Week of September 21, 2026 | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council

• Iran’s Air Links Shrink as Iraq Suspends Flights and Tehran Threatens Regional Airports
• Armed Violence in Sistan and Baluchestan Is Spreading Beyond Iran’s Borderlands
• Pezeshkian at UN: Iran Needs Power to Survive, but Will Not Walk Away From Diplomacy
• Veteran Iranian Actor Sirus Ebrahimzadeh Dies at 89
• Pezeshkian Heads to New York as Signs of a New Diplomatic Opening Emerge

Iran’s Air Links Shrink as Iraq Suspends Flights and Tehran Threatens Regional Airports

Iran’s international air connections narrowed further on September 25 as Najaf, Erbil and Sulaimaniya joined Baghdad in suspending Iranian flights. Iranian aviation officials confirmed the loss of Najaf, a destination they had recently identified as an alternative to Baghdad. Senior officials in Tehran meanwhile threatened neighboring countries’ airports if they cooperated with Washington’s campaign to deny services to Iranian airlines.

Ramin Kashef Azar, chief executive of Imam Khomeini Airport City, told Iranian media that Najaf airport had stopped accepting Iranian flights at 2 a.m. Friday and that no decision had been made to resume them. His remarks, reported by Saat24, confirmed that another major connection between Iran and Iraq – and a fallback that Iranian authorities had only recently proposed – had closed. Reuters subsequently reported, citing two sources, that Erbil and Sulaimaniya were also suspending Iranian flights from Friday.

Passengers were already encountering the consequences. According to BBC Persian, officials at Najaf prevented travelers from boarding a Meraj Airlines flight to Mashhad, leaving the aircraft to return without passengers. The incident illustrates how restrictions on airport services can prevent a journey even when an aircraft is available.

The cancellations extend restrictions that have already affected several nearby destinations. Iranian newspaper Rah-e Emrooz reported on September 24 that services to the United Arab Emirates, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Oman had been canceled. The disruption follows Washington’s expansion of sanctions against Iranian aviation. After designating 27 Iranian airlines earlier in September and canceling key authorizations allowing overflights and U.S.-origin aircraft to travel to Iran, the administration announced a September 23 deadline for its effort to deny them overseas support.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent threatened exclusion from the dollar system for companies providing Iranian carriers with fuel, airport services or ticket sales. The pressure extends beyond the airlines themselves to the foreign companies whose cooperation is necessary for international passenger flights.

Iranian officials have responded by threatening the operation of airports elsewhere in the region. On September 23, Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, warned on Iranian state television that neighboring countries cooperating with U.S. aviation sanctions would find their own airports unable to operate.

Mohammad Mokhber, an adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, reinforced that warning on September 25. In a statement published by Iranian outlets including Khabar Online and Etemad Online, he said that if Iran lost access to flights and airport services, other countries in the region would lose that ability as well. Neither statement identified specific targets, a timetable or an operational order. They nevertheless raised the possibility of a confrontation affecting civilian aviation beyond Iran, as neighboring governments face both U.S. financial pressure and Iranian threats.

Despite the expanding restrictions, some international connections remain operational. The situation differs by country, airline and route. Turkey provides the clearest example. Mahan Air’s earlier suspension of Istanbul and Ankara services did not end every Iranian airline’s access to Turkey. BBC Persian reported that aircraft operated by Iran Air and Qeshm Air landed at Istanbul International Airport on September 25. Iranian domestic reporting also continued to list Turkey among available destinations.

China remained on the active-route list published by Rah-e Emrooz on September 24, alongside Russia, Armenia, Pakistan, Belarus and Afghanistan. These reports describe a continuing network, although they do not establish that every scheduled flight subsequently operated. Malaysia’s diplomatic mission in Tehran also publicly confirmed that direct connections remained available. Speaking at a tourism promotion event in Tehran on September 24, Malaysia’s chargé d’affaires and head of mission said flights between Iran and Malaysia, as well as connections with Southeast Asia, were continuing. Iranian transport outlet Tinn reported his remarks.

The diplomat expressed hope that the services would continue and that more Iranian tourists would visit Malaysia. His statement provides an official account of continuing connectivity, although it does not confirm the operation of each scheduled departure. Separate reporting based on flight tracking had also recorded Iranian services to Thailand after Washington’s announced deadline.

A flight to Tajikistan demonstrates another way airlines are attempting to preserve international access: changing the route when permission to cross a country’s airspace is denied. A Varesh Airlines service bound for Dushanbe returned to Tehran on September 24 after Turkmenistan refused permission to cross its airspace. According to airline sources cited by BBC Persian, the journey was subsequently completed through Azerbaijani, Kazakh and Uzbek airspace before reaching Tajikistan.

More than 90 passengers traveled on the rerouted outbound service. The return flight departed Dushanbe at approximately 1 a.m. Friday with another 90 passengers bound for Tehran. The episode highlights the distinction between permission to land and permission to cross another country’s airspace. A destination can remain accessible even when the usual route becomes unavailable. Conversely, a flight appearing on a departure board does not establish that all the necessary permissions and services are in place.

For passengers, the result is an extremely unpredictable system, leading to canceled flights, unexpected delays and deep frustration. The Najaf case involves travelers reportedly prevented from boarding; the Dushanbe case involves a return to the departure airport followed by an alternative flight path. Both provide concrete examples of disruption beyond announcements of future restrictions.

Fewer direct connections and longer routes can create additional expenses for replacement tickets, accommodation and onward travel. The available reporting does not yet provide a reliable measure of those costs. Their impact will depend on the route, the availability of alternatives and passengers’ ability to meet transit or entry requirements.

These restrictions affect journeys for family visits, education, medical care and religious travel. For Iranians living abroad, they can also make reaching relatives in Iran more difficult. The immediate burden falls on passengers whose travel depends on the airport services and financial arrangements being targeted.

The latest developments show shrinking air options rather than a complete halt to international travel. Iraqi alternatives have closed, while some connections through Turkey, China and other destinations continue. Airlines are trying to preserve access through remaining airports and different flight paths. Tehran’s threats now add the risk that restrictions already disrupting Iranian civilian travel could escalate into a broader confrontation over regional aviation.

Armed Violence in Sistan and Baluchestan Is Spreading Beyond Iran’s Borderlands

Another major confrontation has erupted in Saravan, killing both the commander and intelligence chief of a local Revolutionary Guards operational headquarters. Armed men have also clashed with security forces in Zahedan, the provincial capital, while police have come under attack near Iranshahr. Together, the incidents indicate that the surge in armed violence documented last week is continuing, spreading geographically and imposing greater costs on Iranian security forces.

A week ago, Iran Unfiltered examined a series of violent incidents in Iran’s Baloch and Kurdish regions and asked whether the country’s widening regional war could intensify longstanding conflicts on its periphery. Since then, the situation in Sistan and Baluchestan has deteriorated further.

The most consequential incident came on September 23 in the Jahadabad area of Saravan, where Iranian security forces and members of the People’s Fighters Front engaged in several hours of heavy fighting. The confrontation came only eleven days after the nine-hour battle in the city’s Bakhshan area previously reported by Iran Unfiltered. According to the Revolutionary Guards’ Quds regional headquarters, the operation was jointly conducted by the IRGC, the Intelligence Ministry and police. Iranian authorities said five members of what they described as a “terrorist-Takfiri” group were killed and that weapons and ammunition were recovered from their hideout.

The fighting also inflicted significant losses on the local IRGC command. The Quds headquarters confirmed that Brigadier General Hossein Zarifi, commander of the IRGC’s Shahid Sajjad operational headquarters in Saravan, and Major Ahmad Herati Zeraati, the headquarters’ intelligence chief, were both killed. Haalvsh, a Baloch outlet that closely covers the province, reported that at least 13 other security personnel were seriously wounded, although that figure has not been independently verified.

The People’s Fighters Front separately confirmed that its members were involved. The group said Iranian security forces attacked a location where its fighters were based in Jahadabad, prompting reinforcements to enter the fighting in support of those who had been surrounded. It said four of its fighters were killed — three from the original group and one from the reinforcements. The competing accounts of how the confrontation began and the overall casualty toll cannot be independently verified.

Videos circulated on social media showed heavy gunfire, flames and black smoke rising from a residential building. The Balochistan Human Rights Documentation Network reported that security forces used a quadcopter to locate the armed men and blocked roads around the fighting while using light and heavier weapons.

This was the second prolonged battle between Iranian security forces and the People’s Fighters Front in Saravan in just eleven days. In both cases, the armed group says it sent additional fighters to support members surrounded by security forces. The latest confrontation ended with two senior figures in the local IRGC command dead. Two battles are not enough to establish that the People’s Fighters Front has developed fundamentally greater military capabilities or can sustain a broader insurgent campaign. But repeated, hours-long engagements involving reinforcements and substantial security-force casualties raise the possibility that the conflict around Saravan is moving beyond a pattern dominated by ambushes, assassinations and hit-and-run attacks.

The escalation is also no longer confined to Saravan. On September 18, armed violence reached Zahedan, the provincial capital and largest city in Sistan and Baluchestan. According to Iranian state media, IRGC forces patrolling near University Street encountered a suspicious vehicle, leading to a gun battle in which two occupants were killed and another arrested. Local reports described sustained shooting and a substantial security deployment in the surrounding area.

The location is significant. Zahedan is the political, administrative and security center of the province and, unlike Saravan and many areas historically associated with cross-border militant activity, is not an immediate border city. Armed confrontation inside the provincial capital makes it harder to explain the recent escalation primarily as a problem of infiltration or insecurity along the Pakistani frontier.

The violence has also extended farther west. On September 21, gunmen opened fire on a vehicle carrying police officers on the Bazman-Iranshahr road. Police Captain Alireza Mehrabi was killed and three other officers were wounded. Provincial police described the shooting as a terrorist attack. No organization had publicly claimed responsibility when the incident was initially reported.

The two Saravan battles can be linked because the People’s Fighters Front has acknowledged its involvement in both. There is no evidence, however, that the Zahedan confrontation or the attack near Iranshahr involved the same organization or formed part of a centrally coordinated campaign.

What has changed since Iran Unfiltered examined the issue last week is the combination of frequency, geography and intensity. The September 12 Saravan battle could have been an unusually intense but isolated confrontation in a volatile border area. Eleven days later, the same armed coalition was involved in another hours-long battle there, while armed incidents were also occurring elsewhere in the province.

Notably, the Iranian government is portraying the escalation through the lens of the wider regional war. Following the latest Saravan confrontation, the IRGC’s Quds regional headquarters accused the United States and Israel of seeking to activate and strengthen what it called “terrorist-Takfiri groups” in southeastern Iran after failing to achieve their objectives in the war.

Iranian authorities have not publicly presented evidence establishing that Washington or Israel directed or supported the recent attacks. Baloch armed opposition also long predates the current regional war. The People’s Fighters Front itself was formed before the latest escalation through the consolidation of several existing armed organizations. Instability in Sistan and Baluchestan has deep domestic roots. The province contains a much wider spectrum of religious, political and civil activity that should not be conflated with armed militancy. Longstanding Baloch grievances include economic marginalization, discrimination, inadequate development, political representation, Sunni religious rights and the conduct of security forces.

As violence increases, it is important to distinguish some of these grievances. A broader security response that treats peaceful political activity, civil society and armed militancy as part of the same threat could deepen existing tensions rather than contain them.

The regional war nevertheless changes the environment in which these longstanding conflicts are unfolding. Iran is simultaneously confronting external military pressure, protecting critical infrastructure and shipping routes, managing severe economic strains and trying to prevent armed organizations from exploiting vulnerabilities inside the country. For armed groups already fighting the Islamic Republic, that environment could create opportunities; for Tehran, it creates greater pressure to prevent local violence from developing into a larger internal security challenge.

The escalation in Sistan and Baluchestan is becoming harder to dismiss as an isolated flare-up as it becomes more active, geographically dispersed and costly for Iranian security forces. Whether this is a temporary escalation or the beginning of a more sustained phase remains unclear. But the events of the past two weeks provide stronger reason to watch Sistan and Baluchestan as one of the places where Iran’s external war and its longstanding internal conflicts could increasingly intersect.

Pezeshkian at UN: Iran Needs Power to Survive, but Will Not Walk Away From Diplomacy

Published September 23, 2026

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian used his address to the United Nations General Assembly on Wednesday to deliver a message centered on two themes that have increasingly defined Tehran’s approach after seven months of war: Iran believes it must possess sufficient power to deter further attacks, but it is not closing the door to diplomacy with the United States.

Speaking one day after President Donald Trump used the same UN podium to threaten Iran with further military escalation, Pezeshkian repeatedly returned to the question of power. He argued that Iran’s experience during the war had demonstrated the consequences for countries unable to adequately defend themselves, while distinguishing defensive strength from aggression.

“We want power to defend ourselves, not to invade other countries,” Pezeshkian said. At another point, he put the argument more starkly: in today’s international system, without power, “we will be crushed.” Pezeshkian opened his speech with a direct response to Trump’s portrayal of Iran a day earlier. Holding up photographs of Iranians killed during the conflict, including children killed in the U.S. strike on the Shajareh Tayyebeh school in Minab, victims of the bombing of a sports facility in Lamerd, and Iran’s late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, he rejected the characterization of Iran as a terrorist state.

“We are not terrorists. We are victims of terrorism,” Pezeshkian said, arguing that Iran had been attacked by the United States and Israel and had responded in self-defense. He said Iran had not attacked another country in roughly two centuries and questioned why Iran was accused of terrorism while Iranian civilians, political leaders and infrastructure had been targeted. Pezeshkian credited the Iranian public with preventing those efforts from succeeding.

The broader argument running through the speech was that the war had strengthened Tehran’s belief in deterrence rather than weakened it. Pezeshkian said Iran’s defensive systems exist so that “no one imagines that bombing Iranian cities will go unanswered,” adding that Iran would not seek anyone’s permission to defend itself. At the same time, he emphasized that Iran does not seek regional domination. Its objective, he said, is sufficient strength to defend the country and pursue development, not to invade its neighbors.

That distinction shaped Pezeshkian’s message to surrounding countries. He argued that Iran’s security cannot ultimately be separated from the security of its neighbors and called for cooperation, shared security and economic development. His message also carried a warning: Iran and its neighbors could build peace and security together, or ultimately share the consequences of regional insecurity. Despite his emphasis on military strength, Pezeshkian repeatedly left the door open to negotiations.

“For our defense, we do not fear war, and for peace, we do not run from negotiations,” he said. Pezeshkian said Iran had demonstrated its willingness to pursue diplomacy but would not negotiate under military coercion. “We are ready for dialogue with the world, but we will not accept the language of force.”

The remarks directly answered Trump’s speech a day earlier, in which the U.S. president paired the possibility of an agreement with threats of military “annihilation.” Pezeshkian argued that such threats violate the principles of the UN Charter and would not force Iran to surrender. The exchange highlighted a central obstacle facing renewed diplomacy: Washington is seeking to use military and economic pressure as leverage, while Tehran insists that meaningful negotiations cannot take place under the threat of additional attacks.

Pezeshkian also addressed Iran’s nuclear program, reiterating that Tehran does not seek nuclear weapons but will not surrender its nuclear knowledge or peaceful nuclear technology. Iran, he said, wants nuclear energy for development and does not accept that nuclear science should effectively remain the exclusive domain of a small number of countries. His formulation was straightforward: “No nuclear weapon, but no deprivation of Iran from nuclear knowledge.”

Pezeshkian contrasted Iran’s treatment with that of Israel, which is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons but is not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. “The atomic bomb is in Israel, but the inspectors are in Iran,” he said. He argued that Israel has not subjected its nuclear program to the inspection system applied to Iran while Tehran continues to face sanctions and scrutiny. “Israel kills, but Iran is sanctioned,” Pezeshkian said, presenting the comparison as an example of what Iran views as a double standard.

Pezeshkian also connected sanctions directly to their impact on ordinary Iranians. He argued that U.S. sanctions disproportionately harm the sick, the poor and other vulnerable people, rather than simply putting pressure on the government. He also pointed to Iran being attacked while engaged in negotiations, arguing that Tehran continues to face military pressure and sanctions even as it maintains that it is prepared for diplomacy. 

Another major portion of the speech concerned the Strait of Hormuz, which has become both a military flashpoint and an important source of Iranian leverage. “We cannot allow everyone to benefit from the Strait of Hormuz while Iran is deprived of it,” Pezeshkian said. He argued that Iran could not be expected to accept restrictions on its own commerce while weapons, missiles and military supplies continued to move through the same waters. “They close the way to Iran and then move weapons, ammunition and missiles through the strait to destroy countries. This is not possible, and we will not allow it.”

The remarks came as indirect contacts between Iran and the United States continued in New York. Tehran has linked the future of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz to U.S. military pressure and restrictions on Iranian ports, while signaling that diplomacy remains possible.

The speech also came amid a broader Iranian response to Trump’s UN address. Earlier Wednesday, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei said Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had been authorized to communicate Iran’s conditions through intermediaries in New York. The announcement suggested that despite escalating rhetoric, Tehran continues to authorize diplomatic engagement.

At the same time, Rezaei emphasized Iran’s military and geographic leverage. He described the Strait of Hormuz as an instrument for securing Iran’s rights in negotiations and warned that Tehran would respond to further U.S. attacks. He also warned neighboring countries against allowing their territory, airspace or infrastructure to be used for military operations against Iran.

Rezaei separately made claims about Iran’s military capabilities, including that an Iranian missile had been detonated above the aircraft carrier USS George Washington and that Iran was reverse-engineering a U.S. autonomous underwater vehicle. Those claims have not been independently verified. Iran’s military leadership delivered an even sharper response. The General Staff of the Armed Forces and the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters said Iran was prepared to answer new attacks with “more severe, more crushing and unpredictable blows.”

The military’s language was considerably more confrontational than Pezeshkian’s. The president instead sought to combine deterrence with an explicit willingness to negotiate. Taken together, however, the messages point to a two-track Iranian strategy: demonstrating military leverage while keeping diplomatic channels open.

Pezeshkian also addressed the humanitarian consequences of war in the region, particularly in Gaza. He cited the large number of Palestinians killed and displaced and argued that international institutions had failed to protect civilians. He said it was impossible to speak credibly about peace while the Palestinian conflict remained unresolved and argued that resistance could not simply be eliminated through bombing.

For Pezeshkian, the lesson of Iran’s own experience appeared similar: military pressure can impose enormous costs on civilians, but Tehran does not believe that pressure alone will produce political capitulation. His address therefore presented military strength and diplomacy not as competing approaches, but as interconnected elements of Iran’s strategy after seven months of war. Pezeshkian’s central argument was that credible defensive power is necessary for diplomacy to occur on more equal terms.

His message to Washington was that Iran remains willing to negotiate but will not accept negotiations framed as surrender. To neighboring states, he argued that their security and Iran’s are ultimately intertwined. On the nuclear issue, he rejected both nuclear weapons and demands that Iran abandon peaceful nuclear knowledge. And on Hormuz, he made clear that Tehran does not believe freedom of navigation can mean unrestricted access for others while Iran itself faces blockade and economic exclusion.

One day after Trump paired diplomacy with threats of further military force, Pezeshkian offered Iran’s response from the same UN podium: Tehran intends to strengthen its ability to defend itself while leaving a path open for negotiations. “We do not fear war,” Pezeshkian said, “and we do not run from negotiations.”

Veteran Iranian Actor Sirus Ebrahimzadeh Dies at 89

Published September 24, 2026

Veteran Iranian actor, playwright and theater artist Sirus Ebrahimzadeh has died at the age of 89 after a period of illness, ending a career that stretched across more than five decades of Iranian theater, radio, television and cinema.

Iran’s House of Cinema announced his death on Monday, saying Ebrahimzadeh had died “away from his homeland” after an illness. Iranian media did not initially provide details about the nature of his illness.

Born in Ardabil in 1937, Ebrahimzadeh belonged to a generation of Iranian performers whose careers bridged the country’s dramatically different cultural periods before and after the 1979 revolution. He studied English language and literature at the University of Tehran before traveling to Britain to continue his education in theater. He later returned to Iran and became active across theater, radio and television. His professional work in Iranian broadcasting began in the late 1960s, and his first major film appearance came in Ali Hatami’s “Hassan Kachal” (Hassan the Bald), the influential 1970 musical that became Iran’s first musical feature film.

Over the following decades, Ebrahimzadeh appeared in a wide range of Iranian films, including “Sattar Khan,” “Kamal-ol-Molk,” “Hamsar” (The Spouse), “Chehreh,” “Hotel Carton,” “Mosafer-e Rey,” “Shami dar Bad” and “Moomiaei 3.” His television work included popular series such as “Arayeshgah-e Ziba,” “Velayat-e Eshgh,” “Cactus,” “Ashpazbashi” and “Sakhteman-e Pezeshkan.” That range made Ebrahimzadeh recognizable to several generations of Iranian audiences. His career moved between historical drama, comedy and popular television, while his distinctive voice and delivery became one of his most recognizable characteristics.

He was also more than a screen actor. Ebrahimzadeh’s roots were in theater, and he worked as a playwright, writer and director in addition to performing. His stage career included both Iranian works and productions connected to the European dramatic tradition, while he also performed radio adaptations of major works of theater and literature.

One of the major formal recognitions of his film career came in 2000, when he received the House of Cinema’s Golden Statue for Best Supporting Actor for “Moomiaei 3,” a popular comedy directed by Mohammadreza Honarmand. His later screen appearances became less frequent. The last film featuring him to receive a theatrical release was “Orange Taxi,” directed by Ebrahim Vahid-Zadeh, in 2008, although Iranian audiences continued to encounter him through television and reruns of older productions.

Ebrahimzadeh’s death is notable beyond the loss of a familiar actor. His career represented a generation of Iranian artists who developed in the country’s pre-revolutionary theater and broadcasting institutions but continued working after 1979, adapting to profound changes in Iranian cinema, television and cultural life.

From Ali Hatami’s early cinema to popular television decades later, Ebrahimzadeh remained part of Iran’s cultural landscape across more than half a century of political and social transformation. His death removes another figure from a generation whose careers connect several distinct eras of modern Iranian cultural history.

The National Iranian American Council (NIAC) extends its condolences to Ebrahimzadeh’s family, friends and the Iranian artistic community, and honors his more than five decades of contributions to Iranian theater, cinema and television. His work connected generations of Iranian audiences across periods of profound social and cultural change, leaving a lasting place in Iran’s contemporary cultural memory.

Pezeshkian Heads to New York as Signs of a New Diplomatic Opening Emerge

Published September 22, 2026

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian departed for New York on Tuesday to attend the United Nations General Assembly, arriving at a consequential moment in the nearly seven-month war. His trip comes as commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains severely disrupted, both Iran and the United States face mounting economic pressure, and several diplomatic channels appear to be converging around the question of whether the conflict can be brought toward a negotiated end.

President Trump, in his remarks before the General Assembly, framed Iran as unwilling to strike a deal, a consistent terrorist threat to the U.S., and the globe and his war as justified. He repeated a recent refrain suggesting he can choose between a deal and annihilation. “I have a big decision to make: Will a deal be made with Iran that lets them rebuild and create a far greater country than it ever was before, maybe one of the greatest in the Middle East or even the world?” Trump continued, “Or do I annihilate the Islamic Republic, and do it quickly, never giving them a chance to kill and destroy people and countries again? Do I drive them into hell, with no chance of survival and no hope of future greatness or generations? But I believe we’ll make a deal right after the election…they’re waiting to see how I do in the midterm election. What they don’t realize is I did that already…I’ll be here for two and a half years.” He suggested he will give no credence to the midterms influencing his approach toward Iran, and declared the U.S. has more munitions than ever before. 

Trump also suggested that Iran had killed 72,000 of its own people – roughly 10 times the figure produced by the Iran human rights group HRANA after the protests and 24 times the figure announced by the Iranian government. Moreover, without explanation, he suggested that 10,000 Iranians had been killed recently. While dozens of individuals who have been accused of violence in the protests have been executed, there is no indication of recent widespread protests or a crackdown on such a scale.

Trump’s frame raises a question as to whether the President might be preparing for a climb down or an escalation. Heated, genocidal rhetoric accompanied the pivot to a ceasefire in April. This rhetoric echoes a similar tone, though the President has defied easy predictions on Iran for years.

On Tuesday, Reuters reported that Iran is prepared to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within seven days if the United States eases military pressure and lifts its blockade of Iranian ports. According to a senior Iranian official who was not identified, Tehran’s proposal for ending hostilities was conveyed to Washington through intermediaries on September 16. The official said Iran’s delegation in New York has full authority to revive diplomacy and that details of an agreement could be discussed there through mediators, although a direct meeting between Pezeshkian and President Donald Trump is not planned. Iran has not publicly confirmed the seven-day proposal in these terms.

The timing is significant because Tehran has spent the past several days publicly signaling an interest in negotiations without backing away from its leverage in Hormuz. Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said on September 19 that Iran had conveyed seven conditions to Washington for the beginning of negotiations. Rezaei did not publicly enumerate all seven in his statement. In an interview with Al Jazeera, however, he identified three principal demands: an end to the war “on all fronts,” the release of Iran’s frozen assets and an end to the U.S. naval blockade. He said Qatar had transmitted Iran’s conditions to Washington and that Tehran was awaiting Trump’s response.

The complete list remains undisclosed, but the reported seven-day proposal suggests a potentially important change in sequencing. Previous Iranian statements presented reopening Hormuz as something that would follow fulfillment of Tehran’s conditions. The latest proposal, if accurately reported, appears more incremental: Washington would formally commit to diplomacy and take tangible steps to reduce military pressure and end the blockade, after which Iran could reopen the strait within seven days while negotiations over a broader settlement proceed.

That would amount to an action-for-action process rather than requiring every outstanding dispute to be resolved before Hormuz reopens. The stakes remain enormous. Preliminary shipping data showed only two large commercial vessels crossing the strait on Monday, down from ten the previous day and roughly 125 per day before the war began on February 28. The figures do not include ships that may have crossed with their tracking systems switched off. Two vessels were also attacked in separate incidents around the strait, although responsibility had not been established.

The disruption gives Tehran leverage, but sustaining the confrontation is imposing serious costs on both sides. Trump is approaching the November 3 midterm elections amid record diesel prices, stubborn inflation and growing voter dissatisfaction over the cost of living and the Iran war. His approval rating has fallen to 32 percent, the lowest of his political career in Reuters/Ipsos polling, while some Republican candidates in competitive races are openly calling for the war to end quickly.

Iran is under severe pressure of its own. The U.S. naval blockade and intensified sanctions have constrained oil exports and access to foreign currency, while sharp currency fluctuations, inflation and import pressures are further eroding household purchasing power. Iranian officials have increasingly acknowledged that the economy and people’s livelihoods have become a central challenge of the war. Those pressures do not guarantee compromise, but they give both governments powerful reasons to explore an arrangement that preserves core interests while ending an economically costly conflict.

Another important piece is a separate Iran-Oman framework for navigation through Hormuz. Iranian officials say Tehran and Muscat have developed a plan for reopening shipping through the strait. The proposal surfaced prominently during Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to Beijing on September 16, the same date on which Iran’s latest proposal was reportedly transmitted to Washington.

According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s account of Araghchi’s meeting with Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the Iranian side said Iran had reached a plan with Oman to open the Strait of Hormuz and argued that the United States should fulfill commitments it had made. Wang urged Iran and the United States to exercise restraint, return to the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, rebuild a negotiating mechanism and begin substantive consultations. China also explicitly called for effective measures to reopen Hormuz as soon as possible.

The Beijing meeting is significant because it shows that the Hormuz arrangement and a broader return to negotiations were already being discussed at a high diplomatic level immediately before the latest Iranian initiative became public. It also places China directly inside the diplomatic picture at a moment when Beijing is communicating with both Tehran and Washington.

Inside Iran, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has also begun speaking unusually explicitly about avoiding an indefinite conflict. On September 20, he criticized two competing approaches: one that advocates continued war without offering a mechanism for ending it and, by rejecting diplomacy, risks pushing Iran toward “attrition and endless war”; and another that, in his view, underestimates Iran’s capabilities and favors accepting unilateral American demands. Ghalibaf instead argued for combining military pressure with diplomacy and converting what Iran considers its battlefield leverage into political gains. His comments provide further evidence of an increasingly public discussion within Iran’s political establishment over how the war should end, rather than a simple choice between fighting and negotiating.

China may now become particularly important to that process. Beijing wants the Strait of Hormuz reopened and international energy flows stabilized but has simultaneously called for negotiations based on reciprocal steps rather than unilateral Iranian concessions. China is also a major economic partner of Iran and has significantly more leverage than smaller regional mediators. In its official account of the September 16 meeting, Beijing said it was prepared to play a “constructive role” in resolving the conflict while supporting Iran’s legitimate rights and interests and urging both Tehran and Washington toward substantive negotiations.

What happened immediately afterward makes the Chinese channel more noteworthy. On September 17, one day after meeting Araghchi, Wang spoke by telephone with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The Middle East was among the issues discussed, and Beijing again called for restraint, renewed negotiations and a reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Within roughly 24 hours, China’s foreign minister had therefore been in direct communication with senior officials from both Tehran and Washington as diplomatic activity around the war intensified.

The diplomatic calendar creates another opportunity. Chinese President Xi Jinping is due to visit the United States from September 23 to 25 and meet Trump in Washington. Their agenda extends far beyond Iran, encompassing trade, artificial intelligence, Taiwan and the broader U.S.-China relationship, but the Iran war is also expected to be discussed.

This gives China a potentially distinctive role. Qatar and Oman can carry messages and develop practical arrangements; Beijing has direct access to Tehran, a major economic relationship with Iran and simultaneous high-level access to Washington. Washington could seek Chinese help in encouraging a stable reopening of Hormuz, while Tehran may see Beijing as a major-power channel supportive of reciprocal implementation rather than surrendering its principal leverage before negotiations begin.

The sequence is therefore notable: Araghchi discussed Hormuz and negotiations in Beijing; Wang spoke with Rubio the following day; Iran says its conditions have been conveyed through regional intermediaries; Pezeshkian is now heading to New York; and Xi is preparing for talks with Trump in Washington.

Major obstacles remain. Iran insists Washington must take concrete steps before Tehran relinquishes its leverage in Hormuz. The Trump administration continues to threaten renewed military action, while maritime attacks and broader regional fighting have not stopped. The full seven Iranian conditions remain undisclosed, and Washington has not publicly accepted either Tehran’s reported sequencing proposal or the Iran-Oman framework.

Pezeshkian is therefore not arriving in New York with an announced peace agreement, and a meeting with Trump is not currently expected. What makes this UN gathering different is the diplomatic activity surrounding it: Iran has transmitted conditions for negotiations, senior officials in Tehran are publicly discussing how military leverage could be converted into a political outcome, a concrete proposal for Hormuz has reportedly reached Washington, and governments with access to both sides are actively engaged.

The coming days may show whether these separate channels remain another round of indirect messaging or begin to form a workable negotiating process. Pezeshkian’s presence in New York provides an immediate venue for testing that possibility, while Xi’s talks with Trump could determine whether China assumes a larger role in the diplomacy surrounding the war.