

National Iranian American Council (NIAC)

Iran Unfiltered


SPECIAL EDITION

The Destruction of Iran's Civilian Infrastructure:

Economic and Social Consequences of the 2026 War



September 2026



The Destruction of Iran's Civilian Infrastructure: Economic and Social Consequences of the 2026 War

The 2026 Iran War — February 28, 2026 to the Present

A cross-verified analytical report | Primary sources:

International Energy Agency (IEA) · Bloomberg · CNBC · Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) · Associated Press (AP) · Reuters · Al Jazeera · BBC Persian · UN News · Center for American Progress · The Globe and Mail · WarCosts.org · Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS) · Iran News Update · Rystad Energy · Goldman Sachs · International Monetary Fund (IMF) · Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) · Donya-e Eqtesad · Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA) · The New Humanitarian · UNHCR

Introduction: The Legal Standard and What This Report Documents

Civilian infrastructure is protected under international law. Articles 52 through 56 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibit attacks on civilian objects - including economic infrastructure - unless those objects make an effective contribution to military action and their destruction offers a definite military advantage. The proportionality principle further requires that anticipated harm to civilians not be excessive relative to the expected military gain. A state cannot lawfully destroy the infrastructure on which a civilian population depends for survival and livelihood - its water systems, hospitals, food supply chains, power networks, and the industrial base that provides employment - simply because that infrastructure also generates revenue for the government it opposes.

The United Nations has applied this standard directly to the U.S.-Israel war against Iran. Responding to strikes on Iranian bridges and transport hubs, a spokesperson for Secretary-General António Guterres stated that the Secretary-General was deeply concerned about attacks on civilian infrastructure in Iran and across the region, and that “Such attacks are unacceptable.” In a subsequent statement, the UN reiterated that “vital infrastructure on which civilians rely for survival” - including hospitals and water supplies - “must be spared.” The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Médecins Sans Frontières, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights likewise condemned strikes on water facilities, hospitals, and university campuses, even where attacking parties characterized those facilities as “dual-use.” UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk went further, stating that attacks targeting civilian objects or infrastructure indispensable to civilian populations “constitute serious violations of international humanitarian law and amount to war crimes.”¹

That standard applies to all parties. Iranian retaliatory strikes damaged civilian infrastructure across the region - a power and water desalination plant in Kuwait was hit repeatedly, and civilian sites were struck in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Jordan - and killed civilians, among them a child in Kuwait. The Secretary-General's statement addressed attacks on civilian

infrastructure in Iran *and across the region*, and the High Commissioner for Human Rights applied the identical formulation to Iranian strikes on Gulf states and Jordan: attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure must end, and "if they are deliberate, such attacks may constitute war crimes." The Security Council condemned Iran's attacks on its neighbours in Resolution 2817 of June 3, 2026. This report documents damage inside Iran because that is its subject; the legal standard it applies is not one that distinguishes between belligerents, and some of the regional consequences of Iranian strikes are set out in Section XIV.²

This report is the second volume in a series on the impact of the war. Its companion, *Civilian Casualties and Housing Damage in Iran* (NIAC Iran Unfiltered Special Edition, July 16, 2026), documents the war's direct human cost in the first 39 days: as many as 2,362 civilians killed, including 254 to 376 children, more than 26,500 injured, and over 125,000 residential units damaged or destroyed. The present volume documents the destruction of the infrastructure Iranian civilians depended on and traces its economic and social consequences.³

Since February 28, 2026, United States and Israeli forces have conducted sustained air operations against Iran, concentrated in separate waves: an initial 39-day campaign (February 28 – April 8, 2026) and a renewed campaign in July 2026 that included 13 consecutive nights of US strikes across southern Iran. A third campaign of U.S. strikes began on August 30, 2026. Hostilities did not cease between these waves of strikes: the April 8 agreement was a two-week pause announced by Pakistan and later extended. The United States imposed a naval blockade of Iranian ports on April 13, and on May 7 US forces struck Bandar Abbas and Qeshm Island. The blockade was lifted under the Islamabad Memorandum of June 14 and reimposed on July 14. This report treats the period from February 28, 2026 onward as a single continuous conflict of varying intensity, not as separate wars.

Before the renewal of active hostilities in late August, the war had: taken roughly 70 percent of Iran's refining throughput offline at its peak, by one open-source estimate; and — by Israel's own claim — destroyed 70 percent of Iran's steel production capacity; struck more than 80 energy facilities region-wide; damaged 27 of the country's airports, one of them — Bushehr International — destroyed outright; damaged 12 bridges and two tunnels; struck more than 210 health centers and knocked six hospitals out of service - including a children's cancer hospital in Ahvaz rendered inoperable; damaged or destroyed at least 1,288 schools, of which 16 required fundamental reconstruction after direct hits, along with 32 universities; deepened an internet blackout the Iranian government had already imposed during the January 2026 protest crackdown, driving access down to 12 percent of pre-war levels; eliminated more than one million jobs; and pushed food inflation above 100 percent in a country where 40 percent of the population was already below the absolute poverty line. Iran's government has estimated total damage at approximately \$270 billion. The chapters that follow document each of these findings in turn, identify who conducted each strike and what each facility is, and - wherever sources permit - present the human beings behind the numbers.

Evidence, Methodology, and Scope

This report applies a two-tier evidentiary standard. Tier 1 figures are verified by at least two independent sources using distinct methodologies. Tier 2 figures derive from official Iranian government statements or single sources not yet independently audited, and are cited with explicit attribution. All figures should be read as minimum thresholds: the Iranian government's internet blackouts, its restrictions on media access, and its suppression of independent reporting - in place before the war and intensified during it - have constrained documentation throughout. That constraint was described by residents themselves: a Bandar Abbas resident

told *IranWire* that no independent photographer was permitted near the bombed sites, leaving residents to infer what had been hit from the direction of fire and smoke.⁴

Scope: one conflict, separate phases of major operations. Phase I: the initial US-Israeli air campaign of February 28 to April 8, 2026 (the '39-day war'). The ceasefire that followed was partial and repeatedly breached; hostilities continued at lower intensity through the spring, including U.S. strikes on Bandar Abbas and Qeshm Island on May 7. Phase II: intensified warfare in mid-2026, centered on the Strait of Hormuz crisis, including a U.S. campaign of strikes over 13 consecutive nights against targets across southern Iran in July. An additional third phase of the war appears to be underway at the time of publication.

The Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, mediated by Pakistan and signed on June 14, 2026, declared an immediate end to the war, opened a 60-day window for a final agreement, lifted the U.S. naval blockade, authorized the resumption of Iranian oil exports, and committed the United States and regional partners to a reconstruction plan for Iran worth at least \$300 billion. Its economic provisions were not delivered: Iran exported \$6 billion in oil but did not receive the \$12 billion in frozen assets it expected, or any subsequent investments for reconstruction. U.S. strikes resumed on July 8, and on July 18 Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister announced the suspension of Iran's commitments under the memorandum, citing US breaches. No successor agreement had been concluded at the time of publication. Except where noted, damage figures reflect the cumulative effect of the conflict from February 28, 2026, to the time of publication.⁵

Section I: Energy Infrastructure

1.1 Oil, Gas, and Refining

Iran's oil and gas sector - the country's primary source of hard currency - was a principal target of both US and Israeli air campaigns.

Abadan refinery, Khuzestan (early and mid-March 2026): Iran's largest and oldest refinery, with crude processing capacity of 430,000–500,000 barrels per day, supplying approximately one quarter of national fuel demand. Witnesses in Iraq's Basra governorate reported a heavy strike shortly after 1 a.m. local time, with fires visible across the Shatt al-Arab; it was the first reported attack on Iranian petroleum infrastructure of the war. Subsequent reporting cited additional strikes on or near the Abadan refinery in March, although the extent of damage to the facility was not independently established. WarCosts.org, an open-source damage tracker, attributed the taking of 70 percent of national refining capacity offline to a March 19 strike - the single source of the 70 percent figure used throughout this report, which has not been independently corroborated. By September, the Abadan refinery was demonstrably producing and offering petroleum products, although public reporting reviewed for this report does not establish its current crude throughput or whether it has returned to its pre-war processing capacity. More broadly, Iran's oil minister said in early September that a large portion of reconstruction work at oil and gas refining facilities damaged during the war had been completed. He said debris removal had begun within two to three days of the attacks, although he did not provide facility-by-facility capacity figures that would allow independent assessment of how much refining capacity had actually returned to service.⁶

What the 70 percent figure represents. The 70 percent figure should be understood as WarCosts' estimate of refining capacity taken offline at that point in the war, rather than an estimate that 70 percent of Iran's refining infrastructure had been physically destroyed. Iran had ten operating refineries with a combined capacity of roughly 2.6 million barrels per day. Several factors could help explain the scale of the reported disruption: units damaged at Abadan, which accounts for roughly 17 to 19 percent of national refining capacity; strikes on the Lavan Island refinery and fuel-storage facilities associated with the Tehran refinery; the Persian Gulf Star refinery in Bandar Abbas — Iran's largest gasoline producer at 360,000 barrels per day, supplying roughly 35 percent of national gasoline output — starved of the South Pars condensate it receives by pipeline once Asaluyeh was struck, though the refinery itself was never hit; and missile strikes on fuel storage depots in Tehran and Alborz provinces on March 7. The National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC) stated that fuel supply and distribution remained stable and uninterrupted nationwide, and that stocks had been deliberately drawn down in advance to minimize losses - a Tier 2 official claim recorded here for completeness.⁷

Asaluyeh complex (March 18, 2026 - Israeli drone strike): Israeli forces struck gas processing facilities at Asaluyeh, a city on Iran's Persian Gulf coast that serves as the operational center of the South Pars gas field — the world's largest non-associated natural gas reserve, shared between Iran and Qatar. Four gas processing units went offline. Asaluyeh, together with the Bandar Imam Khomeini port complex, accounts for more than 70 percent of Iran's petrochemical production capacity — a separate measure from the refining figure above.

Reconstruction update (September 2026): The scale and duration of the disruption have become clearer as reconstruction has progressed. Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad said war damage had reduced Iran's natural-gas production by approximately 95 million cubic meters per day, concentrated largely at gas-processing facilities in Asaluyeh. Some of the loss was offset by redirecting processing to other refineries. By September, Paknejad said reconstruction was continuing simultaneously at four damaged gas refineries and at liquid-fuel storage and loading facilities in Tehran. Paknejad said part of the remaining lost capacity was expected to return by March 2027, with the rest during the following six months.⁸

Mahshahr–Bandar Imam petrochemical zone (April 4–7, 2026 - US-Israeli strikes): Mahshahr, in Khuzestan Province on the Persian Gulf, hosts Iran's largest concentration of petrochemical plants - dozens of interconnected production complexes built around the Bandar Imam Khomeini port. In the main wave of US-Israeli strikes on this zone, the following plants were hit: Fajr 1 and Fajr 2 (utility plants supplying power and steam to the entire zone), Bandar Imam Khomeini Petrochemical, Razi (fertilizers), Karoon, Tondgouyan (polyethylene terephthalate), BouAli Sina, Ghadir, Maroon, and Persian Gulf Energy. Six workers were killed - three at Fajr 1 and three at Fajr 2 - and 19 others were wounded across the zone.



Figure 1. Smoke from burning petrochemical facilities as workers evacuate and ambulances arrive. Strikes on the Mahshahr–Bandar Imam zone in April 2026 killed six workers and wounded 19, while releasing chemical smoke plumes over populated areas.

Shiraz, Marvdasht, and South Pars (April 6–7, 2026): Strikes also targeted petrochemical facilities elsewhere in Iran. The Shiraz petrochemical complex was hit by multiple projectiles and rockets, knocking several units out of production, per the company's public relations office. The Marvdasht petrochemical plant sustained a strike whose resulting fire was contained within minutes, with damage described by the local governorate as minor and no casualties. A unit of Amirkabir Petrochemical in the Special Economic Zone was struck on the night of April 7 with no reported casualties or chemical leaks. Two petrochemical plants in the South Pars zone were also targeted by aerial attack, per the Bushehr deputy governor.

Cumulative damage: The International Energy Agency (IEA) stated that more than 80 energy facilities across the region had been struck since the war began, with more than one-third sustaining severe damage. IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol described the crisis as “the greatest global energy security threat in history.” Rystad Energy estimated repair costs for damaged energy infrastructure at \$34–58 billion, and the IEA projected that restoring output to pre-war levels could take up to two years. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights addressed these strikes specifically. “Attacks on energy infrastructure - including South Pars in Iran and Ras Laffan in Qatar - will only compound hardship,” Volker Türk said in March 2026. “Disastrous humanitarian, economic and environmental consequences will be triggered if such attacks continue, resulting in deep harm to civilians - potentially for years to come.”⁹

1.2 The Wider Petrochemical Chain

Iran produced 82 million tonnes of petrochemicals in the year before the war, against an installed capacity of 100 million tonnes. The sector employs 143,000 people directly and generates roughly \$13 billion annually - approximately 33 percent of Iran's total non-oil export revenues, making petrochemicals the country's second-largest source of foreign currency after crude oil. Petrochemical outputs feed automotive manufacturing, household appliances, packaging, textiles, pharmaceuticals, agriculture and construction; disruption upstream cascades rapidly into all of these sectors through raw-material shortages and rising input costs.

On April 16, 2026, the National Petrochemical Company suspended all petrochemical exports until further notice to preserve domestic market stability - halting a revenue stream worth \$13–15 billion annually. No official announcement lifting the suspension was identified in sources reviewed through September 20, 2026.¹⁰

1.3 Oil Exports and the Naval Blockade

The destruction of refining capacity and the collapse of export revenue were distinct events with distinct causes, and conflating them obscures both. Air strikes destroyed Iran's capacity to refine crude for domestic use and to produce petrochemicals. Iran's capacity to *export* crude was not destroyed by bombing; it was severed by the naval blockade, and the timing demonstrates this.

Through the initial air campaign, exports held up. According to the commodity intelligence firm Kpler, Iran shipped 1.84 million barrels per day of crude in March and 1.71 million bpd in April, against an average of 1.68 million bpd in 2025 - exports during the bombardment ran at or slightly above the pre-war trend. Kpler's assessment was that Iran's oil exports were largely unaffected by the war for as long as Iran controlled the Strait of Hormuz, since vessels carrying Iranian oil were permitted to pass.¹¹

The collapse came with the blockade, which took effect in mid-April 2026. The shipping analytics firm Vortexa estimated Iranian crude and condensate exports at 209,000 barrels per day in May, down from 1.34 million bpd in April and close to 1.9 million bpd in March - a fall of 89 percent from March. Kpler put May exports slightly higher at approximately 260,000 bpd, still the lowest monthly level since the height of the 2019–2020 sanctions campaign. Kpler assessed that no tanker was observed successfully evading the blockade around the Strait of Hormuz.¹²

Loading continued while departure did not. Kpler recorded Iranian loadings at roughly 567,000 barrels per day after the blockade took effect - a fall of about 70 percent, but not a stoppage. Iran's export terminals were operating; the cargoes they loaded could not leave. Al Jazeera, citing Kpler, reported approximately 147 million barrels of Iranian crude and condensate in floating storage, of which roughly 67 million were stranded inside the Gulf and Gulf of Oman, unable to move beyond the blockade line. Iran increasingly used tankers as improvised storage, loading crude and leaving vessels anchored offshore while seeking routes to buyers. Onshore storage reached about 60 percent of an 86-million-barrel capacity, and Kpler warned that Iran had between 12 and 22 days of unused storage remaining before forced production cuts, which it estimated could reach a further 1.5 million bpd by mid-May.¹³

The revenue consequence was large and delayed. Al Jazeera assessed the loss at close to \$6 billion across April and May, measured against Iran's March returns. Kpler put the daily revenue impact at \$200–250 million, noting that Tehran would not feel the full financial effect for three to four months, given the time required for cargoes to reach Chinese ports and for buyers to settle payments.

This distinction matters for the legal analysis in this report. Damage to refineries and petrochemical plants destroyed goods that Iranian civilians consumed - fuel, fertilizer, packaging, plastics - and the employment attached to producing them. The blockade destroyed no physical asset; it withheld state revenue while restricting the maritime routes through which food, medicine and industrial inputs reach a country importing roughly 30 percent of its wheat.

Section II: Steel and Heavy Industry

2.1 Mobarakeh Steel, Isfahan

On April 2, 2026, Mobarakeh Steel - Iran's largest industrial complex and at the time the largest steel mill in the Middle East, with an annual production capacity of 7.2 million tons - announced a complete production halt following Israeli air strikes in the preceding days. The company's public statement described 'fundamental destruction' of production-related units. The mill employed more than 20,000 workers directly and anchored Iran's construction and automotive supply chains.¹⁴

2.2 The Netanyahu Statement

On April 3, 2026, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed that the destruction of Iran's steel industry was a deliberate campaign objective. In a video statement released by his office during a situational assessment at the Kirya military headquarters in Tel Aviv, he said: "Together with our American friends, we are continuing to strike the terrorist regime in Iran. We are eliminating commanders, bombing bridges and striking infrastructure." He went on to state that the Air Force had destroyed 70 percent of Iran's steel production capacity, calling this "a tremendous achievement that deprives the Revolutionary Guards" of both financial resources and the capacity to produce weapons in quantity.¹⁵

Days earlier, in a Newsmax interview on March 30, 2026, Netanyahu had said: "The steel plants are controlled by the IRGC." He asserted that the plants served both the regime's internal repression and its production of missiles and weapons, and compared striking them to removing factories operated by the Nazi paramilitary organization SS. Iranian industry sources dispute this characterization, noting that Mobarakeh and Khuzestan Steel are publicly listed companies employing tens of thousands of civilian workers, a distinction that bears directly on whether the mills constituted lawful military objectives under Article 52.

2.3 Khuzestan Steel and Other Facilities

Khuzestan Steel (Ahvaz, March 27, 2026): The operations director stated that all steelmaking modules and furnaces across the Ahvaz complex had been damaged, estimating repairs would take between six months and one year. The March 27 strike was separately reported to have injured 16 people, primarily from blast effects and superficial injuries; contemporaneous reporting did not establish a death at Khuzestan Steel.¹⁶

Additional steel facilities struck: Baghershahr Steel (Isfahan), Oxin Steel (Ahvaz), Sefid Dasht Steel (Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province), and Foulad Rad. Industrial engineers cited by the Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA) estimated that rebuilding rolling mills or arc-furnace

transformers requires one to two years at minimum, with full reconstruction — foundations, structural installation, automation systems — requiring four to six years.

2.4 Employment and Household Consequences

The strikes on the steel sector destroyed output, but the resulting job losses did not fall mainly on steelworkers. Mobarakeh and Khuzestan Steel - the two largest producers, both struck - have publicly denied laying off any employees, and this report records that as the companies' own position. What the strikes destroyed was the supply of steel to the firms below them in the chain, and it was there that employment collapsed. Maral Sanat, a trailer manufacturer headquartered near the Azerbaijani border, laid off 1,500 workers for want of steel. Borujerd, one of Iran's largest textile firms, laid off 700. Dairy plants across the country suspended operations for lack of essential packaging materials. In the petrochemical sector, thousands of workers were placed on unpaid leave following the strikes on Mahshahr and Asaluyeh described in Section I.¹⁷

This pattern is not incidental. As the welfare economist Hadi Kahalzadeh of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft has documented, Iran's social protection system shields public employees, on whom the functioning of the state depends, while the burden of the war's economic damage falls on informal workers and small firms. Within the formal sector, he finds it concentrated among low- and middle-skilled workers - those with the least protection and the least political influence. The struck enterprises, large and state-linked, retained their workforces on suspended operations. The smaller firms that depended on their output could not.¹⁸

The scale of exposure is national. Kahalzadeh assessed that the war placed roughly half of all Iranian jobs - between ten and twelve million positions - at risk, and pushed an additional 5 percent of the population into poverty, on top of the 3.5 to 4.1 million Iranians the UN Development Programme found had already fallen below the poverty line. He projected 3 to 4 million layoffs, which against three-digit inflation would drive already vulnerable households substantially deeper into poverty. Iran's Deputy Minister of Labor, Gholamhossein Mohammadi acknowledged the direct loss of more than one million jobs and said that two million people were unemployed directly or indirectly. The Iranian Red Crescent recorded at least 23,500 damaged commercial units, affecting businesses and civilian livelihoods.¹⁹

The social insurance system could not absorb the shock. Unemployment insurance claims reached approximately 147,000 in the two months following the peak of hostilities - nearly three times the figure for the same period a year earlier - with roughly one third filed by women. But Iranian unemployment insurance reaches only a limited segment of the workforce, excluding informal workers, owners of small private businesses and employees of smaller firms: precisely the groups the layoffs struck hardest. Government estimates cited by Kahalzadeh placed the cost of providing food staples and unemployment benefits for a single year at close to five quadrillion rials, equivalent to 45 to 50 percent of Iran's entire public budget, which was already in substantial deficit.²⁰

The recovery horizon compounds all of this. The rebuild timelines set out in Section 2.3 - one to two years at minimum, and four to six years for full reconstruction - mean downstream firms lost their inputs and their customers' purchasing power simultaneously,

with no near-term prospect of either returning. The workers affected - at Maral Sanat, at Borujerd, in the dairy plants and the petrochemical zones - held no position within the military or security apparatus that the strikes were said to target. National aggregate figures for job losses are set out in Section XI.



Figure 2. The Mobarakeh Steel complex near Isfahan, Iran's largest industrial facility, seen from above. The mill - 7.2 million tonnes of annual capacity and over 20,000 workers - announced a complete production halt on April 2, 2026 after Israeli air strikes, citing "fundamental destruction" of its production units.

Section III: Provincial Industrial Damage

Iran's industrial base extends far beyond its flagship steel and petrochemical complexes. Across the country, provincial 'industrial towns' (shahrak-e san'ati) - planned zones hosting hundreds of small and medium-sized factories producing parts, textiles, food products, and construction materials - form the backbone of local employment and national supply chains. These zones, together with standalone provincial factories, constituted a second layer of targets whose destruction received far less international attention than the strikes on major complexes, but whose consequences for local employment were often devastating. Documented provincial damage includes:

East Azerbaijan: 240 industrial, production, and trade units damaged, 32 by direct strikes, per the provincial industry director. The Tabriz Bearing Manufacturing plant - a key supplier to Iran's machine and automotive industries - suffered damage the provincial governor described as total, requiring full reconstruction.²¹

Markazi Province (Arak, Saveh, Zarandieh): 10 industrial units directly targeted; 75 damaged province-wide. By early May, 822 workers had been formally referred for unemployment insurance, with projections of 1,100.

Hamadan: 14 production units destroyed and 8 requiring repair; 22 commercial units destroyed and 555 requiring repair, per the provincial crisis-management director.

Alborz (Karaj): Confirmed damage to companies in the Baharestan Industrial Zone, including Aram Farmedmahya and Rahbanan Sazandegi.

Additional industrial towns struck across multiple provinces: Tola (Qeshm), Abbas Abad (Pakdasht), Shenzar (Sharifabad), Liya (Qazvin), Hassanabad (Fashafouyeh), Shokouhieh (Qom), Heydarabad (Solduz), Chabahar Free Zone, and Kheirabad (Arak), among others.

Section IV: Transport and Aviation Infrastructure

4.1 Civilian Airports

Bushehr International Airport — completely destroyed (US strikes, July 2026): During the Phase II campaign - 13 consecutive nights of US strikes on southern Iran - Bushehr International Airport, the main civilian airport serving the southern port city on the Persian Gulf, was destroyed. Government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani, after visiting the site, stated the airport 'will definitely have to be rebuilt from scratch.' She described a collapsed terminal and the wreckage of a recently purchased Iran Air Airbus A319, destroyed by a direct missile strike with only a section of its tail remaining. State media published images of the aircraft's charred remains on the tarmac. This is the first Iranian official confirmation of the complete destruction of a civilian airport in the war.

Bushehr International Airport was not an abandoned facility. Iran's government spokesperson listed it among damaged civilian installations alongside the Bushehr Meteorological Center, and Iranian state media have characterized it as a purely civilian passenger and air-services hub with no military function in its structure. The physical record is more complicated: the airport shares its site with the Sixth Tactical Air Base, also known as Shahid Yasini Air Base, a facility of the Iranian Air Force - the regular armed forces, not the Revolutionary Guard - where F-4 Phantom aircraft have been stationed since 1976 and which served as a forward operating point for F-4s during the Iran-Iraq war. The airport's two parallel runways, 4,700 metres long across a 320-hectare site, are among the longest in the Middle East. A Bushehr resident interviewed by IranWire during the July strikes - a single mother living with her nine-year-old daughter - described several large explosions shaking the area at around 10:30 p.m., the first two coming from the direction of the naval dock and the Army air base. She said the blasts felt weaker to her than those of the earlier phase of the war, but that her daughter had been badly affected and she had asked her brother to come and stay with them.²²

That co-location is the crux of the legal question rather than an answer to it. A military function at one part of a shared airfield cannot license the destruction of the passenger terminal, the navigation infrastructure and a parked civilian airliner - particularly in a war waged without

authorization from the UN Security Council. The principles of distinction and precaution require an attacking party to assess whether anticipated civilian harm - here, the loss of a provincial capital's principal air link, which officials say now requires reconstruction from the ground up - is excessive relative to the military advantage gained. No such assessment has been made public.



Figure 3. Bushehr International Airport, destroyed during the war. Government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani stated after her July 28, 2026 site visit that the airport would have to be rebuilt from scratch.

Twenty-seven airports damaged. Morteza Dehghan, managing director of the Iran Airports and Air Navigation Company, stated at a press conference on September 7, 2026 that 27 of the country's airports had sustained damage during the war, and that this infrastructure had been struck in several separate waves rather than once. Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh said terminals, radars and control towers were among the facilities damaged, and that rebuilding them would be protracted because radar equipment must be sourced, manufactured or purchased and the financing secured. Government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani had earlier confirmed damage to civilian airports at Iranshahr (Sistan and Baluchestan Province — where a US projectile triggered a power outage and injured one civilian, and where authorities reported that a strike killed an on-duty staff member at the airport's meteorological facility), Semnan (northern Iran), and Bandar Abbas (southern Iran).²³ During Phase I, the aviation sector had already been paralyzed: a member of parliament's construction committee described airlines as being in a state of effectively complete shutdown, with revenues destroyed and payroll uncertainty for aviation workers.

Restoration has been partial rather than complete. Dehghan described returning airports to service by repairing runway surfaces, converting existing terminals to other uses, reviving damaged navigation and communications systems with domestic specialists, deploying mobile navigation units, and — at some airports — designing and simulating new flight procedures in

place of installing replacement navigation equipment. He also announced that Iran was preparing legal claims for war damages.

Loss of civilian air access. The paralysis of the aviation sector was not only an industrial loss; it severed the means by which people left the country or reached family members inside the country. Iran's Civil Aviation Authority closed the country's airspace until further notice at the outbreak of the war, one of at least eight states in the region to do so on February 28. The Tehran flight information region remained closed through March; Iran partially reopened its eastern portion for overflights in June while the western portion stayed shut, and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency continued through July to advise operators against flying in the region at any altitude. Lufthansa Group, Air France-KLM, British Airways, Emirates, flydubai, United Airlines, Delta and Turkish Airlines all suspended service.

The consequences fell heavily on Iranians abroad and on dual nationals. When Iranian airspace partially reopened on April 21, the US Virtual Embassy for Iran advised American citizens to leave the country immediately and noted that departure by land to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Türkiye or Turkmenistan remained an alternative to the limited commercial flights available. The same advisory cautioned that the Iranian government might prevent US citizens from departing or levy an exit fee, and that US-Iranian dual nationals must exit on Iranian passports, since Iran does not recognize dual nationality and treats dual nationals solely as Iranian citizens. The US-facilitated charter flights organized for Americans stranded by the war departed from the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Israel - not from Iran. For the Iranian-American community, the destruction of civilian aviation infrastructure and the closure of Iranian airspace therefore meant that visiting elderly parents, attending a funeral, or assisting relatives displaced by bombardment became for months either impossible or contingent on a multi-day overland journey through a third country.²⁴

September update — international connectivity: Physical repairs to airports have not restored Iran's pre-war international air connectivity. In September, additional U.S. sanctions and mounting restrictions by foreign governments further narrowed the routes available to Iranian carriers. Turkey and Oman subsequently agreed to halt Mahan Air flights to their territories. The development illustrates a second constraint on civilian aviation after the physical damage documented above: even where airports and navigation systems return to service, international connectivity can remain restricted by sanctions and foreign regulatory decisions.²⁵

4.2 Bridges, Tunnels, and Rail

Twelve bridges and two tunnels damaged (US strikes, Phase II): Iran's Ministry of Roads and Urban Development reported that US strikes damaged 12 bridges and two tunnels, including the bridge on the road connecting Roudan and Bandar Abbas (struck July 18), two bridges near Bandar Khamir, two additional bridges in southern Iran, and two in the northeast. In a single night, US forces struck five bridges across southern and southeastern Iran. Both damaged tunnels have since been reopened and alternate routes established around damaged bridges. The main railway station in Bandar Abbas also sustained damage. Iran's rail network — some 360 stations forming a significant component of national freight transport — suffered broader disruption that compounded the supply-chain difficulties created by port closures and industrial strikes.²⁶

Rail and bridge strikes with civilian casualties (July 2026): Iran's July 17–18 letter to the Security Council reported that strikes late on July 16 and in the early hours of July 17 across Hormozgan Province damaged several bridges, roads, and the Bandar Abbas railway station, disrupting rail services and commercial activity — and that one bridge collapse caused a civilian

vehicle to fall, killing seven civilians and injuring nine. Separately, a railway bridge in northern Golestan Province was damaged in a US airstrike on July 8, and Iran's Geneva mission reported strikes on sections of the Tehran–Mashhad railway — the country's principal east–west passenger corridor.²⁷

Urban transport — Tehran taxis: From the start of the war, at least 93 taxis in Tehran were damaged, some destroyed entirely or buried under rubble. For drivers whose vehicle is their sole source of income, this meant a complete and immediate loss of livelihood; a support package announced in response included an emergency loan of 3 million tomans with a one-month grace period and four-month repayment period.

B1 Bridge, Karaj (April 2, 2026 — Phase I): The B1 bridge, a major highway structure still under construction, was struck by two missiles and split in half. Eight people were killed and at least 95 wounded. The deputy governor of Alborz Province confirmed the victims were civilians celebrating the Sizdah Be-dar spring holiday below the bridge. A second strike occurred after emergency responders arrived — a pattern consistent with double-tap tactics documented elsewhere in the conflict. President Trump amplified the strike on Truth Social, posting a video of the collapse with the message that 'The biggest bridge in Iran comes tumbling down, never to be used again' — confirming the bridge was a deliberate target. The financial loss of the unfinished project has not been officially disclosed.²⁸



Figure 4. The B1 bridge in Karaj, split in half by two missile strikes on April 2, 2026. Eight civilians celebrating the Sizdah Be-dar holiday were killed and at least 95 wounded; the second strike came after first responders had arrived.

4.3 Ports, Maritime Infrastructure, and Food Supply

US-Israeli strikes closed the Shahid Rajaei container port in Bandar Abbas — Iran's principal gateway for containerized trade — on April 1. Both Bandar Abbas and Chabahar were effectively shut, coinciding with the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of global oil exports pass. Phase II strikes destroyed the marine traffic control tower at Chabahar port, which was a source of pride of the local population and a recently-completed infrastructure project. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth posted a photo of the tower's destruction online, seeming to brag about the destruction of a piece of civilian infrastructure.

The destruction of the Chabahar marine traffic control tower affected infrastructure used to manage vessel movements and maritime safety at one of Iran's major commercial ports. Unlike damage to a military installation, the loss of a civilian traffic-control facility can directly disrupt commercial shipping and port operations, with consequences for the movement of goods and the coastal economy. Also destroyed in Phase II strikes were the Bushehr Meteorological Center, and damaged fishing piers and fishing boats on Qeshm Island. Bushehr's civilian maritime infrastructure was struck directly in March: five passenger vessels serving the Bushehr–Kharg route were hit at the Shahid Mehrab Haghgou passenger terminal, the Valfajr passenger pier sustained damage to facilities and craft, and several fishing vessels burned at the Jofreh fishing pier — the livelihood of dozens of local fishing households, according to Iranian officials. A passenger vessel berthed at the Morvarid pier on Kharg Island was hit by two projectiles. In July, a fishing pier at Banud village in Asaluyeh county was struck and local fishing boats caught fire, with no casualties reported. This is infrastructure on which coastal fishing communities depend directly for their livelihoods.²⁹

The loss to fishing communities was documented directly. A Bandar Abbas resident interviewed by IranWire described the bombing of the Panj Peleh fishing pier behind the city's fish market, where several civilian boats and *lenj* cargo vessels were sunk, and recounted seeing fishermen — soaked and shaken — hauling the surviving boats onto trailers to move them out of reach of further strikes. The replacement cost is not trivial for the households involved: a small fishing boat represents at least 400 million tomans, and a privately owned *lenj* cargo vessel upwards of 20 billion tomans. For families whose entire capital is a single vessel, a strike on a pier is not damage to infrastructure but the destruction of the asset their livelihood is built on.



Figure 5. Fishing vessels burning at Jofreh pier, Bushehr, after missile strikes on March 22, 2026. Five passenger vessels on the Bushehr–Kharg route and the Valfajr passenger pier were struck in the same wave — civilian maritime infrastructure supporting dozens of local fishing households. Credit: Tasnim News Agency.

Because Iran imports approximately 30 percent of its wheat, port closures carried immediate food-security consequences: by March 6, nine grain ships were waiting outside the Strait, unable to enter Iranian waters. A US maritime blockade of southern ports during Phase II further squeezed supply chains, which Tehran attempted to bypass through overland routes and a shadow fleet in Gulf waters.



Figure 6. The marine traffic control tower at Chabahar port, destroyed in Phase II strikes alongside the Bushehr Meteorological Center and fishing infrastructure on Qeshm Island — facilities on which coastal shipping safety and fishing communities directly depend.

The food chain itself was also struck. Wheat storage silos in Hoveizeh and Dasht-e Azadegan counties (Khuzestan Province) were hit — corroborated both by Iran's Geneva mission and by Al Jazeera's independent review of civilian-site strikes — along with a bottled-water facility in Musiyan and fishing vessels belonging to communities in southern Iran. For a wheat-importing country whose ports were already blockaded, strikes on grain storage compounded the food-security squeeze from both ends: imports could not arrive, and stored reserves were destroyed.³⁰

Section V: Health Infrastructure

Deputy Health Minister Shahin Akhoondzadeh announced on April 15 that more than 210 health and medical centers had been targeted during the conflict. A substantial share were rural health

houses — often the sole point of care in underserved regions. Six hospitals were knocked out of service entirely, forcing patient loads onto remaining facilities.³¹

Medical personnel killed: Akhoondzadeh confirmed that physicians, pharmacists, nurses, emergency technicians, and paramedics were among those killed, and that a maritime ambulance on the Hormuz–Bandar Abbas route was struck while transporting emergency patients. Per UN OCHA's Humanitarian Update No. 2, cited in this report's [companion volume](#), 24 to 26 health workers were killed and 116 injured.

The Iranian Red Crescent registered a broader count than the Health Ministry's 210+ health and medical centers impacted figure, because it includes any registered damage rather than direct targeting. Its head, Pir Hossein Kolivand, stated on April 10 that 339 medical facilities — hospitals, pharmacies, laboratories, health centres and emergency units — had been damaged, some rendered inoperable and others resuming partial or full operations, alongside 20 Red Crescent centres. He added that a number of ambulances and Red Crescent vehicles were struck directly while conducting operations. Three Red Crescent emergency personnel were killed and 15 injured. Nursing union representatives confirmed additional deaths among emergency responders from secondary explosions after initial strikes, a further instance of the double-tap strike pattern.³²

Phase II added one of the war's most serious medical incidents: Shahid Baghaei Hospital in Ahvaz, a specialized cancer treatment center for children, was damaged by the shockwaves from nearby U.S. strikes and temporarily taken out of service, forcing the evacuation of more than 200 patients. Al Jazeera's independent review reported that strikes hit areas near the hospital, which was subsequently rendered inoperable, and UN human rights experts cited reports of strikes on areas adjacent to the hospital in their statement decrying the resumed campaign.³³ Iran's UN ambassador, in his July 16 letter to the Security Council, described the strike as 'a cowardly act and war crime targeting the most innocent and vulnerable.'



Figure 7. Staff and patients evacuate Shahid Baghaei Hospital in Ahvaz after the strike that rendered the children's cancer centre inoperable. More than 200 patients were moved.

The strain extended beyond the strike zones. A doctor at a pediatric hospital in Rasht in Iran's relatively unscathed north, which was packed with families displaced from Tehran, told the

Associated Press that patient numbers had nearly doubled, medicines were running out, and patients were being asked to buy basic supplies including antibiotics and IV fluids on the open market. The internet blackout prevented him from accessing patient histories or verifying drug dosages online.³⁴

Section VI: Power, Water, and Daily Life

Iran operates 477 power plants, the majority of which are gas-fired. The largest, Damavand, has a capacity of 2,868 megawatts. Strikes on transmission infrastructure in Alborz Province caused outages across parts of Karaj. Strikes also directly damaged electricity infrastructure in Tehran and Alborz provinces. Iranian electricity officials reported temporary outages after projectiles damaged parts of the distribution network, with service restored to affected areas within two hours. The head of Tehran Province's electricity distribution company later said that 229 points on the provincial grid had sustained damage from direct attacks. and President Trump threatened on April 6 that continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz would bring large-scale strikes on power plants. The IEA assessed that damage to shared energy utilities at Mahshahr and Asaluyeh - which supply industrial power across the southern industrial zone - could disrupt the broader national grid.

For ordinary Iranians, the disruption was not an abstraction. Al Jazeera reporting from Tehran in July 2026 described mounting pressures from rising living costs, recurring electricity cuts, and bombed-out infrastructure shaping every household decision. Government employees continued to receive salaries, while private businesses faced repeated disruptions from electricity cuts. Industrial zones were experiencing four to six hours of blackouts a day, reducing production, raising costs, delaying orders and disrupting exports, while small businesses increasingly relied on generators to keep operating and prevent perishable goods from spoiling..

³⁵

Phase II strikes hit water infrastructure directly and repeatedly. The desalination plant in Bonji, in western Jask County (Hormozgan), was struck on July 18, destroying its seawater intake pumping station and electrical transformer and cutting drinking water to 20 villages with a combined population of around 10,000, according to the managing director of the Hormozgan Water and Wastewater Company. The plant, with a capacity of 3,150 cubic metres a day, was returned to service the following day after emergency reconstruction, with tanker deliveries covering the interval. Another desalination plant was hit at Bomani in Sirik County, and Iran's Geneva mission reported the destruction of a drinking-water production facility in Dehloran (Ilam Province).³⁶

Under Article 54 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population — drinking water installations and supplies expressly among them — enjoy special protection; the documented pattern of strikes on desalination and drinking-water facilities therefore raise some of the most direct legal questions of the entire campaign. In Kuwait, Iranian retaliatory strikes repeatedly hit a power and water desalination plant — evidence that the destruction of life-sustaining utilities extended across the region on both sides of the conflict.



Figure 8. The Bonji desalination plant in western Jask county, Hormozgan, after the US strike of July 18, 2026. The seawater intake pumping station and electrical transformer were destroyed, cutting drinking water to 20 villages of some 10,000 people, until it was restored. Credit: IRNA.

Section VII: Communications and the Digital Economy

Iran entered the war already under an unprecedented internet blackout imposed during the January 2026 protest crackdown. Wartime disruption deepened the blackout. Following the strikes of February 28, restrictions and shutdowns lasted 88 consecutive days. In March alone Iranians were disconnected for 22 days out of the month, up from 12 before the war, and access fell to 12 percent of pre-war levels. The economic cost was estimated at approximately \$35 million per day, according to Iran's Minister of Information and Communications Technology, Sattar Hashemi.³⁷

The digital economy - a workplace of last resort for some of those excluded from more formal employment - was devastated. Tehran Chamber of Commerce estimates placed 500,000–700,000 digital businesses on internet platforms, supporting at least one million direct jobs; more than two million Persian-language Instagram accounts operated for income, 64 percent owned by women. The disruption of these sources of income by the internet blackout amid the war was particularly stark. The head of the Internet Businesses Association described the result as silent unemployment: joblessness invisible to official statistics because the seller still nominally exists online while their market, customers, and income have vanished.³⁸

The blackout also reached the classroom. With in-person schooling suspended, education moved onto the same network that was failing. Iran's national school platform, Shad, served roughly 12 million students, but wartime online instruction was severely constrained. In state

schools, daily online instruction was reduced to approximately two hours³⁹, and at least two million pupils could not access even that, lacking either a device or sufficient connectivity. The broader educational consequences of the war — including learning loss, prolonged school disruption, and unequal access to remote education — extend beyond the scope of this report.

Section VIII: Environmental Damage

The Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS) documented more than 300 incidents of potential environmental harm across 12 countries, with the highest-risk events concentrated along the Persian Gulf coast and in Tehran. Specific documented incidents include: strikes on the petrochemical complexes at Mahshahr and Asaluyeh, releasing combustion products and chemical smoke plumes over populated areas. Workers and residents were exposed to toxic fumes from petrochemical fires, an exposure for which no health accounting yet exists. The destruction of coastal infrastructure at Bandar Abbas and fishing piers on Qeshm Island, sunken Iranian naval vessels leaking fuel into Gulf waters, and oil-terminal fires at Bushehr all added to the environmental toll.⁴⁰

Oil pollution reached the mangrove forests of Qeshm Island, among the island's most significant coastal ecosystems and a habitat sustaining biodiversity, shoreline stability, and marine and bird species. The head of Qeshm's Natural Resources and Watershed Management Office reported that the extent of the slicks was under assessment and that containment operations were underway. The source of the oil pollution had not been determined at the time of reporting.⁴¹

The nuclear dimension warrants particular attention. Bushehr hosts Iran's only operational nuclear power plant, which Russia's Rosatom is expanding with additional reactor units. During the July 2026 U.S. campaign, Rosatom halted construction on the second and third units, with its chief executive reporting explosions just kilometers from the facility. Nearly 100 workers and their families were evacuated at the campaign's start, with further evacuations of the roughly 639 remaining Russian personnel continuing during pauses. The plant itself was not directly targeted, but sustained combat operations adjacent to an operating nuclear power station represent a categorical environmental and safety risk. The UN Secretary-General's office specifically cited attacks near 'a nuclear power plant under construction and a desalination plant' among the strikes it deemed unacceptable.⁴²

On July 19, U.S. strikes hit the Darkhovin nuclear power plant — an under-construction facility on the Karun River in Khuzestan Province, roughly 70 kilometers south of Ahvaz. The International Atomic Energy Agency stated the facility was in the very early stages of construction and contained no nuclear material when last visited, and that the attack was not believed to pose a radiological risk. Director General Rafael Grossi nonetheless reiterated his call for “military restraint in the vicinity of all nuclear-related sites.” The head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization formally wrote to the IAEA Director General demanding action against attacks endangering nuclear safety. Darkhovin thus became the second nuclear site — after the halted Bushehr expansion, directly impacted by the war.⁴³

Section IX: The Human Toll

Behind every damaged facility in this report are the people who worked in it, depended on it, or lived beside it. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights framed the pattern directly: “It is

appalling to see how civilians are treated as collateral damage in the conduct of hostilities." He noted that inflammatory rhetoric by senior officials on both sides suggested a worrying intention to inflict harm on civilians.

The government spokesperson stated on July 28 that more than 350 government employees had been killed on duty during the Phase II strikes. The statement did not specify how many were civilian government employees, police, or personnel attached to security or military institutions. This report therefore records the aggregate figure as Tier 2 and does not treat it as a civilian casualty count. UN OCHA and the UN refugee agency UNHCR confirmed that bombardment displaced approximately 3.2 million people - 60 percent of them women and children - with some 118,300 Iranians crossing into Türkiye and Pakistan by mid-April. Across the three primary independent tallies documented in this report's companion volume, as many as 2,362 civilians were killed in Phase I alone - including 254 to 376 children and 496 women - with more than 26,500 injured.

Six petrochemical workers died at the Fajr complex; a steelworker died in the strikes on the Mobarakeh and Khuzestan Steel complexes; medical personnel died in ambulances and clinics; eight holiday celebrants died under the B1 bridge; and seven civilians died when their vehicle fell from a collapsing bridge. In the renewed Phase II strikes, Iran's Ministry of Health reported more than 50 killed and over 500 injured, and Iran's UN letters record firefighters, emergency responders, park rangers, and fishermen among the dead.

The texture of daily life under bombardment emerges from the testimony gathered by international media. A woman fleeing Tehran told The New Humanitarian she paid three times the normal taxi fare - 3 million tomans - to escape the city, because flight itself had become a luxury. A 26-year-old designer described experiencing "everything bad possible" in the span of three months, from the January killings to the war. A lawyer in southwestern Iran who had represented detained women's-rights defenders, interviewed twice by the Associated Press a month apart, moved from speaking about collective action to describing exhaustion, isolation, and a future taken over by worry. A doctor in Rasht binge-watched television between shifts with double patient loads because the blackout had severed every other connection to the world.⁴⁴

These accounts share a common structure: the war did not arrive in a vacuum. It landed on a population already traumatized by an economic collapse, a mass protest movement, and a crackdown that killed thousands. It then systematically destroyed the remaining infrastructure of ordinary life: jobs, apartments, internet connections, bridges to work, or the local airport.

Section X: The Threat and the Record

One element of the documentary record deserves separate treatment, because its significance is cumulative rather than incidental: the United States announced in advance what it intended to destroy.

On April 1, 2026, Ambassador Amir Saeid Iravani, Iran's Permanent Representative in New York, wrote to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council regarding a public social media post in which President Trump threatened that absent a deal the United States would 'blow up and completely obliterate' Iran's critical civilian infrastructure - naming electric generating plants, oil facilities, Kharg Island (the seaport handling up to 90 percent of Iran's oil exports), and dams. Iravani characterized this as an explicit and escalating threat in violation of the UN Charter.

The subsequent record tracks that list closely, and the manner of its execution is itself revealing. Electric generating capacity and oil facilities were struck, as documented in Sections I and VI. Kharg Island's crude export infrastructure was not, though a passenger vessel berthed at the island's Morvarid pier was hit by two projectiles in March. Tanker-tracking data show Iranian loadings continuing at roughly 567,000 barrels per day after the blockade took effect, with export terminals in operation while the cargoes they loaded were unable to leave. Kharg's export function was neutralized by naval blockade rather than by munitions, as set out in Section 1.3. The distinction between instruments - munitions against domestic productive capacity, blockade against export revenue - indicates deliberate selection rather than the incidental consequence of a military campaign.

The geographic breadth of the July campaign was documented contemporaneously in Iravani's letter of July 16, which recorded US strikes from July 8 to July 16 against Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, Ahvaz, Chabahar, Konarak, Jask, Sirik, Iranshahr, Abu Musa Island and Greater Tunb Island, extending in the early hours of July 16 to Shiraz, Khorramabad, Semnan, Urmia and Hamedan. The letter is an official statement of a party to the conflict and Tier 2 by this report's standard; individual claims within it that independent sources have corroborated are cited alongside that corroboration in the relevant sections above.⁴⁵

The institutional response forms the closing element of the record, and it cuts in more than one direction. Resolution 2817, adopted June 3, 2026, condemned Iran's own attacks against its regional neighbors. A Russian draft resolution addressing the broader conflict failed to secure the necessary votes, and Iran rejected a U.S.-Bahrain draft on the Strait of Hormuz as one-sided. What the record shows unambiguously is that no UN Security Council resolution addressed the strikes on Iranian civilian infrastructure documented in this report. Iran's Permanent Representative in Geneva, Ali Bahraini, made the parallel complaint to the UN human rights machinery, warning that the absence of a clear and timely response risked the impression that human rights protection and international law are applied selectively, a concern independent UN human rights experts echoed in decrying the resumed campaign.⁴⁶

Section XI: Labor Market and Employment

11.1 Scale of War-Induced Unemployment

Iran's Deputy Minister of Labor stated that preliminary estimates showed the loss of more than one million jobs, with two million people directly or indirectly unemployed. Broader assessments accounting for chain effects place the figure at up to four million workers — implying 12 to 15 million people, in a population of 90 million, losing their household's primary income. The Secretary General of the House of Labor put direct job destruction at 130,000 positions with downstream losses exceeding 600,000.⁴⁷

11.2 Documented Labor Market Collapse

Spring is Iran's peak hiring season, with the Iran Talent platform typically recording 65,000 monthly vacancies. This year, vacancies collapsed by 80 percent. The mismatch this produced was recorded on the other side of the market: on April 25, 2026, jobseekers submitted 318,000 résumés through the private recruitment platform Jobvision in a single day, against a previous single-day record of 212,000. Jobvision attributed the surge to the war and the prolonged internet blackout, and noted that employer demand moved in the opposite direction, with

published vacancy listings falling measurably against the same period the previous year. Labour supply and labour demand were diverging simultaneously.

Chain unemployment spread outward from the struck industries. Reports indicated 3,700 layoffs at Kerman Motor, and parts factories in the Zagros industrial zone closed as automotive production stopped. Digital-sector layoffs followed the internet blackout: approximately 200 at Digikala, 300 at Shatel, 700 at Raitel. The Dena tire factory in Shiraz moved to lay off 1,100 of its 1,147 workers before provincial authorities intervened. The steel sector's downstream layoffs, including those at Maral Sanat and the Borujerd textile works, are set out in Section 2.4.

The tourism industry also collapsed. The damage itself took two distinct forms. The first was collapse in demand: roughly 30 percent of licensed facilities - hotels, eco-lodges, guesthouses and other licensed units - closed, and the head of the Travel Services Headquarters estimated that some 5,000 workers in Fars Province alone were at risk from tourism closures. The second was physical destruction. According to the deputy head of the Travel Services Headquarters, 66 tourism complexes and facilities sustained physical damage, comprising hotels, restaurants, roadside service complexes, eco-lodges and boutique hotels; some were destroyed outright, while others were damaged either by direct hits or as collateral damage from strikes on adjacent buildings. The Ministry of Cultural Heritage, Tourism and Handicrafts separately recorded at least 62 tourism units damaged or destroyed and removed from the service chain, distributed across twelve provinces, with the heaviest concentration in Kermanshah (13 units) and West Azerbaijan (10). Sector losses over the war's first phase were estimated at 1,300 billion tomans. Hotel Ritaj in Ahvaz sustained roughly 14 billion tomans in damage, and Tehran's Eram Hotel initially took 20 rooms out of service.⁴⁸

According to the Ministry of Cultural Heritage's tourism, approximately 29.7 million domestic trips were recorded during the wartime Nowruz travel period. Officials said the unusual travel pattern reflected movement toward safer areas and staying with relatives or in informal accommodation; only a small share of travelers used hotels or other licensed lodging. The figure represents recorded trips, not 29.7 million unique individuals displaced by the war.

Section XII: Inflation and the Collapse of Purchasing Power

12.1 Why Prices Exploded — The Causal Chain

The war's inflationary impact operated through several reinforcing mechanisms, each traceable to specific strikes documented above. First, supply destruction: bombed factories, refineries, and food-processing plants physically removed goods from the market while demand held or spiked through panic buying and stockpiling. Second, trade strangulation: the closure of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar, the Strait of Hormuz crisis, and the Phase II maritime blockade severed import channels for a country dependent on imports for 30 percent of its wheat, while damage to 12 bridges, rail links, and tunnels raised the cost of moving what goods remained. Third, currency collapse: the rial, already down more than 84 percent, fell further as oil and petrochemical export revenues evaporated, raising the local price of every imported input. Fourth, fiscal strain: a government facing \$270 billion in damage and a collapse in export income cut subsidies it had long used to hold staple prices down. This was shown most visibly

on June 23, when Tehran authorities allowed bread prices to double, reneging on pledges to preserve the flour subsidy.

12.2 The Numbers

Iran entered the war with inflation above 40 percent and 34 million people - 40 percent of the population - below the absolute poverty line. Food inflation was already about 105 percent year-on-year immediately before the war. By May 2026, the Statistics Center of Iran recorded prices jumping about 130 percent.⁴⁹ The Central Bank issued a 10-million-rial banknote, the largest in Iranian history. Rural inflation at 86.5 percent sharply outpaced urban at 69.3 percent concentrating the burden on the most vulnerable regions.

Commodity	Price Change (year-on-year)	Source
Oils and fats	+219%	Statistics Center of Iran, March 2026 CPI data
Bread and cereals	+140%	Statistics Center of Iran, March 2026 CPI data
Red meat and poultry	+135%	Statistics Center of Iran, March 2026 CPI data
Dairy (milk, cheese, eggs)	+116.8%	Statistics Center of Iran, March 2026 CPI data
Fruits and nuts	+104.2%	Statistics Center of Iran, March 2026 CPI data
Housing maintenance	+72.8%	Statistics Center of Iran, March 2026 CPI data
Transportation	+67.5%	Statistics Center of Iran, March 2026 CPI data
Lavash bread (per sheet, Tehran)	14,000 → 27,000 rials (doubled)	RFE/RL, June 2026
Lamb and beef (retail)	Reached 1.6–1.9M tomans/kg	Didban Iran (state media), April 2026

12.3 The Human Experience of Price Collapse

The statistics translate into daily deprivation. A woman in Tehran told RFE/RL that “Things are very bad, and we're actually better off than a lot of people.” She no longer buys meat, rarely eats out, and had bought nothing for herself in months. A pensioner in western Tehran told Al Jazeera that a tub of ice cream and yogurt cost 10 million rials against her monthly pension of 180 million, and that even after a 40 percent increase, the pension “doesn't even begin to cover the essentials.” A Tehran resident named Pouya told BBC Persian in the war's first week that “rice is now at 625 tomans; it was 530 before the war.” In the Grand Bazaar, Reuters found a dental-clinic worker earning \$130 a month who could no longer afford the modest extras her salary had covered before the strikes began. The Secretary General of the House of Labor summarized the arithmetic: half the wages of minimum-wage workers and retirees now go to food alone.⁵⁰

One ratio makes that arithmetic concrete. Teachers, a formally employed professional workforce, earned a reported minimum of 18.7 million tomans a month in 2026. In April–May 2026, the minimum food basket for one person was estimated at 7,380,000 tomans, so feeding a household of three at a minimum level cost more than 22 million tomans, before rent, medicine, transport or schooling. A teacher's entire salary no longer covered their family's food.⁵¹

Section XIII: Macro-Economic Damage to Iran

Government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani announced on April 13 that preliminary estimates placed total war damage at approximately \$270 billion, with the figure expected to rise as assessments continued, and Phase II strikes have since added substantially to the total. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) revised its forecast for Iran's 2026 GDP growth to negative 6 percent, among the sharpest contractions it projected for any economy this year. The suspension of petrochemical exports removed \$13–15 billion in annual revenue; the collapse of oil exports removed the country's largest income stream - an 89 percent fall by May 2026 under the naval blockade, as set out in Section 1.3, and one of withheld revenue rather than destroyed capacity. The government issued no new economic statistics for extended periods during the bombardment, itself an indicator of administrative breakdown.⁵²

Section XIV: Regional and Global Spillover

The war's economic damage did not stop at Iran's borders, and the wider costs form a distinct category of consequence. QatarEnergy declared force majeure following strikes on regional energy facilities including the Ras Laffan hub. By March 12, Gulf Cooperation Council countries had cut total oil production by at least 10 million barrels per day, according to the IEA. Iranian retaliatory strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Jordan, including power, water, energy, and transport facilities. The fighting also caused civilian casualties, including an 11-year-old girl in Kuwait who was killed by falling shrapnel during Iranian attacks. The same legal standard applies to these attacks. Addressing Iranian strikes on Gulf states and Jordan, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk called for an end to attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, warning that attacks targeting civilian objects or infrastructure indispensable to the civilian population constitute serious violations of international humanitarian law and amount to war crimes. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimated that the conflict could reduce the Arab States region's collective GDP by 3.7–6.0 percent, equivalent to \$120–194 billion. Globally, Goldman Sachs raised the probability of a U.S. recession within 12 months to 30 percent, citing war-driven oil price increases, and projected US unemployment reaching 4.6 percent by the end of 2026.⁵³ The IEA's characterization of the crisis as the greatest challenge in the history of global energy security reflects this worldwide transmission: a war fought over Iranian infrastructure repriced energy for every economy on earth.

Section XV: Consolidated Summary Table

Indicator	Figure	Source	Tier
Refining capacity reduction	70%	WarCosts.org	Tier 2
Steel production capacity destroyed	70% (claimed)	PM Netanyahu, April 3	Tier 2
Energy facilities attacked (regional)	80+	IEA (Biol)	Tier 1
Energy facilities severely damaged	More than one-third	IEA	Tier 1
Energy production recovery time	Up to 2 years	IEA	Tier 1
Mobarakeh Steel — status	Complete production halt	Company statement / Bloomberg	Tier 1
Khuzestan Steel — repair estimate	At least 6 months	Operations director	Tier 2
Full steel reconstruction timeline	4–6 years (estimate)	Industrial engineers, ILNA	Tier 2
Industrial units damaged — E. Azerbaijan	240 (32 direct strikes)	Provincial Industry Director	Tier 2
Industrial units damaged — Markazi	75 (10 direct strikes)	Provincial Economic Deputy	Tier 2
Industrial units damaged — Hamadan	14 destroyed + 8 repairable	Crisis Management Director	Tier 2
Energy repair cost	\$34–58 billion	Rystad Energy	Tier 2
Global oil supply disrupted (April 2026)	~13 million bbl/day	IEA (Biol)	Tier 1
Oil exports, March 2026	1.84–1.9M bbl/day (at or above pre-war trend)	Kpler / Vortexa	Tier 1
Oil exports, May 2026	209,000 bbl/day (Vortexa); ~260,000 bbl/day (Kpler) — 89% fall from March	Vortexa / Kpler	Tier 1
Loadings after blockade	~567,000 bbl/day; terminals operating	Kpler	Tier 2
Crude in floating storage	~147M barrels; ~67M stranded inside the Gulf	Kpler via Al Jazeera	Tier 1
Export revenue loss, April–May	~\$5.8–6 billion	Kpler via Al Jazeera	Tier 1
Petrochemical exports	Suspended April 16; no confirmed resumption	National Petrochemical Co.	Tier 2
Bushehr International Airport	Completely destroyed; rebuild from scratch	Govt spokesperson, July 28	Tier 2

Indicator	Figure	Source	Tier
Airports damaged	27 nationwide	Iran Airports & Air Navigation Co., Sept 7, 2026	Tier 2
Key infrastructure sites damaged	~15, incl. fuel storage, airports, civilian aircraft	Red Crescent (Kolivand), April 10	Tier 2
Commercial units damaged	23,500+	Red Crescent (Kolivand), April 10	Tier 2
Bridges / tunnels damaged	12 bridges, 2 tunnels	Ministry of Roads	Tier 2
Bandar Abbas railway station	Damaged	Govt spokesperson	Tier 2
Government employees killed on duty	350+ (Phase II)	Govt spokesperson, July 28	Tier 2
People displaced	3.2 million (60% women & children)	OCHA / UNHCR	Tier 1
Civilian deaths (Phase I)	1,030–2,362	Hengaw / HRANA / MoH-OCHA	Tier 1
Children killed	254–376	HRANA / MoH	Tier 1
Health centers attacked	210+	Deputy Health Minister	Tier 2
Hospitals out of service	6	Deputy Health Minister	Tier 2
Health workers killed / injured	24–26 / 116	OCHA Update 2 (companion vol.)	Tier 1
Baghaei children's cancer hospital (Ahvaz)	Inoperable; 200+ patients evacuated	Al Jazeera / Iravani letter	Tier 1
Desalination plant, Bonji (Jask)	Water cut to 20 villages, ~10,000 people; restored next day	Hormozgan Water & Wastewater Co. / IRNA	Tier 2
Wheat silos, Hoveizeh & Dasht-e Azadegan	Struck	Geneva letter / Al Jazeera	Tier 2
Bridge collapse — civilian vehicle	7 killed, 9 injured	Iravani letter, July 18	Tier 2
Darkhovin NPP (under construction)	Struck July 19; no radiological risk	AEOI / IAEA	Tier 1
Phase II deaths (renewed strikes)	50+ killed, 500+ injured	Health Ministry via UN experts	Tier 2
Medical facilities damaged	339; plus 20 Red Crescent centres	Red Crescent (Kolivand), April 10	Tier 2
Universities damaged	32	Red Crescent (Kolivand), April 10	Tier 2

Indicator	Figure	Source	Tier
Schools damaged or destroyed	1,288 (1,500 educational and non-educational spaces)	Red Crescent recorded 857 as of April 10 Schools Renovation Organization, May 2026; Red Crescent	Tier 2
Schools requiring fundamental reconstruction after direct hits	16	Same	Tier 2
Schools repaired and returned to service	1,018 (254 awaiting repair)	Same	Tier 2
Internet access	12% of pre-war level	WarCosts.org	Tier 2
Daily cost of internet shutdown	~£28 million/day	UK Parliament briefing	Tier 2
Taxis damaged in Tehran	93 vehicles	Official reports	Tier 2
Tourism facilities damaged / closed	66 damaged; ~30% closed	Travel Services HQ	Tier 2
Jobs directly lost	1 million+	Deputy Labor Minister	Tier 2
Total unemployed (incl. indirect)	2–4 million	Deputy Labor Minister / analysts	Tier 2
Food inflation (year-on-year)	105%; ~130% by May	Wikipedia / Statistics Center of Iran	Tier 2
Bread price (Tehran)	Doubled (June 23 subsidy removal)	RFE/RL	Tier 2
Population below poverty line (pre-war)	34 million (40%)	Official data	Tier 2
Total war damage (Iran, Phase I est.)	~\$270 billion	Govt spokesperson	Tier 2
Iran GDP forecast 2026	- 6%	IMF	Tier 1
Arab-state GDP loss (projected)	\$120–194 billion	UNDP	Tier 1
Environmental harm incidents (regional)	300+	CE OBS	Tier 2
Bushehr NPP expansion	Construction halted; Russian staff evacuating	Rosatom	Tier 1

Concluding Observations

This report opened with the legal standard: civilian infrastructure on which populations depend may not be lawfully destroyed absent a definite military advantage, and harm to civilians may not be excessive relative to that advantage. The evidence assembled here - including a civilian airport destroyed so completely it must be rebuilt from scratch; twelve bridges and two tunnels damaged; more than 210 health centers damaged or otherwise affected, disrupting medical services; more than 1,200 schools damaged or forced to suspend normal operations; food-supply chains disrupted in a wheat-importing nation; and steel and petrochemical facilities damaged or forced to curtail operations, affecting industries employing hundreds of thousands of civilian workers under strikes explicitly framed as targeting the adversary's "money machine" — presents a pattern in which economic infrastructure was treated as a target category in itself. The UN Secretary-General's judgment on such strikes was direct: they are unacceptable.

The consequences did not remain at the strike sites. They propagated through every system that connects a modern society: the closed port led to empty bread shelves; a bombing forced a petrochemical zone into idleness; the severed internet triggered mass unemployment affecting a million workers; the destroyed airport left a region cut off from itself. And they landed on human beings - the designer whose factory is failing, the pensioner whose monthly income has been sharply eroded by inflation and rising living costs, the doctor rationing antibiotics in Rasht, the woman who paid triple fare to flee a city under bombardment. Iran's people entered this war already impoverished, already traumatized by a lethal crackdown, already disconnected from the world. The war took much of what remained.

"In practice, the war destroyed the lives and livelihoods of ordinary citizens — people with little influence over the Islamic Republic's policies. Those supposedly meant to benefit from the war ended up bearing its heaviest human and economic costs."

— Hadi Kahalzadeh, welfare economist, Non-Resident Fellow, Quincy Institute | Responsible Statecraft, April 15, 2026⁵⁴

Recommendations

The evidence compiled in this report — corroborated across the International Energy Agency, UN agencies, satellite analysis, independent NGOs, and Iranian official data — documents the systematic destruction of the infrastructure on which Iranian civilian life depends. The following recommendations derive directly from the findings, and parallel those of this report's companion volume on civilian casualties and housing damage:

1. Cease strikes on civilian infrastructure and end the war. All parties should permanently end attacks on energy, transport, health, communications, and industrial facilities serving civilian needs, in accordance with the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution under international humanitarian law. As the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has stated, all parties are bound by their obligations "irrespective of the conduct of any other party."

2. Lift the blockade and restore connectivity. The maritime blockade of Iranian ports should be lifted, alongside sanctions relief as necessary to permit unimpeded delivery of food, medicine, fuel, and reconstruction materials. Restrictions on internet access should end: connectivity is itself civilian infrastructure, and its severance has deepened the economic crisis while obstructing evacuation warnings and independent documentation.

3. Fund reconstruction and reparation. States responsible for unlawful strikes should provide a reconstruction and reparation fund for the rebuilding of destroyed civilian infrastructure - Bushehr International Airport, the damaged bridges and tunnels, health centers, schools, and the industrial employment base - coordinated where possible through UN and Red

Crescent/Red Cross channels to ensure equitable distribution, and should provide compensation to the families of civilian victims, including the workers killed at their workplaces documented in this report. This is not a novel demand. The Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran, brokered by Pakistan and signed on June 14, 2026, committed the United States and regional partners to develop a reconstruction plan for Iran worth at least \$300 billion, commensurate with the approximately \$270 billion in damage Iran's government has estimated. That provision was never implemented: Iran exported \$6 billion in oil under the memorandum without receiving the \$12 billion in frozen assets it anticipated, and the agreement broke down as the parties returned to fighting. Any successor agreement should carry the reconstruction commitment forward with independent monitoring of its implementation, and reconstruction financing should not be made contingent on the political fortunes of a negotiating process.

The distributional risk is not hypothetical. In the education sector alone, the government's initial estimates allocated roughly 4,000 billion tomans for repairing damaged educational facilities and close to 1,000 billion for the schools destroyed outright by direct hits, but approximately 61 percent of rebuilt educational spaces were financed or executed through public donations and charitable networks. Districts with stronger donor networks were rebuilt first; remote districts waited. Reconstruction financing distributed through charitable capacity reproduces the inequality of that capacity, which is why the coordination requirement above matters in practice and not only in principle.⁵⁵

4. Investigate. An Independent international investigation should examine the specific incidents documented here - including the double-tap strike on the B1 bridge, the complete destruction of a civilian airport, the strike that rendered a children's cancer hospital inoperable, and attacks on desalination plants, wheat silos, and other life-sustaining utilities - for potential violations of the laws of war.

5. Keep counting. Monitoring and public reporting of infrastructure and economic damage should continue on an ongoing basis, reconciling official tallies with independently-verified data as access improves, so that the international community retains an accurate and defensible record of the war's full costs and appropriate accountability can be pursued.

Sources & Notes

This report draws on primary reporting, government data, and independent verification, and is designed to be read alongside its companion volume: NIAC Iran Unfiltered Special Edition, Civilian Casualties and Housing Damage in Iran, July 16, 2026 (niacouncil.org). Persian-language sources are cited by outlet and date. Principal sources:

1. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk, 'Civilians bear brunt of reckless war in the Middle East,' OHCHR press release, March 2026; related statements on attacks on civilian infrastructure in Iran, GCC countries and Jordan, March-June 2026 (OHCHR; UN News); United Nations, statements by the Secretary-General's spokesperson on attacks on civilian infrastructure in Iran and across the region, July 2026 (UN News).
2. UN Security Council, Resolution 2817 (2026) and meeting coverage, June 3, 2026 (press.un.org).
3. NIAC, Civilian Casualties and Housing Damage in Iran, Iran Unfiltered Special Edition, July 16, 2026.
4. Maryam Dehkordi, IranWire, "U.S. Strikes Iran's Southern Coast After Hormuz Attacks, Residents Say Civilian Livelihoods Destroyed," July 9, 2026 (Bandar Abbas, Bushehr and Mahshahr resident testimonies; Panj Peleh fishing pier losses; restrictions on independent photography at bombed sites).
5. Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, signed June 14, 2026; full text published by President Masoud Pezeshkian, June 18, 2026, via NPR.

6. +964 Media, 'Strike hits Iran's Abadan, igniting large fires visible from Basra,' March 2, 2026 (witness accounts and correspondent reporting on the Abadan refinery strike); Mohsen Paknejad, Iranian Oil Minister, remarks to Shana, September 4, 2026; Anadolu Agency/Bemama, September 5, 2026 (reconstruction of war-damaged oil and gas refining facilities); WarCosts.org, Iran destruction / cumulative war-damage tracker, 2026 (source of the report's 70 percent refining-capacity-offline estimate).
7. NIORDC notice on the air strike against the Lavan Island refinery, 2026 (Eghtesad Online); National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC), public notices Nos. 1 and following, March 2026 (ISNA; Eco Iran; Fararu), on fuel supply stability and missile strikes against fuel storage depots in Tehran and Alborz provinces on March 7, 2026; Persian Gulf Star Refinery (PGSOC): capacity, condensate feedstock pipeline from South Pars, and share of national gasoline output — company and Iranian energy-sector sources.
8. Mohsen Paknejad, Iranian Oil Minister, reconstruction update, September 2026 (IRNA; Tasnim, September 16, 2026, on reconstruction of four damaged gas refineries and Tehran liquid-fuel storage/loading facilities); The National, August 11, 2026, for the separately reported estimate that war damage reduced natural-gas production by approximately 95 million cubic metres per day.
9. International Energy Agency (IEA); Executive Director Fatih Birol remarks, April 2026 (including Atlantic Council transcript and contemporaneous reporting); Rystad Energy, repair-cost estimates for damaged Iranian energy infrastructure, 2026.
10. Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade / National Petrochemical Company measures suspending petrochemical and downstream-product exports until further notice to prioritize domestic supply, April 2026 (ILNA; Mehr; Tasnim, April 20, 2026).
11. Kpler, 'US blockade: Iran starts feeling the heat,' commodity-intelligence analysis, 2026; Homayoun Falakshahi, head of crude oil analysis.
12. Vortexa export estimates for March-May 2026, via Gulf News, 'Iran oil exports collapse: Down 89% as US blockade, sanctions pressure intensify,' June 5, 2026.
13. Al Jazeera, 'How the US naval blockade has bled Iran of nearly \$6bn in oil revenues,' June 5, 2026; and 'Is Iran's oil storage nearly full — and will it have to cut production?', April 29, 2026; Bloomberg, Iranian crude storage and forced production cuts, April 28, 2026, citing Kpler; Reuters via Asharq Al-Awsat, 'US Naval Blockade Squeezes Iran's Oil Exports, Forces Crude onto Floating Storage,' April 30, 2026; LSEG shipping data.
14. Mobarakeh Steel Company public statement, April 2, 2026; Bloomberg reporting.
15. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, video statement, April 3, 2026 (Al Arabiya; Euronews); Newsmax interview, March 30, 2026.
16. IranWire, "Extensive Damage Reported at Khuzestan Steel After U.S.-Israel Strikes," April 2, 2026 (Mehran Pakbin on damage to all modules and steelmaking furnaces and a six-to-twelve-month restart estimate); Argus Media, "Iranian steel plants damaged by air strikes," March 27, 2026; IRNA/Mehr contemporaneous reporting on 16 injuries from the March 27 strike.
17. CNN, reporting on Iranian industrial layoffs and unemployment insurance claims, April 28, 2026 (Mobarakeh and Khuzestan Steel denials of layoffs; Maral Sanat; Borujerd; dairy and petrochemical suspensions).
18. Hadi Kahalzadeh, 'Six weeks of war have pushed millions of Iranians into poverty,' Responsible Statecraft, April 16, 2026; and related 2026 analysis of Iran's social-protection system and labour-market exposure.
19. UN Development Programme, poverty-line assessments for Iran, 2026.
20. Deputy Labor Minister via ILNA; House of Labor; Donya-e Eqtesad / Iran Talent vacancy data; Jobvision, April 25, 2026.
21. Provincial damage assessments: East Azerbaijan Industry Director; Markazi Province Economic Deputy; Hamadan Crisis-Management Director (ILNA / IRNA, April-May 2026).
22. Sixth Tactical Air Base (Shahid Yasini Air Base), Bushehr: Iranian Air Force facility co-located with Bushehr International Airport; runway and site specifications from Iranian aviation sources. Government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani, July 28, 2026, on the destruction and required rebuilding of Bushehr airport and the aircraft destroyed there (Iranian government briefing as reported by IRNA/Entekhab and Iranian press); Tasnim, July 20, 2026, on reconstruction of the damaged passenger terminal; ILNA reporting quoting Iran Air management on the Airbus A319 destroyed at Bushehr.
23. Morteza Dehghan, managing director, Iran Airports and Air Navigation Company, press conference of September 7, 2026, on damage to 27 airports, reconstruction methods and restoration of aviation services (Tasnim; ISNA; Mehr; Tejarat News). Minister Farzaneh Sadegh, statement on damage to terminals, radars and control towers, August 2026 (SNN).
24. US Virtual Embassy for Iran, security alert of April 21, 2026 (departure advisory, exit-fee warning, dual-national passport requirement); European Union Aviation Safety Agency Conflict Zone Information Bulletins, 2026.
25. U.S. Department of the Treasury, 'Treasury Grounds Iranian Airlines with Sweeping Sanctions Action,' September 8, 2026; Reuters, September 18, 2026, on Turkey and Oman halting Mahan Air flights.
26. Ministry of Roads and Urban Development damage assessment; government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani, July 28, 2026, citing ministry figures of 12 damaged bridge spans and two tunnels and describing emergency detours and reconstruction (IRNA; Hamshahri; Iranian government briefing).
27. Letters of Iran's Permanent Representative to the UN, Amir Saeid Iravani, to the Secretary-General and Security Council: April 1, July 16, July 17-18, and July 20-21, 2026 (IRNA; Tasnim; Mehr; GlobalSecurity/Press TV).
28. The War Zone (TWZ), 'Key Iranian Bridge Severed By Airstrikes,' April 2, 2026; Fars News Agency; President Trump, Truth Social, April 2, 2026.
29. Deputy Governor of Bushehr province for political and security affairs, statement on the strike against the fishing pier at Banud village, Asaluyeh county, July 2026 (IMNA); Tasnim News Agency, report on US-Israeli strikes on fishing and passenger piers in Bushehr, March 22, 2026; Mehr News Agency, report on strikes against the Valfajr passenger pier and Jofreh fishing pier, March 2026.
30. Al Jazeera, 'What are civilian sites in international law and where have US, Iran hit?', July 20, 2026.

31. Deputy Health Minister Shahin Akhoondzadeh, remarks of April 15, 2026 (ISNA).
32. UN OCHA, Islamic Republic of Iran: Humanitarian Updates Nos. 2-3, April 2026; Iranian Red Crescent Society damage registration, April 2026, as cited by UN OCHA; Pir Hossein Kolivand, statement of April 10, 2026, via IRIB and Middle East Monitor.
33. Al Jazeera, "Iran condemns 'barbaric' US attack near children's cancer hospital," July 16, 2026; IranWire, "Ahvaz Children's Cancer Hospital Evacuated Following US Airstrikes," July 16, 2026; UN human rights experts/JURIST reporting on strikes near medical facilities during the resumed campaign.
34. Associated Press, reporting from Iran one month into the war, May 2026 (testimonies of a designer, an engineer, a physician, and an attorney).
35. Al Jazeera, reporting from Tehran, July 21, 2026 (pensioner testimony; electricity cuts).
36. Abdolhamid Hamzehpour, managing director, Hormozgan Water and Wastewater Company, statements on the July 18, 2026 strike against the Bonji desalination plant, destruction of the seawater intake pump station and transformer, interruption of water to 20 villages / roughly 10,000 residents, and emergency restoration (Tasnim, July 18; Sobhe Sahel, July 19; IRNA).
37. Sattar Hashemi, Iran's Minister of Information and Communications Technology, estimated that internet shutdowns caused approximately 5 trillion tomans (about \$35 million) in economic losses per day, 2026.
38. Tehran Chamber of Commerce and Iran ICT Federation estimates on internet-based businesses and employment; Beta Research Center data on Iranian Instagram-based businesses, including the share operated by women.
39. Ministry of Education officials reported that more than 12 million students used the Shad platform during wartime school closures; reporting on virtual education in state schools found that instruction on Shad was effectively limited to about two hours per day.
40. Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS), regional environmental incident tracking, 2026.
41. IRNA, "Oil Pollution Spreads to Qeshm Island's Mangrove Forests," August 12, 2026; citing Yousef Opera, head of Qeshm's Natural Resources and Watershed Management Office, on ongoing monitoring and cleanup efforts and noting that the precise source of the oil pollution had not yet been determined.
42. Rosatom statements on the Bushehr NPP construction halt and personnel evacuation, July 2026 (Reuters).
43. Middle East Eye and IAEA statements on the Darkhovin strike, July 19-20, 2026; IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi.
44. The New Humanitarian, displacement testimonies, March 2026; UNHCR border-crossing data; HRANA casualty documentation.
45. Letter of Iran's Permanent Representative to the UN Office at Geneva, Ali Bahraini, to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, July 16, 2026 (Press TV; Islam Times).
46. Remarks of Iran's Deputy Permanent Representative Gholamhossein Darzi, UN Security Council open debate, July 23, 2026 (Press TV).
47. Tasnim News Agency, citing Deputy Labor Minister Gholamhossein Mohammadi, reported preliminary estimates of more than one million jobs lost and two million people directly or indirectly unemployed; Alireza Mahjoub, Secretary General of the House of Labor, separately reported 130,000 direct job losses and 600,000 indirect job losses, April 2026.
48. Ministry of Cultural Heritage, Tourism and Handicrafts, tourism deputy: internal displacement and accommodation occupancy figures, February 28-April 14, 2026; ministry record of damaged tourism units by province; Travel Services Headquarters, deputy head: categories and count of tourism facilities sustaining physical damage, 2026 (ILNA).
49. Statistics Center of Iran, Consumer Price Index reports, February and May 2026. Food and beverage prices rose 105.5 percent year-on-year in February and 130.4 percent year-on-year in May.
50. BBC Persian, first-week price reporting, March 2026; Reuters, Grand Bazaar reporting, 2026; RFE/RL, bread-price doubling and flour-subsidy removal, June 23, 2026; street interviews on food costs, 2026.
51. Minimum teacher salary and minimum food basket estimates for Iran, 2026, as reported in Persian-language labour and economic press.
52. Eco Iran, damage to factories and business units, 2026; International Monetary Fund, Iran 2026 GDP projection; Goldman Sachs, US recession-probability note; UNDP Arab-states impact assessment, March 30, 2026.
53. United Nations Development Programme, Military Escalation in the Middle East: Economic and Social Implications for the Arab States Region, March 30–31, 2026; Bloomberg, "US Recession Risks Begin to Rise as War Dims Economic Outlook," March 25, 2026, reporting Goldman Sachs's 30 percent twelve-month recession probability and 4.6 percent year-end unemployment forecast.
54. Hadi Kahalzadeh, "6 Weeks of War Have Pushed Millions of Iranians Into Poverty," Responsible Statecraft, April 15, 2026.

55. Organization for Development, Renovation and Equipping of Schools, damage and repair figures, May 2026; government estimates of reconstruction costs for the education sector; Parliamentary Research Center of Iran, assessment of the Shad national school platform capacity and online instruction hours, 2026.

Note on poverty figures. This report cites three poverty measures that are not interchangeable, and readers should not aggregate or compare them directly.

The figure of 40 percent of the population below the absolute poverty line, given in the Introduction and Section 12.2, refers to the share of Iranians whose income fell below the threshold required for a minimum basket of essential goods, measured before the outbreak of hostilities in February 2026.

The figure of an additional 5 percent of the population pushed into poverty, given in Section 2.4, is Hadi Kahalzadeh's estimate of the incremental effect of the first six weeks of war — households newly crossing below the poverty line as a consequence of the conflict, not the total in poverty. It is stated alongside the UN Development Programme's finding that 3.5 to 4.1 million Iranians had already fallen below the poverty line by that point.

A broader figure of approximately 70 percent, also attributed to Kahalzadeh, uses a wider category — the poor together with those vulnerable to poverty, meaning households above the line but without the savings or assets to remain above it through a further shock. That measure reflects more than a decade of sanctions, currency depreciation and inflation, and is not a war-specific figure. This report does not use it.

Report originally compiled and formatted August 2026; updated September 20, 2026. This document synthesizes publicly reported figures from the sources listed above; figures are subject to revision as further verification and investigation proceed.