Two months ago, a hardline President infamous for overseeing mass executions in the Iranian judiciary was the second most powerful man in Iran, and was expected to remain so and potentially assume the role of Supreme Leader after the eventual passing of Ali Khamenei. There was little hope on the horizon for any change after Ebrahim Raisi oversaw a brutal crackdown on protests and had escalated Iran’s nuclear program to new heights after balking at striking a nuclear deal with the United States. But Iranian politics are anything but predictable. Following the helicopter crash that killed Raisi and his Foreign Minister, just under half of the Iranian electorate voted to reject a hardline successor to Raisi and elevate the reformist in the race, Masoud Pezeshkian, to chart a new course.
This unexpected development has put some light on the horizon, though it could still prove to be a false dawn. Pezeshkian will face many restraints on his ability to deliver results to the more than 16 million Iranians who voted him into office, as well as those who didn’t vote because they doubted change was possible or that the system is reformable. While John Kirby, a senior Biden administration spokesperson, has already downplayed the significance of his victory and – concerningly – seemed to suggest a long list of preconditions for new nuclear negotiations, Pezeshkian’s election could mark a significant departure and open up key opportunities that could benefit the Iranian people and help stabilize the region.
Perhaps most significant, at least in the near future, is the possibility of loosened domestic restrictions. Prior to the tragic killing of 22 year-old Mahsa Amini at the hands of the morality police and the mass protest movement sparked by her death, Raisi had tightened enforcement of the nation’s mandatory hijab laws. By contrast, Pezeshkian, then a parliamentarian, condemned Amini’s killing and the harsh crackdown that followed even as most of the Iranian establishment closed ranks amid mass protests. “We have created problems for the people, and we must respond, not beat up that girl (Mahsa) and hand over her body,” stated Pezeshkian.
On the campaign trail, he doubled down on his oppositional stance, vowing to be a voice in the government against harsh enforcement of the hijab laws, which likely helped spur turnout in each electoral round. Notably, he stated “I do not support improper hijab, but I cannot impose force on girls. I have daughters and cannot be forceful with them; those in the streets are like my daughters.”
While there are many power centers in the Islamic Republic, the President can shape enforcement of mandatory hijab laws and either tighten or loosen them. One of the lasting gains of the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom protests is the continued, widespread defiance of the hijab laws that followed, which has led to disagreements among the Islamic Republic’s authorities over the intensity and manner of enforcement to try to restore more regular compliance.
Pezeshkian himself opposes the Noor Plan – recently rolled out by the Raisi administration, which led to harsh confrontations with women in the streets – and the strict enforcement of mandatory hijab laws. He has also promised to make efforts to persuade other sectors of power to stop harassing women and girls who do not accept the mandatory hijab. Given his rhetoric on the campaign trail, Pezeshkian will be judged harshly if he fails to shift from Raisi’s comparatively rigid stance and harsh enforcement that have helped sow fierce opposition to the Islamic Republic among millions of the people it rules over.
Another key factor in Pezeshkian’s victory was his focus on sanctions as a cause for the country’s economic plight, and his vow to pursue their lifting via direct negotiations with the United States. As he stated in campaigning:
“For me, diplomacy, negotiation, and agreement are not signs of weakness but a sensible and low-cost way to achieve dignity. We no longer have the luxury of stagnation while regional countries are rapidly developing. Our oil revenues should not end up in the hands of smugglers. With sanctions, one can survive but not progress. With widespread voter participation, we will have the strongest bargaining chip in negotiations. With public support, reviving the JCPOA, lifting sanctions, and removing banking obstacles like FATF (Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental body that sets standards to combat money laundering and terrorism financing that Iran has not adhered to) will be possible.”
In these vows, he was joined on the campaign trail by the former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, who animatedly made the case for Pezeshkian, defended the 2015 nuclear accord he negotiated and denounced the hardline opposition to engagement with the West embodied by the hardline candidate Saeed Jalili. While Zarif himself is unlikely to be restored to the Foreign Minister role in the face of a hardline parliament, he is playing a role in vetting candidates for positions in the new administration and is likely to continue to be a close adviser to Pezeshkian. Zarif’s former deputy Abbas Araghchi, who was deeply involved in the 2015 negotiations, maintains strong relations with the nation’s power centers and could likely be confirmed for the Foreign Minister position.
This will be a sharp contrast to the Raisi government which was internally conflicted on negotiations with the West, and preferred to muddle through amid pressure and expand its nuclear program rather than risk exposing the Iranian economy to another shock of sanctions reimposition if the U.S. again failed to abide by its commitments under a restoration of the deal. Pezeshkian’s team will likely be filled with those who secured the JCPOA in 2015, view it positively and believe engagement is necessary to get out from under the shroud of sanctions that have stifled the Iranian economy and the nation’s aspiration for decades.
Here, there is a clear opportunity, if the United States can seize it. Iran already has the capability to produce nuclear weapons and has, recently, floated the notion that it could weaponize its program if backed into a corner. Iran has become a de facto latent nuclear power in the years since Trump ripped up the nuclear accord as Western sanctions and other pressures have empowered anti-Western factions within Iran’s power structure, pushing the country into the arms of China and Russia, which has has had highly negative ramifications in the Russia-Ukraine war. If whoever wins the U.S. election in November puts sanctions relief on the table, a deal can likely be struck again that puts weaponization at bay and eases some of the pressure on Iran’s economy to the benefit of ordinary Iranians.