France, Germany and the United Kingdom (the E3) have cast their die: if Iran does not agree to a compromise on its nuclear program in little more than two weeks, they will move to trigger the return of six United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Iran at the end of August.
In an August 13 letter to the UN Secretary General and UN Security Council, the French, German and United Kingdom Foreign Ministers announced their intention to trigger “snapback” of six United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Iran if no compromise is forthcoming by the end of August, little more than two weeks away.
As we have written before (see our memo on snapback and op-ed in The American Conservative), this threat is highly unlikely to convince Iran to agree to new nuclear terms. However, it is highly likely to trigger significant retaliation from Iran, up to and including Iran’s withdrawal from The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Such a move could be treated as a pre-text by Israel for another attack. As a result, it is highly likely that a move to snapback UN sanctions triggers a renewed outbreak of war with Iran.
Still, the letter conveys some significant details regarding the European powers’ position and thinking, and is worth close examination.
An offer to extend the snapback deadline is on the table
The letter does offer Iran an extension of the snapback deadline, which could be construed as a positive. It states “the E3 have offered Iran a limited extension of the relevant provisions of UNSCR 2231, in exchange for Iran resuming negotiations and addressing some of the international community’s most immediate concerns regarding the transparency and extent of its nuclear programme. To date, the offer put forward by the E3 has remained unanswered by Iran.”
However, the extent of what the E3 is seeking will likely determine whether Iran seizes or passes on this offer. Critically, Iran, anticipating another attack by Israel, is very unlikely to agree to what the E3 likely seeks: putting the enriched uranium stockpile that survived the Israeli and American attacks back under international monitoring. There is an unstated catch to Iran doing so. As it stands, doubts around the location of this stockpile make another strike a more dicey proposition than if its location is confirmed. Absent some form of security guarantee, which the E3 can’t credibly offer by themselves, such a deal will likely remain out of reach. If, on the other hand, the E3 is seeking some sort of roadmap to cooperation with the IAEA and a broader deal at a later date, Iran might be willing to strike a deal and delay the possibility of snapback.
Given the risks of moving forward with snapback and the damage that the June strikes did to prospects for diplomacy, the E3 would be better served by extending the deadline for snapback regardless of Iran’s willingness to entertain any concessions in the coming two weeks.
The E3 seek to clearly establish their standing to trigger snapback
Given the failure of the Trump administration’s attempt to trigger snapback of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran from outside the agreement in the fall of 2020, the E3 letter details many of their respective efforts to comply with the JCPOA. This sets the stage for a coming procedural dispute on snapback. It is highly likely that Russia and China, who have been coordinating with Iran in recent months on the nuclear issue and the possibility of snapback, will seek to complicate if not outright block the attempt to trigger the return of the six prior UN Security Council Resolutions. By outlining their continued participation in the accord, the E3 put themselves in a favorable position to ensure that prior efforts to block snapback cannot be revisited.
Notably, the letter also includes a reference to the prior UN Security Council Resolutions’ attempt to prohibit future enrichment in Iran. It states “Despite unfounded claims to the contrary, the E3, as JCPoA participants, would be clearly and unambiguously legally justified in using relevant provisions of UNSCR 2231 (2015) to trigger UN snapback to reinstate UNSC resolutions against Iran which would prohibit enrichment and re-impose UN sanctions.” Iran has fiercely contested this call for zero enrichment since its adoption in 2006, and dropping the demand was vital to diplomatic progress between 2013 and 2015 that ultimately led to the JCPOA. The E3’s apparent reference to the clause seems to be an effort to influence Iran’s thinking, yet it could also augur a much more aggressive European position in the wake of snapback.
The E3 tout their commitment to diplomacy, yet largely ignore the consequences of the joint Israeli and American attack on Iran
The European powers highlight their apparent commitment to resolving the nuclear standoff with Iran through negotiations. Yet there is increasing room for Iran to doubt this is the case or that their security will be improved by engaging with the Europeans. With the most recent high-level engagement with the European powers occurring on July 25, making little progress a little over a month after the U.S. joined Israel’s attacks on Iran’s nuclear program, the issuance of this letter absent a more concerted diplomatic effort looks like the E3 is checking boxes on the road to snapback rather than seriously engaging in trying to find a solution that forestalls it and resolves their underlying concerns.
Adding to that impression are the few, passing mentions of the Israeli and American strikes in June. The letter states, by way of buttressing the E3’s position on snapback as a credible actor, “We did not participate in the planning or execution of any military action against Iran.” It also notes, in recounting prior nuclear steps by Iran beyond the limits of the accord, “While Iran’s nuclear programme has sustained significant damage, the fact of Iran’s continued nonperformance of its JCPoA commitments remains.”
This is a missed opportunity to present themselves as a more neutral arbiter, rather than an appendage of American foreign policy and its pressure campaign. The June strikes did not have the backing of the UN Security Council and were thus illegal under international law. Moreover, by any measure they highly complicated the path ahead for negotiations, rendering a new deal next to impossible in the near term. Yet the E3’s response to those strikes in June ranged from fairly muted to outright supportive. While France expressed “concern” and French President Emmanuel Macron described them as “illegal,” the United Kingdom’s Prime Minister Keir Starmer suggested the strikes helped “alleviate” the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, wildly, suggested that Israel was doing “dirty work…for all of us” in its strikes that left hundreds of Iranian civilians dead. Iran is highly unlikely to ignore this selective application of international law, which will drive their decisionmaking in the weeks to come and how they approach the snapback extension offer.
What’s driving European calculations?
Europe seems to be driven by two considerations: first, a belief that allowing snapback to expire and effectively removing Iran’s nuclear program from the UN Security Council agenda is not possible at this juncture. This reflects both an understanding of the increasing division in the UN Security Council, contra a decade before, as well as an apparent recognition that Iran’s nuclear program was not “obliterated.” Such considerations are understandable, even if they do not necessarily determine a responsible path forward.
Europe also may believe that snapback is leverage that must be used, and can be used effectively. Here, there is significant reason to doubt their assessment. The threat of an imminent attack from Israel is far more significant to Iran’s security calculations than the return of UN Security Council Resolutions that they weathered more than a decade ago, and are ultimately less impactful than American sanctions that have been in place since 2018. If Europe is asking for significant steps that Iran’s leaders believe would put them in a worse position in a renewed war with Israel (and potentially the U.S.), Europe is making an offer that Iran can only refuse.
That would put global security, and by extension European and American security, in a much worse position. Iran has pledged that it would respond to snapback by exiting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is a position it has held across multiple Iranian administrations. Sitting in Tehran, it would be increasingly difficult to argue the merits of staying in the treaty, particularly in the wake of attack by two nuclear-armed powers and when clauses of a defunct accord are being held over their head as leverage. The end result of snapback will be to make another outbreak of war much more likely. Is that something the Europeans want to help bring about? If not, they along with the U.S., will likely need to pivot from their march ahead on snapback.