Week of July 13, 2026 | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council
- IRAN UNFILTERED SPECIAL EDITION: Civilian Casualties and Housing Damage in Iran
- The Strait of Hormuz War: Escalation, Iranian Resilience, and the Risk of a Wider Regional Conflict
- Iran’s Internal Debate Over a Return to War with the United States
- As Iran’s Parliament Reconvenes, Institutional Politics Still Favor Pragmatists Despite Hardline Rhetoric
- Has Iran “Miscalculated” in the Strait of Hormuz?
- Why the Iran-U.S. War Resumed — and What Comes Next
IRAN UNFILTERED SPECIAL EDITION: Civilian Casualties and Housing Damage in Iran
Executive Summary
The 2026 Iran War caused a civilian catastrophe fully corroborated by independent international organizations. Civilian death tolls range between 1,030 and 2,362 — with the true figure difficult to determine given Iran’s internet blackout, restricted journalist access, and the fact that approximately 40% of bodies were initially unidentifiable due to the nature of munitions used. At least 254 to 376 children are confirmed among the dead, and over 26,500 people were injured across the 40 days.
The Minab school strike — killing 156 people including 120 schoolchildren on the opening day of the war, confirmed by the local prosecutor and independently verified by satellite imagery, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the UN, and major news organizations — stands as the single most documented atrocity of the conflict and has prompted formal war crimes investigations. The cumulative pattern of incidents — including the Lamerd sports hall, the Niloofar Square killings, and the double-tap Karaj bridge strike — reflects a war in which civilian concentrations were repeatedly struck.
On housing, the Red Crescent’s final confirmed total of 125,630 civilian units damaged — including 100,000 residential units — is the most authoritative national figure available and has been cited directly by UN OCHA in its humanitarian updates. Tehran bore the largest single-city burden with 46,623 residential units damaged and 649 recorded impact points, while the western border provinces of Kermanshah, Kurdistan, and Ilam recorded the most severe damage outside the capital. The scale of destruction was approximately 15 times greater than the damage caused by the June 2025 Twelve-Day War, and in total magnitude is broadly comparable to the residential damage inflicted over the entire eight-year Iran-Iraq War.
The most scientifically independent measure — the Oregon State University satellite assessment of at least 7,645 buildings with confirmed structural damage — provides the externally verified scientific floor. The gap between this figure and the Red Crescent’s 125,630 units reflects fundamentally different definitions of damage: the satellite methodology captures only significant structural change, while the ground registration counts any impact including broken windows and cracked walls. The government’s own categorisation confirms that the vast majority of the 125,630 units fall into the minor damage category — but that does not make the smaller number more “true.” Both figures document real harm to real people’s homes.
The displacement of 3.2 million Iranians — 60% of them women and children — is confirmed by both OCHA and UNHCR, and represents one of the largest internal displacement events in Iranian history since the Iran-Iraq War. Taken together, the documented human and material costs of this conflict place it among the most destructive episodes of civilian harm in the modern Middle East.
1.1 Total Death Toll — Cross-Source Verification
Four independent sources provide the primary death counts. Their convergence across distinct methodologies makes the civilian casualty figures among the most robustly documented of the conflict.
Iranian Ministry of Health / Al Jazeera tracker (May 5, 2026): At least 3,468 people were killed in US-Israeli attacks on Iran between February 28 and April 8, 2026, according to Iran’s Ministry of Health. The victims were aged between eight months and 88 years and included seven infants, 376 children, and 496 women. More than 26,500 people were injured, including at least 4,000 women and 1,621 children.
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT — RED CRESCENT RELIEF WORKER, TEHRAN
“I saw a man standing on the rubble. Shortly after, his wife’s body was found near the building. The intensity of the strike had made identification of the body extremely difficult. In one moment, that man had lost everything — his home was destroyed and not a single member of his family remained by his side.”
— Elias Nazpour, journalist and relief worker, Iranian Red Crescent Society (Khorasan Razavi unit). Source: Fararu / Mehr News Agency, May 2026
HRANA — Human Rights Activists in Iran (US-based NGO): As of April 7, HRANA documented 3,636 total deaths in Iran due to strikes, including 1,701 civilians (among them at least 254 children), 1,221 military personnel, and 714 unclassified. HRANA noted it is believed that military casualties are significantly higher than reported, as confirmations depend on government data obscured due to the sensitive nature of military information.
Hengaw Organization for Human Rights (Norway-based NGO): At least 7,650 people were killed during the 40-day phase of the war, of whom 1,030 — equivalent to 13.5% — were civilians, and at least 6,620 were military personnel. Hengaw’s significantly higher total reflects its deeper documentation of military casualties, particularly across Kurdish provinces where it has strong field networks.
UN OCHA Humanitarian Update No. 3 (April 16): As of 7 April, the Ministry of Health and Medical Education reported at least 2,362 civilian deaths and more than 32,314 injuries nationwide, with the highest casualties recorded in Tehran, Hormozgan, and Isfahan.
By contrast, this civilian death range is higher than the 1,030 cited by Hengaw and 1,701 confirmed civilian dead cited by HRANA. However, a death toll of 2,362 in the February 28 – April 8 phase of the war is certainly plausible and perhaps even likely given documentation barriers. The total death toll (civilian + military combined) ranges from 3,375–7,650, depending on sources.
Read the full report on the NIAC website…
The Strait of Hormuz War: Escalation, Iranian Resilience, and the Risk of a Wider Regional Conflict
Military operations in the U.S.–Iran war across July 16-17 indicate a widening campaign involving the return of a maritime blockade and the bombing of civilian and military infrastructure, regional bases and commercial shipping, testing the political and military endurance of the warring parties. The immediate battlefield is concentrated in southern Iran and the Persian Gulf, with the United States seemingly seeking to force Iran to surrender its control over the Strait of Hormuz before Iranian retaliation imposes intolerable military, political, and economic costs on Washington and its regional partners. Some observers increasingly speculate that the array of targeting is focused on limiting Iran’s ability to counter a land invasion of Iranian islands in the Strait of Hormuz or the southern coast.
During the sixth consecutive night of American attacks, U.S. forces expanded their target set to include bridges, an airport, railway infrastructure, port facilities, communications systems, coastal positions and other logistical nodes in southern Iran. U.S. Central Command said it had targeted military logistics infrastructure, while Iranian media reported attacks around Bandar Abbas, Bandar Khamir, Qeshm Island, Iranshahr and Chabahar. Bridges connecting Bandar Abbas with the rest of the country were struck, as was a railway station and infrastructure at Iranshahr airport. The maritime tower at the port of Chabahar was also destroyed, with Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth posting a photo of the destruction of the tower. Electricity and transportation services have been impacted in parts of southern Iran.
These attacks caused significant human casualties. Iranian accounts reported at least eight people killed and approximately 20 injured in the latest attacks across southern Iran. Broader official Iranian figures cited in international reporting put the toll from the renewed U.S. campaign at at least 38 dead and more than 400 wounded. The dead included civilians, emergency workers and military personnel. In Bandar Khamir, strikes reportedly hit areas close to civilian transportation infrastructure. Earlier in the renewed campaign, a firefighter was killed following an attack on Iranshahr airport, while fishing piers, commercial facilities and boats were damaged in Sirik and Bandar Abbas.
The distinction between military and civilian infrastructure has become increasingly blurred. Bridges, ports, airports, railways, power networks and communications facilities sustain civilian life and economic activity, even if they at times are used for military purposes. Their destruction produces civilian casualties, isolates communities, interrupts emergency services, restricts food and fuel distribution, and leaves civilians without electricity during extreme summer heat. As the campaign expands, the humanitarian consequences are therefore likely to grow even if Washington continues to classify the targets as militarily relevant.
Iran responded to the American strikes with missiles and drones directed at U.S. military sites and facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar. Explosions were reported in Doha, where a child was injured, while Kuwait said Iranian attacks damaged a desalination facility. Tehran claimed that it had struck American military assets and air-defense systems, although several of its claims, including assertions that U.S. aircraft had been destroyed, remain unverified. Gulf governments reported intercepting incoming missiles and drones, but the attacks demonstrated that bases and infrastructure used to support the American campaign remain vulnerable.
The renewed exchange is occurring alongside an increasingly aggressive maritime confrontation. U.S. Marines boarded the tanker M/T Wen Yao in the Gulf of Oman as part of Washington’s renewed blockade of Iranian ports. U.S. forces also redirected several commercial vessels and reportedly disabled another tanker that attempted to challenge the blockade. Iran, meanwhile, has continued to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and insists that it will resist attempts to eliminate its control over the waterway. Commercial traffic through the strait has fallen sharply, insurance costs have risen, and oil prices have risen higher as the risk of a prolonged disruption increases.
The American target pattern indicates that Bandar Abbas has become a major focus of the campaign. The city is Iran’s largest commercial port, an important naval and Revolutionary Guard base, and the logistical center of Iranian operations around Hormuz. By striking bridges, railways, airports, radar systems, communications facilities and nearby islands, the United States is attempting to isolate this southern theater from the Iranian interior. The objective appears to be not merely the destruction of weapons but the weakening of the larger network that allows Iran to reinforce coastal units, reposition mobile missiles, coordinate naval operations and sustain the closure or disruption of the strait.
This strategy also may be aimed at preparing for an American invasion or incursion. An attempt to exert control and occupy the entire southern coast is likely beyond American operational readiness, requiring vast numbers of troops, extensive regional staging areas and a commitment to occupy a large and hostile country. As a result, limited territorial operations are more plausible, even though they would likely entail heavy casualties and ultimately prove unsustainable. U.S. Marines or special forces could attempt to seize or temporarily neutralize Iranian positions on Qeshm, Abu Musa, Greater Tunb or Lesser Tunb, conduct raids against missile and radar facilities, and seek to establish protected maritime corridors. Attacks on bridges and transport routes would slow Iranian reinforcements and make such operations easier to sustain.
The more ambitious future scenario is not a conventional invasion resembling Iraq in 2003, but a distributed war combining American airpower, naval forces and special operations with pressure from regional states and armed groups along Iran’s periphery. In Sistan and Baluchestan, local militants could intensify attacks while external actors supplied intelligence or logistical assistance. Kurdish opposition organizations could increase cross-border operations in western Iran. Arab armed networks or sabotage teams could target pipelines, ports and energy facilities in Khuzestan. Gulf countries could supply bases, intelligence, air defense, maritime patrols and financing without committing large armies inside Iran.
Pakistan would be particularly important in relation to the southeastern border and the defense of Saudi Arabia, but direct Pakistani participation in an invasion remains unlikely. Islamabad is concerned about being drawn into the conflict and must consider its own Baluch insurgency, domestic sectarian tensions, economic vulnerability and relations with China. Pakistan is more likely to reinforce Saudi defenses, secure its border with Iran, control armed movements through Pakistani Baluchestan and share intelligence than to open a direct ground front.
Iran’s strategy seeks to prevent the United States from limiting the war to Iranian territory while raising the costs on Washington. Mehdi Mohammadi, an adviser to parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, has described the present phase as preparatory and has argued that Iran must transfer the costs of war to the economic and political rear of the U.S.-led coalition. His remarks should not be treated as confirmation of an approved operational plan, but they provide a coherent explanation of one strand of Iranian strategic thinking.
In this framework, Iran cannot defeat the United States by matching its aircraft, naval forces or surveillance capabilities. It must instead threaten the systems that sustain American and regional power: the Strait of Hormuz, Bab al-Mandeb, the Red Sea, Gulf energy terminals, alternative oil pipelines, ports, airports, desalination facilities, insurance markets and global fuel prices. Reporting that Tehran instructed the Houthis to prepare to close Bab al-Mandeb if the United States attacked Iran’s electricity network lends credibility to the possibility of a coordinated two-strait strategy.
A simultaneous crisis in Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb could force commercial shipping to avoid both the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea–Suez route. Ships might be redirected around the Cape of Good Hope, increasing transportation time, fuel use, freight charges and insurance premiums. Iran and its allies would not need to impose a complete physical closure. Repeated drone or missile attacks and the credible threat of mines might be enough to convince shipping companies that the routes were commercially unacceptable.
The most important uncertainty in American and regional calculations, however, is Iran’s capacity for endurance. During the earlier 39-day phase of the war, Iran absorbed tens of thousands of U.S. and Israeli attacks, the assassination of senior political and military figures, damage to military and civilian infrastructure, economic disruption, and substantial casualties without experiencing the rapid political or institutional collapse that some war planners apparently expected. Despite internal dissatisfaction and economic hardship, the state preserved command continuity, continued missile and drone operations, maintained control over the security apparatus and prevented significant military defections or a nationwide uprising.
The earlier campaign therefore demonstrated that Iran’s vulnerability to airpower does not automatically translate into political collapse. The country’s decentralized military structures, strategic depth, extensive security institutions, experience operating under sanctions and capacity to replace individual commanders allowed it to continue fighting. Public anger at the government coexisted with nationalism and opposition to foreign military intervention. External attacks may even have temporarily reduced internal political divisions by transforming the conflict into a perceived defense of the country.
This resilience could again disrupt American and regional expectations. A strategy built on the assumption that several weeks of infrastructure destruction, assassinations and economic pressure will produce regime collapse may underestimate the Iranian state’s ability to absorb punishment. Iran does not need to defeat the United States conventionally. It may only need to survive long enough for casualties, energy prices, shipping disruption, political opposition and divisions among Gulf governments to weaken the coalition, convincing President Trump to shift course again.
The existential nature of the conflict reinforces this endurance. For Washington, the war’s goals have shifted between nuclear disarmament, weakening Iran’s military, changing its regional behavior and restoring unrestricted passage through the Strait of Hormuz. These are serious objectives, but they are not existential for the United States, and there is an observable mismatch between means and ends. For Iran’s political and military leadership, however, the war is increasingly understood as a struggle for the survival of the state, the territorial integrity of the country and the continuation of the existing political order.
An actor fighting for limited strategic objectives may eventually decide that the costs are excessive. An actor that believes it is fighting for survival can more easily justify destruction, civilian suffering and economic deprivation. This asymmetry of commitment may be as important as the asymmetry in military power. The United States possesses overwhelming conventional superiority, but Iran may possess a greater willingness to absorb prolonged costs because defeat could mean the collapse of the state, foreign occupation, territorial fragmentation or the removal of the ruling system.
This does not mean that Iran is invulnerable. Continued attacks could seriously weaken its economy, military infrastructure and ability to govern. Civilian casualties and service failures could eventually produce anger that manifests in opposition to the government. Peripheral armed conflicts could exhaust security forces. Assassinations or defections could damage command cohesion. But these outcomes are not automatic, and the experience of the earlier 39-day phase of the war suggests that timelines based on rapid collapse should be treated with skepticism.
The likely future is therefore a contest between American escalation and Iranian endurance. Washington will continue attacking southern logistics, enforcing the maritime blockade and considering limited territorial operations. It may also support sabotage, assassinations and armed pressure in peripheral regions. Iran will continue striking regional bases, threatening Gulf infrastructure and attempting to globalize the conflict through the Strait of Hormuz and potentially Bab al-Mandeb.
The decisive question is not simply how many Iranian targets the United States can destroy. It is whether that destruction can produce political fragmentation before Iran’s retaliation generates intolerable regional and global consequences. If Iran again demonstrates the resilience it showed during the 39-day war, the United States and its partners may once again phase a situation where tactical military success has not produced strategic victory. The U.S. would then phase yet another fork in the escalation trap, where ever more radical military operations are contemplated and deescalation looks like a bitter pill after so many sunk costs.
Iran faces an equally severe dilemma. Its endurance may deny Washington a quick victory, but escalation against Gulf cities, commercial shipping and global energy routes could unify its adversaries and help justify a much broader campaign. The conflict is therefore moving toward a dangerous test of political will. American strategy depends on the belief that military and economic pressure will eventually break Iran. Iranian strategy depends on the belief that the country can survive longer than the opposing coalition can tolerate the war. The outcome may be determined less by battlefield superiority than by which side has misunderstood the other’s capacity and willingness to endure.
Iran’s Internal Debate Over a Return to War with the United States
As military confrontation between Iran and the United States has resumed and the Iran–U.S. memorandum of understanding appears to have collapsed, an intense political debate has emerged inside Iran over the pursuit of negotiations to secure Iran’s interests. The debate has intensified since the funeral of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, as competing political factions sought to define Iran’s response to renewed hostilities.
The central question revolves around whether and when Iran should consider diplomacy to de-escalate the present round of war. Hardline clerical and parliamentary figures argue that Washington has effectively destroyed the memorandum of understanding and that Iran should focus on winning the war and imposing unforgettable costs on the United States. In contrast, the government, reformist political groups, former President Mohammad Khatami, and several pragmatic establishment figures argue that abandoning diplomacy would guarantee a damaging regional conflict and worsen Iran’s economic and political challenges.
One of the strongest calls for ending diplomacy came from Alireza Arafi, Director of Iran’s Seminaries and a senior member of the country’s leadership structure. Arafi declared that the United States had violated every major provision of the memorandum and urged Iranian officials to regard it as finished. He called on President Masoud Pezeshkian, the Supreme National Security Council, military commanders and diplomats to abandon negotiations and instead pursue what he described as the path of “jihad and resistance.” He also rejected arguments that economic hardship or concern over the costs of the war should influence national strategy.
His position reflects a broader argument within hardline circles that the United States has already resumed the war and that continued negotiations would only delay an unavoidable military confrontation. This position has also gained significant support inside parliament. Approximately 180 members of the Majles signed a statement declaring that the memorandum had effectively ended, emphasizing retaliation against the United States and supporting measures to reinforce Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz. Their intervention demonstrates that pressure to terminate negotiations has become institutional rather than merely rhetorical.
Another influential intervention came from Seyyed Ali Khomeini, grandson of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, during a memorial ceremony held after Khamenei’s funeral. Khomeini argued that Iran’s conflict with the United States had entered a new stage following Khamenei’s death, describing the relationship as one of “blood vengeance.” He said any official who was not thinking about avenging the late leader should question his own conscience.
While acknowledging that negotiations may continue, he rejected the idea that they could ever lead to peace with Washington. Instead, he argued that “negotiation itself is another form of war” and declared that anyone seeking negotiations in order to achieve peace with the United States was a “traitor.” According to Khomeini, the Islamic Republic’s identity is defined by refusing compromise with America, and diplomacy must never become a vehicle for reconciliation or de-escalation.
Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has adopted a more nuanced position. He argues that Iran must remain fully prepared for war while simultaneously using diplomacy to secure national interests. According to Ghalibaf, war and negotiations are complementary instruments rather than competing alternatives. Negotiations should continue only when they preserve Iran’s battlefield achievements, protect its strategic gains, and produce concrete benefits. Otherwise, he argues, Iran has no reason to remain committed to the memorandum. Ghalibaf also emphasizes that Iran’s military must retain complete operational freedom and presents Iran’s position in the Strait of Hormuz as both a strategic military achievement and a source of diplomatic leverage. His approach attempts to preserve negotiations without allowing them to limit Iran’s military options.
The Iran Reform Front has taken another position, strongly defending both the government and the negotiating team. The coalition argues that preserving the memorandum is essential to preventing a full-scale war, reducing sanctions, stabilizing the economy, and protecting Iran’s national interests. It warns that weakening diplomacy through contradictory political messages could lead to renewed military confrontation, intensified sanctions, worsening economic conditions, capital flight and greater international isolation.
Former President Mohammad Khatami has emerged as one of the most prominent advocates of preserving negotiations. He argues that military defense, diplomacy, and domestic governance cannot be separated and describes the 14-point memorandum as an opportunity to move Iran beyond the current crisis. Khatami warns that allowing public anger after Khamenei’s funeral to dictate national policy could deepen Iran’s harm amid the war.
Khatami also challenges religious arguments being used against negotiations, pointing to Imam Hassan’s peace treaty and Iran’s acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 598 after the Iran-Iraq War as historical examples showing that compromise can serve national survival. According to Khatami, undermining negotiations ultimately serves those seeking to drag Iran back into prolonged conflict.
The debate is not simply between reformists and conservatives. Some conservative establishment figures have also defended the continued use of diplomacy. Asadollah Badamchian, Secretary-General of the Islamic Coalition Party, argues that negotiation should not be confused with surrender and that Iran cannot demand concessions from Washington while refusing to negotiate. Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejei has similarly argued that negotiations do not necessarily constitute capitulation and warned that public attacks on diplomacy could create the impression that Iran’s leadership is divided.
Outside the formal political establishment, teachers’ rights activist Aziz Ghasemzadeh rejected both the Islamic Republic and foreign military intervention, arguing that Iranians should not be forced to choose between authoritarian rule and a destructive external war. He criticized attempts to portray attacks on bridges, energy facilities, schools, transportation networks, and other civilian infrastructure as attacks only against the government, arguing that such destruction primarily harms ordinary Iranians.
Taken together, the current debate has crystallized into three broad camps.
- The war-and-retaliation camp – represented by Arafi, Seyyed Ali Khomeini, many lawmakers, parts of the clerical establishment, and hardline media – believes the memorandum has effectively collapsed and that Iran should prioritize retaliation and focus on winning the war.
- The military-diplomatic camp – represented most clearly by Ghalibaf and parts of the security establishment – believe diplomacy should continue only when it strengthens Iran’s military position and complements deterrence.
- The de-escalation camp – represented by the Pezeshkian government’s allies, the Reform Front, Mohammad Khatami, and parts of civil society – argues that preserving negotiations remains the best chance to reduce the harm to the nation by the war.
The principal disagreement inside Iran is therefore centered around whether the country should accept that another large-scale war with the United States has become inevitable or continue using diplomacy in an effort to prevent that outcome. For now, Iran appears to be pursuing a dual-track strategy, maintaining diplomatic engagement while preserving military readiness and emphasizing deterrence. Whether this balance can be sustained will depend on developments on the battlefield, the American posture toward the memorandum and the outcome of the increasingly public political struggle over Iran’s response to the renewed war with the United States.
As Iran’s Parliament Reconvenes, Institutional Politics Still Favor Pragmatists Despite Hardline Rhetoric
After four and a half months of suspension, Iran’s parliament (Majles) finally reconvened on the evening of July 13, holding its first public session since the outbreak of the war. More than 250 lawmakers attended the meeting, which was chaired by Deputy Speaker Hamidreza Hajibabaei in the absence of Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.
The session carried strong symbolic messages. Lawmakers paid tribute to Ali Khamenei and senior military and political figures killed during the war and chanted slogans calling for “revenge.” A portrait of Mojtaba Khamenei, Iran’s new Supreme Leader, was displayed inside the parliament building. The Majles also approved procedural changes allowing future parliamentary sessions to be held virtually or outside the parliament building during emergency conditions, reflecting the security environment that has shaped Iranian politics since the beginning of the conflict.
The confrontational rhetoric was reinforced further when more than 180 members of parliament signed a public pledge declaring that they would “stand in the line of revenge.” The lawmakers vowed to answer the calls of senior clerics and members of the Assembly of Experts who had declared retaliation against those responsible for killing Iran’s leaders to be a religious obligation. They pledged not to neglect “planning or practical measures” and committed themselves to legislation concerning revenge for those killed in the recent war, the exercise of Iran’s sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, and the creation of effective strategic deterrence against future attacks by the United States and Israel.
The letter also revealed continuing frustration within parliament over its four-and-a-half-month suspension. The signatories argued that the overwhelming majority of lawmakers had opposed the prolonged closure of the Majles and believed that its legislative and oversight functions should have resumed much earlier. They implicitly criticized the delay in reopening parliament and argued that the parliamentary rules should have been amended sooner to allow the institution to continue operating under wartime conditions.
The reopening of parliament comes after months of political controversy. Since the beginning of the war, Israel and the United States successfully targeted numerous senior Iranian military and political leaders, forcing much of the country’s leadership into secure locations and effectively preventing parliament from convening.
During the extended break, lawmakers closely associated with the Paydari Front including Hamid Rasai repeatedly demanded that parliament resume its sessions. They openly accused Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf of deliberately preventing parliament from meeting in order to avoid legislative interference in negotiations with the United States. These same lawmakers consistently opposed diplomacy with Washington and repeatedly called for the resignation of Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, one of the principal architects of Iran’s negotiating strategy. Ghalibaf’s allies, however, maintained that the suspension of parliamentary sessions had been ordered by the country’s security authorities rather than by parliament’s leadership.
The session also entailed the formal introduction of the “Strategic Action for the Security and Sustainable Development of the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf” legislation, a comprehensive maritime security and sovereignty bill governing navigation, access, transit fees, enforcement and Iran’s exercise of jurisdiction in the vital energy waterway. However, this bill should not be interpreted as a victory for the hardline faction. Protecting Iran’s role in securing and managing the Strait of Hormuz has become a matter of broad institutional consensus, supported by officials across the political establishment, including Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, the Supreme National Security Council, and the IRGC. The political differences concern implementation and diplomacy—not the strategic importance of Hormuz itself.
The most significant development occurred not in the parliamentary speeches but in the leadership elections of the Majles National Security and Foreign Policy Committee. In the committee’s internal vote, Seyed Mahmoud Nabavian, who had served as First Vice Chairman during the first two years of the current parliament, and Ebrahim Rezaei, who had served as the committee’s spokesman, were both removed from the committee’s leadership.
Instead, lawmakers elected Ebrahim Azizi as chairman, Abbas Moqtadaei and Amir Hayat-Moqaddam as first and second vice chairmen, Hassan Ghashghavi as spokesman, and Bahnam Saeidi and Yaqub Rezazadeh as the committee’s secretaries. This reshuffle is politically important because Nabavian and Rezaei have been among the parliament’s most vocal opponents of negotiations with the United States and leading representatives of the ideological hardline current. Throughout the parliamentary suspension, they repeatedly criticized Ghalibaf and Araghchi, arguing that parliament should take a much more confrontational position toward diplomacy with Washington.
Their removal from the committee’s leadership represents one of the clearest institutional indicators that the hardline faction has failed to translate its wartime visibility into greater political control. This finding is particularly significant when viewed alongside developments over the past week.During Ali Khamenei’s funeral ceremonies, public messaging appeared to be dominated by calls for revenge and by outspoken hardline figures, creating the impression that radicals were emerging as the dominant force within the Islamic Republic following the leadership transition.
The reopening of parliament presents a different picture. Although revolutionary rhetoric remains highly visible, the institutional balance of power continues to favor the more pragmatic establishment represented by Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Masoud Pezeshkian, and Abbas Araghchi. The parliamentary majority did not elevate the leading anti-negotiation figures; instead, it removed two of their most prominent representatives from the leadership of parliament’s most important national security committee.
This suggests that media visibility and political influence should not be confused with institutional authority. Hardline figures continue to shape public discourse and mobilize ideological supporters, but they have not demonstrated that they command the parliamentary support necessary to redirect Iran’s national security or foreign policy.
Taken together, the first parliamentary session after four and a half months of suspension indicates that the post-war political equilibrium remains largely intact. While revolutionary rhetoric continues to serve important symbolic and mobilizational purposes, the governing institutions still appear to be controlled by the more pragmatic coalition that has overseen Iran’s strategic decision-making, diplomacy, and crisis management throughout the conflict. The sidelining of Seyed Mahmoud Nabavian and Ebrahim Rezaei may ultimately prove to be a more meaningful indicator of Iran’s internal political trajectory than the highly publicized rhetoric that dominated Ali Khamenei’s funeral ceremonies.
Has Iran “Miscalculated” in the Strait of Hormuz?
Twenty-five days after Iran and the United States signed a memorandum intended to end the previous round of fighting, the conflict has returned with significant military, maritime, and regional escalation. U.S. forces have carried out successive waves of strikes across southern Iran, Tehran has launched missiles and drones against U.S. military facilities in several regional countries, commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has fallen sharply, and Washington has announced the resumption of its naval blockade of Iranian ports.
The latest American attacks were reported across a broad area of southern Iran, including Bandar Abbas, Qeshm, Jask, Sirik, Abu Musa, Abadan, Ahvaz, Mahshahr, Omidiyeh, Behbahan, Dezful, and Shadgan. Iranian provincial authorities reported casualties in several locations. According to officials in Khuzestan, strikes on Abadan killed at least two people and wounded three others, while a projectile that struck an agricultural water-pumping station in Mahshahr killed a guard and injured four people. Earlier attacks on Farur Island near Bandar Lengeh reportedly killed a telecommunications maintenance worker and wounded two colleagues. Iranian officials also reported extensive damage to the country’s electricity network, claiming that more than 4,000 megawatts of generating or transmission capacity had been lost during the broader campaign.
U.S. Central Command said its operations targeted Iranian air-defense systems, coastal radar sites, missile and drone capabilities, military small boats, and facilities associated with attacks on commercial shipping. In one notable development, the United States used unmanned surface vessels in combat for the first time. Three Corsair sea drones reportedly struck a submarine and ship-maintenance facility at the Bandar Abbas naval base. CENTCOM presented the operation as part of an effort to weaken Iran’s ability to attack ships in and around the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran responded by announcing missile and drone attacks against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Oman, and other regional locations. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed that it targeted helicopter maintenance facilities, an aircraft hangar, and a drone command-and-control center at Bahrain’s Sheikh Isa Air Base. It also claimed attacks on fuel storage facilities at Jordan’s Prince Hassan Air Base, a Patriot air-defense system at Kuwait’s Ali Al Salem Air Base, and a strategic radar installation at Ahmed Al Jaber Air Base. Iran’s regular army separately said it had struck American air-defense, missile, shelter, and logistical facilities in Kuwait. These claims have not all been independently verified.
Kuwait’s Defense Ministry confirmed that three locations in northern Kuwait were attacked and that a drone struck an offshore platform belonging to the Kuwait Oil Company, causing material damage and injuring one employee. Bahrain accused Iran of targeting civilians, while Iranian officials insisted that their operations were directed exclusively at U.S. bases and facilities used to attack Iran. Oman summoned the Iranian ambassador after reported drone strikes in Musandam and Al Batinah, describing the incidents as violations of its sovereignty. Tehran, meanwhile, warned regional governments that providing territory, logistical assistance, or military support for U.S. attacks would be regarded as participation in the war and could make the locations from which those attacks were launched legitimate targets.
The immediate center of the confrontation remains the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has announced that passage through the Strait is suspended until further notice because of what it describes as illegal U.S. military activity. Iranian forces have reportedly attacked or threatened vessels attempting to transit without Iranian authorization, including ships using the southern route near Oman. CENTCOM has rejected Iran’s position, declaring that the Strait remains open to lawful international navigation and that U.S. forces are deployed to guarantee freedom of passage.
The practical effect, however, has been a severe reduction in shipping. Marine-tracking data cited in the reports indicated that no commercial vessel publicly transmitting its location had been observed passing through the Strait for a significant period. Kpler data showed that only eight commercial vessels crossed on Sunday, compared with 21 on Saturday and 14 on Friday, while several of those ships reportedly disabled their tracking signals during transit. This suggests that, regardless of competing legal declarations from Washington and Tehran, shipping companies are treating the waterway as an active conflict zone.
President Donald Trump has now announced that the United States is reinstating the naval blockade of Iranian ports. CENTCOM said the renewed blockade would apply to vessels entering or leaving Iranian ports and coastal areas, while ships not violating the blockade would continue to receive U.S. protection in regional waters. The first phase of the blockade had been implemented between April 13 and June 18, during which CENTCOM said American forces disabled several vessels and redirected more than 100 others attempting to trade with Iran.
Trump has also declared that the Strait will remain open “with or without Iran,” described the United States as the “Guardian of the Hormuz Strait,” and proposed charging a fee equal to 20 percent of cargo value for U.S.-provided security. The International Maritime Organization responded that there is no legal basis for imposing a compulsory toll solely for passage through an international strait. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi replied sarcastically that Trump was correct that whoever guarantees secure commercial passage should be compensated, adding that Iran had always been the guardian of the Strait and would remain so, although he suggested that a 20 percent fee was excessive.
The dispute over the Strait appears to have been the immediate cause of the breakdown in negotiations. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei said the recent talks in Muscat focused on arrangements under Clause Five of the memorandum, which required Iran to make its best efforts to facilitate safe, cost-free commercial passage for a limited period. Tehran appears to have interpreted that provision as recognizing a central Iranian role in managing maritime passage. Washington, by contrast, has since sought to erode Iran’s role in managing the navigation of the strait, taking steps to set up separate navigation pathways while framing these steps in line with freedom of navigation.
Baghaei accused the United States of dismantling the broader 14-point understanding and pressuring Oman not to accept Iran’s proposed arrangements. Trump offered a very different account, claiming that Iran and the United States had been close to an agreement before Iran attacked a commercial vessel with a drone. He said Iran had been prepared to make major concessions before abruptly reversing course. The conflicting narratives demonstrate that the disagreement is no longer merely about whether ships can pass, but about who has the authority to determine the conditions of passage.
The conflict has also expanded into Yemen. The internationally-recognized Yemeni government said it struck the runway at Sana’a International Airport to prevent an Iranian aircraft from landing. The flight was subsequently diverted to Hodeidah. The Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of carrying out the attack, declared that the period of de-escalation had ended, and launched ballistic missiles and drones against Abha International Airport in Saudi Arabia. They also warned airlines against operating in Saudi airspace until what they call the blockade of Sana’a Airport is lifted.
This represents one of the most serious escalations between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia since the 2022 truce reduced direct hostilities. There have also been reports of small boats approaching a tanker near Yemen, raising concerns that attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea may resume. The importance of these developments extends beyond Yemen: renewed Houthi operations could place the Bab al-Mandab Strait under pressure at the same time that shipping through Hormuz is already severely disrupted. Previous Houthi threats against Red Sea shipping have demonstrated how rapidly uncertainty in that waterway can affect freight rates, insurance costs, and global energy markets.
Taken together, these developments suggest that Iran may have concluded that it faced a fundamental strategic choice. The first option was to accept the American interpretation of the post-war memorandum, an interpretation generally reflected in Trump’s public statements and subsequent U.S. actions. In Tehran’s view, that would have meant accepting not only an American role in determining the rules of passage through the Strait of Hormuz, but also major changes in the Lebanese ceasefire.
The Lebanon issue should not be reduced to Hezbollah’s operational freedom. From Iran’s perspective, the more consequential concern is that the ceasefire has not produced a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory. Instead, Israel’s continuing presence in parts of southern Lebanon risks turning a temporary military arrangement into the long-term loss or occupation of portions of Lebanese land. At the same time, many predominantly Shiite towns and villages in southern Lebanon have been destroyed or rendered uninhabitable. Accepting such an outcome would mean accepting both the continued Israeli presence and a post-war reality in which large areas of Lebanon’s Shiite south remain devastated, depopulated, or inaccessible to their residents.
The same logic applies to the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has historically regarded the Strait not simply as an international shipping route but as a central source of sovereignty, deterrence, and regional influence. An American declaration that Iran does not control the Strait, combined with a U.S.-enforced blockade of Iranian ports and a proposed American toll on passing cargo, would effectively strip Tehran of one of its most important remaining instruments of leverage. Even if commercial passage continued, Iran would have to accept that the United States—not Iran—was setting and enforcing the security rules.
Iran therefore appears to have been willing to risk the breakdown of the memorandum, and a return to war, before these arrangements became established facts. This does not necessarily mean Tehran expects to defeat the United States militarily. Rather, its decision may be based on the belief that renewed conflict now offers a better opportunity to position Iran for these evolving security arrangements than waiting several months.
Iranian decision-makers may believe the timing of the current breakdown is favorable for several reasons. First, global energy importers may not yet have fully replenished their strategic reserves or adapted their supply networks to another prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz. A renewed disruption now could therefore have a greater and faster effect on oil prices, shipping insurance, and global inflation than a similar disruption after governments and markets have had more time to prepare.
Second, Tehran may calculate that Trump remains particularly vulnerable to rising fuel prices and inflation in advance of the November midterm election. Iran may therefore believe that economic pressure generated by maritime instability can produce results more quickly than military pressure alone. The objective would not necessarily be to sustain a permanent closure of Hormuz, but to demonstrate that the United States cannot impose its interpretation of the agreement without incurring significant costs.
Third, the Houthis’ entry into the confrontation could multiply that pressure. Iran’s effort to break the air blockade of Yemen appears to have led to the renewed outbreak of hostilities. If fighting with Saudi Arabia expands and Houthi forces resume attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, Washington and its partners could face simultaneous disruptions at both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab. Hormuz affects the exit route for much of the Gulf’s oil and liquefied natural gas, while Bab al-Mandab connects the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Pressure on both chokepoints could produce far greater consequences than disruption at either one alone.
Iran may consequently believe that it has a limited window in which military and economic escalation can improve its negotiating position. Its calculation appears to be that Washington will eventually return to negotiations once the cost of securing Hormuz, defending regional bases, protecting Gulf infrastructure, reassuring commercial shipping, and containing a renewed Yemen front becomes sufficiently high.
However, this is an extremely dangerous strategy. It assumes that the United States will respond to higher costs by negotiating rather than expanding its military campaign or withdrawing altogether. It also assumes that Iran can impose meaningful economic pressure before its naval, missile, energy, and command infrastructure is severely degraded. The attacks on southern Iran, the renewed blockade, and the first U.S. combat use of sea drones show that Washington is prepared to employ new capabilities to reduce Iran’s ability to threaten shipping.
The strategy also risks further alienating regional countries. Iranian attacks on American facilities situated inside Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Jordan, Qatar, and other states may be described by Tehran as strikes against the United States, but those governments are increasingly treating them as violations of their own territory and sovereignty. Iran may therefore gain short-term military leverage while losing diplomatic space among neighboring states that could otherwise play a mediating role.
For now, it is impossible to know whether Iran’s analysis is correct. The outcome will depend on whether disruption in Hormuz becomes sustained, whether the Houthis reopen the Red Sea front, whether global energy prices rise enough to affect U.S. political calculations, and whether Washington decides that negotiations are preferable to an expanded war.
What appears clearer is that Iran did not view the emerging post-ceasefire order as a tolerable compromise. Tehran seems to have concluded that accepting Washington’s interpretation would mean acquiescing to a long-term Israeli presence on Lebanese territory, the destruction and possible long-term displacement of Shiite communities in southern Lebanon, and the loss of Iran’s effective control and leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. Faced with that choice, it appears to have selected renewed war in the hope that immediate pressure will produce a more favorable agreement later. Whether that judgment proves strategically successful or disastrously mistaken remains to be seen.
Why the Iran-U.S. War Resumed — and What Comes Next
Only weeks after the signing of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, Iran and the United States have once again entered a cycle of direct military confrontation. What was presented as an end to the war now appears to have been little more than a temporary pause. Across the better part of a week, U.S. forces have carried out repeated waves of strikes against targets across southern Iran, while Iran has responded by attacking American bases and military facilities in Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and Jordan. Commercial shipping has been hit, regional air defenses have been activated, and the Strait of Hormuz has once again become the central battlefield in the war.
The renewed war was not triggered by a single incident. It emerged from two unresolved crises that remained in place after the agreement: Lebanon and the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, the domestic balance of power inside Iran appears to have shifted in favor of factions that opposed the agreement from the beginning and now argue that Washington and Israel used the ceasefire to consolidate military gains without fulfilling their own commitments.
On Lebanon, Israel attempted to use negotiations with the Lebanese government to avoid a full withdrawal from Lebanese territory as called for in the understanding with Iran and preserve its military freedom of action in the south. From Tehran’s perspective, Israel was trying to redefine the ceasefire so that it would stop large-scale fighting while allowing Israel to maintain occupied positions, conduct military operations, and impose new security arrangements on Lebanon.
This became a broader test of whether the United States and Israel intended to implement the agreement in good faith. Opponents of the deal inside Iran increasingly argued that Israel was using the ceasefire not to end the conflict, but to formalize the results of the war. If Israel could avoid withdrawal from Lebanon while continuing pressure on the Lebanese government, they argued, Washington might attempt to use the same strategy against Iran in the Strait of Hormuz.
The more immediate flashpoint for the breakdown of the ceasefire was the continuing struggle over control of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran interpreted the Islamabad agreement as recognizing a central Iranian role in restoring and managing commercial navigation through the strait. Washington, however, appears to have regarded the agreement as requiring Iran to guarantee unrestricted passage without imposing licensing requirements, fees, or Iranian control over shipping routes.
Oman has proposed reopening both the southern route through Omani waters and the northern route near Iran. Under the reported proposal, the southern route would operate without Iranian permission and largely according to the conditions that existed before the war. From the perspective of Oman and the United States, this arrangement would preserve freedom of navigation and prevent Iran from exercising unilateral control over the waterway.
From Iran’s perspective, however, the proposal amounted to the creation of a parallel route designed to bypass Iranian authority and reduce Tehran’s leverage over the strait. For the Iranian leadership, the ability to regulate or disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz was a significant strategic gain to emerge from the war. If commercial vessels could pass through the southern route under U.S. protection and without following Iranian procedures, Iran’s claim to control the strait would be severely weakened.
In this contested environment, Iran’s reaction was therefore predictable. It attempted to block vessels that used what it described as an unauthorized route by issuing warnings, firing on or intercepting ships, and ultimately announcing the formal closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
Following the official closure announcement, commercial traffic through the strait reportedly fell to minimal levels. While the United States continues to insist that the waterway is legally and militarily open, shipping companies have little incentive to test whether passage is genuinely safe while missiles and drones are firing in the area. The practical question is therefore not only whether a route is technically open, but whether commercial operators, insurers, and crews are willing to use it.
In this sense, Iran has once again demonstrated that effective control does not necessarily require physically blocking every vessel. If the threat of attack is sufficient to deter normal commercial traffic, Tehran can impose a de facto closure even while U.S. forces declare that freedom of navigation remains guaranteed.
This has produced two directly contradictory claims. Iran says the strait is closed and that no ship can pass without complying with Iranian arrangements. U.S. Central Command says the strait remains open, that Iran does not control it, and that American forces are deployed to ensure lawful passage.
These claims cannot coexist indefinitely. Every commercial vessel that passes safely under U.S. protection strengthens Washington’s position. Every ship that turns back, is intercepted, or is attacked strengthens Iran’s claim that it controls the waterway. The strait has therefore become not merely a shipping route, but a daily test of military credibility and political authority.
Tensions in the Strait of Hormuz are the proximate cause of the collapse of the memorandum of understanding. President Donald Trump said Iran and the United States had been close to another agreement before Iran suddenly attacked another ship with a drone. While the claims should be taken with a grain of salt, President Trump asserted that Iranian negotiators had been prepared to make major concessions and that the attack came only hours later.
Iran presented a different account. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said the vessel that was fired upon had used an unauthorized route, ignored warnings and shut down its tracking systems. From Tehran’s perspective, the ship was not merely a civilian commercial vessel but part of a U.S.-backed attempt to establish a navigation route outside Iranian control.
The United States responded with a major new wave of strikes. U.S. Central Command has said approximately 140 military targets were struck in one round, and more than 300 targets had been attacked over three nights. The announced targets included missile and drone sites, coastal surveillance systems, ammunition storage facilities, communications networks, and Iranian naval capabilities. Sunday evening, CENTCOM announced that they had “began launching more strikes against Iran to continue degrading their ability to attack civilian mariners and commercial ships freely transiting the Strait of Hormuz. The Commander in Chief has directed the strikes to hold Iranian forces accountable.”
Strikes were reported across Bandar Abbas, Qeshm, Bandar Lengeh, Jask, Sirik, Chabahar, Konarak, Bushehr, Asaluyeh, Dayyer, Kangan, Khuzestan, Kerman, Lorestan, and other areas. Iranian officials reported casualties, including military personnel and civilian infrastructure workers.
Iran responded by expanding the battlefield across the region. The IRGC said it used Qadr, Emad, Kheibar Shekan, Fateh-110, and Zolfaghar ballistic missiles against U.S. targets in the Middle East. These missile types represent a mix of medium-range and short-range systems designed for attacks on fixed military infrastructure, air bases, command centers, radar installations, and logistics facilities.
The IRGC announced that it had targeted Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, describing the strike as part of the second phase of its response. According to the IRGC statement, ballistic missiles struck the base’s aircraft maintenance facilities and command-and-control center. The IRGC also said that it had intercepted and stopped a second vessel in the Strait of Hormuz and warned, using the phrase “fight, and we will fight,” that continued U.S. attacks would produce stronger retaliation.
Iran also claimed that it struck Prince Hassan Air Base in Jordan with ballistic missiles. According to the IRGC, the attack targeted a command-and-control center and hangars used by MQ-9 drones. The Guard said the strike was part of the first stage of its retaliation against the latest American attacks.
There are also unconfirmed open-source claims that a U.S. Navy MQ-4C Triton strategic reconnaissance drone may have been destroyed at the Jordanian base. Some open-source intelligence analysts say the aircraft had previously been based at Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates but was transferred to Jordan because of the vulnerability of bases closer to Iran.
Satellite imagery reportedly shows damage to a drone maintenance hangar at Prince Hassan Air Base, while Sentinel-2 imagery from July 12 showed smoke still visible over the site. Analysts who track the aircraft’s movements say the MQ-4C had been flying almost daily until July 11. They argue that if it does not return to flight operations in the following days, this may indicate that it was damaged or destroyed. However, this remains speculative. While claims concerning the aircraft should be treated as unverified, the potential loss would be significant. The MQ-4C Triton is a long-endurance maritime surveillance aircraft used to monitor large maritime areas and support naval intelligence operations. Its reported value is approximately $240 million. If confirmed, its destruction would represent one of the most important Iranian strikes on a high-value U.S. intelligence asset during the conflict.
Iranian missiles also struck or landed near targets in Kuwait. Reports indicated that three Iranian ballistic missiles landed near Shuwaikh Port in Kuwait City. Kuwaiti authorities separately reported attacks on three facilities in northern Kuwait and a drone strike on an offshore oil installation belonging to the Kuwait Oil Company. Material damage and at least one injury were reported.
Iranian media said the intended targets included U.S. missile units or military positions in Kuwait. However, strikes near a major commercial port and damage to an oil facility increased the risk that the conflict would be viewed not only as an Iran-U.S. confrontation, but as a direct threat to the security and economic infrastructure of Gulf states.
Iran also announced attacks on U.S. radar systems, Patriot batteries, ammunition depots, logistical facilities, and command infrastructure in Bahrain and Oman. In Oman, the IRGC said it struck logistical support facilities for U.S. naval forces and aircraft-carrier refueling infrastructure at Duqm.
The attack on Oman was particularly consequential because Muscat had served as a principal mediator between Iran and the United States. Only hours before the strike, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had been in Oman discussing navigation arrangements for the Strait of Hormuz. Oman condemned the attack, summoned the Iranian ambassador, and described the strikes as irresponsible violations of sovereignty and good-neighborly relations. Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, and other regional governments also condemned Iranian attacks or activated air-defense measures in response to Iranian missiles and drones.
Iran’s strategy appears to be based on the argument that regional states cannot provide bases, ports, radar coverage, logistical support, or transit routes to the United States while remaining insulated from the consequences of war. By expanding its retaliation across multiple states, Tehran is attempting to raise the regional cost of U.S. military operations. But this strategy carries a major political risk. Countries such as Oman and Qatar had previously worked to preserve the ceasefire and maintain diplomatic channels. By striking their territory, Iran risks transforming mediators into adversaries and creating a stronger regional coalition in support of U.S. military action.
The absence of Saudi Arabia from Iran’s publicly announced list of targets is also notable. Iran attacked or claimed to have attacked targets in Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Jordan, and areas connected to the United Arab Emirates, but it did not directly target Saudi Arabia. This may indicate that Tehran is deliberately preserving a political channel with Riyadh or attempting to prevent Saudi Arabia from joining the conflict more directly. Iran may also be distinguishing between countries it believes are actively supporting U.S. operations and those that have remained more cautious.
However, this distinction may not survive a prolonged war. If Saudi Arabia becomes more closely involved in U.S. military operations, maritime security, or regional air defense, pressure inside Iran to broaden the target list could increase.
The return to war also reflects an apparent change in the internal balance of power in Tehran. After the agreement, President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf defended negotiations as a necessary way to end the war and reduce economic pressure.
Following the funeral of Ali Khamenei, however, opponents of the agreement appear to have gained greater influence. Calls for revenge at the funeral; slogans against Pezeshkian, Ghalibaf, and Araghchi; and increasingly hostile criticism on state television suggest that sections of the political and security establishment now view the agreement as an unacceptable concession.
The written message attributed to Mojtaba Khamenei, Iran’s new leader, further intensified this atmosphere. In the message, he pledged that revenge for his father and others killed during the war would “certainly” be carried out. He also warned that those responsible should not expect to die peacefully. This rhetoric is important because it suggests that revenge may now be developing into a central source of political legitimacy for the new leadership. If so, restraint and compromise with the United States could become increasingly difficult to defend inside the Iranian system.
The attacks in the Strait of Hormuz may therefore serve a domestic as well as a strategic function. They allow the new leadership to demonstrate that it has not surrendered, that it will not abandon Iran’s main source of leverage, and that it is willing to impose costs on the United States.
Ghalibaf’s rhetoric has also become notably harder. He has said that the era of one-sided agreements is over, that the United States must pay a price for failing to honor its commitments, and that only those prepared for war are capable of negotiating with Washington. This shift may represent an effort by Ghalibaf to protect himself from criticism over his role in the negotiations. By emphasizing military readiness, he can argue that dialogue was never intended to replace deterrence and that responsibility for the collapse of the agreement lies with the United States.
Araghchi, by contrast, continues to emphasize mutual compliance with the Islamabad memorandum. He has accused Washington of violating the deal through new sanctions and other measures, while arguing that the only viable path remains reciprocal implementation. The difference between these positions may reflect a deeper struggle inside Tehran between officials seeking to salvage the agreement and factions that believe the diplomatic phase has ended.
New U.S. sanctions have strengthened the position of the agreement’s opponents. Washington imposed measures against individuals, exchange houses, and companies accused of financing the IRGC, evading sanctions, and transferring assets for senior Iranian officials. The United States portrayed the sanctions as a response to renewed Iranian attacks on international shipping. Tehran, however, said the sanctions violated U.S. commitments under the memorandum and demonstrated that Washington had no intention of providing meaningful economic relief.
This reinforces the argument made by hardliners: Iran provided immediate concessions, while U.S. promises remained vague, delayed, or reversible. Under this interpretation, the closure of the strait is an attempt to restore leverage that Iran surrendered during the negotiations. Iran’s current strategy appears to be based on a calculated gamble. Tehran may believe that Trump does not want a prolonged regional war, that disruption in the Strait of Hormuz will drive up energy prices, and that pressure on Gulf governments and U.S. military bases will eventually force Washington to moderate its position.
Under this calculation, Iran must demonstrate that the United States cannot simultaneously benefit from the ceasefire, impose new sanctions, establish a shipping route outside Iranian control, and attack Iranian military positions without facing substantial costs. Tehran may expect that a controlled escalation will force the United States back into talks through Qatar, Oman, or Pakistan, potentially producing concessions on sanctions relief or recognition of Iran’s role in the strait. But the gamble could fail. Trump may interpret attacks on commercial vessels, regional bases, and allied states not as bargaining pressure but as a direct challenge to U.S. military credibility. In that case, Washington may expand rather than limit its attacks.
What may come next is extremely difficult to foretell, but the continued evisceration of diplomatic agreements will make any attempt to restore peace extremely difficult. Iran, fresh off new U.S. attacks amid the late Supreme Leader’s funeral ceremonies, will view any U.S. pivot back to diplomacy with even deeper distrust. U.S. hawks will likewise paint Iran’s actions as the predictable irrationality of radicals, even if U.S. actions have helped trigger Iranian retaliation every step of the way.
While the Islamabad agreement may still be salvageable, another declaration of ceasefire is unlikely to be enough. Any durable settlement will have to address the issues that were postponed the first time: Israel’s obligations in Lebanon, the management of the Strait of Hormuz, sanctions relief, freedom of navigation, the role of coastal states, and the use of regional bases by the United States. Without agreements on these underlying disputes, any future ceasefire will remain only a temporary pause before the next round of war.