On Sunday, September 28, six prior UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran came back into effect, finalizing the “snapback” process set up in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and triggered by European powers in late August.
What just happened?
France, Germany and the United Kingdom initiated the snapback procedure under UN Security Council Resolution 2231, finding Iran in noncompliance with the accord and demanding certain concessions from Iran to delay the return of the prior resolutions. In short, all parties appeared to be more comfortable with snapback than with a deal, and so the UN sanctions have returned.
Iran proposed certain positive steps to forestall snapback, including the return of IAEA monitoring over Iranian facilities and accounting for its higher enriched uranium stockpiles. Yet, the European troika demanded faster steps and, spurred by the Trump administration, seemed unlikely to agree to any package the Iranians were comfortable accepting. The Trump administration, meanwhile, appears to have been content with snapback going forward, and may have reiterated hardline demands of ending all Iranian enrichment indefinitely for a delay on the return of UN sanctions.
How has snapback been received in Iran?
Iran has reacted harshly, slamming the snapback as illegitimate and Western powers as duplicitous. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian – a moderate affiliated with Iran’s reformist factions – stated today “The dream of forcing Iran to its knees is a fantasy and a delusion. We will never yield to such filthy and despicable individuals. Even imagining it is impossible…they sanction us because we refuse to bow down; because we refuse to be humiliated.”
Iran’s parliament is also beginning to debate how to respond. Parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf warned of forthcoming retaliation against any nations enforcing the UN sanctions, while the spokesperson for the national security commission noted discussion and personal support for steps to initiate withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, though he noted there would need to be consensus for such a step.
As expected, the snapback has provoked a shock in Iranian markets. The currency, the rial, depreciated in open markets, trading at a record rate of above 110,000 to the dollar, fueling panic among consumers and traders. Prices of food, medicine, and household goods began to rise, while importers warned of bottlenecks and industrial suppliers reported disruptions.
How does this impact prospects for diplomacy?
Prospects for negotiations have taken a further hit by snapback. While the threat of the reimposition of UN sanctions could have been used deftly as a point of leverage in a good faith negotiation, its trigger without any Iranian concessions means that leverage has been spent for no gain. Instead, with Iranian doubts already pervasive after being bombed in the middle of earlier negotiations, the snapback affair has further dampened appetite in Tehran for any form of negotiations with the West. The E3, formerly a productive mediator between the U.S. and Iran, has also rendered itself as a dispensable actor in the U.S.-Iran dispute, making it hard to figure out which actors – if any – might be able to bring the U.S. and Iran back to a productive stance on negotiations.
Are risks of war growing?
The failure of diplomatic brinksmanship in the snapback showdown raises the question of whether and when the June war between Israel and Iran may reignite. Danny Citrinowicz, former head of the Iran Division in the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate’s Research Department, wrote in Israel Hayom that the prospect of a new, deadlier round of war is increasing with the failure of diplomacy.
According to Citrinowicz “Tehran still prefers a diplomatic path that could lead to sanctions relief. But given the Western stance, which Iran views as a ‘demand for surrender,’ its leadership recognizes that military escalation is increasingly likely.” He warns that while the June war took Iran by surprise and saw robust American support in shooting down Iranian missiles, a future conflagration may be on worse footing for Israel. This is due to both better Iranian preparedness and questions about American participation. According to Citrinowicz, “If Washington is less committed this time, questions will arise about how a future conflict could be brought to an end, and how to avoid sliding into a prolonged war of attrition that could exact a heavier toll on Israel than on Iran, given Iran’s geographic depth and its experience from the devastating 1980-88 war with Iraq.”
What do the UN Security Council Resolutions do?
With snapback, Resolution 1696 (2006), Resolution 1737 (2006), Resolution 1747 (2007), Resolution 1803 (2008), Resolution 1835 (2008) and Resolution 1929 (2010) have now been restored. While some parties, including Iran and Russia, view this move as illegitimate, the return of the resolutions will significantly shape Iran’s diplomatic, economic and military environment.
Most of the six prior Security Council resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and are thus legally binding on Iran and other parties. While the resolutions do not endorse the use of force against Iran, they utilize sanctions and diplomatic requirements that were aimed at compelling Iran to make major changes to its nuclear behavior.
The resolutions called on Iran and UN member states to take certain steps to address ongoing international concerns regarding the nature of Iran’s nuclear program. These include calls on Iran to halt all enrichment of uranium, including in Resolution 1696. It states, “Demands…that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA.” This is significant, as calling for Iran to halt enrichment as a prerequisite to begin serious nuclear negotiations long stood in the way to serious diplomatic progress with Iran.
The resolutions also compel member states to act to halt various forms of commercial activity that might benefit Iran’s nuclear program and other specified areas. According to UNSCR 1747, member states are called on to halt the sale of major weapons systems to Iran. It prohibits the sale or transfer to Iran of “battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems” along with associated technical training “in order to prevent a destabilising accumulation of arms.”
Member states are also compelled to interdict Iranian shipments suspected of violating UN restrictions under UNSCR 1929. It states that all States are called upon “to inspect…all cargo to and from Iran, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited” under prior UN Security Council resolutions.
Additionally, UNSCR 1929 includes prohibitions on Iran launching nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. It states Iran “shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and that States shall take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities.” Iranian missiles were vital to Iran’s retaliatory capabilities in the June war, which saw Israel come under repeated fire by Iranian missiles.
Notably, Iran is likely seeking to buttress its defense systems following Israel’s sneak attack on Iran in June that did not receive any endorsement by the UN Security Council, and was thus illegal under international law. Whether potential arms suppliers would be deterred from transferring arms to Iran following the return of these resolutions is unclear, but it would surely be strongly opposed by Iran along with certain actors in the international system given the current diplomatic and security environment.