Week of July 20, 2026 | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council
- From Hormuz to the Red Sea: How Iran Is Turning the War Into a Battle for Strategic Leverage
- Iran Accelerates Executions Under New Espionage Law Following the Dey 1404 Uprising
- Shir-Mohammad Espandar: The Man Who Gave the Doneli a Voice
- Saeed Madani: Iran’s Democratic Future Cannot Be Built Through Monarchy or Foreign Military Intervention
- Iran’s Leading Independent Football Platform Goes Dark After World Cup
- “We Do Not Want War”: Iranian Anti-War Declaration Emerges as the Conflict Intensifies
- War Intensifies With Strikes on Infrastructure
From Hormuz to the Red Sea: How Iran Is Turning the War Into a Battle for Strategic Leverage
The renewed U.S.-Iran war is not simply an exchange of bombings, but a broader contest over energy routes, regional military access, economic endurance, and the terms under which the two sides may eventually return to negotiations. Iran’s principal leverage remains its ability to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, while the United States is attempting to destroy that leverage through a sustained campaign against Iran’s military capabilities and the nation’s infrastructure. So far, Washington has inflicted extensive damage inside Iran but has not restored normal navigation through the strait or achieved other goals associated with the war.
The scale of the maritime disruption is striking. Ship-tracking data showed that only three vessels per day passed through the Strait of Hormuz between July 22 and July 24, a tiny fraction of the normal volume through the world’s most important oil and gas corridor. Although this does not amount to complete physical closure, it gives Iran what can reasonably be described as effective coercive control over the waterway: Tehran does not need to stop every vessel if the threat of missiles, drones, mines, seizures, and rising insurance costs persuades most shipowners to abstain from transit.
Iran does not legally control the Strait of Hormuz, nor has it established an uncontested naval occupation of the channel. Yet it has demonstrated the capacity to determine, through the selective application of force and risk, whether the strait functions as an ordinary commercial route or not. The United States resumed its blockade of Iran-related shipping in part to weaken Tehran’s economy and break this position. Instead, renewed fighting has again largely halted commercial traffic and with new disruptions to traffic in the Red Sea, physical crude prices have risen sharply and some grades have approached $110 per barrel. Brent crude surpassed $105 on July 24 as traders struggled to replace disrupted Middle Eastern supplies.
Iran has simultaneously sought to transform pressure on its own exports into a wider counter-blockade against the Gulf states supporting the American campaign. Bahrain and Kuwait have borne much of the retaliation as both have provided important military facilities, logistics, air defenses and staging capacity to the United States. Iran has targeted American-linked military sites in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan, while Kuwait has also reported damage to power-generation facilities connected to freshwater production.
This is not simply retaliation for individual U.S. strikes. The pattern suggests that Tehran is trying to increase the cost of hosting American forces and supporting operations against Iran. Bases, radar sites, air-defense systems, logistics centers, fuel facilities, troop accommodations, communications infrastructure, and dual-use installations across the region are being placed under continuing pressure. Iran appears to be trying to reduce the geographic freedom from which Washington can conduct the war.
After concentrating much of its earlier retaliation on Bahrain and Kuwait, Iran has increasingly focused on American positions in Jordan. The shift is strategically significant. Jordan provides the United States with access to an area connecting the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Syria and Israel. Sustained attacks there have resulted in casualties and appear to be aimed at dispersing America’s regional presence, forcing it to consolidate personnel and materiel in fewer and more heavily defended locations – like Israel – or those further from Iran.
Iran has not driven the United States out of the region, but it may have achieved partial success in limiting the operational flexibility that America’s regional basing network was designed to provide. Every threatened base has either been largely abandoned or now requires additional interceptors, protection systems, medical support, personnel dispersal, hardened shelters and contingency planning. Even unsuccessful attacks impose costs by compelling the United States to expend expensive defensive missiles and divert assets from offensive operations.
This pressure also changes how the effectiveness of Iranian missile and drone attacks should be assessed. The debate is no longer whether Iranian weapons are reaching important areas, but how much military and economic damage they are causing. Iranian claims regarding individual aircraft, intelligence sites, radar systems, and command facilities still require careful verification, but the broader effectiveness of the campaign can no longer be dismissed simply as an unverified Iranian narrative.
American acknowledgments of casualties, damage, rising operational costs, and the need for additional personnel demonstrate that the strikes are producing consequences. Reports that U.S. officials are considering whether outside assistance – including possible Russian and Chinese intelligence, targeting support, or technology – may have contributed to Iran’s improving performance further illustrate how unexpected some of the attacks have appeared in Washington.
What can be said with greater confidence is that Iran’s missiles and drones appear to be imposing more serious costs than many U.S. planners expected, and perhaps operating more effectively than during the earlier phase of the conflict. Iran may be combining lessons from previous exchanges, improved targeting, new tactics, dispersed launch systems, and a greater willingness to strike the logistical architecture behind American operations rather than focusing only on heavily-defended flagship bases.
The United States, for its part, has responded with an increasingly sustained campaign inside Iran. By July 23, the U.S. military had completed twelve consecutive nights of strikes against command centers, missile and drone storage facilities, coastal surveillance positions, maritime capabilities, air defenses and launch sites. Washington has also attacked or threatened infrastructure whose military and civilian functions overlap, including bridges, energy systems, coastal installations, and facilities connected to Iran’s ability to sustain operations around Hormuz.
The attacks on bridges illustrate both the power and limitations of this approach. Destroying transportation links can slow military movement, disrupt supply chains, increase domestic costs and signal that the United States is prepared to widen its target list. But many Iranian bridges cross seasonal or dry riverbeds and can be bypassed through temporary roads, engineering work, or alternative routes. Unless conducted as part of a sustained campaign against transportation, electricity, fuel, communications, and repair capacity, isolated bridge attacks are unlikely to paralyze Iran.
Strikes targeting infrastructure that is primarily used by civilians are also war crimes. Those that impact reservoirs, water networks, desalination facilities or electricity plants are particularly consequential. They can impose immediate pressure on civilians and create significant humanitarian costs, particularly in southern Iran. Yet such attacks may not produce the political result Washington seeks. Infrastructure destruction can weaken state capacity while simultaneously strengthening nationalist sentiment and making compromise appear equivalent to capitulation. Economic pain does not automatically translate into political surrender.
Meanwhile, the Houthis have announced a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia and attacked Saudi-linked oil tankers, making both the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb unsafe simultaneously for certain ships. The southern Red Sea is particularly important because Saudi Arabia has relied on its east-west pipeline and Red Sea ports to bypass disruptions in the Persian Gulf. If both chokepoints are threatened, one of the principal alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz becomes far less reliable.
The economic effects are already visible. War-risk insurance premiums for some southern Red Sea routes have increased from roughly 0.3 percent to more than 1 percent of a vessel’s value, with some quotations reaching 3 percent. Some tankers have rerouted through the Suez Canal and around the Cape of Good Hope, adding approximately one month to voyages and millions of dollars in additional operating costs.
This two-chokepoint strategy creates a difficult problem for Washington. Military superiority alone cannot reopen maritime trade. The United States must also convince insurers, tanker operators, crews, exporters and importers that shipping will remain safe after the next missile launch, drone attack, mine incident, or tanker seizure. Destroying launch sites does not automatically restore commercial confidence, particularly when Iran can disperse its weapons and the Houthis can generate an independent threat environment.
That helps explain the growing debate over broader American escalation. President Donald Trump has threatened to expand the target list to include energy facilities and additional bridges, seize Kharg Island and strike the deeply buried nuclear-related facility known as Pickaxe Mountain (Kuh-e Kolang). The movement of additional troops, aircraft, medical personnel and logistical units may therefore represent preparations for a longer air campaign, enhanced force protection, mounting casualties, or even a limited ground operation.
The reduction of diplomatic personnel by Britain and several European governments similarly reflects expectations that the conflict could intensify. Possible scenarios include special operations, an attempt to seize and hold an island or coastal position or operations targeting infrastructure connected to Hormuz. Any attack on Kuh-e Kolang would carry considerable uncertainty. A deeply-buried facility may require repeated use of specialized munitions, and even extensive physical destruction would not eliminate Iran’s scientific expertise, dispersed equipment or long-term rebuilding capacity. Several analysts have argued that such an attack could strengthen the argument inside Iran for eventually acquiring a nuclear deterrent rather than eliminating that possibility.
Iranian figures, including Mehdi Mohammadi, have explicitly advanced this argument: that attacks intended to eliminate the nuclear program could instead accelerate a political decision to reconstruct it under more secretive and militarized conditions. Whether Iran currently intends to build a nuclear weapon remains uncertain, but the strategic risk is clear: destroying physical infrastructure could strengthen the internal case for pursuing a future deterrent.
The United States therefore faces a difficult strategic choice. Its campaign has damaged Iran’s military, naval, energy and nuclear infrastructure, but it has not removed Iran’s leverage over Hormuz, halted attacks on regional bases or prevented the conflict from expanding into the Red Sea. A significantly larger campaign might reduce Iran’s retaliatory capacity, but it also may fail to do so while exacerbating the global energy crisis, increasing American casualties, exposing Gulf partners to greater retaliation and making disengagement even more difficult.
Iran faces difficult calculations as well. Its chokepoint strategy has demonstrated that the United States cannot wage war without imposing substantial military and economic costs on the region and global markets. Yet prolonged disruption also damages Iran’s own economy, threatens export revenues, consumes military inventories and increases the risk of devastating attacks on critical infrastructure and civilian population centers.
Ultimately, Iran wants to demonstrate that it cannot be bombed, blockaded, or stripped of its missile and nuclear capabilities without imposing unacceptable costs. The United States, in the thick of a war in which it did not expect extensive pushback, appears to be searching for an endstate that it can more reasonably claim as a win. Yet many of the goals it has pursued are extraordinarily difficult to achieve by military means alone.
Washington’s immediate objective has been to deprive Tehran of its Strait of Hormuz leverage. It has not yet achieved that goal. Commercial shipping remains severely restricted, energy prices continue to rise and insecurity has spread beyond the Persian Gulf into the Red Sea. Iran, meanwhile, has preserved much of its retaliatory capability and increased pressure on the American regional military network, though at considerable cost and while remaining vulnerable to a much larger American campaign.
President Trump appears to have concluded that only a dramatically expanded offensive can alter this balance. Such an escalation could include broader attacks on Iran’s electricity, transportation, water, energy, and communications infrastructure, renewed strikes against deeply buried nuclear facilities or attempts to seize strategically important territory such as Kharg Island. The United States would be betting that overwhelming pressure can compel Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and agree to other far-reaching American terms.
The alternative is that both governments conclude the risks of further escalation now outweigh the benefits. Each side may believe it has accumulated sufficient leverage to return to negotiations without appearing to surrender: Iran through its continued influence over Hormuz, the Red Sea, and regional bases; and the United States through the damage it has inflicted and the credible threat of much broader escalation. Whether the next phase is diplomacy or a far more destructive war will depend on which side believes time is improving its bargaining position, and whether either side fatally miscalculates the other’s willingness to escalate.
Iran Accelerates Executions Under New Espionage Law Following January Uprising
Iran has sharply accelerated the use of the death penalty against individuals accused of involvement in the January protests and alleged espionage, with authorities increasingly relying on a newly enacted espionage law that significantly expands the scope of capital punishment for national security offenses.
On July 22, Iran’s Judiciary announced the execution of Mehdi Khanaki, who was arrested for charges related to his activity in the January protests. According to the Judiciary’s news agency, Mizan, Khanki was convicted of “operational actions” on behalf of Israel, the United States, and hostile groups, as well as manufacturing and possessing weapons, explosives, and ammunition. Officials also announced the confiscation of all of his property.
According to the Judiciary, Khanki’s death sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court before being carried out. However, authorities disclosed few details regarding the judicial proceedings, including the identity of the trial court judges, the substance of his legal defense, or the arguments presented by his attorney. The official report also did not identify the opposition group that Khanki was accused of joining.
Khanki is among the first known protesters to be executed under Iran’s new “Law on Intensifying Punishment for Espionage and Cooperation with the Zionist Regime and Hostile States.” The legislation was initially approved by Parliament shortly before the end of the twelve-day war with Israel and later became law after review by the Guardian Council. Under the statute, a broad range of activities described as espionage, intelligence cooperation, or “operational action” on behalf of hostile governments or organizations may be punished by execution and confiscation of assets.
The legislation drew criticism from numerous Iranian legal scholars, lawyers, and civil society figures, who argued that its broad definitions could undermine constitutional protections and fair trial guarantees while expanding the use of capital punishment in political and national security cases. Khanki’s execution follows a broader surge in executions carried out after the recent conflict between Iran, Israel, and the United States. Human rights organizations report that Iranian authorities have increasingly pursued death sentences against individuals accused of espionage, collaboration with foreign governments, and participation in the January protests.
During the past week alone, Mohammad Amini Dehaghani, Mohieddin Abdollahi, and Hossein Palani were also executed after being convicted in national security-related cases. In separate proceedings, Gol-Mohammad Mohammadi and Erfan Esfandiari, two detainees connected to the Alikhani Square case in Isfahan, were executed following convictions stemming from the January unrest.
Meanwhile, Iran Human Rights has reported that Mojtaba Dehbandi and Kianoush Hamzehei Kazerouni have also been sentenced to death over allegations linked to the Dey uprising, while UN-appointed independent human rights experts have urged Iran to immediately halt the executions of ten additional men arrested in connection with the Alikhani Square case. According to the experts, several families have reportedly been summoned for final visits, raising concerns that further executions may be imminent.
International human rights bodies have expressed growing concern over both the pace of the executions and the fairness of the judicial process. They have questioned whether defendants received meaningful access to legal counsel and due process, particularly in politically sensitive national security cases. UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran Mai Sato has warned that the death penalty is increasingly being used as a tool to spread fear and suppress dissent, noting that executions have risen to unusually high levels over the past year and have accelerated further since the recent regional conflict.
At the same time, Judiciary Chief Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei has repeatedly instructed prosecutors to process cases involving wartime detainees and participants in the January protests rapidly and without leniency, reinforcing the government’s determination to conclude these cases swiftly and harshly.
The convergence of the new espionage law, expedited judicial procedures, and the growing number of executions suggests that Iran has entered a new phase of post-conflict repression in which national security legislation is being used more extensively against individuals accused of involvement in political unrest.
Shir-Mohammad Espandar: The Man Who Gave the Doneli a Voice
Published July 23, 2026
The passing of Shir-Mohammad Espandar at the age of 98 marks the end of an extraordinary chapter in the history of Iranian music. More than a virtuoso performer, Espandar was a guardian of cultural memory whose lifelong devotion transformed the doneli—the distinctive double-flute of Baluchistan—into an internationally recognized symbol of Iran’s diverse artistic heritage. His life demonstrated how a single musician can preserve, elevate, and share the traditions of an entire community with the world.
Born in 1931 in Bampur, in Iran’s southeastern province of Sistan and Baluchistan, Espandar first learned to play the reed flute from his father. As a young man, he traveled to what is now Pakistan, where he encountered the doneli. Without formal instruction, he mastered the instrument simply by observing experienced musicians, revealing an exceptional musical ear and unwavering determination. After spending roughly fifteen years abroad, he returned to Iran in 1958 and dedicated the rest of his life to preserving and promoting the musical traditions of Baluchistan.
The doneli is among the most technically demanding instruments in Iranian folk music. Consisting of two flutes played simultaneously, it requires extraordinary breath control, coordination, and the ability to sustain two melodic lines at once through circular breathing. Espandar elevated this challenging instrument into a refined artistic medium, captivating audiences with performances that combined technical brilliance, emotional depth, and profound respect for Baluchi musical traditions.
Before Espandar gained national recognition, the doneli remained largely unknown outside Baluchistan. Through decades of performances at cultural festivals and international events, he introduced audiences across Iran and beyond to the beauty of Baluchi music. In doing so, he became one of the country’s most important cultural ambassadors, demonstrating that regional traditions are an essential part of Iran’s national identity and deserve recognition on the global stage.
His contribution extended beyond performance. Espandar was also a skilled craftsman who built many of the instruments he played, preserving not only the music but also the traditional knowledge required to create the doneli. His recordings—particularly the album Music of Baluchistan: Shir-Mohammad Espandar, released by the Mahoor Institute—remain invaluable documents of one of Iran’s oldest living musical traditions and continue to inspire musicians and researchers alike.
Throughout his career, Espandar received numerous honors in recognition of his artistic achievements and cultural significance. His distinctive style of doneli performance was registered in 2017 as part of Iran’s intangible cultural heritage, acknowledging his central role in safeguarding this remarkable tradition. His first doneli and a sculpture commemorating his life are preserved in Tehran’s Museum of Anthropology, ensuring that future generations will remember both the artist and the heritage he dedicated his life to protecting.
In his later years, despite losing his eyesight to cataracts, Espandar remained deeply concerned about the future of the doneli. He devoted considerable effort to teaching younger musicians, yet often lamented that the instrument’s extraordinary technical demands made it difficult to find a successor capable of carrying his tradition forward. His passing therefore serves as both a moment of remembrance and a reminder of the urgent need to preserve Iran’s rich and diverse intangible cultural heritage.
At NIAC, we recognize that Iran’s greatest treasures are found not only in its historic monuments but also in the people who dedicate their lives to preserving its cultural traditions. Shir-Mohammad Espandar’s artistry transcended regional boundaries, reminding audiences around the world of the richness, diversity, and resilience of Iranian culture. His legacy belongs not only to the people of Baluchistan, but to all who believe that music has the power to preserve identity, foster understanding, and connect generations.
We extend our heartfelt condolences to Shir-Mohammad Espandar’s family, friends, students, and colleagues, and to the people of Baluchistan and all Iranians who cherished his music and his extraordinary artistic legacy. May his memory endure through every note of the doneli and through the generations of artists and listeners who continue to celebrate the cultural heritage he devoted his life to preserving.
Saeed Madani: Iran’s Democratic Future Cannot Be Built Through Monarchy or Foreign Military Intervention
Published July 22, 2026
Renowned Iranian sociologist and recent political prisoner Saeed Madani sharply criticized monarchist politics, calls for foreign military intervention and what he describes as unrealistic expectations surrounding the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. While reiterating that the Islamic Republic bears full responsibility for the violent suppression and killing of protesters, Madani argued in an open letter to fellow sociologist Asef Bayat that opposition to the government alone does not make every alternative democratic or legitimate.
The letter is the latest installment in an ongoing exchange between Madani and Bayat that began in May 2024 after Bayat responded to an interview Madani gave from prison about Iran following the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement. Since then, the two scholars have exchanged several lengthy letters debating Iran’s protest movements, democratic transition, revolution, civil society, and the role of violence in political change. Madani’s newest response focuses extensively on the future of Iran’s opposition and the risks he associates with monarchist strategies and reliance on foreign powers.
Madani, a sociologist and longtime researcher on poverty, inequality, social movements, and civil society, argues that Iran’s democratic future cannot be built either through the continuation of the Islamic Republic or through foreign-backed regime change. Instead, he advocates what he calls a nonviolent democratic transition based on organized civil society, sustained domestic pressure, negotiations, a referendum, and a constituent assembly.
A central part of Madani’s argument is his distinction between two phases of the January protests. He argues that the demonstrations before January 8 were fundamentally different from those that followed Reza Pahlavi’s public call for nationwide mobilization on January 8 and 9.
According to Madani, the protests that began in early January emerged organically from Iran’s worsening economic and social conditions. He writes that demonstrations initially spread from Tehran’s commercial districts, including the Alaeddin market, where currency depreciation, inflation, economic instability, and declining purchasing power had placed enormous pressure on merchants, shop employees, delivery workers, informal laborers, and members of Iran’s shrinking middle class.
Madani argues that these early demonstrations were not organized by monarchists or any single opposition leader abroad. Rather, they reflected accumulated public frustration over inflation, corruption, unemployment, inequality, political repression, and the absence of economic prospects. Similar to previous nationwide protests, including those of 2017, 2019, and the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, the demonstrations combined economic grievances with broader political demands and spread through decentralized social networks rather than centralized leadership.
Madani argues that Reza Pahlavi’s attempts on January 8-9 to direct the protest movement via calls for mobilization and action fundamentally altered the political atmosphere surrounding the protests. Rather than remaining a decentralized social movement, the demonstrations increasingly became associated with a final confrontation aimed at immediate regime change under a specific political alternative.
Madani emphasizes that the the Islamic Republic bears direct responsibility for the deaths and repression that followed, arguing that the government likely would have suppressed the protests violently regardless of Reza Pahlavi’s intervention.
Still, Madani sharply criticizes Pahlavi’s call as “irresponsible” and “opportunistic,” arguing that people were encouraged to confront one of the region’s most heavily armed security apparatuses without organized domestic leadership, protective structures, or any realistic mechanism to reduce the risks facing protesters. His criticism is not directed at encouraging protest itself. Instead, he argues that political leaders who call on citizens to risk their lives have an ethical responsibility to accurately assess the risks, avoid unrealistic promises, and accept responsibility for the consequences of their appeals.
One of Madani’s strongest criticisms concerns what he describes as the expectation that foreign assistance would arrive if demonstrations intensified. According to him, many opposition media outlets and activists created the impression that if protesters remained in the streets long enough, the United States or Israel would intervene militarily, weaken the Islamic Republic, and pave the way for Reza Pahlavi’s return to power.
Madani argues that those making such claims had no authority to guarantee foreign intervention, yet many protesters came to believe that regime collapse was imminent. Drawing on conversations with detainees following the protests, Madani writes that many had embraced three central assumptions: that pre-revolutionary Iran had been a period of comprehensive prosperity and freedom; that the monarchy represented the only viable alternative to the Islamic Republic; and that Donald Trump would ultimately help install Reza Pahlavi in Tehran after the government’s rapid collapse. Madani notes that some detainees even referred to Trump as “Uncle Trump,” which he interprets as evidence that parts of the opposition had come to view the United States not as a foreign state pursuing its own strategic interests, but as a benevolent actor committed to liberating Iran.
He rejects all three assumptions as historically inaccurate and politically misleading. In his view, pre-1979 Iran should neither be portrayed as an ideal democracy nor reduced to a simple narrative of prosperity. Likewise, he argues that Iran’s future should not be presented as a binary choice between the Islamic Republic and the restoration of the monarchy.
Madani devotes considerable attention to what he calls the monarchist reconstruction of history. He argues that parts of the opposition have created an idealized and selective image of the Pahlavi era, emphasizing stability and economic development while minimizing political repression, inequality, corruption, and the absence of democratic institutions.
According to Madani, distorting history for political purposes undermines democratic legitimacy. A political movement that relies on selective historical narratives, he argues, cannot simply assume that it will respect democratic principles once in power.
His criticism extends beyond evaluations of Mohammad Reza Shah himself. Instead, Madani questions the principle of hereditary political legitimacy, arguing that political authority in a democratic society must derive exclusively from the free choice of citizens, rather than family lineage, historical nostalgia, or foreign sponsorship. Madani also criticizes the revival of symbols such as the Imperial Guard (“Javidan Guard”), arguing that such symbolism allowed the government to portray a broad social protest movement as an organized attempt to restore the monarchy.
Madani stresses that none of these criticisms diminish the Islamic Republic’s responsibility for the violence. Regardless of the political orientation of protesters or opposition groups, the government remains fully responsible for the killings, arrests, and repression.
His second major criticism concerns calls for American and Israeli military intervention. Madani argues that parts of the monarchist opposition have increasingly linked regime change to foreign military action rather than domestic political mobilization. In this framework, Iranian society no longer serves as the principal engine of change; instead, foreign governments are expected to weaken or overthrow the Islamic Republic through military force before transferring power to a preferred political alternative.
He rejects this strategy on both political and ethical grounds. Politically, Madani argues that it wrongly assumes Iran’s domestic protest movements have failed simply because they have not yet overthrown the government. He maintains that social movements should not be judged solely by immediate regime change. Even when governments survive, movements can fundamentally reshape public attitudes, political culture, gender relations, and the boundaries of acceptable state authority. He cites the lasting social transformations following the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement as evidence that profound change can occur without immediate governmental collapse.
Ethically, Madani questions how human rights advocates can support military attacks that would inevitably endanger civilians, conscript soldiers, hospital workers, and other individuals who may have no role in government decision-making. He argues that support for bombing military or government facilities cannot ignore the human costs involved.
Madani also challenges the assumption that the United States or Israel would prioritize Iran’s democratic future over their own strategic interests. Foreign governments, he argues, pursue national security and geopolitical objectives, not democratic transformation in other countries.
Even if military intervention succeeded in weakening or toppling the Islamic Republic, Madani warns that there is no guarantee such an outcome would produce democracy. Instead, it could result in institutional collapse, civil conflict, territorial fragmentation, or prolonged instability similar to experiences elsewhere in the region.
He therefore argues that welcoming foreign military attacks in the name of Iranian nationalism presents a fundamental contradiction. In his view, one cannot simultaneously claim to defend Iran while encouraging military strikes against Iranian territory and infrastructure.
Madani similarly cautions against viewing uncontrolled state collapse as a desirable outcome. Without functioning institutions and a broadly negotiated political transition, he argues, the collapse of the state could produce civil war or fragmentation rather than democracy.
As an alternative, Madani advocates a negotiated, nonviolent democratic transition rooted in Iranian civil society. He argues that labor organizations, students, women, teachers, retirees, professional associations, and other social groups remain the country’s primary agents of democratic change.
His vision closely resembles Bayat’s concept of a “negotiated revolution,” in which sustained civic mobilization ultimately creates the conditions for negotiations, a national referendum, and the election of a constituent assembly to determine Iran’s future political system. In this framework, no individual, dynasty, or foreign government has the authority to predetermine Iran’s political future. Whether Iran ultimately chooses a republic, constitutional monarchy, or another political system, Madani argues that such decisions must emerge through free public participation rather than hereditary claims or foreign military intervention.
Madani concludes that the protests before January 8 represented an authentic, internally generated social movement that did not originate with Reza Pahlavi’s call. While maintaining that the Islamic Republic bears full responsibility for the subsequent killings, he argues that the January 8-9 mobilization changed both the political framing and the risks facing protesters by promoting expectations of rapid regime collapse and possible American or Israeli intervention.
Ultimately, Madani argues that the path to power cannot be separated from the nature of the political system that follows. In his view, a democratic Iran cannot emerge through historical revisionism, hereditary political claims, or foreign military intervention, but only through a democratic process led by Iranian society itself.
Iran’s Leading Independent Football Platform Goes Dark After World Cup
Published July 22, 2026
On July 20, Football 360, one of Iran’s most influential independent sports media platforms founded by renowned journalist and broadcaster Adel Ferdosipour, was abruptly disrupted shortly after the conclusion of the FIFA World Cup, fueling new concerns about censorship and political interference in Iranian sports journalism. Ferdosipour has worked in sports television for years, where his unvarnished, critical voice has earned him a mass following inside the country.
During a live broadcast, Ferdosipour revealed that Football 360’s website had gone offline only minutes before the program was scheduled to begin, forcing the show to continue through YouTube, Instagram, and Telegram. He initially expressed hope that the outage was the result of a technical problem but later suggested that it reflected years of pressure against him and his independent media platform.
The timing immediately drew attention. The disruption occurred one day after the World Cup final and came on the heels of a highly public confrontation between Ferdosipour and Iran national team head coach Amir Ghalenoei over criticism of the team’s performances.
The dispute began after Ghalenoei sharply criticized journalists and commentators who had questioned Iran’s performance during the tournament. Without naming Ferdosipour directly, he accused some media figures of disappearing during the war and returning only to attack the national team. He also questioned why the authorities continued to provide such critics with public platforms, comments widely interpreted as an appeal for official action against independent sports commentators.
Ferdosipour strongly rejected the accusations, stating that he had remained in Tehran throughout the war, while noting that Ghalenoei himself had spent part of that period at his residence in Antalya, Turkey. Defending the role of independent journalism, Ferdosipour declared, “If they expected me to say the national team played wonderfully regardless of reality, I am not that kind of person.”
While Ferdosipour linked the disruption to criticism of the national team, another explanation has emerged from Iranian media. According to Asr-e Iran, the disruption may have stemmed from a series of complaints filed by Iran’s state broadcaster (IRIB) against Adel Ferdosipour and Football 360. The report alleges that government authorities and regulatory bodies deliberately postponed intervention until after the World Cup had concluded to avoid controversy during the tournament.
According to the same report, Ferdosipour’s live interview with internationally renowned Iranian referee Alireza Faghani further intensified pressure from IRIB, ultimately leading to action against the platform the day after the World Cup final. Faghani – a referee in key matches in the World Cup – has been a target of criticism by state media after Faghani was photographed with and shook the hand of U.S. President Donald Trump after officiating a match in the United States in 2025. Yet, the possible connection to the Faghani interview could not be independently confirmed, and neither IRIB nor Iranian judicial or regulatory authorities have publicly commented on the reports. No official explanation has been provided for the disruption.
For Ferdosipour, however, the incident represented the latest chapter in a much longer history of pressure. Visibly emotional during the broadcast, he said it was the first time in his broadcasting career that he had struggled to hold back tears. Ferdosipour reflected on his earlier removal from Iranian state television in 2018 despite the immense popularity of his iconic football program Navad (90), saying that after being dismissed he had been reduced to “absolute zero.”
Rather than leaving journalism, he rebuilt his career from scratch. Football 360, launched in 2022, quickly became one of Iran’s largest independent football media platforms, covering men’s and women’s football through articles, podcasts, interviews, mobile applications and live online broadcasts. Its success provided Ferdosipour with an independent audience after years away from state television.
He argued that the platform’s growth had been accompanied by continuous efforts to undermine its work. According to Ferdosipour, guests were regularly contacted by unidentified callers and warned not to appear on Football 360, while Iran’s Football Federation prohibited members of the Referees Committee from giving interviews to the program. He also alleged that authorities had spent years scrutinizing every aspect of his finances, professional activities and private life in an effort to find material that could be used against him.
Declaring that he would not compromise his principles, Ferdosipour said, “I was never a yes-man. I am not one, and I never will be. When I see something wrong, I will say it, whatever the consequences.” One of the most striking moments of the broadcast came when he questioned why such extensive pressure was being directed at a single independent sports platform. “You have all the media. You have all the resources. You control the national team. You have everything. Can you really not tolerate one website and one application?” he asked.
The precise nature and cause of the disruption remain unclear. Reports indicated that Football 360’s website became inaccessible shortly before the live broadcast, while its Android application was reportedly removed from Café Bazaar, one of Iran’s largest Android application marketplaces. Iranian authorities have provided no official explanation for the disruption, and it remains unclear whether it resulted from legal action, regulatory intervention, technical factors, or a combination of these. The absence of any official statement has only intensified speculation about the role of government regulators, judicial authorities and state media institutions.
The controversy underscores how sports journalism in Iran has increasingly become intertwined with politics and freedom of expression. Football remains one of the country’s most influential public arenas, and criticism of the national team has increasingly become entangled with broader debates over patriotism, political loyalty and the boundaries of permissible public criticism.
Whether the disruption was triggered by criticism of the national team, long-running complaints from Iran’s state broadcaster, the interview with Alireza Faghani, or a combination of these factors, the sequence of events has heightened concerns that one of Iran’s most influential independent media platforms was subjected to political pressure because of its editorial independence. In the absence of an official explanation, the incident stands as another example of the uncertain environment facing independent journalists and digital media outlets operating outside Iran’s state-controlled broadcasting system.
“We Do Not Want War”: Iranian Anti-War Declaration Emerges as the Conflict Intensifies
Published July 19, 2026
One of the most significant political developments in the latest phase of the U.S.–Iran war has come not from the battlefield but from inside Iran itself. As military operations expand across Iran and the Persian Gulf, 268 Iranian public figures – including political activists, university professors, economists, lawyers, physicians, former members of parliament, former government officials, labor and teachers’ representatives, religious scholars, artists, and civil society leaders – have issued a joint declaration rejecting the continuation of the war.
Published under the title “We Do Not Want War,” the statement represents one of the broadest anti-war appeals to emerge from inside Iran since the conflict began. Unlike previous declarations that focused primarily on domestic political issues, this appeal directly condemns continued military escalation, rejects attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, and calls for an immediate return to diplomacy before the conflict expands beyond anyone’s ability to control.
The declaration begins by affirming that the Iranian people possess the fundamental right to live in peace, dignity, and security. It describes peace as both a universal human right and a divine blessing, arguing that genuine peace requires the complete cessation of war, military threats, incitement, hatred, and policies built upon perpetual confrontation.
The signatories argue that the overwhelming majority of Iranians seek peace rather than endless conflict and insist that no decision to continue the war should be imposed upon the country without regard to the wishes of its citizens. Addressing governments, military organizations, and international actors involved in the war, they warn that denying the Iranian people their right to peace would constitute a profound injustice.
“Despite all our differences, we raise the call of ‘No to War,'” the declaration states, inviting Iranians of every political orientation, religion, ethnicity, profession, and intellectual tradition to unite behind that message. It concludes with a verse from the Persian poet Saadi, expressing the timeless principle that even those strong enough to prevail in war should choose peace instead.
The breadth of the signatories gives the declaration exceptional political significance. Conservatives, reformists, independent intellectuals, economists, physicians, teachers, lawyers, environmental activists, Sunni religious leaders, former parliamentarians, and former senior government officials all appear on the list, reflecting a rare convergence across Iran’s deeply fragmented political landscape. Among those signing are former Central Bank Governor Valiollah Seif, former diplomat Mohammad Hossein Adeli, political figures Faezah Hashemi and Parvaneh Salahshouri, and dozens of former legislators and prominent academics.
The timing of the declaration is especially important because it coincides with what appears to be a fundamental transformation in the character of the war itself. During the earlier forty-day conflict, military operations largely centered on missile bases, command facilities, and conventional military infrastructure. The latest escalation suggests that both sides are increasingly extending their campaigns beyond purely military objectives toward the infrastructure that sustains modern economies and civilian life.
The text of the joint statement is translated below:
To Our Fellow Iranians and to People Around the World
We, the undersigned, together with all citizens of Iran, have the fundamental right to live in peace and security, with dignity and honor. Peace is both a divine blessing and a universal human right. The minimum condition for enjoying that right is the complete and unconditional end of war, and the cessation of all threats, incitement to hatred, and warmongering.
We believe that the overwhelming majority of the Iranian people desire peace and the right to live a dignified life. Therefore, since no decision should be imposed upon the country against the will of its people—and because that will can only be legitimately determined through the free expression of public opinion—we firmly remind all governments, military forces involved in the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, and all members of the international community that violating this fundamental right of the Iranian people is a grave injustice against a nation that does not want war and stands for peace.
Despite all our differences, we raise our collective voice to say “No to War.” We sincerely call upon all our fellow Iranians—regardless of gender, political or ideological beliefs, religion, ethnicity, or any other distinction—to join this call and strengthen its echo by adding their voices.
Even if you possess the strength of an elephant or the claws of a lion,
To me, peace is still better than war.
— Saadi
War Intensifies With Strikes on Infrastructure
Published July 19, 2026
Following eight consecutive nights of intensified U.S. operations and Iranian retaliation, each round of military action is now being presented by both governments as a necessary response to previous attacks, creating a cycle of retaliation that continually raises the threshold of violence while narrowing the space available for diplomacy. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced it had conducted new strikes against Iranian missile and drone storage facilities, naval capabilities, coastal surveillance systems, air-defense assets, and logistics infrastructure. American officials also said they had targeted Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps units allegedly connected to attacks on U.S. forces in Jordan.
On Friday, an Iranian missile and drone attack in Jordan killed two American service members, left another missing and injured several others, as announced by CENTCOM on Saturday. U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth declared that the deaths of the soldiers had only strengthened America’s resolve, while Iranian officials warned that any further U.S. attacks would trigger increasingly severe retaliation.
Perhaps the most consequential strategic development has been the emergence of a doctrine of mutual infrastructure deterrence. As American strikes have expanded beyond conventional military targets to include transportation networks, coastal facilities, energy infrastructure, and – according to Iranian authorities – water and other civilian installations, Tehran appears increasingly prepared to demonstrate that attacks on Iran’s essential infrastructure will carry corresponding consequences for neighboring states hosting or facilitating American military operations.
This shift is most visible in Kuwait. Iranian military sources announced successive operations against facilities associated with American forces near Al-Adairi and Ali Al Salem, while Kuwaiti authorities accused Iran of repeatedly striking electricity-generation facilities, water infrastructure, oil installations and areas surrounding American military positions. Although Iran maintains that its intended targets were U.S. military assets, the reported damage to power, water, and energy infrastructure illustrates how attacks directed at military facilities can quickly produce broader civilian and economic consequences.
The psychological impact inside Kuwait has been immediate. Reports indicate increased public purchases of bottled water and canned food amid concerns about possible disruptions to electricity and water supplies, demonstrating how attacks on critical infrastructure can generate insecurity well beyond the immediate sites of military engagement.
Similar dynamics are emerging elsewhere across the Persian Gulf. Bahrain reported intercepting multiple Iranian missiles and drones aimed toward areas associated with American military facilities while warning of attempted attacks against civilian locations. Jordan likewise intercepted several Iranian missiles launched toward the Aqaba region, home to the kingdom’s only seaport and one of the Middle East’s most important logistics corridors. Although little physical damage was reported, the targeting of areas near ports, transportation hubs, and commercial infrastructure signals that the geographical scope of the conflict is steadily expanding.
American strikes have continued against targets inside southern Iran, triggering Iran’s expanded retaliation. Iranian authorities reported attacks near Abadan and announced that U.S. forces struck the construction site of the Darkhovin nuclear power plant. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) later stated that the facility remained in the early stages of construction and contained no nuclear material, reducing immediate nuclear concerns while highlighting the widening range of strategic infrastructure now being drawn into the conflict.
Iranian officials have also accused the United States of attacking roads, bridges, communications facilities, electricity networks, transportation infrastructure, and desalination facilities. Authorities said an attack on a desalination plant near Jask disrupted drinking-water supplies for approximately 20 villages and around 10,000 residents. Additional strikes have been reported around Bandar Abbas, Qeshm, Sirik, Larak Island, Shadegan, and other locations along Iran’s southern coast.
According to Iran’s Health Ministry, U.S. strikes between July 6 and July 18 killed at least 50 people and injured more than 500, including women and children. Independent reporting has likewise documented significant civilian casualties, although wartime restrictions, communications disruptions, and limited access to affected areas continue to complicate independent verification of battlefield claims made by both sides.
Collectively, these developments suggest that both governments are gradually moving beyond a campaign focused solely on degrading military capabilities. Increasingly, the conflict appears directed toward weakening economic resilience, disrupting essential services, and raising the domestic costs of continued warfare.
Rather than attempting to match American military superiority directly, Tehran appears to be pursuing a strategy intended to expose the vulnerability of Gulf states whose territories support American operations. Modern Gulf economies depend upon highly concentrated networks of ports, airports, desalination plants, electricity grids, energy terminals, financial centers and maritime trade routes. Even limited disruptions to these interconnected systems can produce consequences extending far beyond the immediate military objectives.
Iran has reinforced this message through its actions in the Strait of Hormuz. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has continued to assert control over designated shipping corridors and has reported incidents involving commercial vessels that allegedly ignored Iranian instructions. Combined with attacks on regional military facilities and infrastructure, these actions suggest that Tehran is attempting to demonstrate its ability to impose costs not only on American forces but also on the broader commercial and energy systems upon which the Gulf depends.
This broader strategic context may also help explain the increasingly urgent diplomatic language adopted by the United Arab Emirates. On July 19, the UAE issued one of its strongest appeals since the conflict resumed, calling for an immediate halt to military escalation, the protection of civilian infrastructure and a rapid return to negotiations. The Emirati government also emphasized safeguarding navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and condemned attacks against schools, hospitals, universities, residential areas, transportation systems, energy facilities, and desalination plants.
Although the UAE has so far avoided the level of direct damage reported in Kuwait and Bahrain, its economy is particularly dependent upon highly exposed infrastructure, including ports, airports, desalination facilities, logistics centers, financial hubs, and energy installations. The UAE has not publicly linked its diplomatic appeal to any direct Iranian warning, and no such causal relationship has been independently confirmed. Nevertheless, its unusually strong emphasis on protecting civilian infrastructure is consistent with a broader realization increasingly shared across the Gulf Cooperation Council countries: if the present trajectory continues, no regional state can confidently assume that its critical infrastructure will remain outside the battlefield.
The widening conflict is also reshaping regional diplomacy. Countries that have long attempted to balance security cooperation with Washington while maintaining workable relations with Tehran now face diminishing room for neutrality. Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan have all become increasingly exposed in the war. Each successive exchange increases pressure on Gulf monarchies to seek de-escalation before they become even more directly involved in the conflict.
Meanwhile, the economic consequences continue to mount. Iran’s currency has fallen sharply, while foreign exchange, gold, and precious-metal coin prices having reached record levels amid fears of prolonged conflict, inflation, shortages and further damage to national infrastructure. The Strait of Hormuz – through which roughly one-fifth of globally traded oil passes – remains one of the world’s most sensitive maritime chokepoints, making any disruption a matter of global economic concern.
The renewed fighting also follows the collapse of the Islamabad memorandum, a temporary understanding intended to reduce hostilities and create space for negotiations. Tehran has declared that it no longer considers itself bound by the agreement, accusing Washington of violating its commitments through renewed military operations. The United States, in turn, has blamed Iran for attacks on regional military installations and commercial shipping.
Statements attributed to Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, have warned that continued American military operations would bring heavier costs for the United States and its regional partners. Such rhetoric underscores the extent to which both governments increasingly view escalation as a means of restoring deterrence rather than seeking immediate compromise.
Yet recent history suggests that this calculation carries considerable risks. During the previous forty-day conflict, Iran absorbed repeated attacks against missile infrastructure, military facilities, and senior personnel while maintaining sufficient command cohesion to continue retaliatory operations until a ceasefire emerged. Although the costs were severe, the state did not experience the strategic collapse many outside observers had anticipated.
That experience is likely shaping Tehran’s current calculations. For Iranian decision-makers, the present conflict is widely viewed as existential rather than limited. Consequently, expanding attacks on infrastructure may not necessarily compel strategic concessions. Instead, they are likely to strengthen Tehran’s determination to broaden retaliation in ways designed to increase the regional costs of continued military pressure.
This dynamic creates the possibility of dangerous strategic miscalculation on all sides. Policymakers in Washington and regional capitals may underestimate Iran’s willingness to absorb sustained losses. Conversely, Iranian leaders may underestimate the willingness of the United States and its partners to sustain a prolonged military campaign if they conclude that Tehran is deliberately regionalizing the conflict.
Whether Washington and Tehran are prepared to reverse this trajectory remains uncertain. What is becoming increasingly clear, however, is that every additional strike against critical infrastructure increases the likelihood that the conflict will expand beyond military forces to encompass the civilian systems that sustain daily life throughout the Middle East.