What does it mean to trigger “snapback” on Iran?
In the weeks and months to come, three European parties – France, Germany and the United Kingdom – could seek to trigger the snapback of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) on Iran that were previously waived under the 2015 nuclear agreement.
The years that preceded the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), saw the imposition of six separate UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran. They are Resolution 1696 (2006), Resolution 1737 (2006), Resolution 1747 (2007), Resolution 1803 (2008), Resolution 1835 (2008) and Resolution 1929 (2010). These resolutions imposed UN sanctions on Iran, which were then leveraged via multilateral diplomacy with Iran to strike a comprehensive nuclear agreement.
The agreement that was struck effectively waived, or terminated, these prior six UN Security Council Resolutions and replaced them with UNSC Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA.
However, there was a significant catch to the resolution codifying the JCPOA – – any party to the agreement can effectively terminate it unilaterally. If any party to the JCPOA deemed another to be in significant non-performance of commitments under the JCPOA, it allowed for that participant to force a vote at the Security Council on a new draft resolution. The resolution would be on whether to continue the terminations of the six prior UNSC Resolutions on Iran within 30 days. Under this process, any single permanent member of the Security Council can veto that resolution, bringing the six Iran-related resolutions terminated by the JCPOA back into force. As UNSCR 2231 states:
“within 30 days of receiving a notification by a JCPOA participant State of an issue that the JCPOA participant State believes constitutes significant non-performance of commitments under the JCPOA, it shall vote on a draft resolution to continue in effect the terminations in paragraph 7 (a) of this resolution, decides further that if, within 10 days of the notification referred to above, no Member of the Security Council has submitted such a draft resolution for a vote, then the President of the Security Council shall submit such a draft resolution and put it to a vote within 30 days of the notification referred to above, and expresses its intention to take into account the views of the States involved in the issue and any opinion on the issue by the Advisory Board established in the JCPOA;”
In so doing, the parties to the agreement effectively reversed the ordinary functioning of the UN Security Council. Rather than a single permanent member holding veto power that could be wielded against the return of prior resolutions, a single party to the JCPOA could bring the resolutions back by vetoing the resolution continuing the termination of those sanctions. This “snap back” mechanism was a significant concession, particularly for Russia, China, and Iran, in that it theoretically could allow the U.S. or European powers to obviate the veto power of China and Russia in order to terminate the accord.
Critically, this ability to “snap back” prior UNSC Resolutions terminates on October 18, 2025, along with UNSCR 2231, according to the timeline negotiated in 2015.
This is what the European parties are threatening to do: if Iran does not agree to some sort of a new nuclear understanding in the coming weeks, which for now appears to be highly unlikely, they are expected to trigger snapback of the six prior UN Security Council Resolutions.
What do the six prior UN Security Council Resolutions do?
Most of the six prior Security Council resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and are thus legally binding on Iran and other parties. While the resolutions do not endorse the use of force against Iran, which would surely be opposed by permanent UN Security Council members in Russia and China and potentially others, they utilize sanctions and diplomatic requirements that were aimed at compelling Iran to make major changes to its nuclear behavior.
The resolutions called on Iran and UN member states to take certain steps to address ongoing international concerns regarding the nature of Iran’s nuclear program. These include calls on Iran to halt all enrichment of uranium, including in Resolution 1696. It states, “Demands…that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA.” This is significant, as calling for Iran to halt enrichment as a prerequisite to begin serious nuclear negotiations long stood in the way to serious diplomatic progress with Iran.
By dropping the enrichment requirement enshrined in the resolutions, the Obama administration paved a path to the 2013 interim nuclear agreement, known as the Joint Plan of Action, as well as the 2015 JCPOA. A return to this requirement would reflect some of the hardline demands of the Israeli government, and more recently the Trump administration, that Iran give up all enrichment as part of a final agreement – which Iran has strongly resisted. Iran asserts a right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and has strongly rebuffed any attempt to force it to halt enriching uranium regardless of past and present calls.
The resolutions also compel member states to act to halt various forms of commercial activity that might benefit Iran’s nuclear program and other specified areas. According to UNSCR 1747, member states are called on to halt the sale of major weapons systems to Iran. It prohibits the sale or transfer to Iran of “battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems” along with associated technical training “in order to prevent a destabilising accumulation of arms.”
Member states are also compelled to interdict Iranian shipments suspected of violating UN restrictions under UNSCR 1929. It states that all States are called upon “to inspect…all cargo to and from Iran, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited” under prior UN Security Council resolutions.
Additionally, UNSCR 1929 includes prohibitions on Iran launching nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. It states Iran “shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and that States shall take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities.” Iranian missiles were vital to Iran’s retaliatory capabilities in the June war, which saw Israel come under repeated fire by Iranian missiles.
Notably, Iran is likely seeking to buttress its defense systems following Israel’s sneak attack on Iran in June that did not receive any endorsement by the UN Security Council, and was thus illegal under international law. Whether potential arms suppliers would be deterred from transferring arms to Iran following the return of these resolutions is unclear, but it would surely be strongly opposed by Iran along with certain actors in the international system given the current diplomatic and security environment.
When is a snapback attempt likely to happen?
Without further action, UN Security Council Resolution 2231 is set to expire on October 18, 2025, and with it the ability to snap back the six original UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran. That leaves only a few months for the European parties to the JCPOA to initiate snapback, if they choose to do so.
The rotating Presidency of the UN Security Council could be a determining factor on timing. In August, the UN Security Council President will be Panama, followed by the Republic of Korea in September and Russia in October. Given Russia’s comparative alignment with Iran, it is likely that European actors would seek to avoid acting at a time when Russia has greater influence over the procedure of the Security Council.
Given that a snapback attempt likely entails a roughly 30-day window in which the UN Security Council can choose to continue the terminations of the prior resolutions, snapback is most likely to be initiated at some point between late August or, failing that, by mid-September.
Would a snapback attempt succeed?
If France, Germany or the United Kingdom choose to try to snap back prior UN Security Council resolutions on Iran, it is likely that they succeed from a procedural standpoint.
To the extent that the JCPOA remains an active agreement, the European powers never formally left the accord, just like Iran, Russia and China. UNSCR 2231 – endorsed unanimously in 2015 – also authorizes the snapback procedure itself.
However, it is worth noting that Russia and China are highly likely to object, and could turn the procedure into a messy bureaucratic fight. After all, the snapback provision was envisaged as a procedure that might need to be applied to Iran violating the agreement and dashing for a nuclear weapon. Yet what transpired is that the U.S. violated the agreement wholesale in 2018, Europe proved unable or unwilling to deliver any relief from U.S. unilateral sanctions, attempts to revive the JCPOA failed and ongoing negotiations toward a new nuclear deal were pre-empted by a joint U.S. and Israeli attack on Iran without approval from the UN Security Council. Iran is thus at risk of being punished according to the vestige of a deal that was broken by the U.S. in the wake of an illegal war on its territory, when outside parties are not even seriously attempting to put a workable deal on the table and the status of key elements of Iran’s nuclear program is unknown in the wake of the U.S.-Israeli bombings.
Moreover, the premise of snapback is a reversal of the ordinary functioning of the UN Security Council, where a single permanent member can veto new resolutions. This highly unusual procedure is novel, and Russia and China are likely to argue – not without some basis – that the procedure risks being abused in favor of deeper tensions and more conflict.
Lastly, it is worth noting that the last time snapback was attempted, the push failed. The U.S. had ceased participation in the accord entirely in 2018, yet sought to trigger snapback from outside the JCPOA in 2020. Then, the vast majority of Security Council members – including the European parties – rejected the U.S. attempt to trigger snapback, arguing the effort was illegitimate given the U.S. was no longer party to the accord.
What could transpire at the end of a snapback attempt is that the validity of the UN Security Council resolutions will depend on the eye of the beholder: China and Russia could argue the resolutions are illegitimate and remain terminated, while the U.S. and Europe assert that they are indeed legitimate and active, with the rest of the international community choosing one camp or another or seeking to remain neutral on the question.
How is Iran likely to react to snapback?
Iran has already paid a significant price for sticking to what Iranian officials see as a principled position on the nuclear file: decades of punishing and overlapping multilateral and unilateral sanctions culminating with the bombing of the crown jewels of its nuclear program not when it was dashing for a bomb, but when it was actively negotiating a new nuclear understanding. In this context, while the return of UN sanctions is likely to hurt the Iranian economy in the short term, it is far from clear that engagement will remove the snapback sword of Damocles hanging over its head or deliver enhanced security to the country. Any concessions Iran is likely to give on its nuclear program are not going to be made solely to stave off snapback, but rather, because they are seen as advancing Iranian security in the short, medium and long term – including in advance of any new U.S. or Israeli strikes on Iran.
Iran has signaled that it will respond to snapback of prior UN Security Council Resolutions by withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This is a long-standing Iranian position dating back, at least, to the U.S. threat to snap back sanctions on Iran in 2020, and legislation has been introduced in the current Majles (Iranian Parliament) that would mandate Iran’s withdrawal. Particularly after being attacked by two nuclear-armed states operating without the backing of the UN Security Council, it is highly likely that Iran follows through on the threat to initiate a withdrawal from the NPT. This would have serious ramifications for the global nonproliferation regime and relations with Iran.
The NPT is the foundation of global nonproliferation efforts. At its core is a fundamental bargain: nuclear weapons states will pursue disarmament while non-nuclear weapons states can develop nuclear energy peacefully while being prohibited from pursuing weaponization. While there are fundamental questions about the sustainability of the NPT as disarmament efforts are virtually nonexistent, it has arguably been very successful in helping to guard against new states joining the ranks of nuclear weapon powers. Only one state – North Korea – has joined the ranks of nuclear powers after previously ratifying the NPT. Critically, it tested its first nuclear device after finalizing its withdrawal from the NPT and ending IAEA inspection over its nuclear program. If Iran exits the NPT, it will very likely be ending IAEA monitoring inside Iran indefinitely. Whether or not this leads to weaponization would depend on whether Iran chooses to weaponize, including in the face of highly realistic military threats.
There is a process for any state considering withdrawing from the NPT. Article X of the treaty states:
Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
If Iran follows through on its stated position, the initiation of the withdrawal process would kick off three months in which diplomacy could prevent or delay Iran’s exit from the NPT. However, following snapback, the diplomatic pathways would get much more complex and involve many more actors – including, likely, the entirety of the UN Security Council.
Are there alternatives to snapback?
Importantly, there is nothing requiring the European parties to the JCPOA to trigger snapback. Without an actual, credible diplomatic strategy being pursued by either the Americans or Europeans, abstaining from snapping back is likely to make much more sense than bringing back resolutions that were passed more than fifteen years ago that can only serve to supercharge the nuclear crisis by pushing Iran to begin to exit the NPT and very likely reigniting the war that was paused in June.
Yet, that is likely not how leadership in the U.S. or Europe are likely to see matters, who will view any loss of a tool for pressure against Iran – even if it can only be used to the detriment of their interests – as too important to give up.
According to some sources, the Europeans may have offered Iran a deal: Iran would take certain steps – such as to begin to cooperate with the IAEA again – in exchange for an extension for the snapback provision. This would, in theory, put more time on the clock for negotiations while preserving Europe’s leverage on snapback. However, Iran has reacted harshly to any notion of Europe triggering snapback. As Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told the Financial Times, “With the Europeans, there is no reason right now to negotiate because they cannot lift sanctions, they cannot do anything. If they do snap back, that means that this is the end of the road for them.” This should not be entirely surprising. It is highly unlikely that Iran wants to have the threat of snapback constantly hanging over its head, being used to pressure the country into concessions that it may not want to make.
Moreover, in the current post-war environment, it is highly likely that Iran sees significant risks to agreeing to new concessions with Europe and the United States. Right now, Iran’s nuclear program is operating with a degree of ambiguity that makes the success of a future Israeli or American strike a more difficult proposition. While Israeli officials have asserted that Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to near weapons grade is buried and inaccessible, Iran has suggested that it was moved, which could have happened either before or after the war. Bringing that stockpile back under international observation would be objectively good for transparency and nonproliferation efforts, but the real question is not whether Iran should do this, but what kind of guarantees will be needed to restore Iran’s faith that cooperation won’t lead to another attack. Here, the mere threat of a delay on snapback is likely nowhere near enough to get Iran to fully cooperate and restore a high degree of monitoring in Iran.
Given the strong headwinds in the face of securing significant concessions with the snapback tool, the E3 – in coordination with the U.S. – should push to unilaterally extend the snapback provision. In so doing, Europe would preserve its ability to trigger snapback and thus its key leverage, while buying more time for negotiations to be revived and begin to progress. Given that such a move could delay the outbreak of a deadly war that would be bad for all parties, such a move should receive the backing of all permanent members of the Security Council.
The E3 and U.S. need to consider their options carefully. Do they want to trigger a breakdown of the ceasefire between Israel and Iran, triggering a new outbreak of the war? If so, that is the likely outcome of triggering snapback in the weeks to come. For the Europeans, are they so confident in diplomatic offramps that would likely require unanimity from the UN Security Council that they are ready to expend their last, remaining source of leverage? There is little reason to be confident that a path back from the brink can be found, particularly after expending its main leverage. That leaves a unilateral extension as the only likely recourse for those hoping to preserve the snap-back option while not shutting the door on diplomatic efforts towards a new nuclear agreement.