strait of Hormuz might have remained closed and the conflict could have continued for months or even years.

Trump repeatedly emphasized that the agreement could facilitate Iran’s reintegration into the global economy if Tehran complies with its commitments. He suggested that Gulf Arab states could play an important role in future investment and reconstruction efforts and acknowledged the scale of economic damage suffered during the conflict. He also stated that world leaders have broadly welcomed the agreement and indicated that financial restrictions on Iran could eventually be eased as part of a broader settlement.

Perhaps most notably, Trump appeared to distance himself from some of the maximalist positions advocated by anti-Iran voices in Washington and Israel. Discussing conventional missile capabilities, he argued that Iran could not realistically be expected to possess no defensive capabilities while neighboring countries maintained significant missile arsenals. He suggested that discussions regarding conventional missiles should occur within a broader regional framework rather than through unilateral restrictions on Iran.

Trump also issued unusually direct criticism of Israeli actions in Lebanon. While reaffirming support for Israel’s security, he argued that Israeli forces could exercise greater restraint and warned that unnecessary escalation could jeopardize the diplomatic process. Referring to Israeli strikes in Beirut, he suggested that entire residential buildings should not be destroyed in response to limited provocations. He stated that Israel “can do better” in dealing with Hezbollah and openly criticized attacks that risk undermining the agreement.

At the same time, Trump repeatedly warned that the agreement remains conditional. He stated that if Iran failed to comply with its commitments, military action could resume. While emphasizing his preference for diplomacy, he made clear that Washington views compliance as essential for moving toward a final agreement.

The strongest opposition to the MOU has come from Israel and some of its supporters in Washington.Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has explicitly rejected calls for a withdrawal from southern Lebanon, insisting that Israeli forces will remain in security zones for as long as necessary. Opposition extends well beyond Netanyahu. National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir declared that Israel is not bound by the agreement and rejected any arrangement that limits Israeli military freedom of action. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich criticized the agreement as a strategic mistake and argued that pressure on Iran should continue. Opposition politicians including Benny Gantz and Yair Golan likewise condemned the deal, describing it as a strategic setback that risks empowering Iran while restricting Israeli options. Across much of Israel’s political spectrum, concerns center on the perception that the agreement could provide Iran with economic relief while leaving core regional disputes unresolved.

Iran has repeatedly warned that continued Israeli military operations in Lebanon could jeopardize the agreement. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that any future Israeli attack on Lebanon or continued occupation of Lebanese territory would be viewed as a violation of the understanding reached between Tehran and Washington.

These concerns intensified after Israel continued strikes in southern Lebanon despite Trump’s public criticism. Araghchi argued that the end of hostilities in Lebanon is inseparable from the broader end of the war and insisted that any final settlement must address both military operations and territorial occupation.

Although support for the agreement appears to dominate among senior decision-makers in Iran, a vocal group of hardline opponents has mobilized against it. Small protests have been reported in Tehran and Mashhad, organized primarily by activists and figures associated with the ultraconservative Paydari Front. Demonstrators chanted slogans against both Abbas Araghchi and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, accusing them of compromising Iran’s interests. Some protesters went further, calling for Araghchi’s execution and portraying the negotiations as a surrender to the United States.

Among the most prominent critics has been Mahmoud Nabavian, a member of parliament and a leading figure associated with the Paydari Front, who claimed that the agreement would effectively turn Iran into “a colony of America.” Nabavian argued that Tehran would immediately reopen the Strait of Hormuz while receiving no concrete guarantees regarding sanctions relief or the release of frozen assets. He also criticized provisions related to enriched uranium, questioned whether the agreement adequately protects Iran’s national interests, and compared it unfavorably to the JCPOA.

Another prominent critic is Amirhossein Sabeti, a member of parliament from Tehran and one of the most outspoken hardline voices in the legislature. Sabeti described the MOU as weaker than the nuclear deal and argued that it would neither produce meaningful economic benefits nor guarantee long-term security. He accused supporters of misunderstanding the intentions of Iran’s adversaries and argued that Iran should prepare for future conflict rather than rely on negotiations.

Opposition to the agreement has also extended into parliament itself. Hardline lawmakers, including Sabeti and Hamid Rasaee, promoted a gathering and protest campaign against the negotiations. Organizers initially claimed that 16 members of parliament had participated in the anti-agreement meeting. However, the claim quickly became controversial when several lawmakers whose names had been listed publicly denied attending, highlighting both the existence of organized parliamentary opposition and its limited scale within the legislature.

The contrast between the hardline opposition led by Nabavian, Sabeti, and Rasaee and the support expressed by moderates such as Khatami underscores one of the central political dynamics surrounding the MOU. While a vocal minority continues to portray the agreement as a strategic retreat, much of Iran’s political establishment – including senior state institutions, a large majority of parliament, and prominent moderate figures – has rallied behind the effort to translate military gains into a diplomatic settlement.

Taken together, the statements of Trump, Ghalibaf, Pezeshkian, Araghchi, and other senior officials suggest that the principal decision-makers in both Washington and Tehran currently view diplomacy as preferable to continued conflict. Both governments appear eager to present the agreement as a success to domestic audiences: Iranian officials emphasize sovereignty, resistance, economic recovery, and the conversion of military gains into political achievements, while Trump portrays the MOU as a more effective alternative to endless military escalation.

At the same time, powerful opponents remain determined to derail the process. Israeli leaders continue to reject key provisions relating to Lebanon. American hawks remain skeptical of sanctions relief and engagement with Tehran. A minority but highly vocal bloc of Iranian hardliners, including several members of parliament associated with the Paydari Front, continues to denounce the agreement as a strategic retreat and a repeat of what they view as the failures of the JCPOA.

As a result, the MOU has generated both genuine hope and significant resistance. The public positions of senior leaders on both sides indicate that a final agreement is now conceivable in a way that seemed impossible only weeks ago. Yet those same statements also reveal how fragile the process remains. The coming weeks – particularly the formal signing ceremony in Switzerland, negotiations toward a final agreement, and developments in Lebanon – will determine whether the MOU becomes the foundation of a durable settlement or collapses under pressure from domestic and regional spoilers.

Deal to End the War is Finalized, but Spoilers Remain

Published June 15, 2026

The announcement that the United States and Iran have reached a memorandum of understanding to end the war marks a historic and hopeful turning point after months of violence, uncertainty, and profound human suffering. For more than one hundred days, the Middle East lived under the shadow of a conflict that was engulfing the entire region. Thousands of civilians were killed or injured, critical infrastructure was damaged, international shipping routes were disrupted, energy markets were shaken, and millions of people across the region woke up each day wondering whether a wider war was imminent.

Today, for the first time in months, there is reason for cautious optimism. According to statements from Iranian officials, Pakistani mediators, and President Trump, the parties have reached a framework that would permanently halt military operations across all fronts, including Lebanon, end the U.S. naval blockade of Iran, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and launch a new round of negotiations aimed at reaching a comprehensive nuclear and sanctions focused agreement.

According to details reported by Iranian media, the memorandum includes an immediate and permanent end to military operations, the lifting of the naval blockade imposed during the war, the reopening of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, partial sanctions relief, the release of frozen Iranian funds, and a 60-day process to negotiate a final agreement. Iranian officials have stated that future negotiations would focus primarily on nuclear issues, sanctions relief, and economic reconstruction. Reports on the precise terms remain incomplete and some provisions have yet to be independently confirmed. Even Iranian officials urged caution regarding speculation over the agreement’s details in the days leading up to its announcement.

If implemented, however, the framework could provide the basis for a broader agreement that reduces tensions, restores economic activity, and prevents a return to war. The significance of the agreement extends beyond its specific terms. After months of military confrontation, both sides have effectively acknowledged a reality that history has repeatedly demonstrated: military force can inflict enormous damage, but it rarely resolves the underlying political disputes that drive conflict. Ultimately, the parties returned to the negotiating table because diplomacy remained the only viable path to a sustainable outcome.

Perhaps the most sobering lesson of this conflict is how close the parties may already have been to a diplomatic breakthrough before the war began. In the weeks leading up to the conflict, Oman was actively mediating between Washington and Tehran. Oman’s Foreign Minister, Badr Albusaidi, traveled to Washington and met with Vice President JD Vance as part of a diplomatic effort to bridge remaining differences between the two sides. In public interviews, Albusaidi expressed optimism that an agreement was within reach and emphasized that there was no alternative to diplomacy. Omani officials argued that meaningful progress had already been achieved and that communication channels between Washington and Tehran remained open.

At the time, discussions focused primarily on guaranteeing that Iran would never acquire a nuclear weapon while providing a framework for sanctions relief and broader de-escalation. Reports suggested that Iran had signaled willingness to accept significant constraints and monitoring measures regarding its nuclear program. Diplomatic channels remained active, mediators were engaged, and a negotiated outcome appeared possible.

Yet despite this progress, the United States chose a military path. President Trump initially framed the war as a war to topple the Iranian government and prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. The opening phase of the war targeted senior figures within Iran’s military and political establishment. Over the course of the conflict, a number of high-ranking Iranian military commanders and government officials were killed. Yet, as the Iranian government proved durable and unleashed a volley of missiles and drones at countries, including many that were cooperating with the war with Iran, and blocked the Strait of Hormuz. The equation suddenly changed from a quick and speedy operation to topple an injured adversary to finding a way out of a costly war that could not win on the cheap. While goals started lofty, the bar for an end to the war was quickly lowered in Washington.

At various moments during the war, President Trump suggested that Iran’s political future could look very different after the conflict and has argued at various points that a regime change has occurred, even though this argument was strained by the fact that the senior Ali Khamenei was replaced by his son, Mojtaba. Reports also emerged that Kurdish groups were being viewed by some policymakers as potential partners in attacking inside of Iran, and Trump later acknowledged that the United States had provided arms to Kurdish actors who had not held up their end of the apparent bargain.

The result was one of the most dangerous and costly confrontations in recent Middle Eastern history. And yet, after more than one hundred days of fighting, enormous destruction across Iran, substantial costs to the United States and its partners, disruptions to global trade and energy markets, and repeated fears of regional escalation, the diplomatic destination looks remarkably familiar. The emerging agreement appears centered on the same core nuclear issue that was already under discussion before the war.

Meanwhile, Iran continues to reject negotiations over its missile program and its regional alliances, including Hezbollah and other non-state actors. According to reports regarding the emerging framework, these issues have been explicitly excluded from the current negotiations. Instead, future talks are expected to focus on nuclear arrangements, sanctions relief, implementation mechanisms, and economic recovery.

In a striking irony, some of the most important issues now being addressed, including the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the restoration of maritime commerce, were not the central disputes before the war. They became major international concerns only because the conflict itself created them.

The path to this agreement was far from smooth, and perhaps no actor worked harder to prevent it from materializing than Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Throughout the negotiations, Netanyahu repeatedly argued against diplomatic engagement with Iran and favored a strategy of continued military pressure. In the final hours before the agreement was reached, Israel’s strike on Beirut’s southern suburbs threatened to derail the negotiations entirely. Coming at a moment when diplomats were reportedly closing the remaining gaps between Washington and Tehran, the attack was widely viewed by Iranian officials – and even President Trump, himself – as a deliberate provocation designed to jeopardize the diplomatic process and force a return to escalation.

It did not work—this time. The agreement was finalized despite these efforts, but the political incentives that drove them have not disappeared. Netanyahu and much of the Israeli political establishment continues to view a U.S.-Iran diplomatic opening as contrary to their nation’s strategic vision for the region. Netanyahu has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to challenge American diplomatic initiatives toward Iran, including under the Obama administration and now under President Trump. His motivation to keep pressure on Iran and prevent a broader U.S.-Iran rapprochement is unlikely to disappear simply because an agreement has been signed.

President Trump recognized the danger in real time. His unusually sharp public criticism of Israel’s Beirut strike reflected an understanding that a single act of escalation could destroy months of diplomatic work. By publicly stating that the attack “should not have happened” and urging all sides to step back from confrontation, Trump helped prevent the collapse of negotiations at a critical moment. That diplomacy survived this episode may ultimately be one of the most important developments of the entire process. But it also serves as a reminder that reaching an agreement and sustaining it are two different tasks. The forces that opposed this agreement before it was signed are unlikely to disappear after it takes effect.

Indeed, even before the agreement is formally signed, its first major challenge has already emerged. While the reported framework calls for an immediate and permanent end to military operations across all fronts, including Lebanon, Israeli officials have signaled that they do not view themselves as bound by that provision. According to reports in the Israeli press, Prime Minister Netanyahu informed President Trump that Israel does not consider itself committed to the Lebanon-related provisions of the U.S.-Iran understanding. Israeli officials reportedly indicated that Israeli forces would remain in their current positions, continue operations against Hezbollah, and retain freedom of action to strike what they consider threats to Israeli security.

Inside Israel, opposition leaders such as Yair Lapid and Avigdor Lieberman have described the emerging understanding as a major strategic setback for Netanyahu’s government. Their criticism reflects concern that military pressure failed to secure broader concessions from Iran on missiles, regional alliances, or other long-standing Israeli priorities. That Netanyahu got his Iran war after decades of campaigning but did not improve Israel’s regional position is a major setback to his government and a boon for his political opponents, almost all of whom are equally if not more hawkish toward Iran but do not have anywhere near as much of a track record as Netanyahu in leading the nation or handling relations with the United States.

If military operations in Lebanon continue despite the agreement, Tehran may conclude that Washington is either unwilling or unable to deliver on commitments that were central to the negotiations. If the U.S. does not restrain Israel from violating the apparent terms of the agreement, the negotiating process could break down, paving the way for at least a resumption of the Israeli-Iranian portion of the war.

The agreement has also faced opposition from other quarters. Inside Iran, hardline critics have also voiced strong opposition. Conservative newspapers, political activists, and demonstrators associated with more hardline factions have questioned the wisdom of the agreement and accused negotiators of making unnecessary concessions. In Washington, some influential critics have decried the terms, highlighted Vice President JD Vance’s role in brokering the agreement and hinted at a Congressional debate on the deal.

The agreement announced this week is not a final peace treaty. Many difficult issues remain unresolved. The implementation of sanctions relief, the future of Iran’s nuclear program, mechanisms for verification, maritime security arrangements, reconstruction efforts, and broader regional tensions will all require difficult negotiations in the weeks and months ahead.

Success is not guaranteed. But after months of suffering, the region has been given an opportunity that seemed impossible only a short time ago.

The significance of this moment extends beyond governments and political leaders. For families in Iran, it means the possibility that air raid sirens may finally fall silent. For communities in Lebanon, it means the ongoing war that has devastated the south of the country and extended to Beirut may end. For Americans, it means avoiding deeper military entanglement in another costly Middle Eastern conflict. For the global economy, it means the reopening of one of the world’s most important commercial waterways and the prospect of greater stability in energy markets.

Additionally, it means that diplomacy has once again proven its value. The central lesson of the past one hundred days is not that war succeeded where diplomacy failed. It is precisely the opposite. After months of destruction, enormous economic costs, and tragic loss of life, all sides have returned to a negotiating process that was already available before the conflict began.

The agreement’s success will ultimately be measured not by the ceremonies surrounding its signing, but by whether it can withstand the pressures that have undermined so many previous diplomatic openings. The question of Lebanon is likely to be the first test. If the parties can prevent renewed escalation there, the agreement may begin to build the confidence necessary for more difficult negotiations ahead. If they cannot, the forces that repeatedly pushed the region toward war may once again gain the upper hand.

For now, however, the people of the region – and those who worked tirelessly to keep the possibility of diplomacy alive – have earned a moment of relief and hope. After so much suffering, diplomacy has been given another chance. The responsibility now falls on all sides to ensure that it is not squandered.