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Military Exchanges Threaten to Unravel Tentative Truce, Khamenei’s Funeral in Iran and Iraq, and More

Week of July 6, 2026 | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council

The U.S.–Iran confrontation is in an unsettled phase. While Thursday night saw fewer reported strikes than the previous two days, political statements, military warnings, maritime developments, and diplomatic activity do not point to any clear pivot away from further warfare. There is a strong likelihood for further strikes and military exchanges this weekend. 

President Donald Trump announced that the United States had agreed to Iran’s request to continue negotiations, but at the same time declared that the ceasefire is over, apparently referring to previous understandings including the Memorandum of Understanding.

Despite this rhetoric, additional developments suggest that neither Washington nor Tehran currently appears eager to return to a full-scale war. Reuters reported that Qatari negotiators are in Tehran, while Pakistan continues to play a central mediating role. According to Reuters and Axios, these diplomatic efforts are being coordinated with the United States and are aimed at reducing tensions and creating conditions for broader negotiations rather than allowing the conflict to escalate further.

On the military front, the pace of hostilities slowed Thursday evening. Reports from Iran indicated limited explosions near Konarak and Choghadak, while U.S. officials stated that no new American strikes were conducted overnight. Some regional media and online sources have speculated that the incidents may have involved assets or facilities linked to Bahrain or Kuwait. However, these claims remain entirely unverified. Neither government has acknowledged involvement, no independent evidence has emerged to support the allegations, and such participation would be inconsistent with the cautious approach both states have publicly maintained throughout the current crisis.

At the same time, there are also unverified reports citing an Iranian security official suggesting that Israel was responsible for the latest strikes. Israel has neither confirmed nor denied involvement, and major international news organizations have not independently verified the claim.

Iran reportedly retaliated by launching missiles toward U.S.-related targets in the region, causing no reported damage or casualties after interceptions by U.S. and regional air defense systems. Although both sides continue to exchange threats, the scale of military operations has been considerably lower than during the previous two nights.

The central strategic question, however, remains the future of the Strait of Hormuz, the proximate trigger for the ongoing escalation. Recent shipping data suggest that maritime traffic is recovering only gradually and remains well below normal levels. 18 commercial vessels reportedly transited the Strait of Hormuz on July 9, compared with 28 on July 8 and 36 on July 7, underscoring that commercial confidence remains fragile despite the reduction in military activity.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) similarly reported that oil flows through the Strait have begun to recover, contributing to an improvement in global oil demand and supply. Nevertheless, exports from Gulf producers remain significantly below pre-war levels, indicating that energy markets continue to price in substantial geopolitical risk.

Iran, meanwhile, continues to present itself as the principal guarantor of security in the Strait. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stated that shipping capacity has recovered to approximately 50 percent of pre-war levels, while emphasizing that vessels are increasingly transiting through routes designated by Iran after receiving authorization from the IRGC Navy. The statement also warned that any foreign attempt to dictate navigation routes would disrupt the gradual reopening process and could trigger further confrontation.

These developments highlight what is now the most important unresolved issue of the crisis: whether Iran will be able to maintain effective operational control over security conditions in the Strait of Hormuz after sustaining significant U.S. military strikes, or whether continued American military pressure will fundamentally reshape the balance of power in one of the world’s most strategically important maritime chokepoints.

Closely related is another unresolved question: whether Iran will resume attacks against commercial shipping. Since the large-scale U.S. strikes earlier this week, no independently confirmed attacks against merchant vessels have been reported. Nevertheless, shipping companies continue to operate cautiously, insurance premiums remain elevated, and vessel traffic remains well below normal levels. The absence of new attacks should therefore not be interpreted as evidence that the maritime crisis has been resolved.

Another notable development is President Trump’s growing emphasis on personal security threats. During funeral ceremonies for Ali Khamenei, chants calling for revenge against Trump attracted considerable attention inside and outside Iran. At the same time, The Wall Street Journal reported that Israel had shared intelligence with Washington concerning an alleged new Iranian plot targeting the U.S. president. Although these reports have not been publicly substantiated, they appear to have reinforced Trump’s harder line on Iran, with the President commenting publicly on the apparent assassination threats and noting that if anything happens to him, Iran will be bombed harder than ever before. 

Inside Iran, officials continue to emphasize deterrence rather than compromise. Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr warned that any attacks on Iranian infrastructure would be met with reciprocal retaliation, while Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reiterated to Pakistan’s Army Chief that Iran remains prepared to defend itself if U.S. attacks continue. The IRGC likewise warned that further American military action could place U.S. bases throughout the region at risk.

Taken together, these developments suggest that the military confrontation may be entering a lower-intensity phase without producing a political settlement. Active diplomacy continues, military exchanges have become more limited, and neither side currently appears to seek a return to unrestricted war. Yet none of the underlying disputes that drove the latest escalation have been resolved. The future security architecture of the Strait of Hormuz, freedom of navigation, Iran’s ability to preserve its influence over the waterway, the credibility of U.S. deterrence, and the durability of ongoing negotiations all remain uncertain. For now, the decline in violence appears to represent a tactical pause rather than a strategic resolution, and the Strait of Hormuz remains the single most important indicator of whether the crisis moves back toward diplomacy or returns to military escalation.

The Funeral of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei: A Demonstration of Mourning, Succession, and the Resilience of the Islamic Republic

The funeral of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s second Supreme Leader, became far more than the burial of the country’s longest-serving leader. It evolved into the first major political event of Iran’s post-Khamenei era, a test of the Islamic Republic’s institutional resilience following a devastating war with the United States and Israel, and a carefully orchestrated demonstration of continuity at a moment when many observers believed the regime faced one of the greatest threats in its history.

Born in Mashhad in 1939, Khamenei studied in the seminaries of Mashhad, Qom, and Najaf before emerging as one of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s closest revolutionary allies. Following the 1979 Revolution, he served in several senior positions before becoming Iran’s president in 1981, a position he held throughout most of the Iran-Iraq War. After Khomeini’s death in 1989, he was selected as Supreme Leader and remained Iran’s highest political and religious authority for nearly 37 years, exercising ultimate control over the country’s armed forces, security establishment, judiciary, and the broad direction of domestic and foreign policy.

His leadership shaped nearly every major chapter of contemporary Iranian history, including the expansion of Iran’s regional alliances, the development of its missile and nuclear programs, decades of confrontation and negotiation with the United States, repeated rounds of international sanctions, and successive domestic protest movements. For his supporters, Khamenei represented independence from foreign powers, resistance to U.S. and Israeli pressure, and the preservation of the Islamic Republic through repeated crises. He was also regarded by many of them as the architect of Iran’s military deterrence strategy: a network of missile capabilities, regional alliances, and asymmetric forces that, in their view, enabled Iran to withstand two wars within a single year against some of the world’s most powerful militaries. His critics, by contrast, associate his rule with severe political repression, restrictions on civil liberties, violent crackdowns on protests, economic mismanagement, Iran’s growing international isolation and a decline in living standards for the nation.

His death during the opening hours of the recent U.S.-Israeli military campaign therefore marked not only the end of one of the Middle East’s longest-serving rulers but also the conclusion of a defining era in the history of the Islamic Republic.

The official mourning ceremonies unfolded over nearly a week, beginning in Tehran, continuing through Qom, extending into Najaf and Karbala, and concluding with Khamenei’s burial at the Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad. Alongside him, his daughter, granddaughter, daughter-in-law and son-in-law were also laid to rest following their demise in the same attack, reinforcing the government’s portrayal of the strike as a broader national tragedy rather than solely the assassination of a political leader.

Throughout the ceremonies, Iran’s senior civilian and military leadership appeared prominently alongside one another, projecting an image of institutional cohesion following the war. The visible participation of senior political leaders, military commanders and security officials reinforced the government’s message that the state’s core institutions remained functional despite the heavy losses sustained during the conflict. More importantly, only months after a war that many believed could seriously weaken—or even threaten the survival of—the Islamic Republic, the government successfully organized coordinated funeral ceremonies across multiple cities and two countries while maintaining an orderly transfer of authority. Regardless of differing estimates regarding attendance, the funeral itself became a demonstration of the state’s continuing organizational capacity.

One of the most notable features of the ceremonies, however, was the complete absence of Mojtaba Khamenei, who had succeeded his father as Supreme Leader. Although written statements attributed to him were released during the mourning period, he did not make a confirmed public appearance in Tehran, Qom, Najaf, Karbala or Mashhad. Instead, the final funeral prayer was led by Khamenei’s eldest son, Mostafa Khamenei, while his brothers Meysam and Masoud also appeared publicly. No official explanation was offered for Mojtaba’s absence. Reported injuries sustained during the February 28 attack and the continuing risk of assassination both provide plausible explanations for his absence. Nevertheless, the contrast was striking: while the Islamic Republic sought to project continuity through the funeral, the individual who had inherited its highest office remained unseen.

Perhaps the most historically remarkable aspect of the funeral was its Iraqi chapter. During the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War, Ali Khamenei served as Iran’s president while the two neighboring countries fought one of the twentieth century’s longest and bloodiest conventional wars. Four decades later, the same wartime president was received with official honors in Najaf before his coffin was carried through Najaf and Karbala, the holiest cities of Shi’a Islam. The Iraqi government declared a public holiday and senior Iraqi political and religious figures – including representatives associated with Muqtada al-Sadr, Ammar al-Hakim, and other influential Shi’a institutions – joined thousands of mourners in the ceremonies.

Such a scene would have been almost unimaginable during the war and remained difficult to envision even twenty years ago. The funeral illustrated one of the Middle East’s most remarkable geopolitical transformations: the country that had once fought an eight-year war against Iran became the site of one of the largest commemorations of the Iranian leader who had served as president during that conflict. This extraordinary reversal reflected not only the profound political changes that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, but also the deep religious, social, and political ties that have developed between the Shi’a communities of Iran and Iraq. 

For Tehran, the Iraqi ceremonies demonstrated that despite the recent war and the loss of its Supreme Leader, Iran’s regional relationships had not collapsed. At the same time, they highlighted Iraq’s continuing role as a bridge between religious solidarity, national interests, and competing regional influences.

The funeral also extended well beyond Iran and Iraq. Symbolic funeral prayers, memorial gatherings, and mourning ceremonies were organized by Shi’a communities and organizations in several countries, particularly Pakistan, where some of the largest overseas commemorations took place. Additional ceremonies were reported in Lebanon, India, Bahrain, Nigeria and other countries with significant Shi’a populations. Although these events differed considerably in scale and political character, together they demonstrated that Khamenei’s death resonated beyond Iran’s borders and was viewed by many participants as an event affecting the broader Shi’a community rather than only the Iranian state.

Khamenei’s assassination also carried an important religious dimension. Although he was first and foremost Iran’s political leader, he was simultaneously regarded by many followers as one of the senior religious authorities of the Shi’a world. Consequently, many Shi’a communities interpreted his killing not simply as the death of a head of state but as a hostile act against one of the leading Shi’a clerics. This perception contributed significantly to the emotional intensity of the funeral, helping explain why Najaf and Karbala occupied such central positions in the mourning ceremonies, and reinforced the Iranian government’s decision to consistently describe Khamenei as a martyr. Through funeral rituals, carefully selected Qur’anic recitations, and ceremonies held in the holiest cities of Shi’a Islam, Iranian officials sought to place his death within a broader historical narrative of sacrifice, oppression, steadfastness, and resistance that occupies a central place in Shi’a collective memory.

The funeral simultaneously conveyed several political messages. Domestically, it was intended to reassure the public that the Islamic Republic’s institutions remained functional despite unprecedented military losses. Regionally, it demonstrated that Iran continued to enjoy meaningful relationships with important political and religious actors across the Middle East. Internationally, it projected defiance toward the United States and Israel while portraying Khamenei’s death as part of a broader struggle against foreign intervention. At the same time, the ceremonies reflected a genuine emotional response among many participants whose motivations combined religious conviction, nationalism, and anger over the foreign military campaign. State organization and authentic public mourning were not mutually exclusive; both were visible throughout the week-long ceremonies.

The funeral concluded in Mashhad, where Khamenei was buried at the Imam Reza Shrine, his birthplace and one of Shi’a Islam’s holiest sites. The final stage of the journey symbolically linked Najaf, Karbala, and Mashhad – three of the most important centers of Shi’a religious life – reinforcing the government’s effort to present Khamenei not merely as an Iranian political leader but as a figure of significance across the wider Shi’a world.

Ultimately, the funeral represented far more than a state ceremony. It became the first major test of Iran’s political order after Ali Khamenei and demonstrated that the Islamic Republic possessed considerably greater institutional resilience than many had anticipated during the war. The government successfully coordinated a complex series of ceremonies across two countries, publicly reunited its senior political and military leadership, and showcased the endurance of its regional and religious networks despite one of the greatest crises in its history.

Yet the funeral also exposed the uncertainties of the new era. Mojtaba Khamenei’s continued absence left important questions unanswered about the exercise of authority under the new leadership and the evolving balance of power among the Supreme Leader’s office, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the clerical establishment, and elected institutions. Iran continues to confront severe economic pressures, domestic political challenges, regional tensions, and an uncertain relationship with the United States and its neighbors.

In that sense, the funeral conveyed two realities simultaneously. It demonstrated that the Islamic Republic survived a conflict that many believed threatened its very existence and retained the capacity to mobilize state institutions, regional partners, and significant public support. At the same time, it marked the beginning of a new and uncertain chapter whose long-term stability will depend not on the symbolism of Ali Khamenei’s funeral, but on whether Iran’s new leadership can successfully navigate the profound domestic and international challenges that lie ahead.

Renewed U.S.–Iran Military Conflict Raises Risks of Regional War While Leaving Diplomacy on Life Support

Published July 9, 2026

Yesterday saw a second consecutive night of large-scale U.S. airstrikes inside Iran, Iranian retaliation against U.S. military facilities across the Gulf, and an unprecedented disruption of commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The latest escalation has significantly weakened the fragile Memorandum of Understanding framework that had reduced hostilities only weeks earlier. Despite increasingly intense military operations, a diplomatic pathway may not have been completely abandoned.

According to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), American forces conducted two waves of strikes over two nights, targeting approximately 170 military sites across Iran. The targets reportedly included air defense systems, coastal surveillance equipment, missile and drone storage facilities, naval assets, military logistics infrastructure, and more than sixty Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) fast attack boats positioned along Iran’s southern coastline. Washington stated that the operations were carried out in response to attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and were intended to further degrade Iran’s ability to threaten international maritime traffic and civilian vessels.

Iranian officials, however, argued that the campaign extended well beyond military objectives. In addition to attacks reported near Bandar Abbas, Chabahar, Bushehr, Ahvaz, Qeshm, Kharg Island, Abu Musa, Sirik, and Iranshahr, Iranian authorities accused the United States of striking civilian and dual-use infrastructure, including commercial port facilities, airport infrastructure, and railway networks. Iran’s Ministry of Health reported 14 fatalities and 78 injuries over two days of U.S. attacks, while provincial officials announced additional casualties in Sirik, Ahvaz, and Iranshahr. Tehran condemned the strikes as war crimes, arguing that they violated both the United Nations Charter and the Memorandum of Understanding that had served as the basis for ending the previous phase of hostilities.

One of the most strategically significant developments was the apparent expansion of U.S. targeting to include Iran’s railway infrastructure. Iranian authorities reported that a U.S. cruise missile struck the Aq-Takkeh Khan railway bridge in Golestan Province, damaging part of the rail corridor linking Iran with Turkmenistan and onward to Russia and Central Asia. Additional railway infrastructure near Kashmar in Razavi Khorasan Province was also reportedly hit, disrupting traffic along the important Tehran–Mashhad railway corridor.

The attack on the Aq-Takkeh Khan railway bridge may be particularly consequential. Located only about 40 kilometers from the Turkmenistan border, the railway has reportedly become, since late 2025, an increasingly important corridor for freight traffic and petrochemical exports between Iran and Russia, while also serving as a key component of Iran’s expanding eastward trade links with Central Asia.

Seen in this context, the strikes appear intended to send a broader strategic message. By targeting transportation infrastructure connected to Iran’s northern trade corridors, Washington may be signaling that the Strait of Hormuz is not the only strategic chokepoint in this confrontation. If Tehran seeks to leverage the Strait of Hormuz to pressure global energy markets, the United States can in turn threaten Iran’s alternative trade and logistics routes linking it to Russia, Turkmenistan, and the wider Eurasian region. Whether or not this was the primary objective, the strikes suggest that Washington is attempting to demonstrate that it possesses escalation options beyond the Persian Gulf and will not easily tolerate prolonged disruption of one of the world’s most important maritime corridors.

Iran responded by broadening its retaliation against U.S. military assets across the region. Iranian military statements claimed missile and drone attacks against U.S.-linked facilities in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Jordan, including Patriot missile batteries, fuel depots, satellite and early-warning infrastructure, and major American military installations. Regional governments confirmed multiple interceptions of missiles and drones, while Bahrain activated nationwide warning sirens, Kuwait announced the interception of four missiles and ten drones, and Jordan declared a heightened state of military readiness after intercepting projectiles crossing its airspace.

Equally notable is the pattern of countries that have not been targeted. Despite repeated attacks against U.S. facilities in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Jordan, the United Arab Emirates has remained largely untouched, even though it hosts significant American military assets and would ordinarily be viewed as a likely target in a wider regional confrontation. This continued restraint strengthens speculation that some form of tacit understanding, deconfliction mechanism, or quiet political arrangement may exist between Tehran and Abu Dhabi. While no public evidence confirms such an agreement, Iran’s selective targeting indicates that its retaliation remains carefully calibrated rather than indiscriminate. The UAE’s gradual rapprochement with Iran after the war may have created channels that both sides see value in preserving, even amid escalating conflict elsewhere in the region. It remains unclear whether this dynamic will last if the conflict continues.

Shipping data and industry reports indicated that tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz nearly came to a standstill, with only a handful of vessels reportedly transiting the waterway while many commercial ships disabled public tracking systems because of security concerns. The IRGC Navy simultaneously declared that it remained responsible for managing security in the Strait and warned that further U.S. military intervention would disrupt the gradual reopening of maritime traffic. Whether the Strait is formally closed or simply considered too dangerous for normal navigation, the practical effect has been the same: insurers, shipping companies, and global energy markets increasingly regard one of the world’s most important energy corridors as an active conflict zone. Oil prices responded immediately, with Brent crude rising toward $80 per barrel, reflecting renewed concerns over disruptions to global energy supplies.

President Donald Trump has attempted to frame the military campaign in a way that limits perceptions of a broader war. Despite authorizing one of the largest U.S. strike operations against Iran, he insisted that the confrontation “is not a war,” but rather an effort to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons while repeating his assertion that his administration has ended multiple wars. At the same time, Trump claimed that Iranian officials had recently contacted Washington and were “very eager” to reach an agreement, while questioning whether they could ultimately be trusted to honor one.

Taken together, Trump’s messaging appears carefully calibrated to pursue two objectives simultaneously. First, by portraying the conflict as a limited military operation rather than an open-ended war, the administration is likely seeking to reassure financial markets, regional allies, and energy traders that the United States does not intend to become entangled in another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict. Such messaging is particularly important at a moment when uncertainty surrounding the Strait of Hormuz has immediate consequences for global energy prices and financial stability. Second, Trump’s repeated references to Iran’s willingness to negotiate suggest that Washington deliberately wishes to keep diplomatic options alive even while dramatically increasing military pressure. This reflects a strategy of using military escalation to strengthen bargaining leverage rather than end the diplomatic track altogether.

Iranian officials have responded by sharply condemning both the military operations and Trump’s rhetoric. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi rejected Trump’s language, while senior Iranian officials argued that the President’s remarks had effectively narrowed the political space for renewed negotiations. 

Structurally, both sides are incentivized to keep the possibility of negotiations alive. Iran continues to face severe economic pressures that cannot be truly resolved without sanctions relief, while the United States has significant reasons to avoid a prolonged regional conflict that could destabilize global energy markets amid shortages, threaten key regional partners, and require a sustained military commitment. Yet, this logic has not meant that the parties can sustain any pivot toward peace, with repeated breaches of commitments to abstain from military action.

The latest escalation demonstrates that the confrontation has evolved well beyond disputes over Iran’s nuclear program or isolated incidents involving commercial shipping. The United States appears to be signaling that if Iran threatens global maritime commerce through the Strait of Hormuz, Washington is prepared to impose costs on Iran’s broader strategic infrastructure, including transportation corridors connecting the country to Russia and Central Asia. Iran, for its part, has demonstrated both an ability to expand retaliation across multiple regional theaters and a willingness to exercise selective restraint toward certain regional actors, most notably the United Arab Emirates.

Once again, military escalation and diplomatic signaling are occurring simultaneously. For now, both Washington and Tehran are attempting to improve their negotiating positions through the use of force while avoiding actions that would make diplomacy politically impossible. Whether this strategy succeeds will depend largely on whether continued retaliation overtakes the remaining incentives for restraint and whether regional mediators – including Pakistan, Qatar, Oman, and other Gulf states – can preserve channels for dialogue before the crisis evolves into a broader regional war. Although the ceasefire framework is now under extraordinary strain, the continued signaling from both capitals suggests that it has not yet become entirely irreparable.

U.S.–Iran Ceasefire Under Severe Strain as Fighting Returns to the Persian Gulf, Threatening Regional Stability and Global Energy Markets

Published July 8, 2026

Not even three weeks into implementation, the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding less than three weeks ago is under severe strain and at risk of collapse. A new round of military exchanges triggered by disputes in the Strait of Hormuz has placed the agreement under unprecedented pressure, although neither side has formally abandoned the memorandum and regional mediators continue working to preserve a diplomatic path. The renewed confrontation has expanded beyond maritime incidents to include U.S. airstrikes inside Iran, Iranian missile and drone attacks against U.S. military facilities, the reimposition of oil sanctions, and increasingly confrontational rhetoric from leaders on both sides. Together, a return to a broader regional conflict is nearer than ever, threatening global energy security, freedom of navigation, and the future of U.S.–Iran diplomacy.

At the time of publication, initial reports indicate that Iran is under attack for a second straight night, including expansions of strikes on Iran’s Chabahar port. While events are not yet clear, it appears highly likely that the U.S. is conducting further strikes, with Iranian retaliation likely to follow.

The immediate crisis began after three commercial vessels were reportedly attacked while transiting or approaching the Strait of Hormuz. According to maritime monitoring organizations and regional governments, the vessels included the Qatari LNG carrier Al Rekayyat, the Saudi tanker Wadiyan, and the Liberian-flagged tanker Cyprus Prosperity. Qatar and Saudi Arabia publicly attributed the attacks to Iran, while Tehran has denied responsibility. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) condemned the attacks, warning that thousands of civilian seafarers remain exposed to growing risks in one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors and calling for maximum restraint to protect international navigation.

The attacks have had an immediate impact on global shipping. Commercial tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has fallen sharply as shipping companies reassess security risks. According to shipping analytics cited by international media, only a handful of tankers transited the Strait during the day, reflecting a dramatic slowdown in commercial traffic. While navigation has not completely stopped, the decline illustrates the growing reluctance of commercial operators to enter an increasingly volatile maritime environment.

Late Tuesday, the United States canceled a waiver allowing Iran to sell oil openly and launched one of its largest military operations against Iran since the ceasefire was announced. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) stated that American forces struck more than 80 military targets across southern Iran, including air-defense systems, command-and-control facilities, coastal radar installations, anti-ship missile sites, and dozens of IRGC fast attack boats positioned around the Strait of Hormuz. According to CENTCOM, the operation was intended to reduce Iran’s ability to threaten commercial shipping following what Washington described as attacks on international vessels. President Donald Trump later said that U.S. forces had destroyed 28 Iranian boats during the operation and warned that additional strikes could follow, although that specific figure has not been independently verified.

Iranian media simultaneously reported numerous explosions across Bandar Abbas, Sirik, Qeshm, Bushehr, and Mahshahr. Tasnim News Agency reported multiple explosions around Sirik, while IRNA confirmed repeated explosions in Bandar Abbas, Qeshm, and surrounding coastal areas. Iran’s Army later announced that eight members of its Air Force and Navy were killed during the strikes in Bandar Abbas and Bushehr, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) separately confirmed the death of one of its personnel near Mahshahr.

The revocation of the temporary sanctions waiver that had allowed Iran to resume limited oil exports under the memorandum of understanding is arguably just as consequential. The waiver had temporarily permitted Iran to export crude oil, petroleum products, and petrochemicals while repatriating foreign currency revenues through the Central Bank of Iran. Although originally expected to remain in place for two months, the U.S. Treasury shortened the arrangement following the attacks on commercial shipping, while allowing transactions already underway to conclude by July 17. U.S. officials described the agreement as performance-based, arguing that Iran would benefit economically only if it complied with its commitments and refrained from threatening international navigation.

Tehran strongly rejected Washington’s narrative, arguing that the United States – not Iran – had repeatedly violated the memorandum before the latest military exchanges. Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi argued that revoking the temporary oil-export waiver constituted a “flagrant violation” of Article 10 of the agreement, while the U.S. military strikes represented serious violations of Articles 1 and 2. He further asserted that continued Israeli military operations in Lebanon, supported by Washington, together with repeated American threats against Iran, had already breached the agreement several times during the preceding weeks. Iran’s Foreign Ministry similarly condemned the restoration of oil sanctions as evidence of “bad faith, instability, and the unreliability of the U.S. government,” warning that Washington would bear responsibility for the consequences of repeatedly violating the memorandum.

Parliament Speaker and Iran’s lead negotiator Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf delivered one of Tehran’s strongest political responses, declaring that “the era of bullying and extortion is over” and insisting that “we do not back down, and we do not retreat.” Qalibaf – who has been criticized by some hardliners for his role in brokering the agreement – argued that the United States had violated the memorandum by interfering with Iran’s maritime arrangements in the Strait of Hormuz, restoring oil sanctions, launching military strikes against southern Iran, and allowing continued Israeli military operations in Lebanon. According to Qalibaf, these actions demonstrated that Washington expected Iran to continue implementing the agreement while abandoning its own obligations. He therefore portrayed Iran’s military actions as responses to repeated American violations rather than the initial escalation.

President Masoud Pezeshkian echoed this position. In a statement posted on X, he accused the United States of continuing its longstanding policy of “breaking the rules, bullying competitors, creating obstacles, and cheating,” adding that Iran “will not accept such behavior and will firmly defend its rights.” His statement framed Iran’s military response as an act of national self-defense rather than an attempt to widen the conflict.

The dispute over the Strait of Hormuz has become the central issue underlying the renewed confrontation. Iranian officials argue that the memorandum recognized Tehran’s authority to manage future navigation arrangements through the Strait and maintain maritime safety. According to Iran, commercial vessels should use the Iranian-designated shipping corridor, while ships using alternative routes near Oman or disabling or manipulating their Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders create navigational hazards and undermine agreed maritime arrangements. After Oman discussed establishing a temporary alternative shipping corridor, seemingly at the behest of Washington, Iranian officials warned that only the Iranian-designated route should be considered safe, indicating that vessels ignoring those arrangements could face enforcement measures.

As tensions escalated further, Iranian officials and state media issued increasingly forceful warnings regarding Tehran’s future response. Iranian media, citing informed security sources, reported that Iran had adopted a new military doctrine under which any future U.S. strike would immediately trigger the complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz and retaliation against at least two enemy targets for every Iranian target struck. Iranian military officials also warned that any country assisting future U.S. military operations against Iran could itself become a legitimate military target. Separately, Ebrahim Rezaei, spokesperson for the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, said that withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and reconsidering Iran’s nuclear doctrine could be considered if Iran faced what officials described as an existential threat following another U.S. attack. He added that Iran would respond to any renewed U.S. military action “with all its capabilities.”

Iran subsequently announced missile and drone strikes against 85 U.S.-related military targets in Bahrain and Kuwait Tuesday evening, including facilities associated with the U.S. Fifth Fleet, Port Salman, and Ali Al Salem Air Base. Kuwait reported intercepting ballistic missiles and drones, while Bahrain activated air-raid warning systems. Iran also claimed to have shot down an American MQ-9 Reaper drone, although the full extent of damage remains unconfirmed.

President Donald Trump delivered mixed signals about the future of the conflict. Speaking earlier today, President Trump warned that the United States was prepared to conduct additional strikes against Iran if necessary and stating that he no longer wished to negotiate with Tehran, he also said he did not expect the war to resume on a prolonged basis, telling reporters that “I don’t think the war is going to start again” and that “whatever happens will happen very quickly.” At the same time, U.S. officials indicated that additional military operations against Iranian targets remain under consideration should hostilities continue.

The confrontation has also strained relations between Iran and several Gulf states. Qatar summoned Iran’s chargé d’affaires and delivered a formal diplomatic protest after its LNG carrier was targeted, describing the incident as a serious violation of international maritime safety, a direct threat to global energy security, and a clear breach of international law. Saudi Arabia similarly condemned the reported attack on its tanker. Iran responded by urging Qatar not to take actions inconsistent with the memorandum while insisting that Tehran remained committed to ensuring maritime safety under navigation arrangements coordinated with Iran.

Financial markets reacted immediately to the renewed conflict. Brent crude oil prices rose by more than 5 percent, while major U.S. stock indexes declined and European markets experienced sharp losses. Because roughly one-fifth of global oil and LNG trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, even limited disruptions immediately affect global energy prices, shipping costs, insurance premiums, and financial markets.

The latest escalation has placed the ceasefire framework under extraordinary pressure, but it has not necessarily eliminated the possibility of diplomacy. Washington and Tehran continue to accuse one another of violating the memorandum, yet both also frame their military and economic actions as responses to the other side’s alleged breaches, rather than formally withdrawing from the agreement itself. Meanwhile, regional mediators—including Qatar and other countries involved in facilitating the original understanding—continue efforts to prevent the current crisis from evolving into a sustained regional war. Whether the ceasefire can ultimately survive will likely depend on whether both sides choose continued military escalation or return to negotiations in the days ahead. For now, protecting civilian shipping, preserving freedom of navigation, avoiding direct confrontation between U.S. and Iranian forces, and sustaining diplomatic engagement remain essential to preventing a wider and potentially far more destructive regional conflict.

Strait of Hormuz Attacks Trigger Revocation of Oil Waivers, Threatening Shaky Peace

Published July 7, 2026

The Strait of Hormuz has once again become one of the world’s most dangerous maritime flashpoints after at least three commercial vessels were reportedly attacked near the strategic waterway. Washington has responded by revoking its general license allowing Iran to sell oil in line with the Memorandum of Understanding, arguably the most tangible benefit Iran has received to date under the deal. That move is likely to provoke sharp responses from Iran and could snowball into a crisis. Unless resolved soon, disputes over maritime control, freedom of navigation, and the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding itself risk returning the U.S., Iran and Israel to a state of war.

According to U.S. officials, Iran fired at least two missiles toward commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz on Monday and a third on Tuesday morning, causing significant damage to the vessels but without casualties. UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that one of the vessels was struck east of Lima, Oman, on its port side by an unidentified projectile, causing a fire. 

Reuters later reported that one of the damaged vessels was a Qatari liquefied natural gas (LNG) carrier. According to three informed sources, the crew was evacuated after the ship transmitted a distress signal following the strike. Reuters also reported that the vessel had suffered significant damage and was at risk of explosion, raising the stakes of the incident far beyond a routine maritime security episode. It marked the first reported attack on a Qatari LNG carrier since the start of the U.S.-Israel-Iran war. Qatar, alongside Oman and Pakistan, has played an important intermediary role in communications between Tehran and Washington and sent senior officials to participate in the funeral ceremony for the late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

The diplomatic fallout was immediate. Qatar condemned the attack on its LNG carrier and formally held Iran legally responsible. Majed Al Ansari, spokesperson for Qatar’s Foreign Ministry, described the targeting of the Qatari vessel as “an unacceptable attack on the safety and security of international navigation” and said Doha considers Iran fully legally responsible for the attack and for any damages or consequences arising from it. Tehran had not publicly responded to Qatar’s accusation at the time of writing. Reuters also reported that a Saudi tanker was damaged off the coast of Oman, although the exact circumstances remain under investigation.

The U.S. has subsequently moved to revoke the general license allowing Iran to sell oil and petroleum-based products. According to a senior U.S. official, “As President Trump and the administration have repeatedly affirmed, the MOU in effect with Iran is entirely performance-based. Iran will only reap benefits if they exhibit good behavior. Iran’s actions in the Strait were wholly unacceptable to the United States and will be met with consequences. Our negotiators continue to work in good faith towards a final deal.” Yet, this is a highly consequential move and may trigger further Iranian retaliation, particularly given past American steps to renege on sanctions relief obligations in past agreements.

The attacks occurred amid a deepening dispute over who has the authority to regulate maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran insists that vessels should use the navigation corridor designated by Tehran, while a separate southern route closer to Omani waters is supported by Washington and some international shipping interests. Tehran views that southern corridor as a red line, arguing that it violates the “Iranian arrangements” it believes are embedded in the June 18 Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding.

This dispute reflects a broader clash over the interpretation of the MOU. Iran’s interpretation is that the memorandum effectively recognizes Tehran’s central role in controlling and managing security arrangements in the Strait of Hormuz. In this reading, the lifting of the U.S.-backed maritime blockade and the regulation of shipping lanes must occur within an Iranian-defined framework. By contrast, Oman’s initiative, supported by the United States, appears to seek a more internationalized or alternative navigation arrangement that reduces reliance on Iranian-designated routes. This has turned the southern route near Oman into one of Tehran’s clearest postwar red lines.

Reflecting that position, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, a member of Iran’s parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, warned that “any action in the Strait of Hormuz without coordination with Iran is doomed to fail.” He added that decisions regarding a change in the governing regime of the Strait had been made at the “highest levels of the system” and would be implemented. Boroujerdi also said Iran’s Parliament is pursuing legislation on the “management of the Strait of Hormuz,” signaling an attempt to formalize Iran’s claim to a more direct role in regulating passage through the waterway.

The maritime crisis has also intersected with escalating political threats. Before the latest attack, President Donald Trump warned that the United States would either reach an agreement with Iran or “finish the job,” while threatening that U.S. forces could target Iran’s bridges, power grid, and other critical infrastructure if diplomacy fails. Although these remarks preceded the attack on the Qatari LNG carrier, they contributed to the coercive atmosphere surrounding the negotiations.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi responded by saying that final negotiations cannot begin as long as threats against Iran continue. Referring to Article 13 of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, Araghchi said the provision is clear: final-status talks will not begin while Iran remains under threat. He called on Washington to honor its signature and said neither the Iranian people nor Iran’s armed forces are intimidated by threats.

This creates a dangerous diplomatic and military test. Iran is certain to respond to the revocation of its sanctions relief, while the U.S. may contemplate further steps including military strikes on Iranian soil. A vicious cycle could easily take hold that threatens the MOU as a whole.

The conflict is no longer simply about whether ships can pass through the Strait, but about sovereignty, maritime governance, and Iran’s desire to preserve the Strait of Hormuz as one of its most important bargaining chips in negotiations with Washington. Oman’s southern corridor initiative, therefore, has become more than a technical navigation proposal; it has become a challenge to Iran’s leverage.

The attacks have already begun affecting global energy markets. Oil prices rose more than 2%, tanker freight rates climbed, and commercial shipping companies began reassessing transit through the Strait as concerns over maritime security intensified.

The crisis now combines threats to global energy security, competing interpretations of the June 18 MOU, regional diplomatic fallout with Qatar, and uncertainty over whether Iran or the United States will respond militarily. Without urgent deconfliction, clearer maritime rules, and a renewed diplomatic channel, conflict in the Strait Hormuz could quickly transform a fragile postwar arrangement into a broader regional crisis.

Iran’s Direct Flight to Sana’a: Breaking the Yemen Blockade or Opening a New Chapter in Regional Competition?

Published July 6, 2026

The arrival of a Mahan Air flight from Tehran to Sana’a on July 3, following the signing of an air transport agreement between Iranian and Houthi-controlled Yemeni aviation authorities, represents one of the most consequential developments in the Yemen conflict in years. The flight, which reportedly traveled through Omani airspace and returned to Tehran several hours later, was followed by competing narratives, mutual threats, and renewed concerns that Yemen could once again become a major arena of regional competition.

The flight was historic not simply because it was a direct connection between Iran and Houthi-controlled Yemen, but because it appears to have been the first publicly acknowledged international flight into Sana’a outside the Saudi-led coalition’s framework since the coalition intervention began in 2015. Its significance therefore extends well beyond aviation or humanitarian access and touches directly on questions of sovereignty, regional influence, deterrence, and the emerging security order in the Middle East.

From the perspective of the Houthis (Ansar Allah) and Iran, the flight represents an effort to challenge what they describe as a long-standing blockade that has isolated millions of Yemenis living in Houthi-controlled territories. Houthi officials stated that the aircraft transported patients, wounded civilians, and stranded Yemenis and characterized Saudi efforts to prevent the landing as a continuation of policies that have contributed to Yemen’s humanitarian crisis. They have argued that reopening regular flights between Sana’a and Tehran is both a humanitarian necessity and an assertion of their political legitimacy as the de facto governing authority over much of northern and western Yemen.

For Tehran, the operation also carries broader strategic significance. Since the recent regional war, Iran has sought to demonstrate that the “Axis of Resistance” remains operational and capable of maintaining strategic depth across the region. Reestablishing direct access to Sana’a would strengthen Iran’s ties with one of its most important regional partners while signaling that Tehran remains capable of projecting influence despite years of sanctions, military pressure, and diplomatic isolation. From this perspective, the flight was not merely a logistical operation but also a political statement about Iran’s continuing regional role.

At the same time, the internationally recognized Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia view the same development through a fundamentally different strategic lens. Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council convened an emergency meeting immediately after the flight and condemned it as a violation of Yemeni sovereignty, arguing that only the internationally-recognized government possesses the legal authority to regulate the country’s airspace and international transportation links. Saudi-backed Yemeni officials further alleged that the flight may have transported Iranian advisers and personnel, although independent confirmation of these claims remains unavailable.

For Saudi Arabia, the issue extends beyond Yemen itself. Since launching its intervention in 2015, Riyadh has viewed limiting Iranian influence on the Arabian Peninsula as a central national security objective. The prospect of regular direct flights between Iran and Houthi-controlled Yemen raises concerns in Riyadh that Tehran could establish a more permanent logistical, political, or military presence near Saudi Arabia’s southern border and adjacent to the strategically vital Red Sea corridor. Saudi officials and coalition representatives therefore see the flight not as an isolated humanitarian initiative but as a potential challenge to the regional security architecture that has existed for more than a decade.

The strategic importance of the issue is amplified by geography. The Houthis control Sana’a, the port of Hodeidah, and much of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline, placing them near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. For Iran and its allies, maintaining influence in Yemen provides strategic leverage over a second critical international shipping route. For Saudi Arabia, Gulf states, Israel, and the United States, preventing any single adversarial power from consolidating control over these corridors remains a core security objective.

The timing of the flight also carries symbolic significance. It occurred on the same day that Saudi representatives traveled to Tehran to participate in funeral ceremonies for former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, highlighting the complex reality of contemporary Middle Eastern diplomacy: regional rivals are simultaneously pursuing diplomatic engagement and strategic competition.

The immediate danger is that both sides may interpret restraint as weakness. The Houthis have warned that future attempts to prevent flights into Sana’a could result in attacks on Saudi airports and critical infrastructure, while the Saudi-led coalition has threatened to respond with “unprecedented force” to any threats against Saudi territory or Yemeni sovereignty. Such mutual deterrence dynamics have repeatedly escalated into broader conflicts throughout the region.

From a policy perspective, the challenge is not simply determining which side’s legal or political claims are stronger, but preventing Yemen from becoming the catalyst for another regional confrontation. A sustainable approach would likely require acknowledging the legitimate interests and concerns of all parties: humanitarian access and political recognition concerns raised by the Houthis and Iran; sovereignty and security concerns raised by the internationally-recognized Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia; and broader international concerns regarding regional stability and maritime security.

One potential path forward could involve internationally monitored civilian air corridors into Sana’a, including independent inspections of passengers and cargo, transparent reporting mechanisms, and renewed diplomatic engagement on a broader political settlement in Yemen. Such arrangements would not resolve the underlying political conflict, but they could reduce the risk that disputes over access, sovereignty, and influence trigger another cycle of regional escalation.

Ultimately, the dispute over a single flight between Tehran and Sana’a reflects a larger question confronting the Middle East after the recent war: whether the region’s emerging order will be shaped primarily through competition and deterrence, or through negotiated arrangements that accommodate the core security interests of rival regional powers. The answer to that question may determine not only the future of Yemen, but the trajectory of the broader Middle East for years to come.

Shahrnush Parsipur (1946–2026): The Writer Who Refused to Belong to Power

Published July 6, 2026

The death of Shahrnush Parsipur in San Francisco marks the passing of one of the most influential, independent, and courageous voices in modern Iranian literature. Over a career spanning more than six decades, Parsipur produced some of the most important works of contemporary Persian fiction while enduring censorship, imprisonment, and exile under two different political systems. Yet throughout her life, she remained committed to intellectual independence and the belief that freedom could neither be granted by governments nor sacrificed to ideology.

Earlier this year, international attention returned to Parsipur’s literary legacy when the English translation of her celebrated novel Women Without Men was included on the longlist for the 2026 International Booker Prize. The recognition served as a reminder that although Parsipur spent much of her life marginalized by political authorities in Iran, her work ultimately transcended national boundaries and became part of the global literary canon.

Born in Tehran in February 1946 and raised partly in Khorramshahr, Parsipur grew up in a household where books and intellectual curiosity occupied a central place. She later recalled that from adolescence onward, writing became the defining purpose of her life. Her literary talent emerged early, with her first published short story appearing while she was still a teenager.

After moving to Tehran for higher education, Parsipur studied social sciences while pursuing an increasingly serious literary career. She briefly married acclaimed filmmaker Nasser Taghvai, but later reflected that neither of them was suited for conventional family life. The marriage ended after several years, and Parsipur devoted herself almost entirely to literature and intellectual work.

Long before the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Parsipur had already demonstrated a willingness to challenge political authority. In 1974, following the execution of dissident intellectuals Khosrow Golsorkhi and Keramat Daneshian, she resigned from her position at Iran’s national television organization in protest against arbitrary arrests and executions. Although she rejected ideological labels and did not align herself with organized political movements, she believed that defending individual liberty and human dignity was a personal responsibility.

Her commitment to independent thought came at a significant personal cost. During the final years of the Pahlavi monarchy, she was detained by the security services and imprisoned for 54 days without formal charges or trial. Although she was eventually released, the experience profoundly shaped her understanding of political repression and state power.

Following a period of depression and economic hardship, Parsipur traveled to France to continue her studies. Before leaving Iran, however, she completed her novel The Dog and the Long Winter, one of the earliest major novels written by an Iranian woman in the modern era. The work explored the social and emotional realities of middle-class Iranian life and helped establish Parsipur as an important literary figure.

During the revolutionary upheavals of 1978 and 1979, Parsipur remained skeptical of political absolutism and collective certainty. Even while interviewing revolutionary figures in France, she maintained a critical distance from political movements and insisted on preserving individual moral judgment. Nevertheless, she decided to return to Iran after the revolution, believing that a writer’s identity could only fully emerge within her own society and language.

That decision would dramatically alter the course of her life. In the early years of the Islamic Republic, amid widespread political repression, Parsipur was arrested and imprisoned for more than four years. The psychological effects of imprisonment remained with her throughout her life, but the experience also became an important source of literary inspiration.

One of the works that emerged from this period was Touba and the Meaning of Night, widely regarded as one of the masterpieces of modern Persian literature. Drawing partly on the life of her grandmother, the novel traced the experiences of an Iranian woman across decades of political and social transformation. Upon publication, the novel achieved extraordinary popularity and established Parsipur as one of Iran’s most significant contemporary writers.

Her international reputation, however, rests most prominently on Women Without Men, a novel that combined magical realism, social criticism, and feminist themes to explore the lives of five Iranian women confronting various forms of oppression and exclusion. Through its rich symbolism and innovative narrative structure, the novel challenged conventional understandings of gender, sexuality, and power in Iranian society.

The book’s success also triggered one of the most difficult periods of Parsipur’s life. Religious conservatives launched a coordinated campaign against both the novel and its author. The book was banned, publishers abandoned her work, and Parsipur was arrested once again. Eventually, she was effectively barred from publishing in Iran. Previously published books were censored, altered, or withdrawn from circulation altogether, forcing her into a second and ultimately permanent exile.

After emigrating to the United States, Parsipur continued writing despite financial hardship and personal struggles. In exile, she remained intellectually active through literature, translation, radio programs, podcasts, and her support for younger generations of Iranian writers and artists. Although she lived thousands of miles from Iran, she never ceased to engage with Iranian society, culture, and politics.

Throughout her years abroad, Parsipur repeatedly expressed a desire to return to Iran but concluded that economic realities, health concerns, and the country’s restrictive social environment made such a return impossible. Her reflections on exile often combined personal sorrow with broader observations about the social and economic difficulties faced by ordinary Iranians.

Parsipur’s literary legacy reached a new international audience in 2009, when Iranian-American artist and filmmaker Shirin Neshat adapted Women Without Men into an acclaimed feature film. The film, which included an appearance by Parsipur herself, won the Silver Lion for Best Director at the Venice Film Festival and introduced her work to audiences around the world.

One of Parsipur’s final public interventions reflected the same independent spirit that had characterized her entire life. In a video statement released during the recent military conflict involving Iran, she strongly opposed foreign military intervention, arguing that freedom could not be imposed from outside. She declared:

“How can a people become free through the attack of two countries on another country? I strongly oppose this attack. I am deeply angered that the people of Iran are being killed in the streets and under the rain of missiles. I do not believe this will help Iran. I call upon the United States and Israel to stop attacking Iran. Freedom cannot be given to Iran from outside. The people of Iran themselves must win their own freedom.”

Shahrnush Parsipur spent her life resisting easy categorizations and refusing political patronage. She was imprisoned under both monarchy and republic, censored by both secular and religious authorities, and lived much of her life in exile. Yet through literature and through the example of her own life, she remained steadfast in defending the values of freedom, dignity, and intellectual independence that defined her extraordinary legacy.

The National Iranian American Council (NIAC) mourns the passing of Shahrnush Parsipur, whose life and work embodied the enduring struggle for freedom of expression, intellectual independence, and human dignity. Parsipur’s extraordinary literary contributions helped shape not only modern Iranian literature, but also the cultural and political consciousness of generations of Iranians and Iranian Americans. Her unwavering commitment to speaking truth to power—whether confronting authoritarianism, censorship, or war—will remain an inspiration to all who believe in justice and freedom. We extend our deepest condolences to her family, friends, colleagues, readers, and admirers around the world, as well as to the broader Iranian-American community, which proudly embraced her as one of its most distinguished cultural voices. Her words, courage, and humanity will continue to resonate long after her passing.

Khamenei’s Funeral Becomes a Stage for Mourning, Power Projection, and Political Messaging

Published July 6, 2026

The ongoing funeral ceremonies for Ali Khamenei, held four months after his killing in U.S.-Israeli strikes on February 28, 2026, have evolved into one of the most significant political and symbolic events in the history of the Islamic Republic. Through the large-scale mourning ceremonies in Tehran and the planned commemorations and burial events in Qom, Iraq, and Mashhad, the Iranian leadership has sought to project an image of national unity, regime continuity, regional influence, and political resilience in the aftermath of the war.

In Tehran, the main procession began at the Mosalla and was planned to continue for more than 10 hours along a roughly 10-kilometer route to Azadi Square. Authorities imposed extensive traffic restrictions in Tehran, Qom, and Mashhad, while state media emphasized images of vast crowds, red flags, and chants calling for “revenge” against the United States and Israel. The coffins of Khamenei and four members of his family who were killed alongside him in the February 28 strikes were transported on a specially designed ceremonial vehicle and accompanied by large crowds carrying portraits, religious symbols, and anti-American and anti-Israeli slogans.

Despite extraordinary official claims regarding attendance, there remains no independent assessment capable of verifying the size of the crowd. Iranian officials estimated participation between 12 and 20 million, while government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani suggested that attendance exceeded 15 million people. Such figures should be treated with caution. Nevertheless, regardless of the precise numbers, the Islamic Republic appears to have succeeded in achieving one of its principal political objectives: projecting an image of mass domestic support, political continuity, and national resilience. The funeral demonstrated that the government continues to possess a substantial and highly mobilizable social base, capable of producing large-scale public displays of loyalty and support.

This message appears to have been recognized even by some of the Islamic Republic’s principal adversaries. Speaking to Axios, U.S. President Donald Trump said he was surprised by scenes of mourning during the funeral ceremonies. “I was surprised to see some Iranians crying,” he said, adding that he had believed that “people hated Khamenei.” Trump then suggested that the displays of grief might not have been genuine, remarking: “Maybe those tears were not real.” 

Similarly, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu acknowledged that, despite his belief that most Iranians oppose the Islamic Republic, the regime still retains a significant social base. “Iran is a country of about 90 million people. Around 80 percent of them hate this regime and would like to see it destroyed. But even so, there are still several million people — a minority — that they can bring into the streets,” Netanyahu stated. Referring to funeral chants of “Death to America,” “Death to Trump,” and “Death to Netanyahu,” he argued that these demonstrators represented “the face of the minority that has taken power and has held the talented people of Iran hostage.” While both leaders questioned the representativeness or authenticity of the mourning scenes, their remarks also implicitly acknowledged that the Islamic Republic was able to stage a substantial and politically significant display of public support.

The ceremonies also highlighted the emerging post-Khamenei leadership structure. Mojtaba Khamenei, who has assumed leadership of the Islamic Republic, was notably absent from the funeral prayer for his father and several family members, even as his brothers Mostafa, Meysam, and Masoud Khamenei appeared in the front row. Shortly afterward, however, a decree attributed to Mojtaba reappointed Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei as head of the judiciary, signaling an effort to project institutional continuity despite his public absence. Speculation regarding Mojtaba’s absence has been fueled by reports that he was seriously wounded in the same attack that killed his father and remains under heavy security protection.

A major political controversy surrounding the funeral was the absence of Iran’s former presidents and other former senior officials. None of Iran’s former presidents attended the official memorial service, and according to criticism raised by Mohammad-Ali Abtahi – former chief of staff to President Mohammad Khatami – they were not formally invited. Abtahi argued that the funeral represented the “most important historical opportunity to demonstrate national cohesion” and criticized organizers for failing to invite former presidents, parliament speakers, ministers, and other political, cultural, and social figures, including individuals who had publicly disagreed with Khamenei during his lifetime. According to Abtahi, such participation could have projected a stronger image of national unity and political reconciliation.

Foreign participation gave the funeral a significant diplomatic dimension. Iranian officials claimed that representatives from nearly 100 countries attended the ceremonies, including at least eight heads of state or government and twelve parliamentary speakers. Senior representatives arrived from Pakistan, Iraq, Tajikistan, Armenia, Russia, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, China, India, Afghanistan, and several Iran-aligned non-state groups. The simultaneous presence of representatives of the Taliban government, the Afghan National Resistance Front, and the Fatemiyoun Brigade illustrated Tehran’s effort to maintain multiple channels of influence within Afghanistan. Delegations from Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi militias, and other members of the so-called “Axis of Resistance” also participated prominently.

One of the most striking and controversial aspects of the ceremonies was the reported recitation of different Quranic verses for different foreign delegations and political figures as they approached Khamenei’s coffin. For the Saudi delegation, organizers reportedly selected Verse 13 of Surah Al-Imran, which describes a battle between believers fighting in the path of God and unbelievers. Observers interpreted this as a symbolic message regarding regional competition and the Islamic Republic’s self-perception as a victorious and divinely-supported actor succeeding despite being outnumbered. For Turkey, organizers reportedly recited Verse 95 of Surah An-Nisa, emphasizing the superiority of those who struggle and fight over those who remain behind. This was interpreted by some observers as a criticism of Ankara’s cautious and shifting regional policies. For Qatar, verses from Surah Al-Fath were reportedly selected, emphasizing forgiveness, divine favor, and the completion of God’s blessing, reflecting Tehran’s relatively positive view of Qatar’s diplomatic and mediating role. For Pakistan, organizers reportedly chose Verse 80 of Surah Al-Isra, which refers to entering and departing with truthfulness. Some observers interpreted this as a signal regarding Islamabad’s role as a mediator between Iran and the United States.

One of the most controversial recitations concerned the family of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, including Hassan Khomeini. For this delegation, organizers reportedly selected Verse 95 of Surah An-Nisa, the same verse contrasting those who remain seated with those who engage in struggle and sacrifice. According to reports, Hassan and other members of the Khomeini family left the platform after hearing the verse, apparently interpreting it as a pointed political message rather than a neutral religious recitation. The incident triggered widespread discussion and criticism within Iran.

For Hamas, the selected verse reportedly praised those who had remained faithful to their covenant with God, including those who had achieved martyrdom and those still awaiting it. For Hezbollah, organizers reportedly recited the verse: “Do not weaken and do not grieve; you will be superior if you are believers,” a clear message of encouragement and continued support. For Ansar Allah (the Houthis), the selected verses reportedly praised steadfast believers who do not weaken in the face of adversity. For Iraq, organizers reportedly selected a verse emphasizing faith without doubt and steadfast commitment, which was interpreted as encouragement to maintain alignment with Tehran and the resistance axis.

These selective Quranic recitations generated criticism among reformist and moderate political figures. Javad Emam, spokesperson for the Reform Front, argued that the Quran should serve as a source of mercy, empathy, and national unity, rather than as an instrument for distinguishing insiders from outsiders. He warned that if reports regarding the intentional selection of verses were correct, such practices would undermine rather than strengthen national cohesion.

The funeral also unfolded against the backdrop of a fragile ceasefire and temporarily suspended U.S.-Iran negotiations. President Trump stated that both sides had agreed to delay negotiations until the funeral ceremonies had concluded. At the same time, both Washington and Tehran continued to signal that a return to military conflict remained possible if negotiations collapsed.

Overall, Khamenei’s funeral became a defining post-war political event for the Islamic Republic. The government used it simultaneously to project mourning, revenge, political continuity, diplomatic relevance, regional influence, and domestic legitimacy. Yet the absence of Mojtaba Khamenei from public ceremonies, the exclusion of former presidents and senior officials, criticism from figures such as Abtahi and Javad Emam, and the controversial use of Quranic verses all suggest that beneath the carefully managed image of unity, Iran’s post-Khamenei political order remains marked by unresolved questions regarding legitimacy, factional balance, and the future direction of the Islamic Republic.

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