Week of August 11, 2025 | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council
- Larijani’s Trip to Lebanon Amid the Hezbollah Disarmament Crisis
- Imminent Snapback: Europe’s Ultimatum, Iran’s Response, and Russia–China’s Position
- Debate Over the Number of Political Prisoners within the Islamic Republic’s Government
- The Land Subsidence Crisis in Iran: A Result of Mismanagement and Unsustainable Development Policies
- Iran Signals Conditional Willingness for New Nuclear Deal with U.S. and Europe Amid Rising Tensions
- Mahmoud Farshchian, Master of Persian Miniature Art, Passes Away at 95 in the United States
Larijani’s Trip to Lebanon Amid the Hezbollah Disarmament Crisis
Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, visited Beirut at a time of mounting political tension over the Lebanese government’s decision to pursue the full disarmament of Hezbollah. The trip highlighted the growing divide between Iran and Lebanon’s leadership, as well as the deepening rift within Lebanon over Hezbollah’s future role and military capabilities.
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun welcomed cooperation with Iran but stressed that it must occur within the framework of national sovereignty and mutual respect. He emphasized that no group in Lebanon is permitted to bear arms or rely on foreign support, warning against any external interference—whether from Iran or others. In response, Larijani insisted that Iran does not interfere in Lebanon’s decision-making, contrasting Tehran’s stance with what he described as U.S. pressure and imposed plans. At the same time, he praised Hezbollah’s “resistance” as a national and Islamic asset, warning that Israel remains Lebanon’s true enemy.
Larijani’s arrival was marked by organized public displays of support from Hezbollah sympathizers, with flags, songs, and street gatherings along Beirut’s “Imam Khomeini Street.” This reception contrasted sharply with calls from anti-Hezbollah political factions, including Christian Maronite parties such as the Lebanese Forces and Kataeb, for the visit to be cancelled. These groups argued that Larijani’s presence amounted to interference aimed at blocking disarmament. Behind the scenes, Saudi Arabia was reportedly pressuring Lebanese authorities to delay or reconsider the visit.
The political environment has shifted notably: critics of Hezbollah are now more vocal and emboldened than in past years, citing the group’s weakened position following the death of Hassan Nasrallah in Israeli strikes, losses among its commanders, and continued Israeli military pressure. Some analysts attribute the government’s hardening position to these vulnerabilities, as well as to U.S. and Saudi backing.
Hezbollah’s new leader, Naim Qassem, has taken a hard line, rejecting any surrender of arms and warning of possible civil war if the government proceeds with its disarmament plan. Naim Qassem said in a speech on Friday, August 15, that his group would never disarm. He warned that if the Lebanese government moved against Hezbollah, there would be “no life left in Lebanon.”
Qassem accused the government of violating the National Pact, Lebanon’s 1943 agreement on power-sharing, by deciding to strip Hezbollah of its weapons. He argued that such a move would place the country “on the brink of a major crisis” and cautioned that, if the plan were implemented, Lebanon could face civil war.
He urged the government to focus instead on preparing a strategy to repel aggression, rather than “handing the country over to the Israeli occupier.” Qassem also warned against involving the Lebanese Armed Forces in any “internal confrontation,” suggesting it would dangerously divide the military. Although Hezbollah and its Shiite ally, the Amal Movement, initially postponed street protests to allow for negotiation, Qassem made clear that mass mobilization remains an option—possibly including protests at the U.S. embassy in Lebanon.
Speaking during an Arbaeen commemoration, Qassem framed the choice before Hezbollah in stark historical terms: “At every stage of history, we face two options—stand with Imam Hussein or with Yazid. Today, we choose to stand with the Hussein of our time, embodied in the positions of Imam Khomeini, followed by Imam Khamenei, and in the legacy of Sheikh Ragheb, Sayyed Abbas, and Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.”
In Hezbollah’s view, the threat posed by disarmament is not solely about Israel. The group also perceives a rising danger from Syria’s new political and military establishment, which in recent months clashed with Hezbollah’s allies along the border and has been accused of targeting Alawite communities inside Syria. Hezbollah forces fought alongside the Assad regime during the Syrian civil war, often in coordination with pro-Alawite militias. Now, with old animosities resurfacing, Hezbollah fears that elements within the current Syrian leadership—longtime adversaries in certain border zones—could seek revenge against past supporters of the Assad government. This broader regional calculus reinforces Hezbollah’s determination to retain its arsenal as a hedge against multiple fronts of potential hostility.
Opposition media outlets, including MTV Lebanon and the newspaper Al-Liwaa, labeled Larijani’s trip “provocative” and Iranian officials’ statements as a “clear violation of sovereignty.” They argued that Tehran’s continued support for Hezbollah’s armed status is part of a broader regional project that has destabilized other states under Iranian influence, such as Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Prominent parliamentarians like Ziad Hawat and Elias Hankash openly called for Iran to keep out of Lebanese affairs, condemning Hezbollah’s alignment with Tehran’s regional agenda.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah and its supporters maintain that the group’s weapons are essential for defending Lebanon against Israel, pointing to ongoing Israeli airstrikes and military presence in southern Lebanon. They argue that the government’s disarmament push ignores the reality of external threats. Still, the Lebanese cabinet has instructed the army to present a comprehensive disarmament plan by year’s end, which could prove highly disruptive to the preexisting Lebanese political balance.
The internal Shiite front, traditionally united, is showing strain. Sources close to Nabih Berri, Speaker of Parliament and leader of Amal, say both Amal and Hezbollah feel betrayed by President Aoun, accusing him of misleading them about the timing of the disarmament proposal’s adoption. Communication channels between the Shiite bloc and the presidency have since broken down, and Berri has warned that the issue now affects the entire Shiite community’s political standing, not just Hezbollah’s.
The military dimension is equally sensitive: with roughly 30% of Lebanese army personnel being Shiite, concerns exist over whether the armed forces would enforce a disarmament order against Hezbollah in a united fashion. Analysts warn that the country could be forced into a stark choice between internal confrontation—risking civil war—and shelving the disarmament effort altogether.
Larijani’s trip, therefore, unfolded not merely as a diplomatic visit, but as a symbolic battle over Lebanon’s sovereignty, Hezbollah’s future, and Iran and Israel’s role in the country. It coincided with Hezbollah’s largest public displays of support since Nasrallah’s death, demonstrating that, despite its weakened strategic position, the group retains a solid grassroots base among Lebanese Shiites and other anti-Israel factions. However, with opposition forces energized and foreign powers deeply involved, the coming months could determine whether Lebanon moves toward disarmament and potential internal conflict, or maintains the status quo under a fragile and uneasy balance.
Imminent Snapback: Europe’s Ultimatum, Iran’s Response, and Russia–China’s Position
The United Kingdom, France, and Germany—the “E3”—have formally notified the United Nations that unless Iran re-engages diplomatically and agrees to unspecified nuclear demands by the end of August 2025, they will activate the snapback mechanism under the JCPOA and UN Security Council Resolution 2231 to restore UN sanctions. In parallel, they have offered Iran a delay on the reimposition of snapback. As reported by Iranian outlets, this extension would be contingent on Tehran resuming talks with the United States and re-commencing full IAEA cooperation—conditions the E3 argues are clear, justifiable, and proportionate. They emphasized their legal right under the JCPOA and UNSCR 2231, explicitly rejecting Iran’s assertion that there is no legal basis for restoring sanctions.
From the E3’s perspective, Iran’s nuclear program now constitutes an ongoing threat to international peace and security. Tehran’s lack of credible assurances regarding the peaceful nature of its program, combined with its suspension of IAEA cooperation following a 12-day conflict sparked by Israeli and U.S. strikes on key nuclear facilities in Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan, have intensified this concern.
In response, Iran—through Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi—has rejected the legal standing of the E3 to trigger snapback, arguing that their prior actions, including European alignment with the U.S. after Washington’s 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA, nullify their authority. Iran revealed coordination with China and Russia to prevent the reinstatement of sanctions. Araghchi termed snapback “certainly bad,” promising fierce opposition, and suggested undisclosed counter-measures, while acknowledging the legal complexity of the situation—especially since Iran is not a UN Security Council member.
China has publicly opposed invoking snapback, stating that it would hinder trust, derail diplomacy, and offer no constructive path forward. Beijing emphasized its preference for a political-diplomatic resolution. Russia likewise challenged the E3’s claim to legal authority, arguing they have “no legal or moral right” to initiate such a move, citing their inconsistent compliance with JCPOA and UNSCR 2231 obligations.
The mechanics of snapback are relatively straightforward, though they represent an inversion of the traditional functioning of the UN Security Council. Under UNSCR 2231, any JCPOA participant can lodge a “significant non-performance” complaint. If no resolution is then enacted with unanimity from the Permanent members of the Security Council continuing their termination, six prior UN Security Council Resolutions are automatically re-imposed.
Strategically, the E3 appear to believe that reactivating snapback could re-establish UN-level restrictions, increase diplomatic pressure, and shore up non-proliferation norms. Iran, by contrast, may leverage support from China and Russia to counter the move, even as it risks renewed UN sanctions, further economic strains, and international isolation.
Observers suggest that snapback might serve better as a negotiating tool than a final act. With the October 18, 2025 sunset of UN constraints under UNSCR 2231 fast approaching, and Russia’s coming Presidency of the Security Council in October, the E3 indicates it will move to finalize snapback – a roughly 30 day process – well before the deadline. But once they trigger snapback, the E3’s leverage will effectively end. From that point forward, it would require unanimity from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – including the United States – to prevent the restoration of the resolutions.
Possible scenarios involve an extension of the snapback deadline, a deal with Iran to enhance nonproliferation safeguards, the return of the UN sanctions, and the deadline passing without an accepted return of the UN sanctions. However, the snapback deadline passing without action from the E3 appears unlikely.
For policymakers and mediators, the pragmatic path may lie in extension of the snapback deadline, with or without significant concessions from Iran. China and Russia could be enlisted as guarantors of such an arrangement to lend diplomatic credibility and help enforce compliance. Simultaneously, preparatory steps should be taken to mitigate escalation risks—including maintaining regional communication channels, protecting civilian infrastructure, and ensuring clarity about snapback’s legal and operational triggers.
However, the E3 do not appear to be making significant progress toward a deal, and may just be checking boxes on the way to triggering snapback. The strategic dance unfolding over snapback is not merely about Iran’s nuclear status and war and peace with Iran; it is a high-stakes contest over multilateralism, legal norms, and the enduring viability of structured diplomacy in an increasingly fractured international system.
Debate Over the Number of Political Prisoners within the Islamic Republic’s Government
Published August 14, 2025
Recent comments made by Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei, the head of Iran’s Judiciary, suggesting the number of political prisoners is limited to five people or less, along with remarks from reformist-aligned figures, have sparked a wave of media and political reactions. Analysts have once again pointed out that the root of this ambiguity lies in the narrow and vague definition of “political crime” in the 2016 law—a law that was eventually passed after 37 years of delays but remains limited and ineffective, without any reforms to date.
Mohseni-Ejei stated that “a few days after the end of the recent imposed war, several political and media groups informed me through various channels that, in order to strengthen social unity and cohesion, they requested the release of those referred to as political prisoners. I did not ignore their request or respond negatively, but instead I asked them to provide a list of these prisoners so we could examine and scrutinize them. The noteworthy point is that until now, none of those requesting groups have provided me with a list, and when faced with my demand, some of them said they had reservations about submitting a list of political prisoners.”
He also acknowledged the disagreement over labeling prisoners as political or security-related, stating, “We have a difference of opinion regarding the definition of a political prisoner. Sometimes all security prisoners are called political prisoners, and other times, it is the opposite. There is all this noise and commotion about how many political prisoners we have; well, you can announce that after your own examination, the number of our political prisoners does not even reach five, so that the misleading propaganda of our adversaries can be neutralized and lose its effect.”
Meanwhile, Elyas Hazrati, head of the Government’s Information Council and publisher of Etemad newspaper, in a meeting with media representatives and the head of the Judiciary, said, “I asked many journalists and intellectuals to provide me with the names of political prisoners, but only three were introduced to me. Eventually, by adding two more, I presented a list of five to the head of the Judiciary.” In fact, Hazrati, who is both head of the Government’s Information Council and the editor-in-chief of one of the few remaining reformist newspapers, has effectively presented a narrative aligned with the judicial system, more so than representing a position as a journalist or political activist.
Article 168 of the Iranian Constitution, established in 1979, stipulates that trials for “political and press crimes” must be public and include a jury. However, the absence of a law defining “political crime” rendered this article effectively useless for decades.
Efforts to draft a law on political crime began in the mid-1980s, but due to the security atmosphere following the war, differences between branches of government, and fears of opening up political criticism, this process was repeatedly halted. Even in the 2000s, when drafts were proposed in Parliament, the Guardian Council or the government of the time suspended them. Finally, on May 10, 2016, the 9th Parliament passed a five-article “Political Crime Law”, which was approved by the Guardian Council in June of the same year.
After two years of review in Parliament, the Political Crime Law was passed in 2015 in the final days of the 9th Parliament and was ratified by President Hassan Rouhani in 2016. The Judiciary implemented the law in 2020.
According to Article 1 of the law, “crimes committed with the intention of reforming the country against the political management and institutions or domestic or foreign policies of the country,” without intending to harm the government, are considered political crimes. In Article 2, the law lists the types of political crimes, including the spread of false information, insults, and defamation against the heads of the three branches of government, the Head of the Expediency Council, Vice Presidents, Ministers, Members of Parliament, Members of the Assembly of Experts, and members of the Guardian Council, as well as foreign political representatives in Iran.
Article 5 mentions that the determination of whether an accusation is political lies with the prosecution or the court in which the case is being tried. Article 6 of the law provides benefits such as a ban on solitary confinement for more than 15 days, regular family visits, and access to books, publications, radio, and television for political prisoners. Furthermore, if these individuals commit another political crime, they are not subject to the law of increased punishment for repeat offenders. However, in reality, many of these benefits are practically not implemented due to the label of “security” associated with such individuals.
From the very beginning, the content of the law and its implementation raised challenges for political activists and lawyers. One of the most complicated issues regarding the definition of political crime is that, in the first stage, if the prosecutor believes that the defendant’s intent was not to reform the country but to harm the Islamic Republic, the case is excluded from the scope of this law.
Since the law’s implementation, the distinction between political and security crimes has been a critical issue in the treatment of prisoners. For instance, political criminals are allowed to avoid wearing prison uniforms, have family visits, and access educational materials. However, the real challenge lies in the interpretation by authorities—whether the crime is seen as political or security-related. This has led to a situation where many individuals who commit crimes falling under the political crime category are not categorized as political prisoners but rather as security prisoners.
Lawyers have emphasized that this law is incomplete and does not provide a clear definition of what constitutes a political crime. Even the spokesperson for the Judiciary at the time acknowledged the ambiguity in the differentiation between political and security crimes. It now seems that, after a long period, this issue has once again come to the forefront of news, with the debate continuing over the proper categorization of political prisoners.
Figures such as Mostafa Tajzadeh, who is imprisoned for peaceful political activities, illustrate this problem. By international standards, he and hundreds of others should be classified as political prisoners, yet the judiciary continues to label them as security offenders, stripping them of the protections outlined in the Political Crime Law. Political dissent is often reframed as a threat to national security to justify harsh sentences.
In this context, human rights advocates such as Emadeddin Baghi have noted that if the judiciary truly wanted a complete and accurate list of prisoners, it would not need to request one from others. Baghi recalls that if independent civil institutions like the “Association for the Defense of Prisoners’ Rights” were not facing restrictions, they could maintain and share accurate, up-to-date information with the judiciary, media, and the public. He also noted that during Ebrahim Raisi’s tenure as judiciary chief, a similar list was provided, leading to pardons and releases. More recently, Baghi was contacted by Ezzatollah Zarghami, who had met with Ejei about prisoners and asked him to prepare a list. Baghi said he compiled only a list of 70 male and female prisoners, aiming to choose names that would face fewer political and security obstacles — while still expressing his hope that all prisoners might one day be freed.
Similarly, Azar Mansouri, head of the “Reform Front,” has argued in a letter to the judiciary that her organization can only provide criteria for identifying political prisoners, not participate in the “list-making game,” which she says legitimizes the regime’s narrow definition of political prisoners and excludes many innocent detainees. Mansouri emphasized that, under Iran’s constitution, no one should be imprisoned for peaceful political or civil activity or expression of beliefs — yet the authorities label political prisoners as “security” cases. She insists that anyone jailed for peaceful political engagement or expression of opinion should be recognized as a political or conscientious prisoner and freed immediately.
Political analyst Ahmad Zeidabadi has identified three reasons why political groups in Iran avoid producing such lists: (1) they often lack detailed knowledge of each prisoner’s charges and activities; (2) they suffer from conceptual confusion over the legal distinction between political and security offenses; and (3) they fear defending the rights of prisoners whose rhetoric against senior officials has been especially harsh. Zeidabadi considers the “Association for the Defense of Prisoners’ Rights” a credible body for distinguishing political from non-political prisoners and believes it could provide the judiciary with a comprehensive, reliable list.
The Land Subsidence Crisis in Iran: A Result of Mismanagement and Unsustainable Development Policies
Published August 14, 2025
Iran is facing a growing crisis of land subsidence, which has become a national issue. Isa Bozorgzadeh, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Water, has raised concerns that land subsidence is affecting the entire country as excessive extraction of groundwater has reached critical levels. This issue is directly tied to the mismanagement of water resources.
As reported by Mehr News, Bozorgzadeh emphasized, “The only way to combat subsidence is to reduce excessive extraction from groundwater resources and limit it. For decades, we have driven unsustainable development forward through over-extraction of groundwater.”
Bozorgzadeh continued, “Unfortunately, the outcome is that more than 300 plains in Iran are experiencing subsidence at varying rates.” Groundwater resources, especially in Iran’s arid and semi-arid regions, are vital for supplying water for drinking, agriculture, and industry. However, extracting more than the renewable capacity of these resources has severely depleted groundwater levels. This depletion increases the mechanical pressure on the earth’s layers, leading to the formation of voids and ultimately causing land subsidence.
Over the decades, several factors have contributed to this crisis. Population growth, the need to ensure food security, and the lack of an integrated water management system have made it easier for unsustainable extraction of groundwater resources to continue.
One of the main drivers of the subsidence crisis has been the unregulated drilling and exploitation of water wells. Many legal wells have been authorized without considering the actual capacity of groundwater aquifers, and many lack smart meters or extraction limits. This situation has led to over-extraction, even from legally permitted wells.
In addition to this, there are a large number of illegal wells scattered across the country, especially in rural areas and private farms. According to Ministry of Energy statistics, about one million wells exist in Iran, half of which—around 500,000 wells—are illegal. These illegal wells extract 50 billion cubic meters of water annually from underground aquifers. There is no control over the amount of water extracted from these wells, and they are often located in critical areas, causing a rapid drop in groundwater levels.
One of the key reasons behind excessive groundwater extraction has been the self-sufficiency policy in agricultural production, particularly for wheat. This policy, which aimed to reduce dependence on imports and enhance food security, led to the expansion of water-intensive crops in the country’s dry regions.
While wheat could have been produced efficiently in regions like Khuzestan and Golestan without putting too much pressure on water resources, many central and eastern provinces, which rely on groundwater, expanded wheat and other water-intensive crop cultivation. This approach disregarded the actual capacity of water resources, resulting in excessive extraction from underground aquifers and causing disruption in groundwater balance in some areas.
The high level of wheat cultivation in the central and eastern parts of Iran has led to the depletion of groundwater resources. Each kilogram of wheat produced in some regions requires over 1500 liters of water. Wheat is considered among the most water-consuming agricultural crops, with an average of 9.5 billion cubic meters of water consumed annually for its cultivation.
Looking back at the self-sufficiency slogan and the agricultural policies that exacerbated the water crisis, one of the most destructive policies was enacted during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The government, focused on developing deprived areas and increasing self-sufficiency, initiated extensive irrigation and agricultural development projects. During this period, the issuance of permits for well-drilling, agricultural land expansion, and water transfer projects from rivers and underground sources intensified.
More specifically, in 2010, a law was passed that allowed individuals who had drilled illegal wells before 2006 to apply for permits. However, after this law was implemented, more than 120,000 new illegal wells were drilled, and the illegal well issue remained unresolved. According to this law, all previous illegal wells were to be regularized and permitted, effectively legalizing them. Additionally, over 110,000 illegal wells were registered, making them subject to the law, while 200,000 other wells also claimed to fall under this legislation.
As a result, with the passage of a single law, approximately 400,000 illegal wells were officially recognized, with little regard for broader environmental impacts. The land subsidence crisis in Iran is the outcome of decades of mismanagement, excessive groundwater extraction, and development policies that lacked scientific backing. Both legal and illegal wells, the self-sufficiency policy in agriculture, and agricultural expansion plans—especially during the Ahmadinejad era—have all significantly contributed to this crisis. With surface water resources in suboptimal conditions and 57% of the country’s dam capacity empty, the future of water management in Iran remains uncertain, and the need for a sustainable development approach has never been more pressing.
Iran Signals Conditional Willingness for New Nuclear Deal with U.S. and Europe Amid Rising Tensions
Published August 11, 2025
Iran has indicated readiness to enter a new nuclear agreement with the United States and European powers, provided that U.S. sanctions are lifted and security guarantees are offered to prevent further military action during negotiations. In an interview with Japan’s Kyodo News, Majid Takht-Ravanchi, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, said Tehran could accept temporary limits on its peaceful nuclear program as part of a “fair, win-win deal,” but stressed that uranium enrichment must be allowed to continue on Iranian soil. He framed the proposal as a confidence-building measure, contingent on reciprocal steps by Washington.
The possible shift in tone comes in the wake of the June U.S.-Israeli bombardment on Iranian soil, which targeted nuclear, military, and civilian infrastructure. According to Iranian sources, 1,065 people—mostly civilians—were killed, including senior military officials and nuclear scientists. The war ended after 12 days, with Iran launching extensive missile and drone attacks on Israel and U.S. military assets in the region.
Norway has emerged as a potential mediator for renewed U.S.-Iran dialogue after earlier Oman-facilitated talks collapsed amid the conflict. Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Andreas Kravik visited Tehran last week, meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. While no official confirmation of mediation was made, Norway’s condemnation of Israel’s strikes and its traditionally good relations with Tehran have fueled speculation.
Meanwhile, Iran and the E3—Britain, France, and Germany—met in Istanbul two weeks ago, focusing on the “snapback” mechanism that could reimpose UN sanctions unless a new deal is reached. The Europeans have given Iran until late August to agree to a new monitoring framework for its nuclear program, threatening to trigger the return of Security Council resolutions if no agreement is made. Tehran has dismissed European moral authority to use the snapback tool, citing their failure to condemn Israel’s attacks.
A senior IAEA official is expected to visit Tehran soon for discussions on future cooperation, but Iran has made clear there will be no immediate access to nuclear sites, citing security and safety concerns for inspectors following the recent strikes. In July, Iran’s parliament passed an emergency law making cooperation with the IAEA subject to case-by-case approval by the Supreme National Security Council. Araghchi has stated that any agency requests will be evaluated individually under this framework.
Amid these diplomatic maneuvers, domestic debate over renewed talks with the U.S. has intensified. President Masoud Pezeshkian, speaking on August 9 and again on August 10 (19 Mordad), defended engagement, saying: “Surrender is not in our nature, but who says we should fear talking? If we don’t talk, do we want to fight again, rebuild, and face destruction once more? The government will not take any step without the Leader’s consent, even if it goes against my own opinion.” He stressed that diplomacy must be approached without emotional reactions and that coordination with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is absolute.
These remarks triggered a wave of reactions. Aziz Ghazanfari, deputy political chief of the IRGC, warned that careless statements could harm national security. Brigadier General Ali Fadavi, IRGC deputy commander, emphasized that military readiness is non-negotiable and conflict between “truth and falsehood” is eternal. Conservative MP Hamid Rasaei questioned Pezeshkian’s political competence, accusing him of sending signals of weakness to enemies. Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of Kayhan, suggested the president’s words could be interpreted as equating negotiations with surrender when the U.S. has predetermined the outcome.
Hardline commentator Foad Izadi argued Pezeshkian’s stance might encourage further U.S. or Israeli attacks, prompting reformist analyst Ahmad Zeidabadi to counter that such reasoning is “childish” and misunderstands the nature of war and diplomacy. Former presidential adviser Hesamoddin Ashna criticized Pezeshkian’s “off-the-cuff” style, urging him to speak with more discipline, while Tasnim News Agency accused him of projecting “a weak and desperate image” that could undermine even the negotiations he supports.
The internal split is further highlighted by Saeed Jalili, a leading conservative and former nuclear negotiator, who likened post-war talks with the U.S. to the biblical Golden Calf worship, warning of betrayal. In contrast, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi defended diplomacy, likening Khamenei’s leadership to “Moses parting the sea,” saying the Leader has guided Iran both in negotiations and in defense with “wise and courageous” leadership.
Iran’s political scene remains sharply divided over the possibility of renewed negotiations with Washington. While both sides have signaled openness to indirect talks at various points, key sticking points remain and it is unclear whether any party is fully committed to resolving the conflict at a negotiating table. Meanwhile, Tehran is seeking to strengthen its bargaining position through accelerated defense measures and regional alliances. With European snapback deadlines looming and mediation channels tentatively opening, the coming weeks could prove decisive in shaping the next phase of Iran’s nuclear diplomacy and determine whether the June war will reignite.
Mahmoud Farshchian, Master of Persian Miniature Art, Passes Away at 95 in the United States
Published August 14, 2025
On August 9, Mahmoud Farshchian, the renowned Iranian painter and master of miniature art, passed away in the United States at the age of 95. In recent days, reports had indicated that he was hospitalized in the United States, where he resided.
Farshchian was celebrated for his masterful blending of traditional Persian miniature techniques with elements of Western painting, creating a unique style widely known as the Farshchian School. His works often explored Shi’a and religious themes, and many of his paintings were presented by Iranian officials as diplomatic gifts to foreign dignitaries.
Some of his most famous works include The Evening of Ashura, Shams and Rumi, The Guarantor of the Deer, The Fifth Day of Creation, Praise, and The Seventh Sky. His paintings have been exhibited in prestigious institutions such as the Louvre in Paris, the Metropolitan Museum of Art in London, and the Art Institute of Chicago.
Born on January 24, 1930, in Isfahan, Farshchian studied under masters such as Mirza Agha Emami and Isa Bahadori before traveling to Europe, where exposure to Renaissance and Baroque art profoundly influenced his approach to composition, perspective, and lighting. Upon returning to Iran, he served as Director of the Department of National Arts and as a professor at the Faculty of Fine Arts at the University of Tehran, mentoring a new generation of Iranian artists.
In 2019, alongside the inscription of “Persian Miniature Art” on the national list of intangible heritage, Farshchian was recognized as a “Living Human Treasure.” Throughout his career, he received numerous honors both in Iran and abroad and was often hailed as the “reviver of Persian miniature painting.” His dedicated museum in the Sa’dabad Palace complex in Tehran houses a large collection of his works.
Farshchian’s style is characterized by flowing, circular compositions and the symbolic use of animals—particularly horses and deer—to convey emotional and spiritual meaning. His art was deeply rooted in Iranian mysticism, and despite his appreciation for Western techniques, he remained critical of modern art trends, believing they had reached a “dead end.”
Although he enjoyed significant recognition within Iran, including the establishment of a university program in his name, Farshchian grew frustrated with the lack of proper academic support for traditional Iranian painting. In his later years, he chose to live outside Iran, stating that his concerns were not being heard.
According to reports from Iranian media, he is to be buried in his hometown of Isfahan, next to the tomb of the 17th-century poet Saeb Tabrizi. Mahmoud Farshchian was not only a towering figure in the world of Persian art but also a cultural bridge between Iran and the global community. His works have inspired Iranian Americans and art lovers worldwide, preserving and reinterpreting the beauty of Iranian heritage for new generations. Living much of his later life in the United States, he became a source of pride and connection for the Iranian American community, reminding us of the enduring power of art to transcend borders and unite hearts.
The National Iranian American Council (NIAC) extends our deepest condolences to his family, friends, admirers of his work, and the entire Iranian-American community. The passing of Mahmoud Farshchian is not only a loss for the world of art but for all who cherish the cultural legacy of Iran. His spirit will continue to live on in the delicate lines, vibrant colors, and timeless stories of his paintings.