Featuring: Curt Mills (Executive Director, The American Conservative), Negar Mortazavi (Senior Fellow, Center for International Policy), Jamal Abdi (President, NIAC) and moderator Ryan Costello (Policy Director, NIAC)
Washington, DC – “I think the strategic case is self-evident: I don’t think an Iran war is necessary or justified for U.S. national security, but I think it’s almost more important to make the political argument that this is bad for Trump.” Those comments were made by Curt Mills, Executive Director of The American Conservative, during a NIAC-hosted briefing for Congressional staff in the Kennedy Caucus Room on Capitol Hill on Wednesday. “Weaponization, War or a Deal? Trump’s High-Stakes Approach Toward Iran” shed a light on U.S.-Iran relations at a critical juncture, when indirect negotiations could soon commence amid rising threats of war.
Mills broke down the dueling camps within the Trump administration, including more diplomacy-minded figures and other neoconservative-linked figures he noted were seeking to “poison pill” the President’s negotiations. “I think it’s very clear that his national security advisor for as long as he lasts in the job, Mr. Waltz, is very much pushing as he said, openly, on the Sunday press shows for complete dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear program.” Mills suggested this would likely be a nonstarter for any figure in Iran and appears intended to undermine chances for negotiations.
Regarding threats to bomb Iran, NIAC President Jamal Abdi made clear that hawks are not intending for strikes to be a one-off. Rather, he noted that strikes could not knock out Iran’s nuclear program on a permanent basis. According to Abdi, Iran’s nuclear program is “dispersed, it’s buried deep,” which means it is “not just a one off bombing campaign, it is a sustained campaign. And even after that campaign is over, think about what Iran does, whether it is responding militarily, whether it is finally kicking out inspectors for good and truly working towards a nuclear weapon, other methods of retaliation. Everybody acknowledges that we would need to go in again and again and again.”
Ryan Costello, NIAC’s Policy Director and the moderator of the discussion, noted that the most recent Worldwide Threat Assessment from the Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, indicated that Iran is not actively pursuing a nuclear weapon. This point was reflected in a recent statement by an advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Larijani, who argued that while Iran is not currently pursuing a nuclear weapon, if there are strikes on Iran’s nuclear program the nation would be forced to move its program toward weaponization.
Negar Mortazavi delved into opinion on Iran, noting that the Iranian government is currently experiencing a “legitimacy crisis.” While noting that there are many different views within Iran, Mortazavi argued that “one of the main grievances” Iranians have toward their government – particularly those who protest it and have heavily criticized it – is the way they are conducting their regional and foreign policy, including relations with the United States. “I find very little Iranians who actually like sanctions, living under economic sanctions or the pressure of sanctions, with the caveat that there is actually a very small elite that profits from the sanctions.”
Abdi addressed the impact of sanctions on internal dynamics in Iran, stating “[t]he sanctions and these military threats have, I believe, distorted the political economy inside Iran and actually benefited the current ruling structure, have securitized the environment there, have hurt civil society and organic movements for representation and democracy and things like that – which is none of our business.” Abdi continued, “When the JCPOA was signed, it wasn’t the reduction in the nuclear program that had Khamenei and hardliners inside of Iran worried, the number one thing that they warned about was the opening up of Iran to engagement with the West. The penetration of Iran by the West. This fear that end of U.S. and international-imposed isolation would actually pose a greater threat to the repression inside of Iran than any external military threat and any sanctions could.”
Looking ahead, Abdi noted that Trump – in campaigning for his first term in office – did not initially suggest that he’d rip up the nuclear deal and criticized it for having no real economic benefits for the United States. If the U.S. and Iran do strike a deal, Abdi argued “if there is a Trump deal, it is likely going to be one that does acknowledge a peaceful nuclear program inside of Iran and has the verification inside of Iran to do that, and create some of that political protection for an agreement by potentially enabling greater engagement between the U.S. and Iran in terms of trade.” Mortazavi, meanwhile, noted that trust building measures are needed on both sides, and that Trump has significant leverage including Iran’s assets which have been restricted as a result of U.S. sanctions. “Honestly, I don’t think President Trump cares too much about the details of the deal…but it just has to be presented and packaged as a better deal.”